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United States’ counterinsurgency activities in the Western Hemisphere provide a 
new lens with which to investigate Latin America’s Cold War experience. This 
dissertation contributes to the debate over the impact of American foreign policy in the 
region by reconstructing a key component of Washington’s strategy: the U. S. Army’s 
counterinsurgency training of South American military forces during the 1960s and 
1970s. Counterinsurgency casts a long shadow over U. S. foreign relations with Latin 
America but few authors explain what that doctrine entailed and how Washington sought 
to disseminate it among its regional allies.  
This dissertation contributes to the new Cold War literature on Latin America by 
using previously unpublished and declassified materials to demystify the term 
“counterinsurgency.” It examines American training of South American militaries and 
explains the doctrine and tactics the U.S. Army sought to transmit to its counterparts 
under the rubric of counterinsurgency. After reconstructing the U.S. Army’s institutional 
apparatus for teaching internal security, this dissertation investigates the impact of 
American counterinsurgency efforts. In doing so it seeks to solve an enduring enigma. If 
the regional hegemon, the United States, exported one consistent counterinsurgency 
 viii 
doctrine throughout the Western Hemisphere, why did South American countries 
experience such widely divergent internal security outcomes during the Cold War?  
A comparative analysis of six South American nations’ responses to American 
counterinsurgency yields new insights into Latin America’s Cold War experience. This 
dissertation argues that U.S. Army counterinsurgency training was more complex, 
nuanced and perishable than previously understood. Numerous obstacles impeded the 
U.S. Army’s ability to disseminate its training. Moreover, South American political and 
military leaders chose whether to accept or reject U.S. counterinsurgency. Washington 
did not dictate or decree its internal security training. Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia 
embraced American counterinsurgency and sought U.S. Army assistance in confronting 
internal insecurity. Brazil, Argentina, and Chile shunned the American “model.” Military 
regimes in those nations developed their own internal security doctrine and tactics and 
conducted “dirty wars” against their populations a result of their own choices, not 
because of their slight exposure to American counterinsurgency concepts.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The Cuban Revolution of 1959 sent shockwaves across the Western Hemisphere 
from Washington, D.C. in the north to Santiago and Buenos Aires in the south. Fidel 
Castro’s guerrilla army not only defeated the U.S.-backed Batista regime and seized the 
reins of government in Havana; it also fired the imagination of leftists throughout Latin 
America and beyond. After consolidating their revolution at home, Fidel Castro and his 
lieutenants sought to “export” their revolution to other Latin American countries in order 
to force long overdue social change and create regional allies.  Castro’s chief lieutenant 
and revolutionary theorist, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, published a manual on how to 
conduct revolution in 1960. Guerrilla Warfare quickly earned a wide audience in Latin 
America. Over the next two decades, Cuban efforts spawned or supported guerrilla 
movements in Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Nicaragua and 
Guatemala. Washington quickly moved to counter Havana’s efforts.  
Troubles in the Caribbean compounded the greater international Cold War 
challenges faced by the United States. As the 1960s began, insurgencies raged in multiple 
countries, guerrillas had toppled the government in Cuba and in 1961 Soviet Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed his nation’s support for “wars of national liberation.” The 
Cuban revolution weighed heavily on the minds of the new John F. Kennedy 
administration. In May 1961, the Department of Defense prepared a draft paper titled 
“U.S. Policy for the Security of Latin America in the Sixties.” “The Cuban experience 
makes it plain that the fall of additional Latin American nations to the Sino-Soviet Bloc 




establishment of a military foothold in Latin America by Bloc powers would pose a direct 
threat to security of the United States.” The paper concluded that although the Western 
Hemisphere military forces were prepared against an armed external attack (which it 
deemed unlikely), those forces had “an ineffective strategy and insufficient capability to 
guard against the most likely threat—the threat to internal security.” Finally, the 
document recommended encouraging Latin American nations to deemphasize the role of 
defense against external attack – the United States would assume primary responsibility 
for this mission – while emphasizing their role in the “internal security mission.”1 In 
October of 1961, the Department of State circulated a draft of another document entitled 
“Guidance for Policy and Operations in Latin America.” The State Department argued 
that Latin American militaries should accept internal security as their new role, 
participate in inter-American police or naval patrol forces, and form dual-purpose units 
with civic action as well as military capabilities. Kennedy approved the guidance in May 
1962, establishing the first step in the development of the United States’ 
counterinsurgency policy for Latin America.2  
 Additional guidance soon followed. In August President Kennedy formalized 
American policy in National Security Action Memorandum 182, which promulgated U.S. 
counterinsurgency doctrine and directed all government departments and agencies to 
“initiate the formulation of internal doctrine, tactics and techniques appropriate to their 
own department or agency” for conducting counterinsurgency.3 This classified directive 
                                               
1 Department of Defense, “Draft paper prepared in the Department of Defense,” Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1961-1963, Volume XII American Republics, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1996), 173-175.  
2 Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964 (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 227. 
3 Memorandum for Mr. Komer, “Subject: CI Effort in Washington,” dated 22 June 1965, National Security 
Files (hereafter NSF), Files of Robert W. Komer, Box 15, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, 




put the U.S. government to work implementing the administration’s new guidance for 
preventing revolutions. Kennedy unveiled his policy to the world in a speech in Miami, 
Florida on 18 November 1963, when he proclaimed that, “We in this hemisphere must 
also use every resource at our command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in 
this hemisphere.”4 Although Kennedy died just four days later, his words in Miami 
gained renown as the “No more Cubas” speech and helped cement United States regional 
policy for subsequent presidential administrations. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and 
Nixon each applied American power to prevent revolutions and check communist 
expansion in Latin America throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The United States applied 
its military power primarily through internal security training for Latin American armies, 
and the U.S. Army shouldered most of the load.  
United States’ counterinsurgency activities in Latin America provide a new lens 
with which to investigate Latin America’s Cold War experience. This dissertation 
contributes to the debate over the impact of American foreign policy in the region by 
reconstructing a key component of Washington’s strategy: the U. S. Army’s 
counterinsurgency training of South American military forces during the 1960s and 
1970s. Building on that base, this dissertation then undertakes to explore regional 
responses to American counterinsurgency and Cuba’s export of revolution. It also 
investigates the emergence and impact of home-grown internal security doctrines and 
French counter revolutionary war tactics. This dissertation rediscovers the power of Latin 
American agency and demonstrates the limits of American hegemony.  
                                               
4 John F. Kennedy, “Address in Miami before the Inter-American Press Association,” 18 November 1963. 





Historians have long remarked on the transformative effects that the Kennedy 
administration’s “shift to internal security” had on Latin American militaries. That shift 
was considerably less of a watershed than American policymakers and observers 
perceived at the time. Historians too have overemphasized its impact. A deeper 
understanding of the region’s history reveals that President Eisenhower’s “Hemispheric 
Defense” was much more of a foreign concept to Latin American military forces than 
internal security. The Viceroyalty of Peru confronted its first insurrection just a few short 
years after the conquest in 1543. Many other insurrections and rebellions in the Spanish 
Americas followed in the centuries before independence. The new nations of Latin 
America did not disregard internal security as a mission of their armed forces after 
independence, they merely added defense of their borders (based on fears of 
encroachment or domination by their neighbors) to the list of military duties. 
Washington’s encouragement of hemispheric military cooperation between historic rivals 
represented a transformational change for Latin American military forces. Defending 
their nations from internal threats did not. Regional forces were long accustomed to 
worrying about threats to the status quo emanating from within their own borders.5  
The Cuban revolution also contributed to the increased emphasis on internal 
security among Latin American militaries, albeit unintentionally. Military officers 
throughout the region clearly discerned the threat Guevara’s revolutionary guerrilla 
warfare model held for their institutions. Fidel Castro and his followers disbanded the 
Cuban Army shortly after their triumphant seizure of power in 1959. Fidel vehemently 
advocated that other revolutionaries adopt that policy as well.6 Yet for Latin American 
                                               
5 See for example, Miguel Angel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 61-66, 80, 90.  




military officers the revolutionary threat held even more menace than the dissolution of 
their institutions, it also put their very lives at risk. Guevara, acting under Castro’s orders, 
conducted tribunals after the revolution and executed hundreds of former Cuban Army 
officers.7 Moreover, Castro’s embrace of Communism tarred future revolutionary efforts 
in the region with the same brush, whether those movements were nationalistic or not. 
Guerrilla movements and revolutionary rhetoric also rekindled fears of Communism 
among some regional militaries, like the Brazilian Army, which had confronted and 
suppressed Communist movements in prior decades.  
Counterinsurgency casts a long shadow over U. S. foreign relations with Latin 
America but few authors explain what counterinsurgency entailed and how Washington 
sought to inculcate this doctrine among its regional Cold War allies. In support of 
counterinsurgency, the United States conducted civic action (nation building) under 
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress and trained Latin American militaries in 
counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine through U.S. Army schools and mobile training 
team missions (small teams of U.S. military experts instructing regional forces in their 
own countries). Washington also provided aid to regional armed forces under the Military 
Assistance Program. However, in much of the Latin American historiography of the Cold 
War, these three distinct efforts are often lumped together under the rubric of 
“counterinsurgency training.” Despite this indistinct factual foundation, some authors go 
on to blame American counterinsurgency policies and training for fostering military 
authoritarian rule and human rights violations in Latin America.8  
                                               
7 Rex A Hudson, ed., Cuba: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2001). 288.  
8 See for example: Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of 
the New Imperialism (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006); Clara Nieto, Masters of War; Latin 




The historiography of the Cold War in Latin Americas is replete with discussions 
of the ill-effects of U.S. counterinsurgency policies. Nevertheless, counterinsurgency is 
not well defined or well understood. In military parlance counter guerrilla, 
counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, civic action and subversive warfare are all 
distinct terms. Yet many authors apply these terms interchangeably. Military experts 
might debate the nuance of the terms. Their interpretations might vary slightly across 
countries, but for military professionals the terms were not fungible. U.S. officials and 
military officers defined counter guerrilla and counter bandit operations as activities 
undertaken by military, paramilitary and police forces against guerrillas or bandits (armed 
criminal groups operating in the countryside). In a sense these operations were remedial. 
The presence of an armed guerrilla threat necessitated an armed governmental response. 
Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, was a much broader concept. It comprised “those 
military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat subversive insurgency.”9 Counterinsurgency efforts could be 
remedial, if the country already faced an insurgency, or preemptive if the intent of the 
local government was to ameliorate the conditions in the country that made it susceptible 
to revolution. Civic action comprised military works or “nation building” activities such 
as constructing schools, clinics, and roads, or improving education, sanitation, agriculture 
or public health. Civic action could be a remedial component of ongoing 
counterinsurgency efforts or a preventative effort designed to inoculate a country from 
future outbreaks of insurgency by remedying the causes of public dissatisfaction.  
                                                                                                                                            
Seven Stories Press, 2003); Stephen C. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy 
Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1999); Donald C. Hodges, Argentina's "Dirty War:" an Intellectual Biography (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1991).  
9 Special Group (Counterinsurgency), “Glossary of Counterinsurgency Terms,” 17 May, 1962, Historical 




Just as the historiography lacks precision in the terms and concepts associated 
with counterinsurgency, it also lacks detail about the methods employed by the United 
States to assist its allies in developing their internal security capabilities. No detailed 
listing of what countries received counterinsurgency training and by what method 
(attendance at U.S. Army schools or participation in U.S. Army mobile training team 
instruction in the host country) currently exists. Likewise, few works describe or analyze 
the development and composition of American counterinsurgency doctrine.   
How the United States attempted to transmit its internal security doctrine and 
tactics to its Latin American allies has gone largely unexplored. One notable exception is 
Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning’s Internal Security and Military Power (1966). 
The authors provide an overview of U.S. counterinsurgency schools and a discussion of 
mobile training team missions. Although published during the counterinsurgency era in 
the 1960s, some modern Latin American historians still cite Internal Security. It stands as 
one of the few works detailing how the U.S. government promoted and implemented 
counterinsurgency in the region.10 Nevertheless, the work is long out of date and was 
incomplete when written. U.S. counterinsurgency efforts were ongoing at the time of 
publication and continued into the early 1970s and beyond. Moreover, the U.S. Army 
classified most of its records and correspondence detailing its counterinsurgency efforts 
due to the security concerns of the times, thus making them long unavailable to historians 
and political scientists.  
                                               
10 Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power; Counterinsurgency and 
Civic Action in Latin America (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1966); for authors citing 
Barber and Ronning’s  Internal Security and Military Power see for example: Brian Loveman, For la 
Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999); 
Stephen C Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist 
Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999); and Andrew 
J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 (Washington, 




Another notable exception is Andrew J. Birtle’s U.S. Army Counterinsurgency 
and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 (2006). Birtle charts the development, 
evolution and implementation of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine after World War 
II. He provides great detail about the Kennedy administration’s fixation on 
counterinsurgency. That emphasis created tremendous pressure for executive branch 
agencies, especially the Department of Defense, to develop new doctrine and tactics to 
meet the threat of guerrilla warfare. The work is rich in detail regarding U.S. Army 
counterinsurgency doctrine, almost all of which applies to the Latin American 
experience. Yet the book is thin on the Army’s effort to implement that doctrine in the 
region. The author – like many historians and the U.S. Army itself – spent most of his toil 
and effort on Vietnam. Birtle discusses the U.S Army intervention in the Dominican 
Republic in 1965 as a Cold War contingency operation. He also provides an overview of 
U.S. Army counterinsurgency schools as a means of disseminating its doctrine. However, 
Birtle only briefly mentions the army’s extensive mobile training team efforts and 
devotes a scant nine pages to the U.S. Army’s advisory experience in Latin America from 
1959 to 1979.11  
American military training provided to friendly governments’ security forces has 
often seemed confusing and shrouded in mystery for civilian researchers. “[F]oreign 
military training,” one researcher lamented, “is largely a black box offering the civilian 
scholar little opportunity to peek inside.”12 Because of that challenge – and the lack of 
documents due to security classification – many assessments of the impact of American 
military training rely on conjecture rather than factual analysis. “Amid the plethora of 
                                               
11 Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 291-304.  
12 Katherine McCoy, “Trained to Torture? The Human Rights Effects of Military Training at the School of 




condemnations of U.S. policy in Latin America,” another researcher judges, “perhaps no 
single issue has been as devoid of empirical analysis as the effects of military 
assistance.”13 The purpose of this research project is to pry open that black box and shine 
a bright light inside. It provides a new fact-based assessment of the impact and 
limitations of U.S. counterinsurgency training. 
This dissertation contributes to the new Cold War literature on Latin America by 
using previously unpublished and declassified materials to demystify the term 
“counterinsurgency training.” It also provides new insights into U.S. Army training of 
South American militaries. This dissertation explains the doctrine, tactics, techniques and 
procedures the U.S. Army attempted to transmit to its Latin American counterparts under 
the rubric of counterinsurgency. Additionally, it details what countries received 
counterinsurgency training and by what instructional method (U.S. Army schools in the 
United States or the Panama Canal Zone or via mobile training team missions to the host 
country).  
In implementing its foreign policy, the United States government relied heavily 
on the  U.S. Army to provide the doctrine and training to deter or defeat Cuban-inspired 
and supported insurgencies in the Western Hemisphere. Anti-communist governments in 
Latin America and U.S. policymakers naturally looked to the armies of the region to 
counter the revolutionary threat. Armies (and guerrillas) operated on the ground, where 
the people lived, not in the skies or on the waters. Armies also boasted the preponderance 
of military manpower in most countries and, at least in theory, were capable of operating 
in the rural terrain favored by insurgents. Latin American armies quickly assumed the 
                                               
13 David L. Feldman, “Argentina, 1945-1971: Military Assistance, Military Spending, and the Political 





leading role in resisting Cuban-inspired revolutions, and the U.S. Army took lead in 
training them.  
The foundation of this dissertation rests on sources seldom utilized by historians.  
Research conducted in the National Archives, the U.S. Army Heritage and Education 
Center, United States Army South, and the U.S. Army Center of Military History yielded 
a wealth of documents that helped define the focus of this research effort. I uncovered 
previously unpublished archival and declassified U.S. Army historical reports, unit 
records, correspondence, memorandums, and school catalogs detailing the planning, 
management, execution, and evaluation of counterinsurgency training. In addition, I 
utilized my position as an active duty military officer holding a security clearance to 
browse multiple boxes of classified materials at the National Archives and the U.S. Army 
Center of Military History. As a result, I submitted a large number of documents related 
to this research effort for Mandatory Review (the U.S. Government’s internal version of a 
Freedom of Information Act request) and potential declassification. Archival authorities 
approved several of those documents for release, and I have incorporated these new 
materials into my research. Together these disparate documents comprise a mosaic that 
allowed me to reconstruct a key element of American foreign policy in the Western 
Hemisphere during the Cold War: the U.S. Army’s institutional apparatus for 
disseminating counterinsurgency.  
The Army utilized multiple organizations and units to conduct its 
counterinsurgency mission in Latin America. First it relied on its schools. The U.S. Army 
Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina developed counterinsurgency, 
unconventional warfare and psychological warfare doctrines for the army. In January 




for American and allied personnel. That course soon grew into several counterinsurgency 
courses aimed at different audiences. Nevertheless, the central mission of the Special 
Warfare School remained the training of American Special Forces soldiers. In 1963, it 
added a secondary mission of training American military advisors for duty in Vietnam. 
Counterinsurgency instruction did not cease, but it fell to third place in the school’s 
priorities.  
The U.S. Army redoubled its counterinsurgency training efforts in late 1961 when 
it transplanted the Special Warfare School’s new curriculum to the Panama Canal Zone. 
The U.S. Army Caribbean School (later renamed the School of the Americas) took up the 
challenge of teaching counterinsurgency courses to Latin American personnel. It had an 
advantage over Fort Bragg because it conducted all of its courses in Spanish, but 
attendance was sparse. The Kennedy administration wanted a broader dissemination of its 
new antidote to counterinsurgency. Robert Kennedy, the President’s brother, visited the 
school in late 1962 and directed an increased emphasis on counterinsurgency. 
Immediately following his visit the school revamped its course catalog and expanded its 
internal security curriculum.   
Meanwhile, the Army reinforced its efforts to disseminate counterinsurgency 
through its schools system by creating a new unit capable of providing that instruction to 
Latin American forces in their home countries and in Spanish. The Army established the 
8th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Gulick, Panama in early 1963. It also 
assigned other specialized organizations such as military police and engineers to the new 
group to broaden its teaching capabilities. Together those units made up the Special 
Action Force for Latin America. The Army assigned its new Panama-based Green Berets 




(MTT) missions, although the unit also undertook civic action and conventional military 
skills instruction missions as well. The Special Action Force executed nearly six hundred 
MTTs across Latin America during its lifespan from 1962 to 1973. The United States 
Army Caribbean (later U.S. Army Forces Southern Command and U.S. Army South) and 
the U.S. Caribbean Command (later U.S. Southern Command), comprised the higher 
Army and Joint headquarters respectively of the Special Action Force for Latin America 
and the School of the Americas. Those organizations provided guidance, funding and 
oversight of regional counterinsurgency activities.  
The U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and U.S. Military 
Groups (MILGROUPs) throughout Latin America comprised the forward element of 
America’s military assistance and internal security training apparatus. These offices, 
manned by American military officers, operated as part of the United States’ overseas 
diplomatic missions in regional capital cities. They bore responsibility for the planning 
and evaluation of partner nation training and conducted direct liaison with regional 
armies. The correspondence and reports of these offices unveil a unique window into 
America’s military relations with its regional allies. They also chronicle the difficulties of 
imparting military training to foreign armies.  
This dissertation employs quantitative and comparative methodologies to make a 
unique contribution to the study of the Cold War. Archival research and quantitative 
analysis have yielded a detailed empirical record set for the Mobile Training Team 
missions of the U.S. Army’s Special Action Force for Latin America, detailing the 
courses taught, course content, training audience, country and dates of training. Where 
applicable data exists, I have also chronicled contemporary evaluations of the 




data set details the curriculum of the Special Warfare Center and the School of the 
Americas highlighting counterinsurgency course content, attendance by country, by year 
and an assessment of the benefits and detriments of this method of training. I also 
employed comparative analysis to contrast these data sets and determine how they varied 
by content, audience and effectiveness.  
Building on that new knowledge, this work then seeks to go further. I have woven 
this data together to construct a comparative analysis of six South American nations’ 
responses to American counterinsurgency. This investigation of the trajectory and scope 
of counterinsurgency training provided by the U.S. Army against selected countries’ 
historical progression through the 1960s and 1970s provides new insights into Latin 
America’s Cold War experience. In doing so it seeks to solve an enduring enigma. If the 
United States, the regional hegemon, exported one consistent counterinsurgency doctrine 
throughout the Western Hemisphere, why did South American countries experience such 
widely divergent internal security outcomes during the Cold War? 
This dissertation argues that U.S. Army counterinsurgency training was more 
complex, nuanced and perishable than currently depicted in the Cold War historical 
narrative. Numerous obstacles impeded the U.S. Army’s ability to disseminate internal 
security training. The first barrier was acceptance. Washington did not dictate or decree 
counterinsurgency training. Only when the United States and its allies agreed on the 
terms, duration, audience and subject matter did counterinsurgency training take place. 
Some regional governments embraced counterinsurgency training. Venezuela hosted 
fourteen counterinsurgency Mobile Training Team missions between 1962 and 1966. 
Others did not. Chile reluctantly accepted a counterinsurgency survey mission in 1963 (to 




training.14 Pride and nationalism also proved formidable barriers. “[T]here is a strong 
feeling among many influential [Chilean] officers,” American officers in Santiago 
reported to their superiors in Panama in 1962, “that they are perfectly capable of running 
their own army and do not need advice or assistance from the U.S. Army Mission.”15  
Many other factors outside the United States’ control also affected its ability to 
transmit internal security training to its regional partners. Some armies could not afford to 
send students abroad to attend American courses due to budget constraints. Political and 
economic crises disrupted planned military training in several regional countries. 
Conscription and illiteracy complicated training in almost every country. Student 
militants read revolutionary treatises by Che Guevara and Carlos Marighella and guerrilla 
leaders extolled and commanded their forces via communiques. Meanwhile, few of the 
poor rural conscripts that made up the bulk of regional armies could read even the 
simplest of military manuals. In some countries many indigenous recruits did not even 
speak Spanish. Conscription also caused a second dilemma. A one year term of service 
created what one American diplomat termed “a frustrating treadmill” of military training. 
Almost as soon as a regional army (or an American instructor team) trained a conscript 
soldier he left the service and a new untrained campesino took his place. To be effective, 
counterinsurgency units needed recurrent training to overcome the problems of personnel 
turnover due to conscription.  
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15 United States Army Mission to Chile, “U.S. Army Mission Program Report,” dated 17 July 1962, 
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In the majority of South American cases a country’s internal social and political 
context proved the decisive factor in whether it experienced democracy, revolution, or 
repression - not American counterinsurgency efforts. U.S. Army training did not foster 
military authoritarian regimes. Countries that eschewed American internal security 
training and developed their own methods (Brazil, Chile and Argentina) suffered ruthless 
military dictatorships while other countries that received much greater doses of U.S. 
counterinsurgency training (Colombia and Venezuela) did not suffer a “dirty war” and 
avoided military dictatorships.  
Attendance at U.S. counterinsurgency schools and American mobile training team 
activities provide a window into this phenomenon. Between 1961 and 1964 Chile sent 
fifteen students to attend counterinsurgency courses at U.S. Army schools. Over the same 
time period Venezuela sent ninety.  Venezuela led the hemisphere with fourteen 
counterinsurgency MTTs. Chile approved only two - neither of which taught tactics.16 
Venezuela eventually defeated its nearly decade-long Cuban-sponsored insurgency and 
retained its democratic government. Chile had no insurgency in the 1960s, but suffered 
increasingly bitter social polarization in the early 1970s. The Chilean military, led by 
General Augusto Pinochet, overthrew socialist President Salvador Allende in 1973 and 
murdered some 3,200 citizen while torturing tens of thousands more.  American 
counterinsurgency training helped Venezuelan forces defeat a communist-inspired 
insurgency, but it did not lead to the Chilean coup of 1973. In other words, U.S. Army 
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training assisted Venezuela’s democracy to survive while having little influence in the 
establishment of Chile’s military government.  
This disparity in countries’ experiences points to an often overlooked factor of 
Latin America’s Cold War: other internal security doctrines were at work in the region. 
Venezuela and Colombia adopted American counterinsurgency concepts. Other nations 
rejected Washington’s policies in favor of their own policies. Many authors have written 
about the National Security Doctrine in Latin America and most attribute it to the United 
States. That assessment is incorrect. The confusion stems in part from the similar 
objectives each doctrine pursued: internal security and economic development. However, 
each model advocated starkly different methods for achieving those goals.  
Understanding the framework of Washington’s internal security policy in Latin 
America helps to differentiate its purpose, objectives and methods. American 
counterinsurgency operated on two levels. Counterinsurgency doctrine, focused at the 
strategic level, represented a comprehensive national program intended to assist friendly 
democratic governments in resisting Communist subversion. Its purpose was to 
strengthen democracy, not replace it. The doctrine contained two central elements. 
Internal economic development sought to alleviate poverty and inequality as causes of 
discontent which made governments vulnerable to revolution. Meanwhile, internal 
security worked to protect local populations and weak governments from guerrilla 
movements, allowing time for economic growth to generate beneficial results. 
Counterinsurgency tactics, on the other hand, operated at the level of military operations 
aimed at locating, confronting, and defeating rural guerrillas through the development of 
elite counter guerrilla units. Military combat operations strove to protect the rural 




complimentary endeavor, sought to win the allegiance of the populace to the 
government’s side and away from supporting the guerrillas.  
The Andean Ridge countries of Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia each adopted 
American counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics. Washington’s concepts proved well 
suited for the situations these nations encountered. Each country faced rural insurgency 
during the 1960s. Each also experienced a popular rejection of violence and a return to 
democracy. These countries undertook military civic action efforts to gain the support of 
rural campesinos. They also raised specialized counter guerrilla battalions to confront the 
armed guerrilla threat. Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia embraced American internal 
security tenets and training because those concepts meshed well with each country’s 
situation and the goals of its elected leaders.  
The large nations of the Southern Cone - Brazil, Chile and Argentina -- 
encountered a remarkably different set of challenges in the 1960s and 1970s. Brazil and 
Argentina both faced several Cuban-supported rural insurgencies, but most were short-
lived. All three nations confronted the challenge of an elected Leftist president seeking 
radical social and political change. Each also endured the rise of urban terrorism. 
American counterinsurgency, with its focus on democracy and rural insurgency, proved a 
poor fit in the Southern Cone.   
Brazil’s generals, facing different problems, developed different solutions. They 
viewed democracy as weak and unsuited to withstand the challenge of Communism. 
Brazilian officers also considered civilian politicians as incapable of ensuring either 
internal security or economic development. In 1964 they replaced Brazilian democracy 
with an authoritarian regime based on the National Security Doctrine they had developed 




promised a remedy for both of Brazil’s intractable problems. It proposed state direction 
of Brazil’s economy to increase industrialization. It also advocated military dictatorship 
as a means to end political bickering, provide direction for the nation and impose internal 
security.  
Brazil faced a new threat in the late 1960s. Carlos Marighella, a lifelong 
Communist, recrafted Che Guevara’s rural foco strategy into an urban guerrilla warfare 
model based in the cities. Brazilian security forces also detected an active guerrilla foco 
in the remote Araguaia jungle region in 1972. Brazil’s generals responded to both of 
these threats by employing the counter revolutionary war tactics developed by the French 
Army during the “Battle of Algiers” in 1957. Those tactics included the development of 
specialized intelligence organizations employing torture and executions to break the 
guerrilla movements. Meanwhile, the regime’s economic policies generated a sustained 
period of impressive growth known as the “Brazilian Miracle.” The combination of 
internal security “success” and economic progress made the National Security Doctrine 
an appealing option for Brazil’s neighbors.  
Generals in Argentina were the first to emulate their Brazilian counterparts. 
General Juan Carlos Onganía overthrew a civilian president in 1966 and installed the 
“Argentine Revolution,” modeled on Brazil. Argentina’s challenge was how to end the 
cycle of recurrent political and economic crises stemming from the legacies of Peronism 
and the restlessness of the country’s large urban working class. The National Security 
Doctrine seemed to offer a solution. Onganía’s government restricted political 
competition, clamped down hard on students and workers, and implemented an economic 
program designed to impose stability. President Onganía and his generals sought to pre-




subversive activities and imprisoning Leftists and guerrillas. However, like in Brazil, the 
regime’s policies created increasing resentment, which led to the rise of urban terrorism 
and the armed insurgency that it sought to prevent.  
Chile avoided rural insurgency during the 1960s. However, the nation 
experienced an ongoing shift to the Left in its national politics across the decade. That 
phenomenon led to the election of Marxist Salvador Allende to the presidency in 1970. 
At first, Chile’s apolitical military acquiesced to Allende’s “Chilean Road to Socialism.”  
But as the economic and social crisis worsened in 1973, and threats to the military as an 
institution accumulated, the bonds of subordination to civilian rule frayed. Those bonds 
broke in September 1973. The Chilean military unleashed an assault that toppled 
Allende’s government and led to his death. Because of Chile’s history of effective 
democracy, military officers had perceived no need to develop their own doctrines for 
internal security or economic development. The day after the coup d’état Chilean 
generals found themselves in need of just such a blueprint for running the country. The 
National Security Doctrine was a ready alternative and General Augusto Pinochet – who 
became de facto leader shortly after the coup – implemented it in Chile.  
Pinochet, and his architect of repression Colonel Manuel Contreras, also adopted 
French counter revolutionary war tactics as they fought a self-declared internal war 
against Marxism. However, they adapted the Brazilian NSD model and French tactics to 
suit their national circumstances. Chile lacked the multiple large cities of Brazil so 
Contreras formed a single intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Directorate 
(DINA), with national and international reach. Pinochet and Contreras also greatly 
expanded the scope of whom they considered their enemies. Brazilian authorities had 




supporters and sympathizers in later campaigns. Chile had few armed guerrillas, but it did 
have large Socialist and Communist parties and an extensive number of Marxist 
supporters of the former government. Pinochet and Contreras deemed all of them a 
“Marxist cancer” that they attempted to eradicate by murder, torture and disappearances. 
Pinochet also modified Brazil’s economic policy. Rather than pursuing industrial 
development, Chilean economists implemented neoliberal reforms that led to de-
industrialization and punished the urban working class.  
Argentina was embroiled in a near civil war by the mid-1970s. The country faced 
unchecked urban terrorism, a new outbreak of rural insurgency, and yet another economic 
crisis. General Jorge Videla seized power in March 1976 and installed the most ruthless 
National Security Doctrine regime in the Southern Cone. Videla and his accomplices 
unleashed brutal French counter revolutionary war tactics on their enemies – whom they 
declared “non-Argentines” – as part of their internal war. Videla took lessons from 
Onganía’s 1966 failure; he rejected the legal methods of his predecessor and took no 
prisoners who might later enjoy amnesty at the hands of sympathetic politicians. Videla 
also learned from the human rights outcry against the Brazilian and Chilean military 
regimes. Rather than develop officially recognized special intelligence units, he 
decentralized the repression and sought to obscure any official responsibility for the 
internal “dirty war” his regime conducted. Videla’s economist, José Martínez de Hoz, 
also implemented neoliberal policies. But even more so than his Chilean colleagues, he 
attempted to use the economy as a weapon to break the power of Peronism and the 
working class in Argentina.  
Local agency played a decisive role in the Latin America’s Cold War. Generals in 




variants of the National Security Doctrine. Each country’s history and internal situation 
shaped the way they implemented the NSD and the tactics they employed. The internal 
security experiences of their neighbors also influenced these armies’ policies. The tenets 
of American counterinsurgency, which focused on rural threats, made little impression on 
military officers of the Southern Cone. Washington’s internal security concepts also 
seemed discredited in the aftermath of Vietnam. Southern Cone armies attended few 
American internal security courses, accepted only a small number of Special Action 
Force counterinsurgency mobile training team visits, and eschewed internal security 
assistance from Washington. Military regimes in Brazil, Chile and Argentina determined 
the internal security doctrines they implemented during the Cold War. Those armies 
chose the National Security Doctrine and French counter revolutionary war tactics. That 
combination led to the “dirty wars” those nations endured. American counterinsurgency 
did not.   
Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia embraced Washington’s internal security 
doctrine and tactics. Each successfully defeated rural guerrilla insurgencies on the 1960s. 
However, despite all accepting the same U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and training 
(albeit in varying degrees), each nation developed and applied American doctrine in its 
own way and each experienced its own unique outcome. Colombia and Venezuela 
consolidated lasting democracies with their military forces subordinated to civilian rule. 
Bolivia failed to establish an enduring democracy. The country experienced military 
coups d’état before, during, and after the 1960s. Nevertheless, none of these Andean 





PART I: THE INSTITUTIONS OF U. S. ARMY 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Chapter Two: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Schools in the United 
States 
World events in the late 1950s drove U.S. policymakers to develop the means to 
respond to the challenge of Communist inspired insurgencies. President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s early concerns centered on Chinese Communist efforts in Laos and 
Vietnam, not Latin America. The U.S. Army responded to these policies. While Fidel 
Castro’s bearded guerrillas were still skirmishing against the Cuban army in the Sierra 
Maestra Mountains, the United States had already deployed Army Special Forces 
advisors to Vietnam. In January 1959, Fidel’s guerrilla army routed the Cuban 
government forces and seized power. Later that same year the United States deployed 
Special Forces troops to Laos (in civilian clothes to disguise their nationality and military 
affiliation) and began advising and training the Laotian armed forces.17 Even as late as 
mid-1960 it seemed as though the United States might reach an accommodation with the 
new leftist–but not yet Communist–Cuban regime.  
Those prospects dimmed with the Army’s receipt and translation of Ernesto 
“Che” Guevara’s treatise on revolution, La Guerra de Guerrillas. Army Intelligence 
received a copy of Guerrilla Warfare sometime in mid-1960 and ordered its immediate 
translation into English. Lieutenant Colonel Warren, one Army intelligence officer 
assigned to analyze the book, wrote that Guerrilla Warfare “offers nothing new in the 
field of guerrilla warfare tactics and techniques.” However, he hastened to add that the 
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book “actually constitutes a typical and well tested Communist blueprint for the seizure 
of power. In short, it is a formula for revolution.” Warren also observed that “Che” 
Guevara “appears to have assumed or been given the task of exporting the Castro 
revolution throughout the hemisphere.” In support of that effort “wide use is being made 
by Cuban agents of the Guevara book.” 18 Warren closed his summary and analysis with 
a blunt warning: 
The Cuban Revolution has become a symbol for discontented and 
disaffected elements in other Latin American countries, who by example 
can now expect to achieve success in their own revolutionary enterprises. 
Herein lies the danger of Guevara’s book. It is also a brazen warning of 
Communist intentions and possibly capabilities to foment revolutions in 
the Western Hemisphere. As such, it should compel attention to actions 
necessary to forestall and counter Communist inspired or directed 
insurgencies or revolutions.19 
Army Intelligence disseminated the translation and warning to all Army commands in 
November 1960. As Castro and Guevara sought to promote revolution in the Americas, 
U.S. policymakers and Army instructors laid plans to dispense an antidote: 
counterinsurgency training. 
However, developing doctrine and publishing manuals did not result in men and 
units capable of implementing the Army’s new counterinsurgency guidance. For that 
purpose the Army needed schools. The Army had long employed its extensive systems of 
general and technical schools to disseminate doctrine and convert theory into a capability 
for action. By the 1960s, the Army had perfected its method. It imparted doctrine through 
a combination of formal class room instruction, hands on training, and exercises. The 
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Army decided against creating separate counter-guerrilla and counterinsurgency schools. 
Instead, it added these subjects to the curriculum of its existing educational institutions. 
Over time, counterinsurgency spread across many of these schools and a multitude of 
courses eventually addressed the subject, from executive courses for general officers to 
basic training for new recruits.20  
The Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the School of the 
Americas in the Panama Canal Zone trained the majority of Latin American military 
personnel receiving classroom instruction in the doctrine and tactics of counterinsurgency 
from the U.S. Army. Each of these schools developed and maintained its own curriculum. 
Each took a slightly different approach in their instruction and each had its own benefits 
and limitations. Nevertheless, the story of U.S. Army counterinsurgency training begins 
at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg. An analysis of this institution reveals what 
the school taught under the rubric of “counterinsurgency” and the demographics of who 
received its training.  Although Cuba actively sought to create revolution in multiple 
Latin American nations during the early 1960s, instructing Western Hemisphere forces in 
counterinsurgency never became the Special Warfare School’s primary focus. Training 
U.S. Army personnel remained its central mission.  
THE ORIGINS OF U.S. ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY INSTRUCTION 
Before the Army could teach its first counterinsurgency course, it first needed to 
assign that function to one of its subordinate commands. In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. 
Continental Army Command (USCONARC), headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia, 
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held responsibility for all Army units, training schools and installations in the United 
States. The Pentagon alerted the Commanding General of USCONARC of the 
forthcoming requirement to establish a counter-guerrilla warfare operations course in 
October 1960. This message from Army Headquarters directed that the purpose of the 
course would be “to provide working knowledge to selected United States and foreign 
officers in the nature and conduct of counter resistance operations and to provide a 
general knowledge of the various aspects of non-military programs to cope with 
resistance and insurgency.”21 Historians have long recognized John F. Kennedy’s 
fascination with counterinsurgency.  His administration (1961-1963) made 
counterinsurgency a key element of U.S. foreign policy. However, this Pentagon 
memorandum (and the deployment of Special Forces advisors to Laos and Vietnam) 
demonstrates that Army efforts to counter emerging insurgencies predated Kennedy. The 
1960 directive also established the curriculum for the new counter-guerrilla warfare 
course. It mandated “integrated instruction in psychological warfare, intelligence, counter 
intelligence and civil affairs operations.” This detailed guidance dictated four courses per 
year lasting six weeks each and set the class size at 100 “of which approximately 70% 
will be foreign students.”22 Army Headquarters made no mention of a location for the 
new course in its first message.  
The Army leadership soon corrected their oversight. A second message in late 
October directed the Continental Army Command to establish the course at the U.S. 
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Army Special Warfare Center located on Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This second 
message also set the target date for the first course to commence not later than 1 February 
1961.23 The Continental Army Command and the Special Warfare Center met the 
ambitious timeline set by Army leaders. The “Counter Guerrilla Operations Course” 
commenced instruction on 27 January 1961.24 The Army’s first ever course of instruction 
on the topic of counterinsurgency began with four American and thirty-five foreign 
students. The second course commenced in May with seventy-eight students, of which 
sixty-five were foreigners.25 The Special Warfare School, the Special Warfare Center’s 
educational arm, conducted these and subsequent courses in English and foreign students 
from around the world attended alongside their U.S. counterparts. Four American officers 
from the U.S. Army Caribbean School, located on Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone, 
attended the first course. After graduating, these officers returned to Panama and began 
planning and preparations to establish a similar course of their own.26  
Many policymakers in the early 1960s were unfamiliar with the military 
terminology related to special warfare. In an apparent effort to prevent misunderstandings 
and avoid confusion, Kennedy’s Special Group (Counter Insurgency), the high-level 
policy committee guiding the administration’s efforts to thwart Communist subversion, 
developed and promulgated a glossary of counterinsurgency terms in 1962. The Special 
Group (CI) defined counter-guerrilla warfare as “[o]perations and activities conducted by 
armed forces, paramilitary forces, or non-military agencies of a government against 
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guerrillas.” Subversion denoted “[a]ction designed to undermine the military, economic, 
psychological, moral or political strength of a regime.” 27 
The Special Warfare Center’s own publications provided the best source for 
definitions of special warfare terms as employed in the 1960s. In its 1964 brochure, the 
Center defined special warfare as “the application of three related activities carried out by 
specially trained military men capable of realizing their nation’s objectives in cold, 
limited or general war.”28 The Center’s precise definition of these “three related 
activities” warrants quoting in their entirety.  
Counterinsurgency Operations include all military, political, economic, 
psychological, and sociological actions taken by or in conjunction with a 
legal government to prevent or, if necessary eliminate subversive 
insurgency. Subversive insurgency (wars of liberation) has received 
increased emphasis by the Communists as a primary course of action to 
extend communist control. Military operations in counterinsurgency must 
maintain or restore internal order so that the other elements of the 
counterinsurgency program can achieve their goals. Comprehensive 
counterinsurgency plans are required to integrate and coordinate the use of 
all military and non-military resources in the three programs of counter 
guerrilla operations, environmental improvement, and population and 
resources control.  
Psychological Operations include psychological warfare and encompasses 
those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned and 
conducted to create in enemy, neutral or friendly foreign groups the 
emotions, attitudes or behavior to support the achievement of national 
objectives.  
Unconventional Warfare includes guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, 
and subversion against hostile states. Unconventional warfare operations 
are conducted within enemy or enemy controlled territory by 
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predominantly indigenous personnel usually supported and directed in 
varying degrees by an external agency.29  
Although counterinsurgency concepts and doctrine evolved slightly throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, the definitions of the terms remained relatively static.  
The selection of the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg for the site of the 
Army’s first counterinsurgency course was not happenstance. By1961, the Center’s 
experience with special warfare already spanned a decade. The roots of the Special 
Warfare Center germinated in the Army General School at Fort Riley, Kansas. In 1950, 
the General School established a Psychological Warfare Division “to develop 
psychological operations as a specialized area of military instruction.”30 The Army 
transferred the Psychological Warfare School to Fort Bragg in 1952 and renamed it the 
Psychological Warfare Center. The Center also incorporated the existing psychological 
warfare elements at Fort Bragg, and the Army established its new Special Forces units 
there that same year.31 The organization changed names again in 1956. It became the 
Special Warfare Center and assumed responsibilities for developing doctrine in addition 
to training soldiers for Special Forces and psychological warfare assignments. By 1961, 
the Center’s Special Warfare School included trained instructors and doctrine writers 
well versed in unconventional warfare and psychological operations and familiar with the 
related disciplines of counter-guerrilla and counterinsurgency operations. It made sense 
to add counterinsurgency doctrine and training to the Center’s mandate.  
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The new administration of John F. Kennedy sought to regain the initiative in the 
fight against global Communism.32 Yet the battleground in this fight spanned the globe, 
not just the Western Hemisphere. Events soon taught the young president that declaring a 
policy was much simpler than implementing it.   
Kennedy’s first attempt to roll back the tide of Communism occurred in Cuba, 
just months after he took office. The plan to overthrow Fidel Castro using Cuban exiles 
trained and equipped by the United States failed spectacularly. The botched Bay of Pigs 
invasion in April 1961 embarrassed the new president and damaged the nation’s prestige. 
Still stinging from the setback, Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at 
conference in Vienna that summer. The conference did not go well for Kennedy. As he 
left the meeting, his thoughts again turned to regaining the initiative against Communism.  
But he chose to do so in Southeast Asia, not Latin America. After the meeting with 
Khrushchev Kennedy told an aide, “Now we have a problem in making our power 
credible, and Vietnam is the place.”33 Nevertheless, events in Cuba continued to test the 
young president.  
Kennedy prevailed in the next confrontation in the Americas, forcing Khrushchev 
to back down during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. But taking the nation to 
brink of nuclear war with the Soviet Union left Kennedy (and the American public) 
shaken; it was not something anyone wanted to see repeated. Afterwards, Kennedy 
preferred to confront Communism with counterinsurgency, a non-nuclear, less dangerous 
option. “We in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent 
the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere,” Kennedy announced in Miami on 
                                               





18 November 1963, just four days before his assassination.34 “For if there is one principle 
which has run through the long history of this hemisphere it is our common determination 
to prevent the rule of foreign systems or nations in the Americas.”35 “No more Cubas” 
became the guiding U.S. regional policy for his own and subsequent presidential 
administrations. Yet throughout his term of office, Kennedy also grappled with a growing 
insurgency in Vietnam. He sought to contain that threat by dispatching an ever increasing 
number of U.S. military advisors.  
In the Americas, Kennedy relied on counterinsurgency training to strengthen 
regional armies for internal security and the Alliance for Progress to ease the discontent 
that engendered insurgency. Kennedy supported both efforts when he expanded Special 
Forces strength from 1,800 in January1961 to some 8,000 by January 1963.36 In 
implementing Kennedy’s policies, the Army organized its Special Forces soldiers into 
regionally-focused Special Forces Groups, and assigned one of them to Latin America.37 
The U.S. Army’s Special Warfare School was critical to these efforts. It trained the 
Army’s Special Forces troops and taught allied officers the theory and tactics of 
counterinsurgency.  
 The Special Warfare School adapted its organizational structure and course 
offerings to meet the evolving Communist threat, a new policy emphasis on 
counterinsurgency, and a rapidly expanding number of students. In 1962, the Special 
Warfare School organized its academic elements into three departments: psychological 
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operations, unconventional warfare, and counter-guerrilla operations. The six-week 
Counter Guerrilla Course focused its efforts on American and allied officers “with an 
actual or anticipated requirement for a knowledge of counter guerrilla operations.”38 The 
Psychological Operations Course “initiated” students into “all aspects” of propaganda. It 
emphasized intelligence and target and propaganda analysis. Instruction focused on 
“techniques and employment of propaganda as elements of mass communications.” The 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) Course covered the U.S. Army’s organization for UW as 
well as its specialized UW units and their missions. Particular attention was devoted to 
Special Forces Operational Detachments, the twelve-man “A Teams,” consisting of two 
officers and ten men each. The Special Warfare Center’s 1962 brochure explained that 
these detachments “organize indigenous resistance forces and coordinate with the 
military plans and objectives of the theater commander.”39  
As part of its efforts to adapt to an era of rapid change, the Continental Army 
Command conducted a full review of its special warfare activities from late 1961 and into 
early 1962.40 One of the primary areas of the study was “the adequacy of the training 
base for special warfare,” which naturally centered on the Special Warfare School.41 In 
reviewing the school’s “facilities, instruction, funds, and courses,” the review board 
determined that, “[m]any of the deficiencies in these areas resulted from the spectacular 
increase in enrollment at the School.” The number of students had grown from 300 to 
over 1,200 in the space of one year, “and this high level was expected to continue in the 
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future,” the report’s authors noted. The Army responded to the board’s findings. It 
approved additional faculty, allocated funds for new construction, and revamped the 
curriculum.42   
The Special Warfare School had implemented most of the changes directed by its 
higher headquarters by early 1963. It reorganized its academic departments into four 
sections: counterinsurgency, psychological operations, unconventional warfare, and non-
resident instruction.43 The evolution from counter-guerrilla to counterinsurgency 
(reflected in the title of both the academic department and its courses) mirrored the 
Army’s doctrinal evolution as it expanded its focus from the narrow, purely military 
aspects of countering armed guerrillas to a broader study of the political, economic and 
social aspects of countering insurgent movements. 
During this period the Counterinsurgency Operations Course grew from six to 
eight weeks. The course now aligned more closely with the Special Forces Officer and 
Psychological Operations Courses, which likewise lasted eight weeks. Instructors also 
rearranged the focus of the counterinsurgency course and expanded its scope. The earlier 
emphasis on executing counter-guerrilla operations receded as the course encompassed 
the much broader challenge of countering an insurgency. The Center’s 1962 brochure 
described the counter-guerrilla course in detail: 
The purpose of the course is to train U.S. and allied officers in the nature 
and conduct of counter guerrilla operations and to acquaint them with the 
various aspects of non-military programs to cope with resistance and 
insurgency. The scope of the course includes a comprehensive study of 
guerrilla type movements to include analysis of causative factors 
underlying those movements, and the doctrinal principles, theories, and 
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techniques applicable to military actions in countering or nullifying the 
development and spread of insurgency.44 
The sequencing of issues provides an insight into the state of the doctrine in 1962 and the 
relative emphasis on the various subjects covered. The core purpose of the early course 
was to train students in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations while only acquainting 
them with non-military issues. The causative factors underlying an insurgency, and 
military actions related to countering it appears only in the last sentence.  
By 1963 an expanded focus and a shift in emphasis became evident. The précis of 
the new counterinsurgency course explained that, “[T]his specialized course directs major 
emphasis toward the causative factors underlying insurgency and includes the 
development of doctrine, tactics and techniques applicable of military operations as part 
of civic action aimed at preventing and coping with such movements.”45 The Center now 
placed examining the causative factors of insurgency first in the course description while 
reducing the emphasis on military operations and linking them to a larger civic action 
effort. The précis also included a summary of the program of instruction which further 
illustrates the change in priorities from solely military action against guerrillas to an 
overall government effort designed to solve the causes of an insurgency as well as to 
thwart its adherents. The Center now listed counter-guerrilla tactics last on its list of topic 
areas. 46 This revision of the curriculum made counterinsurgency training applicable to far 
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wider audience. No longer was the course just for those armies confronting an armed 
guerrilla threat; now it offered a recipe for the prevention of future insurgency.  
However, the 1963 and 1964 counterinsurgency course descriptions also 
cautioned their potential students. The 1963 course précis included a caveat stressing that 
the host nations carried the burden of any counterinsurgency effort–not the U.S. military. 
“The course emphasizes self-help techniques on the part of host countries,” the Center’s 
cadre wrote, “and does not envision the large-scale employment of U.S. forces in direct 
support of foreign national programs.” 47 Although the provision and scope of U.S. 
military support to any foreign nation remained a policy decision, it is interesting that the 
Special Warfare Center chose to emphasize this point. It reflected Lieutenant Colonel 
Russell Volckman’s earlier writing in Army Field Manual 31-20 Operations Against 
Guerilla Forces (February 1951) when the 1964 brochure warned “that suppressive 
action alone will not eliminate an insurgent movement. Rather, any program for 
countering an insurgency must be coupled with positive efforts to remove the basic 
causes of discontent and to facilitate social and economic progress through peaceful 
means. Finally, the absolute necessity for popular support is shown.”48 Volckmann 
himself stressed this point. “The best solution to prevent, minimize and combat guerilla 
warfare,” he wrote in 1951, was “political, administrative, economic, and military 
policies, intelligently conceived, wisely executed, and supported by appropriate 
propaganda, [that] will minimize the possibility of a massive resistance movement.”49 
These passages convey one of the enduring themes of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine: 
repression alone could not prevent or remedy an insurgency. Only a holistic government 
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program combining political, social, economic and military efforts could achieve long-
term success. Pundits later reduced this concept to the oversimplified cliché “winning 
hearts and minds.”   
The School’s broadened curriculum now offered American and allied students 
comprehensive courses in each of the three special warfare disciplines. The Psychological 
Operations Course gave students a “basic understanding of the principles of propaganda 
and of the behavioral patterns of individuals and national groups.” Trainees learned how 
to use propaganda, plan psychological operations and received instruction on the “use of 
all communications media” to disseminate their messages.50 The Special Forces Officer 
Course remained focused on unconventional warfare. Instructors taught “the concepts 
and principles of guerrilla warfare and the techniques of Special Forces operations in 
cold, limited or general war, with study in the application of these principles and 
techniques in counterinsurgency and psychological operations.”51  
The Special Warfare School also added other courses in 1963. The Senior Officer 
Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare Orientation Course was a one-week executive 
seminar open only to American personnel. The Center’s 1964 brochure explained that the 
course provided “general officers, selected senior commissioned officers of the Armed 
Forces, and high grade civilian personnel of the United States Government” with 
“knowledge of the latest doctrine and concepts of special warfare with emphasis on 
counterinsurgency operations.”52 Compounding its workload, the Center also taught two 
four-week Military Assistance Training Advisor courses, one for officers and one for 
enlisted personnel. Although burdened with the unfortunate acronym “MATA” – which 
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means “to kill” in Spanish -- these courses were restricted to Americans. They trained 
U.S. military members detailed for duty with the Military Assistance Command – 
Vietnam in the skills needed to serve as military advisors and included Vietnamese 
language training. Almost 2,000 personnel graduated from MATA courses in 1963 alone, 
50 percent of the total Special Warfare School graduates for that year.53 Therefore as 
early as 1963, the U.S. Army’s growing commitment in Southeast Asia had begun 
exerting a strong pull on resources and manpower. That pull increased dramatically 
throughout the 1960s. The School now offered a robust curriculum including a one-week 
executive overview, a four-week integrated special warfare and counterinsurgency 
common course, and eight-week specialized courses in each of the three special warfare 
disciplines. But who took these courses?  
STUDENT ATTENDANCE AT THE SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL  
An analysis of attendance at the Special Warfare School in the early 1960s yields 
some surprising insights. First, the Army’s initial single counterinsurgency course had 
now grown to three courses. The school also added two U.S. military advisor courses 
with heavy counterinsurgency content. But the Center was far from achieving the Army’s 
mandate of seventy percent foreign-to-U.S. student ratio for counterinsurgency courses. 
Approximately 570 foreign students attended the Special Warfare Center in 1963 and 
some 400 of them took counterinsurgency courses.54 In contrast, 1,030 U.S. students 
attended counterinsurgency courses in 1963, yielding only a twenty-eight percent foreign 
student attendance rate. Between 1961 and 1963, 1,135 Allied students attended the 
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Special Warfare School.55 Perhaps surprisingly, only 112 of those students hailed from 
Latin America and the Caribbean, representing slightly fewer than ten percent of 
international attendees (see Table 2.1).56  
Table 2.1: Special Warfare School Attendance 1961-1963.  
 
Among Allied students the four-week Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare 
Staff Officer Course appears to have been the most popular. Approximately two-hundred 
and eighty foreign officers graduated from this course in 1963 (attendance data for other 
years is not available). Another one hundred twenty-five or so international officers 
graduated from the eight-week Counterinsurgency Course that same year (see Table 
2.2).57  
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Table 2.2: Special Warfare Center Foreign Student Course Attendance 1963. 
 
Looking deeper here also highlights the Army’s growing preoccupation with 
Southeast Asia. Just four countries, Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan, sent 
some 560 students over this time period–five times as many graduates as the fifteen 
participating nations of Latin America combined.58 Argentina and Bolivia sent the 
highest number of students within Latin America, but these figures represent all Special 
Warfare School courses, not just counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, The Special Warfare 
School’s raison d’être remained the training of U.S. Army soldiers for its Special Forces 
and Psychological Operations formations. Training U.S. advisors for duty in Southeast 
Asia became its second priority. Training foreign students in counterinsurgency and 
unconventional warfare was a tertiary responsibility.  
In late 1965, the Special Warfare Center conducted a second detailed appraisal of 
its counterinsurgency training. The report provides unique insights into the Special 
Warfare School’s doctrine, faculty, and student instruction during the mid-1960s. The 
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Center conducted this counterinsurgency training assessment to meet the requirements of 
a presidentially directed interagency review undertaken by Committee II (Training). 
Major General William R. Peers, U.S. Army, chaired the committee, which included 
senior executives from the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. 
Agency for International Development, U.S. Information Agency and senior officers of 
the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.59 The report considered four main subject areas 
of counterinsurgency training of interest to the committee: doctrine, training of U.S. 
personnel, training of foreign personnel, and career development of Psychological 
Operations officers. The Counterinsurgency Training Review began by reiterating the 
school’s mission to conduct resident and non-resident instruction of psychological 
warfare, unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations for U.S. military, U.S. 
government and foreign personnel. The report then listed the school’s 24 functions, the 
first being to “Initiate, revise, and develop doctrinal techniques, organizations, 
procedures, tactics and techniques related to: a. psychological operations, b. Special 
Forces units, and c. counterinsurgency operations.” 60  
The Counterinsurgency Training Review’s first section entailed a thorough 
assessment of doctrine. After finding the current precepts for counterinsurgency 
adequate, the report further observed that these principles were subject to continual 
evaluation and revision. The review emphasized the school’s focus on “doctrine 
immediately applicable to military activities.” Yet the report’s authors also noted that, 
“[c]ounterinsurgency activities…embrace the responsibilities of several agencies of the 
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[U.S.] Government.”61 A later passage identified the lack of published inter-agency or 
policy guidance for non-military activities related to counterinsurgency such as 
“population and resource control.” The faculty struggled with how to include these non-
military aspects of counterinsurgency. To overcome the lack of existing doctrine they 
“devised concepts upon which to base instruction.” Despite frustrations over the lack of 
published doctrine, the faculty’s ability to conduct interagency coordination appears to 
have been good. “Direct contact is maintained with the State Department, Agency for 
International Development, U.S. Information Agency and the Central Intelligence 
Agency through their representatives who are attached to the [Special Warfare Center],” 
the review noted.62 Nonetheless, this section of the report highlighted the fact that it was 
much easier to write and lecture about the need for a coordinated government program 
incorporating “all political, social, economic and military actions” than it was to achieve 
it.63 Some Latin American armies later overcame the challenge of coordinating 
counterinsurgency efforts across governmental departments by seizing power themselves 
and subordinating civil functions to military control.  
The Special Warfare School’s faculty received detailed consideration in the 
training review. In 1965, the school’s forty-nine instructors included sixteen members 
who had undertaken graduate level study at civilian universities and seventeen graduates 
of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Thirty boasted operational 
counterinsurgency experience, “primarily in Laos and Vietnam.”64 But all was not well 
regarding the school’s workforce. “[A]n acute shortage of personnel,” the review noted, 
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“has on several occasions resulted in less than adequate training during Special Forces 
counterinsurgency field training exercises.”65 The Army authorized the school a staff and 
faculty of 436 officers and enlisted members, but the school counted only 287 personnel 
assigned as of October 8, 1965. Operating with 149 fewer people than its authorization 
caused serious problems. “This acute shortage places a particularly heavy burden on 
assigned personnel,” the review stated, “and adversely affects instruction in 
counterinsurgency.”66 The report also cited the increasing burden of supporting the 
previously mentioned Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) program (two four-
week courses preparing U.S. forces for service in Vietnam) as an additional source of 
strain on its personnel. In 1960 only 900 U.S. military advisors served in Vietnam. In 
1961 Kennedy tripled the number to nearly 3,000. By 1963, that number had soared to 
some 16,000.67 The school’s understrength faculty struggled to train them all. 
Administrators determined the need for an additional 109 personnel to support the 
increased workload for the MATA program. The Army approved an increase of only 84 
positions.68  It is not known if Committee II was able to help remedy the personnel 
shortages at the Special Warfare School, yet training did continue.  
CHALLENGES RELATED TO FOREIGN MILITARY EDUCATION  
Latin American students faced numerous challenges in attending the Special 
Warfare School. Foremost among them was the necessity for fluency in English 
(speaking, reading and writing).69 The school’s language requirement would have 
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precluded many Latin American officers from attending, especially those from the 
smaller nations. Unless a particular officer had a true mastery of English, it is probable 
that at least some of the nuanced meanings of the unfamiliar terms and concepts imparted 
during counterinsurgency training were lost. Although foreign students almost certainly 
struggled during the first years of counterinsurgency training, by 1965 the school had 
addressed many of these challenges. For example, although the U.S. military mission in 
each country was responsible for ensuring foreign students passed a comprehensive basic 
English test, the 1965 training review observed that the school also offered “simultaneous 
interpretation in French and Spanish for all resident instruction received by foreign 
officers.” “Most all Portuguese speaking officers also use the Spanish translation,” the 
report noted. 70  
The Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg expended great effort to ease the 
challenges faced by foreign students. The school’s Foreign Liaison Division had 
implemented a two-week introductory course for foreign officers in 1965 “designed to 
prepare the foreign student to better assimilate subsequent instruction at the School.” The 
training review explained that the program “stresses special warfare terminology” but 
went on to note that, “the preparatory course [also] includes an orientation on American 
democratic principles and the American way of life, customs and mores.”71 The school 
reinforced its language training and translation efforts with a robust sponsorship program. 
American officers assigned each foreign student not one, but four sponsors. An official 
military sponsor “assists the foreign officer on arrival in settling down at Fort Bragg and 
provides hospitality.” The faculty advisor “monitors the academic progress of the foreign 
                                               





student and assists when necessary.” “A volunteer from the local community,” serves as a 
civilian sponsor, and “entertains the foreign officer in the civilian environment.” Lastly, 
each foreign student also found himself assigned an in-class U.S. student sponsor, “who 
is seated next to the foreign officer in class and assists with academic matters and 
classroom activities.”72 Although well intentioned, such heavy attention must have 
overwhelmed many international students. On the other hand, it may have made them 
feel special.  
The school’s global focus presented another academic challenge for Latin 
American attendees. The preponderance of international students from other regions 
precluded a focus solely on Latin America. Given the disproportionate number of 
students from Southeast Asia and the U.S. Army’s growing commitment in that region, it 
is plausible to expect that much of the curriculum focused on the unique social, political 
and economic complexities of Southeast Asia – and the counterinsurgency lessons drawn 
from that area -- not Latin America. Although Western Hemisphere security remained a 
vital national interest of the United States, few if any Army instructors at the Special 
Warfare School would have had personal counterinsurgency experience in the region. 
Instead, as mentioned above, the school relied on the operational experience of its 
instructors who acquired their counterinsurgency knowledge “primarily in Laos and 
Vietnam.”73 Reading a translation of “Che” Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare may have given 
these instructors insights into Latin America, but they probably relied on their own 
personal experiences gained in Southeast Asia.  
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BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING  
Some historians have erroneously equated U.S. training with an unquestioning 
acceptance and eager implementation by Latin American militaries. In fact, imparting 
U.S. doctrine and techniques to regional armies faced numerous obstacles. Only in the 
rare case when their army’s most senior leadership fully embraced counterinsurgency and 
wholeheartedly supported their efforts to spread their new knowledge would these junior 
or mid-grade officers have experienced a general acceptance of the new doctrine. In most 
cases, it is much more probable that they faced widespread resistance to any efforts to 
introduce their newly acquired “foreign doctrine.” Latin American armies are proud and 
nationalistic institutions, but they are also very resistant to change – especially if an 
outside force directed that change.74 Chile provides an example. “Within the Chilean 
Army, there is resistance in many areas to changes in training methods and procedures,” 
U.S. Army Mission officers wrote to their headquarters in 1962. Chilean Army 
“[t]raining methods and procedures are prescribed by regulations which must be followed 
and cannot be altered or changed without specific authority. This is often very frustrating 
to [Chilean] officers returning to Chile from schools in Panama and the U.S.”75  
Whatever the level of cultural resistance experienced by counterinsurgency course 
graduates in attempting to impart their training to their fellow soldiers, the impact of 
sending students to counterinsurgency courses would have been unique to that army. 
“Latin American officers accepted training, weapons, equipment, and other resources to 
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wage their own wars against subversion,” Brian Loveman concludes. “Even with U.S. 
training, ideological indoctrination, and new equipment, the Latin American armed forces 
retained their national idiosyncrasies and their own versions of patriotism.”76 Nations 
facing extant or nascent insurgency likely proved more receptive to adopting external 
doctrine and receiving foreign training and assistance. For armies not fighting an 
insurgency, the natural tendency of all large bureaucracies to resist change likely held 
sway. But in every case, the impact of counterinsurgency training would have been 
dependent on a process of distillation in which that army accepted, rejected or modified 
the concepts, doctrine and tactics espoused by the United States. Each army’s values, 
culture and unique national circumstance affected this process.  
 The U.S. Army faced numerous challenges in seeking to impart 
counterinsurgency training to regional armies. The historical record of how 
counterinsurgency students applied their new skills (if they put them to use at all) upon 
their return home is an obscure one. Nevertheless, U.S. Army missions, liaison and 
advisory offices in the host nation, submitted reports to the Army Caribbean Command in 
1962 and 1963 offering a glimpse of how regional armies employed returning students. 
These records also highlight the wide variety of issues and circumstances that affected 
counterinsurgency (and other military) training and support. These reports also reveal a 
high level of cultural misunderstandings.  
Venezuela embraced U.S. counterinsurgency training to a far greater degree than 
other regional armies, but acceptance of U.S. training did not always ensure the 
productive utilization of U.S. trained personnel upon their return. For example, the Army 
Mission in Venezuela noted in its 1963 semi-annual report that of twenty officers 
                                               




returning from Army schools in the continental United States, four were assigned as 
instructors, four were assigned to the General Staff (Venezuelan Army headquarters) and 
eight were assigned to military units. Another four recently returned officers were still 
awaiting assignment.77 Employment of returning students as instructors would, in most 
cases, represent an ideal utilization of U.S. training. The assumption being that they 
would be in a position to impart their knowledge to fellow soldiers through the courses 
they taught. Assignment to army headquarters to serve on the General Staff also 
represented a potential opportunity for that officer to apply his new skills and enhance the 
capability and knowledge of the host nation army through planning and or decision 
making. Assignment to a tactical unit, while very prestigious, would likely not have been 
an ideal utilization of counterinsurgency training unless the host nation army assigned 
them to units with counterinsurgency or counter-guerrilla missions. Unfortunately the 
available reporting does not distinguish the courses undertaken or link course attendance 
to subsequent assignments. However, the Army Mission in Venezuela report for July 
through December 1963 noted an improvement. Five officers returned from U.S Army 
schools in the United States. Two of them received instructor assignments while the 
remaining three assumed new duties on the General Staff. Yet the same report also 
lamented the “failure to aggressively execute training programs.”78 These records are for 
limited time periods and therefore incomplete. But they do yield insights into the inherent 
difficulties of imparting military training from one national army to another. Other 
examples follow.  
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Chile and Brazil presented the Army with different challenges. American efforts 
to impart counterinsurgency training to these forces ran into obstacles of pride and 
nationalism. The U.S. Army element of the Joint Brazil-United States Military 
Commission reported to the Caribbean Command in January 1963 that the Brazilian 
Army declined to send its soldiers to U.S. Army military intelligence courses in the Canal 
Zone during the preceding three-month reporting period.79 What was the rationale? 
“These courses have been repeatedly offered to the Brazilian Army,” the American Army 
officers wrote, “[b]ut have been turned down based on the host country evaluation that 
local training parallels or exceeds training offered at the [U.S. Army Caribbean School] 
course.”80 The same report cited two Brazilian students returning from the Special 
Warfare School at Fort Bragg. One attended the Special Warfare Officer Course, while 
the other attended the Psychological Operations Course. Both officers received 
assignment to the Directorate of Military Education, presumably an excellent utilization 
of their training. However, these two officers represented the only Brazilian students to 
attend Special Warfare School courses between 1961 and 1963. Neither took a 
counterinsurgency course.81 Despite this fact, the October to December 1962 U.S. Army 
mission report noted that, “there has been a marked increase in training in 
counterinsurgency matters extending from troop information through field exercises.”82 If 
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and training dominated Latin American armies during 
the Cold War, how did the Brazilian Army conduct its own counterinsurgency training 
largely absent of U.S. support? The Brazilian Army relied on its own resources.  
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U.S. officers noted that the Brazilian Army had developed its own “all-inclusive 
term for counterinsurgency” – “Contra-Revolucionario.”83 After developing its own 
concepts and doctrine, the Brazilian Army conducted its own counter-revolutionary 
training: 
All MAP [U.S. Military Assistance Program] units, and infantry, engineer 
and cavalry units not on frontier locations conducted small unit and larger 
unit…exercises [in the] “Contra-Revolucionario” role. Troop information 
[training] on insurgency and Communism conducted in all formations. 
General Staff College conducted additional 150-hour seminar. General 
Staff conducted 50-hour orientation course for 150 senior field grade and 
general officers. …[The]1963-64 [Brazilian Army] Training Directive 
requires from 100 to 200 mandatory hours [of counter-revolutionary 
training] and that all tactical training be oriented to include this element of 
training.84 
Thus as early as the latter months of 1962, the Brazilian Army boasted robust 
counterinsurgency training for individuals (from privates through senior officers) and 
units (from small units through large formations). While American officers could claim 
that, “95% of training references being used for the calendar 1963-64 school and troop 
training programs are those of the U.S. Army, or [the] Brazilian Army based on those of 
the U.S. Army,” a closer reading of this report reveals that counterinsurgency was one of 
the exceptions.85 Among their major accomplishments of the period October to 
December 1962, U.S. Army officers in Brazil listed the following events: 
Groups of Schools Units (MAP supported) conducted a combined arms 
exercise of 5 days’ duration which included utilization of close air support, 
aerial resupply, [and] defense of rear areas against guerrilla operations. 
This was preceded by a 4-day exercise in which officer-students of the 
Career Branch schools manned the staff and command of units up through 
battalion level. This exercise involved the reduction of elements of an 
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insurrection army, counter-guerrilla clean-up and restoration of [the] 
properly constituted government.86 
Therefore, at a time when the U.S. Army Special Warfare School’s curriculum offered 
only a narrowly focused counter-guerrilla course, the Brazilian Army not only trained for 
but also successfully conducted complex exercises and plans to “first, prevent 
insurrection; second; put down insurrection; and third, restore and rehabilitate the 
[affected] area.”87 Brazil did not need American counterinsurgency doctrine. By late 
1962 the Brazilian Army was in fact several steps ahead of the U.S. Army in the 
development and application of its holistic “Contra-Revolucionario” concepts and 
doctrine.  
The same January 1963 report from Brazil also mentioned that spaces in U.S. 
Army military intelligence courses were “placed in lower priority in [the] Brazilian Army 
Training budget in favor of maintenance training requirements.”88 Maintenance training 
in the United States made sense, especially for U.S. provided or purchased military 
equipment. However, this passage also demonstrates that the Brazilian Army based its 
acceptance and prioritization of U.S. training on its own internal assessment of 
requirements, not on external U.S. advice.  
American Army officers in Chile apparently faced even more overt resistance to 
U.S. counterinsurgency initiatives. The Army mission in Chile noted in their January to 
June 1962 Mission Program Report to the Caribbean Command that, 
There is a strong feeling among many influential officers of the Chilean 
Army that they are perfectly capable of running their own Army and do 
not need advice or assistance from the U.S. Army Mission. The Mission is 
seldom consulted or their assistance requested on any matter of 
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importance. This places the mission in the position of almost 
[strikethrough in original text] always being the aggressor in seeking 
improvements. Many times these unsolicited mission approaches or 
recommendations are ignored. This imposes a very definite restriction on 
how much pushing can be done without alienating the Chilean officers 
against the mission and destroying any possibility of obtaining results.89 
Beyond nationalism and independence, the U.S. Army mission’s October 1962 report 
provided additional explanations for the Chilean Army’s reticence. The Army mission 
report began by advising its headquarters they had “failed to secure Chilean Army 
approval for a Counter-Insurgency Survey Team” visit. Survey missions assessed the 
training level of local forces and coordinated future training.90 The mission then notified 
its headquarters that the counterinsurgency training course planned for January 1963 had 
been cancelled. In explaining these setbacks the American Army officers wrote: 
[I]n addition to budgetary problems which strongly influenced these 
decisions, political considerations also played a part. There is no 
insurgency threat in Chile; however, there is a legal Communist Party 
here. All government agencies carefully consider their actions in this 
context to avoid providing [a] propaganda opening for the Communist 
Party. The Army, too, feels it must proceed careful [sic] for even the name 
Counter-Insurgency is subject to misinterpretation and distortion.91 
Two Chilean Army officers did graduate from the U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth during this reporting period, but this course contained 
little or no counterinsurgency content.92 In another blow to U.S. internal security efforts, 
the Chilean Army declined two counterinsurgency course spaces at the Special Warfare 
School for 1963.  
                                               
89 USARMIS to Chile, “U.S. Army Mission Program Report,” dated 17 July 1962, NAAFC. 
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid. 




U.S. officers had to content themselves with the one course the Chilean Army 
accepted; a “Commando Course” taught by a two-man Mobile Training Team from 
Panama. This two-month course taught Ranger type skills (likely focusing on light 
infantry tactics such as patrolling, ambush and counter ambush, marksmanship 
techniques, field craft, dismounted navigation, etc…). U.S. officers only managed to 
inject four hours of counterinsurgency training into the two-month course. “Concepts of 
Guerrilla Warfare” consumed two hours, while “Conduct of units against Irregular 
Forces” accounted for the other two hours of instruction. In a rare bit of positive news, 
the U.S. Army mission proudly reported that Captain Raúl Martínez, a Chilean Army 
graduate of the counterinsurgency course at Fort Bragg, was “scheduled to present the 
instruction.”93  
In its final report for 1962, the U.S. Army mission hailed the Commando Course 
as “an outstanding success” and lauded the efforts of the three American trainers, an 
Army captain and sergeant from the Canal Zone and an Army captain assigned to the 
U.S. mission in Chile. The report cited a second Commando Course planned for April 
1963 and declared the American trainers’ intention to increase counterinsurgency content 
from four hours (during the first course) to three days. In closing, the U.S. officers again 
mentioned Captain Raúl Martínez, informing their headquarters that he “has prepared a 
two hour class on Counter-Insurgency warfare and it is anticipated that he will present 
this class to various elements of the Chilean Army.”94 It is not known if Captain Martínez 
succeeded in efforts to disseminate his U.S. acquired counterinsurgency knowledge, but 
the American officers’ efforts continued into 1963.  
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Other armies that desired U.S. counterinsurgency training faced external 
obstacles. Economic difficulties may not have been as persistent an impediment as 
nationalism and independence, but they were just as effective at blocking training. In July 
1962, the Army Mission in Colombia cited the “insufficiency of dollars to enable 
Colombia to send an adequate number of officers to U.S. CONUS [Continental United 
States] and overseas schools” as number three of the four “Obstacles and Problems” 
facing the mission.95 The problem had worsened by January 1963 when the Army 
Mission reported that, “The recent devaluation of the peso together with an increasing 
uncertainty as to the adequacy of income to meet budget requirements has resulted in the 
suspension of all but a handful of U.S. school quotas.”96 Nevertheless, the same report 
cited six officers and four non-commissioned officers as having returned from U.S. 
schools and claimed that the “effectiveness of utilization continues at about 90%.”97 The 
Army mission at least partially mitigated the budgetary problems through an increase in 
mobile training teams which required no additional funding on the part of the 
Colombians. By mid-1963 Colombia’s budget crisis had eased. The July 1963 report 
made no mention of funding issues but did document seven officers and four non-
commissioned officers who returned from U.S. schools during the reporting period and 
claimed a 100% effectiveness of utilization.98  
The smaller armies of the region were not the only ones that faced budgetary 
problems. The Army Mission in Brazil noted in its April 1963 report that U.S. Army 
schools slots in Panama and the United States “were cancelled by the [Brazilian] 
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government as an economy measure.”99 The same report also noted other budgetary 
impacts on the Brazilian Army. The “[r]eduction of draftee time to 8 months [from the 
standard 12 months] during calendar year 1963 by Presidential determination, as an 
economy measure,” American officers noted, “will reduce the level of training attained 
and the period in which units will have adequately trained strength to deal with internal 
security matters.”100 The Army Mission to Bolivia also faced financial challenges. In 
their June 1962 report, American officers informed Caribbean Command that, “no 
appreciable obstacles were encountered except the inability of the [Bolivian] government 
to support economically all schools quotas made available [by the United States].”101  
The curious reader may wonder why host nation financial troubles would impact 
training courses funded by the United States. It is a good question. In most cases, the U.S. 
government paid all costs associated with transportation, meals, and lodging for foreign 
students, as well as the cost of the course. During the 1960s the U.S. government also 
paid Canal Zone students $1.50 per diem for incidental expenses, while students 
attending schools in the United States received $6 per day.102 Nevertheless, most Latin 
American countries were (and still are) legally bound to pay a fixed per diem to military 
officers when out of the country. The national legislatures set the requirement and 
amounts paid. Military commanders could not issue exemptions or modify the amounts 
paid. The daily amounts varied by county, but all became burdensome when multiplied 
by a large number of students or for courses of long duration. For example, a U.S. Army 
War College researcher in 1966 documented that “an Argentine officer receives $30.00 
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per day when out-of-country.”103 Adjusted for inflation, that amount equated to more 
than $200 in 2013 dollars.104 An eight-week counterinsurgency course at the Special 
Warfare School at Fort Bragg would therefore generate approximately $1,600 in host 
nation costs in 1966 dollars ($11,865 today). Sending an officer to the forty-week Basic 
Officer (Cadet) Course or Command and General Staff (senior officer) Course in the 
Canal Zone would incur an expense of more than $8,000 for the host nation (equivalent 
to a charge of $57,678 in today’s dollars). This would support just one student. Per diem 
obligations could easily become a serious obstacle to some armies’ ability to send 
students to foreign schools, even for courses ostensibly “fully funded” by the United 
States.   
Determining the utilization of students once they returned to Bolivia also proved a 
challenge. Between January and June 1962, three Bolivian officers completed schools in 
the United States while thirty-two officers and twenty-six enlisted men graduated from 
Canal Zone schools. The U.S. Army mission could not track the follow-on duties of the 
students, explaining that the “assignments of these graduates are not readily available as 
no detailed personnel records are maintained in [Bolivian] Army Headquarters.” As if 
imparting counterinsurgency training was not challenge enough, the report went on to 
note that “[p]lanned actions by the [U.S. Army mission] should rectify this deficiency in 
the near future.”105 In January 1963, the Army mission reported that three Bolivian 
officers completed counterinsurgency training in Panama. It also noted the cancellation of 
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fifteen spaces for other Canal Zone courses in the second half of 1963 “because of 
economic conditions.”106  
Peru was different. The U.S. Army Mission in Lima faced political rather than 
financial obstacles to promoting American counterinsurgency training for Peruvian 
military personnel. In its October 1962 report, the mission documented sixteen students 
returning from schools in the United States.107 However, all of the students received 
conventional military skills instruction (Infantry, Engineer, Signal, Armor, Finance, 
Supply and Hospital Administration, to name a few). No officers received instruction at 
the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg during this reporting period. Another eighteen 
students returned from U.S. courses in the Panama Canal Zone, including four officers 
who attended the Counterinsurgency Operations course. Two others attended the 
Counterinsurgency Orientation course. Nevertheless, the report also advised U.S. Army 
leaders in Panama that the counterinsurgency Mobile Training Team course planned to 
commence in April had been suspended due to the Peruvian presidential elections 
scheduled for June.108 Overall, things seemed to be going well.  
Then a crisis struck. The Army Mission in Peru suffered a major disruption to 
their counterinsurgency (and other military) training programs in July 1962. American 
officers in Lima explained to their commanders in Panama that,  
As a result of the military coup d’état in July 1962 and assumption of 
power by a Military Junta there was a break in diplomatic relations 
between the U.S. government and the government of Peru. A month after 
the military coup, the U.S. recognized and established relations with the 
Military Junta but did not resume Military Aid. Accordingly the FY 
[Fiscal Year] 62 MAP [Military Assistance Program] Training Program 
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was suspended. Students already in school in CONUS [Continental United 
States] and Panama continued in school.109  
During the period July to September 1962, two Peruvian officers attended the 
Counterinsurgency Operations course, nine attended the Counterinsurgency Orientation 
course, and another five graduated from other U.S. courses in Panama. Seven officers 
attended courses in the United States, but again none received instruction at the Special 
Warfare School at Fort Bragg.110 The break in relations and the suspension of military 
assistance also impeded planned training in Peru. After mentioning the disruption in 
training due to the break in U.S. military funding, the Army mission explained that,  
A secondary factor that affected progress was the additional duty 
commitments undertaken by all levels of the Peruvian Military Forces in 
reorganizing and administering the Government of Peru. Numerous 
officers were assigned to various governmental ministries and agencies, 
leaving vacancies in the military structure and activities. A number of in-
country military courses of instruction were cancelled due to the lack of 
availability of both instructors and student personnel.111  
Natural disasters, elections, riots, strikes and coups d’état within Latin American nations 
often diverted security forces’ attention from United States’ sponsored training. However, 
this usually impacted in-country training more than student attendance at American-
sponsored courses in the Panama Canal Zone or the United States. While internal crises 
might cause the curtailment or cancellation of enrollment for future students, U.S. Army 
mission reports do not mention any countries recalling students before the completion of 
their training.  
Army mission reports from the early 1960s reveal that counterinsurgency schools 
largely avoided one issue that later plagued mobile training teams (small groups of U.S. 
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Army instructors conducting training in Latin American countries) – illiteracy. The 
Special Warfare School’s counterinsurgency course, as well as later counterinsurgency 
courses as the School of the Americas in Panama, accepted only officer students. While 
the Special Warfare School required basic English skills, the School of the Americas 
conducted all of its courses in Spanish. In either case, teaching officer students alleviated 
school instructors from the challenges of attempting to impart complex 
counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics to the poorly-educated, largely rural conscripts 
that comprised the bulk of most regional armies during the 1960s and 1970s.  
Other Army schools in the United States played a minimal role in providing 
counterinsurgency training to Latin Americans. The Army’s Command and General Staff 
College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas specialized in training mid-grade officers 
in the skills required to serve as staff officers at the battalion and brigade level. However, 
Leavenworth’s one-year resident course concentrated almost exclusively on conventional 
military theory, operations and tactics. In their 1965 survey of counterinsurgency 
training, Barber and Ronning noted that, at the Command and General Staff College, “no 
time was allocated to civic action as a separate subject, but a new topic on the application 
of civic action in counterinsurgency is to be given for the first time in the last part of the 
year [1965].”112 The authors also noted the attendance of only sixteen officers from Latin 
America in the 1964-65 class.113 The U.S. Army War College, the Army’s strategic-level 
school for senior officers, did not accept foreign officers until 1977. The first Latin 
American officer (from Venezuela) did not attend until 1979.114 
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One final school merits brief mention. The Inter-American Defense College, 
which opened its doors in October 1962, served as broadening course for selected Latin 
American and U.S. officers in the grade of Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel. “Its purpose 
is to conduct courses on the Inter-American system,” the college proclaimed in its 
regulations, “and on the political, social, economic and military factors that constitute 
essential components of inter-American defense.”115 Notwithstanding its Pan-American 
title and faculty, the United States exerted strong influence on the school. A U.S. Army 
general served as its director. The school was located on Fort McNair in Washington, 
D.C., and the U.S. government provided two-thirds of its operating budget. The college 
largely patterned its curriculum on the U.S. National War College, also located on Fort 
McNair, but it did not list counterinsurgency among its major subject areas or blocks of 
instruction. Instead, its focus was hemispheric defense. The Inter-American Defense 
College did list “problems of communist [sic] revolutionary warfare and continental 
defense,” and later “underdevelopment and insurgency,” among its topic areas. However, 
it did not devote a major segment of its courses to teaching U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine as was the case at the National War College from 1962-1966.116 A total of one 
hundred and sixty-four Latin American officers and twenty-eight Americans graduated 
from the college between 1962 and 1966.117 
CONCLUSION 
The Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg had firmly established itself as the 
intellectual hub of the Army’s efforts to develop and disseminate counterinsurgency 
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doctrine by 1964. Yet training Latin American forces never became a priority mission for 
the school. Instead, its primary focus remained the training of U.S. soldiers for service in 
Special Forces and Psychological Operations units. The school assumed a new mission of 
training U.S. advisors for duty in Vietnam early in 1963, which quickly became its 
second priority. Training foreign officers in counterinsurgency ranked third in the 
school’s priorities as measured by student attendance numbers.118 Latin American forces 
did not take the lead in attendance of counterinsurgency courses at the school due to a 
combination of factors. The school’s requirement to train a growing number of allied 
students from Southeast Asia resulted in lower quotas for Latin Americans. Moreover, 
the Western Hemisphere had its own specialized regional training school in Panama. 
Latin American students attended other U.S. schools in the early 1960s, but these courses 
provided conventional military skills training and generally lacked counterinsurgency 
content.  
Regardless of how delivered (Army schools or Mobile Training Teams), 
counterinsurgency training of Latin American armies faced numerous challenges. Some 
armies could not afford the costs associated with sending students abroad for training 
because of budget shortfalls or economic crises. In Peru, counterinsurgency training was 
disrupted due to the rupture of diplomatic relations in the aftermath of a military coup 
d’état. Meanwhile, the armies of Chile and Brazil largely shunned U.S. efforts to export 
counterinsurgency training, preferring instead to develop their own theories and train 
their own forces. In fact, by as early as 1962, the Brazilian Army was conducting 
complex, multi-echelon “Contra-Revolucionario” training and exercises related to 
insurgency prevention, counterinsurgency operations, and the reestablishment of 
                                               




government control in affected areas. Meanwhile, the Special Warfare School did not 
expand its focus from counter-guerrilla operations (centered on purely military responses 
to insurgency) to counterinsurgency (focusing on insurgency prevention and whole of 
government responses) until sometime in 1963.  
One hundred and twelve Latin American officers received counterinsurgency 
training at the Special Warfare School from 1961 to 1963. Each of them faced obstacles 
of cultural and bureaucratic resistance when seeking to disseminate their new training 
within their parent armies. Some countries, such as Venezuela, proved more receptive to 
adopting external doctrine and receiving foreign training and assistance. For others, 
institutional pride and skepticism regarding the motives of U.S. hegemony served as 
barriers to American efforts to export its counterinsurgency doctrine.  
While most regional armies sent at least a few officers to attend U.S. Army 
counterinsurgency courses, whole-heartedly adopting a foreign military doctrine –
especially from the regional hegemon--was an altogether different proposition. Each 
army was distinct; Brazil developed its own concepts and tactics. Venezuela embraced 
U.S. counterinsurgency training while Chile and Brazil largely rejected it. Other regional 
armies fell somewhere between these two extremes.  
In sum, the counterinsurgency training of Latin American forces in Army schools 
in the United States was more complex than depicted in the early Cold War era 
historiography. Regional armies did not uniformly and unquestioningly accept U.S. 
training. Each army’s experience was unique; based on its own needs and the particular 




Chapter Three: U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Schools in Panama  
The Kennedy administration placed tremendous emphasis on counterinsurgency 
training in the 1960s; both within the U.S. government and for its regional allies. For the 
U.S. Army, that emphasis quickly radiated beyond its military schools in the United 
States. The Army reinforced its efforts to train foreign officers at the Special Warfare 
School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina by exporting its newly developed 
counterinsurgency curriculum to its schools in Panama. The majority of Latin Americans 
receiving classroom training in counterinsurgency from the U.S. Army attended courses 
in the Canal Zone. The Special Warfare Center trained 111 officers from the region 
across its four courses (only two of which focused directly on counterinsurgency) 
between 1961 and 1963. During the same time period the U.S. Army Caribbean School 
gave instruction to 347 Latin American officers in its two counterinsurgency courses.  
In the early 1950s, the U.S. Army Caribbean School at Fort Gulick, Panama 
shifted its role from training American troops to instructing Latin American military 
students. The school discontinued its English language courses in 1956 and began 
delivering all of its classes in Spanish.1 The school underwent a second transformation in 
the early 1960s. It changed the focus of its instruction from hemispheric defense to 
courses related to internal security.2 Four officers from the staff and faculty of the 
Caribbean School attended the Army’s first counterinsurgency course at Fort Bragg in 
January1961. After graduation, these men returned to the Canal Zone and developed their 
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own counterinsurgency course which commenced its first class that July.3 The 
President’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, visited the school in December 
1962 and directed an increased emphasis on counterinsurgency.4 In response, the 
Caribbean School issued a revised curriculum later that same fiscal year. “The [1962] 
supplemental course catalog expanded the school’s mission,” Joseph Leuer, the school’s 
historian later wrote, “to support U.S. Army missions, attachés, military-assistance 
advisory groups, and commissions operating in Latin America by instructing military and 
para-military personnel in the U.S. military technical skills, leadership techniques, and 
doctrine covering military action and counterinsurgency operations during peace and 
war.”5 The school’s leadership soon added an intensive ten-week counterinsurgency 
operations course for junior officers to complement its existing two-week orientation 
seminar. In July 1963, the Army renamed the school the U.S. Army School of the 
Americas to reflect its’ new hemispheric role.6  
American policymakers sought to spread their new counterinsurgency doctrine 
across Latin America in the early 1960s. The U.S. Army’s Spanish-language school in 
the Panama Canal Zone was a key component for implementing that plan. However, 
numerous factors outside United States’ control impeded the school’s ability to train large 
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numbers of Latin American students in counterinsurgency. National political crises, 
budget shortfalls and resistance to change within Latin American armies all affected 
student attendance at U.S. Army schools. These obstacles often made it difficult for 
regional armies to send students to Canal Zone courses even when they sought American 
training. Other armies rejected U.S. counterinsurgency and chose not to participate.  
From its founding in 1949 through 1964, the school graduated 16,343 Latin 
American students.7 However, the school’s penchant for only releasing cumulative 
statistics has sowed confusion. Some authors have conflated the school’s later 
counterinsurgency focus with its earlier history of training conventional military skills. 
“Between 1961 and 1964 the School of the Americas in the Canal Zone,” one author 
writes, “trained over 16,000 Latin American personnel in counterinsurgency and civic 
action.”8 Clearly this is a misstatement since the author cites the school’s cumulative 
attendance over the previous decade; the school did not undertake its first 
counterinsurgency course until 1961. Other interpretations are more subtle but have also 
opened the window to misinterpretation. “[T]he U.S. Army School of the Americas in the 
Panama Canal Zone,” another author explains, “was especially important, as it eventually 
dedicated approximately 70 percent of its Spanish-based curriculum to 
counterinsurgency-related subjects.”9 Both authors imply that most Latin American 
students at the School of the Americas received training in counterinsurgency. But did 
they? A detailed analysis of the schools’ course catalogs, attendance rosters and 
contemporary military reporting contradict this generally accepted view. The School of 
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the Americas also later suffered from academic misinformation by authors that claimed it 
taught torture and trained dictators. Most regional armies also labored under the burden 
of one-year conscripts which meant that some returning students soon left the military. 
Nevertheless, despite the Army’s emphasis on counterinsurgency and pressure from the 
White House during the 1960s, the majority of students attending the School of the 
Americas in that decade did not receive training in counterinsurgency.  Instead, most 
instruction centered on conventional military skills – as it had since 1949. 
THE U.S. ARMY CARIBBEAN SCHOOL 
In the aftermath of World War II, American policymakers and Army leadership 
decided to maintain the United States’ military bases and presence in the Panama Canal 
Zone. The Army also perpetuated its collection of local “training schools that were 
initially designed to train U.S. military personnel stationed in the Panama Cana Zone in 
the rigors of operating in a tropical environment.”10 From 1946 to 1948, the Latin 
American Ground School (and its predecessor) taught courses on communications, 
weapons and tactics, and basic engineering. Although still primarily intended for the 
training of U.S. personnel, the Ground School first opened its doors to the officers and 
soldiers of Latin American armies in 1948. The Army also operated a food service school 
for cooks, schools for medics and for mechanics. In 1949, the Army consolidated these 
dispersed elements into one entity, the U.S. Army Caribbean School, and located it at 
Fort Gulick.11  
The school’s academic departments reflected the emphasis it placed on the 
various elements of its curriculum. The school established a counterinsurgency 
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committee in 1961 “in recognition of the increasing Communist threat in Latin America” 
and tasked it with “teaching counterinsurgency operations to U.S. officers, NCOs [non-
commissioned officers], and Latin American officers.”12 The school also underwent 
reorganization “to better accomplish the new [counterinsurgency] mission.” It eliminated 
the existing Weapons and Mortars Department and replaced it with Internal Security. The 
new department included the Counterinsurgency, Military Intelligence, Military Police, 
Medical, and Research & Analysis Sections.13 By 1965 the school had reorganized into 
only two academic departments: Internal Security and Technical.  
Like the Special Warfare Center, the Caribbean School soon realized that one 
counterinsurgency course would not meet the growing demand (and political pressure) 
for such instruction. If the school’s cadre harbored any doubts about the importance of its 
new counterinsurgency role, Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s visit disabused them of 
those concerns. “His visit was designed to personally ensure the school was an integral 
part of the Army’s emerging counterinsurgency strategy to support President Kennedy’s 
Alliance for Progress,” the school’s historian later observed. In late 1962, the school 
added an expanded ten-week counterinsurgency course for “lieutenants, captains, and 
civilian officials.”14  
The Caribbean School developed its classes in counterinsurgency for two 
different purposes and for two distinct audiences, as had the Special Warfare Center. Its 
two-week Counterinsurgency Operations Orientation Course, begun in July 1961, 
provided a strategic overview of counterinsurgency doctrine and operations.  The school 
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aimed this course at Latin American “Field-Grade or General Officer personnel” who 
might return to their home armies as planners or strategists and “who required a 
knowledge of counterinsurgency operations” and “the problems involved in elimination 
of insurgency.”15 “The course covered the nature and causes of insurgency and the 
conduct of counterinsurgency operations,” a 1965 Army information paper explained, 
“also, during these two weeks mutual problems in areas of military civic action, 
psychological operations, intelligence and counterintelligence, and tactical operations 
against dissident groups were discussed.”16 Thus the course focused on 
counterinsurgency at its broad strategic level encompassing “those military, paramilitary, 
political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
subversive insurgency.”17  
Course instruction was wide but not very deep. “Counterinsurgency Operations” 
comprised just eighteen of the sixty-six total hours of instruction. Lecturers devoted five 
hours to “Guerrilla Warfare.” “General Subjects” consumed the greatest portion of the 
schedule with twenty hours of course time. Instructors devoted this time to guest lectures, 
seminar discussions, and observing the Counterinsurgency Operations Course training. 
Other topic areas included “Civic Action and Psychological Operations (ten hours),” 
“Intelligence and Military Police Subjects (seven hours),” and “Special Air Operations 
(six hours).”18 Course authors presented a wide-ranging syllabus for a course lasting just 
two-weeks, but they also designed it as a survey course for senior officers. By 1964, the 
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school had added two one-week counterinsurgency orientation courses for American 
personnel: one for officers, the other for enlisted. However, the curriculum lacked a 
mastery course in internal security during its early days.  
The school’s ten-week Counterinsurgency Operations Course, unveiled 1962, 
filled that gap. The school’s cadre developed this seminar as a full immersion into 
counterinsurgency with the goal of instilling subject matter expertise. It focused on 
tactics and its audience was unit level officers. “The course provided instruction and 
reference material for use in counterguerrilla tactics,” according to Army officials, “[i]t 
also covered military civic action, psychological operations, troop and public 
information, strategy and techniques of International Communism, and military 
intelligence and counterintelligence. Upon graduation from this course the students were 
qualified to act as commanders of companies and smaller units conducting 
counterinsurgency operations. They were also qualified to act as instructors for the 
subject in school of their respective countries.”19 Therefore, while the orientation course 
focused on counterinsurgency concepts and doctrine, the operations class centered on 
tactics. The operations course did familiarize students with the theoretical elements of 
counterinsurgency, but its primary emphasis was the “practical training that is required to 
conduct successful counterguerrilla operations in Latin America.”20 The school 
eventually offered both counterinsurgency courses four times per year, but restricted 
enrollment to officers.  
Confusion over who actually received counterinsurgency instruction in the 
Army’s Canal Zone schools likely began during this early period. In the school’s 1962 
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supplemental catalog, the school’s commandant Colonel Edgar Schroeder proclaimed 
that, “[a]ll courses have undergone major modifications during the past eighteen months 
in support of the counterinsurgency effort.”21 “Not only those courses whose title 
includes the term counterinsurgency,” Schroeder explained, “but every course taught has 
definite application in the counterinsurgency field.”22 A closer analysis of the school’s 
curriculum reveals the nuance of the colonel’s statement.  
During the 1964 academic year, the newly renamed School of the Americas 
offered twenty-four courses for its Latin American students. Only four contained 
significant counterinsurgency content.23 The ten-week Counterinsurgency Operations 
Course boasted the highest density of counterinsurgency training with four hundred and 
seventy-six hours of instruction. This was a specialist course designed to instill mastery 
of the subject matter and tactics. As noted above, course authors intended it to prepare 
graduates to command specialized counterguerrilla units or serve as counterinsurgency 
instructors in their home country. In contrast, the authors of the Counterinsurgency 
Operations Orientation Course, with sixty-six hours of instruction, designed it to endow 
students with a broad working knowledge of counterinsurgency concepts-especially at the 
strategic (national) level, but not a mastery of counter-guerrilla tactics. The forty-week 
Command and Staff Course and the eighteen-week Infantry Officers Course also 
provided their attendees with a broad working knowledge of counterinsurgency concepts 
and some understanding of the related tactics. Neither course matched the depth of 
training of the ten-week course.  
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While most other course offerings did include counterinsurgency instruction, the 
training in these courses comprised what the Army terms “awareness training.” This level 
of training falls below a broad working knowledge. Limited time is devoted to the subject 
matter under discussion; the goal is to give students a rudimentary understanding of the 
concepts and a general familiarity with associated terms. The majority of the courses 
taught at the School of the Americas during the early 1960s included this type of 
counterinsurgency awareness training, most of them intended for enlisted personnel. 
These courses allocated a mere four hours to the topic (see Table 3.1).24 Army educators 
clearly did not intend such limited training to produce counterinsurgency experts or 
practitioners. The school also offered two cadet courses in 1964, but neither had 
counterinsurgency content.25 
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Table 3.1: School of the Americas Counterinsurgency Course Content 1964.  
 
Radio operators, vehicle mechanics, supply personnel and others who received 
awareness type training did not learn counterinsurgency tactics.  The United States Army 
defined counterinsurgency in the early 1960s as “all military, political, economic, 
psychological, and sociological actions taken by a legal government to prevent or, if 
necessary eliminate subversive insurgency.”26 Such an all-encompassing definition made 
describing any or all military training courses as being “related to” or having “definite 
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NCO General Supply Course*
Military Police Enlisted Course*
Engineer NCO Course *
Engineer Equipment Operator Course*
Engineer Equipment Mechanic Course*
Communication Chief Course*
Basic Medical Technician Course*
Officer General Supply Course
Engineer Officer Course
Communication Officer Course
Automotive Maintenance Officer Course
Military Police Officer Course
Infantry Officer Course
Command and Staff Course
Counterinsurgency Orientation Course
Counterinsurgency Operations Course
*denotes courses for enlisted personnel 




application in the counterinsurgency field” technically true.27 However, while this 
linkage allowed school administrators (and the Army) to portray an intensive effort to 
disseminate internal security training, it also muddied the waters for later historians and 
researchers. Some conventional military skills training might contribute to a nation’s 
counter guerrilla efforts, such as Military Police and intelligence courses. Other 
instruction related to constructing roads or providing medical support could contribute to 
a country’s civic action efforts. However, more mundane programs like supply 
procedures, weapons and vehicle maintenance, and radio repair primarily supported 
conventional military operations and the day-to-day running of an army. Such courses 
only tenuously related to counterinsurgency, if at all. Categorizing all students that 
attended the School of the Americas as having received training in internal security is 
misleading. Doing so obscures the historical record of how many students actually 
received focused instruction on the doctrine and tactics of counterinsurgency.  
Counterinsurgency – later termed internal security – remained a key element of 
the School of the Americas’ instruction throughout the 1960s. However, the school’s 
1971 course catalog reveals that while internal security had diffused through more of the 
curriculum, conventional military tactics and technical training remained the schools’ 
central focus. The school offered twenty-two courses in 1964. Five of them boasted 
heavy counterinsurgency content (twenty-three percent of all courses). By 1971, school 
administrators had almost doubled the curriculum to forty-two courses. Of these, fifteen 
contained counterinsurgency tactics and related instruction under the broad heading of 
“Irregular Warfare” or the new term “Urban Counterinsurgency” (thirty-six percent of all 
                                               




courses). 28 The counterinsurgency awareness training (four to six hours of treatment) 
present in fifteen courses in 1964 had fallen to just three by 1971. A full twenty-four 
courses listed zero counterinsurgency content in the 1971 catalog (see Table 3.2).29 
Therefore, even though the school expanded the internal security content of its 
curriculum between 1964 and 1971, conventional military operations and technical skills 
training comprised the majority of course content across the decade. 
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Table 3.2: School of the Americas Counterinsurgency Course Content 1971.   
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Combat Arms Command and Unit Staff Officer
Officer Combat Arms Orientation
Small Unit Warfare Basic
NCO Leadership
Basic Officer Qualification
Officer Basic Combat Arms
Combat Arms and Support Services
Irregular Warfare Operations





STUDENT ATTENDANCE AT THE SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS 
Far fewer students received counterinsurgency training at the Schools of the 
Americas than previously understood. School administrators (and later historians) 
proclaimed a major shift in emphasis towards internal security and a diffusion of that 
training across the school’s curriculum in 1962. On the surface this was true. The school 
added new counterinsurgency courses but attendance was sparse.  For example, 
contemporary U.S. Army reporting indicates that slightly less than 1,300 students (Latin 
American and U.S.) undertook training at the School of the Americas in 1964.30 Yet only 
one hundred and twenty-two Latin American students attended the school’s two 
counterinsurgency courses that year. They represented just nine percent of the school’s 
overall enrollment.31  
Four hundred and sixty-seven Latin America officers attended counterinsurgency 
courses at the School of the Americas between 1961 and 1964 - the peak years of the 
U.S. counterinsurgency effort. Two hundred and eighty-six of those students hailed from 
South America. Venezuela and Peru, followed by Ecuador and Bolivia, sent the highest 
numbers of officers to receive counterinsurgency training during this period (see Table 
3.3).32 
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Table 3.3: School of the Americas Counterinsurgency Course Attendance 1961-1964. 
 
While in aggregate these numbers may appear large, few students attended these 
courses each year. Sixty-two students took counterinsurgency classes at the Caribbean 
School in the inaugural year of 1961; including twelve Americans. One hundred eighty-
nine officers participated the following year. After that, attendance waned with 167 
students in 1963 and 149 in 1964.33 Previously unpublished U.S. Army documents 
provide annual student attendance figures for 1958 to 1965. Surprisingly, there was no 
major increase in school’s overall number of students trained as a result of the new 
emphasis on counterinsurgency in 1962 (see Table 3.4). In fact, enrollment showed a 
slight increase beginning in 1960, which continued through 1963, and then tapered off.34 
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Table 3.4: School of the Americas Number of Students Trained 1958-1965. 
 
 
OBSTACLES TO U.S. SCHOOLS ATTENDANCE 
The Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay largely 
shunned the School of the Americas’ counterinsurgency training (see Table 3.3). Yet, so 
did Colombia, which President Kennedy designated as a country of concern for the 
administration’s Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) in 1962, along with Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Guatemala.35 This disconnect underscores the fact that the United States did 
not dictate the number of students Latin American countries sent to its Canal Zone 
schools nor the courses they attended. Instead, American officers had to offer courses to 
their host nation counterparts and try to encourage them to accept U.S. training. A variety 
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of factors outside the United States’ control, and unique to each country, enhanced or 
impeded an army’s willingness and ability to send students to U.S. schools. Budgetary 
uncertainty, political disruptions, and resistance to change affected student enrollment in 
Canal Zone courses, as did some armies’ rejection of U.S. counterinsurgency training and 
doctrine.  
As was the case with Army schools in the United States, budgetary issues 
impeded Colombia’s ability to send students to Panama. “The principal obstacle facing 
the Colombian Army is a lack of funds,” the U.S. Army mission in Bogotá wrote in April 
1963, the “[p]resent financial crisis is seriously reducing the number of students” able to 
attend U.S. schools.36 Ecuador faced a similar predicament. “Lack of funds,” American 
officers in Quito explained, “preclude [sic] the sending of additional personnel to US 
schools during [the] reporting period.”37 Paraguay too suffered from dire financial straits. 
“This mission has continued to encourage top Paraguayan military officials to take 
advantage of the MAP [Military Assistance Program] sponsored service schools in [the 
United States] and the Canal Zone,” American officers in Asuncion reported in July 
1962.38 “The austere financial status of Paraguay,” the same officers noted in October, 
“has caused the suspension of all U.S. Service School spaces and orientation tours until 1 
January 1963.”39 Army mission reports from Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Bolivia also 
cited funding as an obstacle to sending students to U.S. courses.  
                                               
36 United States Army Mission (hereafter cited as USARMIS) to Colombia, “U.S. Army Mission Program 
Report,” dated 24 April 1963, National Archives II, College Park, MD, Records Group 548, Records of 
U.S. Army Forces in the Caribbean (hereafter cited as NAAFC), n.pag. 
37 USARMIS to Ecuador, “U.S. Army Mission Program Report,” dated 19 July 1962, NAAFC, n.pag. 
38 USARMIS to Paraguay, “U.S. Army Mission Program Report,” dated 12 July 1962, NAAFC, n.pag. 




CONVENTIONAL TRAINING VERSUS COUNTERINSURGENCY 
American Army officers labored to impart counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics 
to their Latin American counterparts, but that was only one part of a broader struggle to 
modernize regional armies. In several U.S. Army missions, counterinsurgency was not 
the primary focus. Like their instructor counterparts at the School of the Americas, these 
officers focused the majority of their attention on conventional military training. “The 
major policy objectives of  USARMIS [the U.S. Army Mission in Argentina] is to 
increase Argentina’s internal security capabilities by enhancing the effectiveness of its 
Army in all roles traditionally assigned to a ground military arm,” American officers in 
Buenos Aires explained to their headquarters in 1962. “Achievement of the foregoing 
objectives will meet the requirements of Internal Security Training.” The same officers 
also lamented the burden of producing the reports that contained these comments, and 
other paperwork; required in large part by the new emphasis on internal security. “It is 
estimated that under the present circumstances,” the Americans wrote, “not more than 
15% of the total working hours of the officer personnel in this mission can be devoted to 
the primary task, advising and assisting the Argentine Army.”40 U.S. Army officers in 
Buenos Aires may have exaggerated the amount of time they spent on paperwork. 
However, it is clear that they allocated more of their scarce “advising and assisting” time 
toward imparting conventional military skills knowledge to the Argentine Army rather 
than counterinsurgency training.   
American officers in Uruguay also focused their efforts on conventional military 
training. “The physical characteristic of the country itself is an advantage to the 
accomplishment of the [Uruguayan] Army’s [internal security] mission,” the U.S. 
                                               




officers explained, “there are no forests or jungles which could contribute to the building 
of guerrilla forces.”41 “In view of the political stability of the country,” the Americans 
noted, “internal security in Uruguay is not a major problem.”42 Southern Cone armies 
were not alone in their skepticism regarding the need for U.S. counterinsurgency training; 
at least a few U.S. Army officers serving in their capitals shared that view.  
RESISTANCE TO CHANGE 
Some armies resisted the efforts of their U.S. counterparts to impart new concepts 
and procedures. “Training has a priority below housekeeping duties, repair and 
construction, ceremonies, fiestas, etc…,” American officers in Santiago lamented. “Thus 
far the Chilean Army has resisted adoption of U.S. training techniques.”43 The situation 
was much the same east of the Andes. The Argentine Army has a “remarkably well-
educated officer and NCO [non-commissioned officer] Corps, with an equally 
remarkable lack of appreciation of the practical jobs associated with maneuvering an 
army in the field,” American officers in Buenos Aires complained, “[i]n short, an excess 
of education and a shortage of practical training.”44 Across the River Plate in 
Montevideo, U.S. officers complained that the “Uruguayan Army is characterized by 
rigid inflexibility which is imposed by law.” “Recommendations have been presented, on 
numerous occasions in the past, to the [Uruguayan Army Commander], to establish and 
place in effect a standard training program [across the army],” the Americans continued, 
“[t]hese recommendations have been fully accepted verbally, however, no training plans, 
                                               
41 USARMIS to Uruguay, “U.S. Army Mission Program Report,” dated 11 July 1962, NAAFC, n.pag. 
42 USARMIS to Uruguay, “U.S. Army Mission Program Report,” dated 15 January 1963, NAAFC, n.pag. 
43 USARMIS to Chile, “U.S. Army Mission Program Report,” dated 11 January 1963, NAAFC, n.pag.  




programs, or directives have even been published.”45 Resistance, indifference and lip-
service might have impeded American military training efforts as much as empty coffers.  
POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
In several countries political turmoil hampered U.S. schools attendance, and 
counterinsurgency training. “The instability of the National Government, with recurrent 
Government crises and the concurrent preoccupation of the military in dealing therewith 
constantly impede and delay accomplishment of US Mission objectives,” American 
officers in Ecuador complained in July 1962.46 A year later not much had changed. “The 
diversion of effort of the military to politics,” the same office wrote in July 1963, “rather 
than to the running of an orderly and efficient military organization precludes many 
necessary decisions and direction which are needed.” Yet Ecuador did manage to send 
three officers to internal security training in Panama during the reporting period (April to 
June 1963); two Army officers attended the counterinsurgency operations course, while 
one Air Force officer took the orientation course.47  
Political instability also wracked Argentina. “The major difficulty during the 
period [July to September 1962] has been the double changeover of the Army High 
Command, coupled with and as a result of the Armed Forces’ preoccupation with 
political, social, economic and other non-military problems,” American officers in 
Buenos Aires opined. “[T]he real internal security threat in Argentina has been basically 
non-military in character, emanating from deep-seated political and economic ills.”48 Six 
months later things had gone from bad to worse. “On the second day of this quarterly 
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period [April to June 1963] a major attempt was made by the Argentine Navy to upset the 
government,” the U.S. Army mission wrote. “The major portion of the Army 
immediately reacted, and with the delayed support of the Air Force, managed to quell the 
revolt after several days of maneuvering and actual fighting. Many military officers are 
still under arrest awaiting trial. The percentage of reassignment of officers in many units 
has been exceedingly high, while other units have been disbanded completely.”49 The 
following year the internal situation in Argentina had improved. “During this reporting 
period,” American officers wrote in July 1964, “the Argentine Army was able to resume 
training which was decreased during the period immediately following the elections last 
July.” Yet the Argentine Army remained troubled. “Some anxieties have been caused by 
the recent revolution in Brazil,” U.S. officers in Buenos Aires noted, “by the possibility 
of elections of a Communist-oriented government in Chile, as well as by the current meat 
shortage.”50  
LANGUAGE, CONSCRIPTION, AND ILLITERACY 
The Special Warfare Center and the School of the Americas faced many similar 
challenges in filling their student quotas, but language set them apart. The School of the 
Americas conducted all of its courses in Spanish. Attending Army schools in the United 
States required proficiency in English. This requirement posed a major obstacle in some 
countries. “Language requirements for attendance at CONUS [Continental United States] 
schools preclude attendance of 99% of Ecuadorean enlisted personnel,” American 
officers in Quito noted.51 “[T]he lack of English speaking personnel,” American officers 
in Paraguay observed, “continue to reduce the acceptance of school spaces” in the United 
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States.52 Teaching courses in Spanish alleviated the School of the Americas of this 
burden, but opening its doors to enlisted personnel raised two new challenges: illiteracy 
and conscription.  
Rural peasants comprised the bulk of the enlisted strength in most regional armies 
and training them proved tough. The majority of them lacked education. Venezuela 
perhaps fared better than most. In the Civic Action section of its July 1963 report to the 
Canal Zone, U.S. officers took note of the Venezuelan Army’s literacy training program 
for new conscripts. “This is one of the most forcefully implemented programs of the 
Armed Forces,” the Americans explained, “and is necessary because as many as 50% of 
inductees have been illiterate. Several hours daily are devoted to during the first few 
months of service with the desired objective of a third grade level education prior to 
discharge.”53 American officers in Peru faced a similar challenge. “Soldiers inducted into 
the Peruvian Army serve only a two-year tour with no further training at the end of this 
period,” American officers in Lima observed. “This tour is not of sufficient duration to 
adequately train these personnel, especially since the education level of the average 
inductee is low.”54 Likewise, American officers in Buenos Aires cited “major 
deficiencies” in their advisory and assistance efforts due to a “one-year conscript system, 
which results in an army that is born, flourishes and dies each year.”55 A Department of 
State assessment of internal security programs in Guatemala in 1966 found similar 
barriers to imparting U.S. training. “Training of two-year conscripts is always a 
frustrating treadmill,” the report’s authors wrote, “and, since all of the enlisted men in the 
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Guatemalan Army are conscripts it is doubly hard and unrewarding. Before a conscript is 
adequately trained, he is back in civilian life.”56 Most regional armies labored under the 
burden of one-year conscripts, not two-year as in Guatemala or Peru.  
The Army’s Canal Zone educators understood these issues. “Courses presented at 
the U.S. School of the Americas are designed for the professional development of 
officers, cadets, and enlisted personnel,” school administrators explained in their course 
catalog. “[Commanders of U.S. Military Missions], Military Attachés, and local 
commanders should conduct interviews to screen all candidates. Attendance will be 
determined by the candidate’s educational background [and] ability to absorb the 
instruction.”57 “Recruits… are not considered acceptable students,” the administrators 
concluded.58 Yet despite this admonishment, the school did offer courses for junior 
enlisted personnel. One such listing warned that a prospective student “must have at least 
a fourth grade skill level and the ability to express himself verbally and in writing.”59 
Despite the many obstacles, some armies embraced U.S. counterinsurgency training and 
developed effective training programs of their own. They did so not by sending short-
term enlisted soldiers to attend conventional military courses in Panama with only a brief 
mention of counterinsurgency, but by sending officers to take focused internal security 
courses and bring that training back home.   
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ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Between 1961 and 1964, Peru and Venezuela sent more students to 
counterinsurgency courses at the School of the Americas than all other South American 
armies combined (see Table 5). In a 1962 dispatch to the Canal Zone, U.S. officers in 
Lima reported that four Peruvian officers completed the counterinsurgency operations 
course while two more officers completed the counterinsurgency orientation course. Then 
the American officers added a bit of self-congratulations. “A staff visit by a Mission 
member to the [Caribbean School] revealed that Peruvian students as a whole are doing 
exceptionally well,” the Americans proudly reported. “Out of the ten Peruvians who 
graduated in December[,] four obtained first place ranking in their respective courses.”60 
The next month their training efforts suffered a major setback. The Peruvian military 
seized control of the government on 18 July and “the United States government 
immediately suspended diplomatic relations… [including] the suspension of the activities 
of the U.S. Military Missions.”61 By the end of 1962, Peru and the United States resumed 
diplomatic relations and U.S. military training continued.  
The clearest insights into the state of U.S. Army training and assistance efforts in 
Peru come from the letters of Colonel Robert Ingalls, the Army Mission Chief in Lima. 
During his tenure Ingalls sent several letters to his superior, Major General Theodore F. 
Bogart, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Caribbean in Panama, explaining the 
situation in Peru. “There is a definite favorable response to our emphasis on 
counterinsurgency,” Colonel Ingalls wrote in February 1963. He then cited the following 
actions: “the students now attending school in Panama and the desire to continue sending 
students; acceptance of our recommendation to establish counterinsurgency training here 
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in Peru which will be initiated in [multiple Peruvian Army schools]; [and] the 
establishment of counterinsurgency type forces in the several regions in Peru.”62 
“Starting on 11 March,” Colonel Ingalls explained in an April 1963 letter, “all tactical 
units in the Peruvian Army began a 3 month course of training in counterinsurgency. The 
doctrine and methods being utilized are U.S. and are compiled in a Peruvian training 
manual. Also the curriculum of all arms schools and the Staff College have been revised 
to include the subject of counterinsurgency.”63  
Yet it was Venezuela that received the greatest infusion of U.S. 
counterinsurgency training of any Latin American nation during the 1960s. Although 
American officers in Caracas stated that the “U.S. Army Mission to Venezuela had no 
objectives in… [internal security] during the reporting period” in their July 1962 
summary, the same report also mentioned a recent counter-guerrilla mobile training team 
visit “which trained personnel of the Venezuelan Army and National Guard.” 64 During 
Fiscal Year 1962, (which ended that June), two hundred and five Venezuelans attended 
schools in the United States and another one hundred and forty-one graduated from 
courses at Canal Zone schools.65 Thirty-four of those Venezuelan officers completed 
counterinsurgency training at the Caribbean School in 1962 – a ten-fold increase over the 
previous year. Venezuela sent a total of ninety students to School of the Americas 
counterinsurgency courses between 1961 and 1964. This was an impressive attendance 
figure, and the highest of any Latin American nation, but it was paltry in terms of the size 
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of Venezuela’s security forces. The Venezuelan Army stood at 17,800 men in 1963. The 
Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación (FAC), a National Guard type formation boasted 
12,000 members.66 Both formations sent students to U.S. Canal Zone schools for 
counterinsurgency training.   
Peru had the next highest attendance level for these courses with seventy-five 
graduates during the same period. Argentina, Brazil and Chile each sent fewer than ten. 
Venezuela augmented its School of the Americas counterinsurgency attendance by 
sending eleven students to the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg between 1961 and 
1963, although the available reporting does not indicate which courses they attended.67 
U.S. counterinsurgency training soon permeated the Venezuelan Army and the 
Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación. In mid-1963, American officers in Caracas reported 
that the Venezuelan Army had organized a specialized cazadores counter guerrilla unit.68 
They also described a five-day “combined exercise of FAC counter Insurgency units 
[sic], Air Force and [Army] Paratroop units.” Most surprising was the revelation that the 
Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación had developed its own traveling instructor program for 
internal security. “In FAC a mobile training detachment for counterinsurgency was 
formed,” the same dispatch noted, “under [the] auspices of [the] Army Mission and [the 
previous] Special Forces [mobile training  team.]”69 “Counterinsurgency training,” 
American officers wrote in the 1963 end of year report, “is now integrated into the 
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training schedules of Venezuelan Army tactical units and National Guard Units [sic].”70 
“The continued use of spaces offered by the School of the Americas [has] increased the 
number of specialists available to the FAC and assisted in the development of FAC’s in-
country training capability,” U.S. officers in Caracas explained in their December 1965 
report. “FAC is working hard to improve its capability for conducting counterinsurgency 
operations [and all] FAC schools are emphasizing counterinsurgency training.”71 
REJECTION OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Meanwhile, Brazil and Chile developed their own internal security doctrines. The 
Brazilian Army possessed a comprehensive “Contra-Revolucionario” doctrine and was 
busy training individuals from basic recruits to senior officers by the end of 1962.72 It 
was also conducting complex multi-unit internal security exercises based on this doctrine 
during the same period. In contrast, the U.S. Army Special Warfare School and the 
School of the Americas each offered only a single narrowly focused counter-guerrilla 
course at that time. Therefore, it is exceedingly unlikely that the Brazilian Army based its 
“Contra-Revolucionario” doctrine on U.S. counterinsurgency concepts or methods. In 
fact, some internal security ideas may have travelled from south to north, instead of the 
other way around. The “Brazilian Army furnished [a] guest instructor to the [School of 
the Americas] Counterinsurgency Course,” American officers noted in their October to 
December 1962 report to the Canal Zone.73 Brazil sent a mere four students to attend 
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counterinsurgency training at the School of the Americas between 1961 and 1964, all of 
them in 1962 when Brazil had a parliamentary system.74 
Chile also resisted U.S. counterinsurgency efforts and developed its own doctrine. 
After citing the “strong feeling among many influential officers of the Chilean Army that 
they are perfectly capable of running their own army and do not need advice or assistance 
from the U.S. Army Mission,” American officers in Santiago also noted “much interest in 
Internal Security Training during the past six months” among their Chilean counterparts. 
Nevertheless, the same dispatch advised of the “non-acceptance and apparent lack of 
interest in accepting training spaces offered in CONUS [continental United States] and 
USARCARIB [U.S. Army Caribbean] schools” by the  Chilean Army. “The instability of 
the Chilean Escudo probably contributed” to the rejections, American officers added. 
Almost hidden in the July 1962 report was the information that the Chilean Army had 
promulgated its own counterinsurgency doctrine. American officers in Santiago revealed 
that the “Commander in Chief, Chilean Army authorized the use of the Counter 
Subversive Warfare Manual published by the War Academy for use in that Academy and 
the Chilean Army Service Schools.”75 In contrast to Brazil and Chile, the U.S. Army 
published its first manual prescribing counterinsurgency training for American soldiers in 
February 1963. The Continental Army Command ordered that trainees receive a total of 
three hours of instruction.76 The U.S. Army did not publish its first comprehensive 
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internal security manual, Field Manual 31-22 U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, until 
November 1963, more than a year after the Chilean Army.77  
Argentina did not embrace U.S. counterinsurgency training, but it did not wholly 
reject it either. “Material of US Army origin was furnished to the Center of Higher 
Studies,” U.S. officers in Buenos Aires reported in July 1964, “for preparation of a block 
of instruction in Counterinsurgency for all newly promoted colonels.” However, unlike 
the situation in many other Latin American nations during this era, the Americans were 
not the sole purveyors of military advice and assistance in Buenos Aires. “The Argentine 
Army sends NCO students to course at Fort Gulick,” the American officers explained. 
“Since the advisors from the French Army Mission teach internal security at the Escuela 
Superior de Guerra, officer students do not attend courses in the Canal Zone.”78 Despite 
this declaration, other records show that the Argentine Army sent seven officers to attend 
School of the Americas counterinsurgency courses between 1961 and 1964. U.S. Army 
internal documents make no mention of the Argentine Army affording them the same 
opportunity to teach in its military schools as the French Army advisors enjoyed in the 
early 1960s. Instead, the U.S. Army mission had to content itself with one infantry officer 
and one artillery officer as unit advisors, both stationed in Córdoba.79  
By the middle of the decade counterinsurgency was on the wane as a priority for 
U.S Army missions in Latin America. U.S. officers in Bogotá listed twenty-eight pages 
of projects related to logistics in their January 1965 report; relations earned five pages 
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while internal security received a paltry three.80 A Headquarters U.S Army South 
directive from July 1965 formalized the decline by changing mission reporting 
requirements. Although still mandating regular updates for activities related to personnel 
administration, logistics, relations and Civic Action (among other categories) the 
headquarters eliminated internal security as separate section of the report as it had been 
since 1962.81  
OTHER CANAL ZONE SCHOOLS 
Beyond the School of the Americas, the U.S. Army also operated two other 
schools in the Panama Canal Zone: the Inter-American Geodetic Survey and the Jungle 
Warfare Training Center. The primary mission of the Inter-American Geodetic Survey 
was the mapping of Latin America in cooperation with other U.S. agencies and friendly 
nations. Located at Fort Clayton, the organization consisted of “a headquarters, a 
cartography school, a survey platoon and an aviation company,” according to a 
declassified U.S. Army Forces Southern Command report from July 1965. The command 
grouped the Inter-American Geodetic Survey under the Internal Security section of its 
annual report, although like many activities during the counterinsurgency heyday, the 
link was tenuous. “This organization is important in the overall internal security 
program,” the Canal Zone officers wrote, “since accurate maps are a prerequisite for 
success of military, civic action, and economic-development projects planned or in 
progress. Its military value was clearly demonstrated when during the Cuban [Missile] 
Crisis complete maps of Cuba were available as a result of IAGS efforts.”82 Nevertheless, 
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the cartography schools’ impact was meager. “At Fort Clayton the IAGS conducts a 
school in mapping and geodesy for Latin American personnel, primarily civilians,” an 
earlier report noted. “Two classes of about 100 students each are conducted each year.”83  
In contrast, the Jungle Warfare Training Center’s mission was purely military. 
Although the U.S. Army traces its jungle experience in the Canal Zone to Lieutenant C. 
A. Dravo who “marched a detachment of Infantry across the Isthmus of Panama in 
1916,” formal training in jungle warfare did not commence until 1943. Training 
languished after World War II, but received renewed interest after the outbreak of the 
Korean War as the United States worried the war might spread. The Department of the 
Army ordered its Caribbean Command to “keep the art of jungle warfare alive within the 
U.S. Army” in April 1951. After studying the problem, developing doctrine and tactics, 
and conducting exercises, the command established a Jungle Warfare Training Center at 
Fort Sherman in 1953. A decade later the Army deactivated the center and assigned 
responsibility for jungle training to the School of the Americas. The school quickly 
reestablished training organizing a new Jungle Operations Committee under its Internal 
Security Department in 1963.84  
Throughout its history U.S. Army jungle training focused on combat. A central 
element of the course was to overcome a soldier’s “environmental fear” of the jungle 
which “would undoubtedly result in soldiers being completely ineffective in the 
jungle.”85 Survival training was a lesser concern. “Instruction presented by the JWTC 
[Jungle Warfare Training Center] was almost entirely oriented toward teaching men to 
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fight under jungle conditions. Subjects presented [in 1962] included escape and evasion 
techniques, jungle firing, communications, navigation, tactical and logistical operations,” 
U.S. Army South Historian Hugh Gardner explains.  “Although a few basic elements of 
survival were taught, this phase was incidental to the combat training.”86 
As a result of the 1963 reorganization, the Army reduced the duration of the 
course from three weeks to two, but the rigor increased dramatically. “Previously, those 
taking the jungle course had lived in barracks at Fort Sherman and had gone out to 
classes in the jungle each day,” Gardner tells us. “Actual living in the field had been 
limited to scheduled night time classes and a period of three days in which the final 
Escape and Evasion problem was conducted. Under the new POI [Program of 
Instruction], the men were taken out into the jungle on the first day of the cycle and 
taught to build shelters or palm frond thatched bohios [huts]. Thereafter for the next 12 
days of the cycle the men lived in the shelters they themselves had built.” However, Latin 
American student cycles continued under the previous three week program of instruction 
and, with the exception of the final three day exercise, did not live in the jungle.87 
The Army focused its jungle training efforts on its own soldiers throughout the 
1960s, not Latin Americans. Between 1960 and 1963 the Jungle Warfare Training Center 
conducted ten training cycles per year. The Army allocated six cycles to its units 
stationed in the Canal Zone and another two cycles to troops from the United States. The 
Army reserved the remaining two cycles for Latin American personnel and conducted 
these courses in Spanish.88 Despite these allocations overall course attendance increased 
throughout the decade. Latin American student participation fluctuated but remained far 
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below U.S. numbers. Three hundred twenty Latin American students completed the 
course in 1962. Attendance dropped to one hundred sixty-three the following year, likely 
due to the 1963 reorganization of the school. Afterwards Latin American attendance rose 
steadily between 1964 and 1967. However, the most dramatic increase was the 
skyrocketing attendance of U.S. personnel bound for Vietnam beginning in 1965 (see 
Table 3.5). Army demands for additional course cycles and greater throughput of students 
to feed the growing war in Southeast Asia placed significant demands on the School of 
the Americas cadre, as well as other Canal Zone units.89 
Table 3.5: U.S. Army Jungle Training 1960-1967.  
 
Although U.S. Army Caribbean counted the Inter-American Geodetic Survey and 
the Jungle Warfare Training Center as part of its internal security efforts, neither taught 
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counterinsurgency.90 Both schools’ subject matter was neutral; their training could be 
equally advantageous for conventional or counterinsurgency military operations. A 
detailed summary of the jungle warfare course in 1966 lists two hundred fifty hours of 
instruction. Course authors devoted fifty-two hours to “Jungle Living,” the largest 
instructional block. Patrolling, ambushes and related training comprised 30 hours of the 
course. The next largest, “Area Search and Destroy Operations” consumed 24 hours. 
Counterinsurgency training was absent. Nevertheless, the small-unit patrolling skills 
imparted during jungle training were undoubtedly similar to those presented as part of 
other counter guerrilla training courses. What was different about the jungle course in 
1966 was its context. Training modules on “Area Study of Vietnam,” “Area Search and 
Destroy Operations,” and “Village Cordon and Search Operations” clearly indicated the 
Army’s Vietnam, rather than Latin American focus. 91 The available documents do not 
specify if Latin American student cycles received these same blocks of instruction.  
THE SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS’ CONTESTED LATER HISTORY 
During the early 1990s critics of the School of the Americas, led, ironically, by 
Robert Kennedy’s son, the Congressman, coalesced into a political movement to close 
the school. The school’s critics center their opposition on two interrelated claims; that the 
school trained dictators and that it trained human rights abusers. Both of these charges 
rest on post hoc fallacy arguments. In order words, because some graduates later became 
dictators, critics contend that the one American school that they briefly attended must 
have trained them in how to overthrow their governments. Thus these critics take 
questionable correlation as proof of causality. Although it is undeniable that some 
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dictators and human rights abusers did attend the School of the Americas over the fifty-
four years of its existence, that the school trained or encouraged its students to become 
dictators, torturers or murderers remains unproven.  
Latin America had no shortage of military dictators in the one hundred thirty or so 
years between independence and the establishment of U.S. Army training in the Panama 
Canal Zone in 1946. The existence of military dictatorship in Latin American long 
predates U.S. training. Nevertheless, some former students of the school did become 
dictators, several of whom were also egregious human rights abusers. The school’s 
opponents cite several: Hugo Banzer in Bolivia, Leopoldo Galtieri in Argentina, Augusto 
Pinochet in Chile, and Efraín Ríos Montt in Guatemala. Yet an investigation of these 
officers reveals problems regarding this linkage. For example, General Galtieri, President 
of Argentina from 1981 to 1982, attended an engineer course at the Caribbean School in 
1949.92  Galtieri’s affiliation with the School of the Americas came more than a decade 
before counterinsurgency entered the curriculum and thirty-five years before his 
ascension to the presidency. “Infamously cruel Bolivian dictator Hugo Banzer attended 
the School of the Americas,” another investigator writes, “but his class records from 1956 
show that he took a short course in how to best serve as a military driver. Whatever 
Banzer understood about the use of torture and terror– and Bolivians understood only too 
well that this was a lot – he learned somewhere other than his brief stint at the School of 
the Americas.”93 
 The schools’ critics cite other eventual dictators among its “notorious graduates,” 
but these too present problems of causality. General Efraín Ríos Montt, responsible for 
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the horrific genocide in Guatemala during his brief tenure as president from 1982 to 
1983, also trained at the School of the Americas. However, like Galtieri, Ríos Montt 
attended the school in 1950 – again three decades before seizing the presidency and a full 
decade before the introduction of counterinsurgency training. Another infamous dictator, 
Augusto Pinochet in Chile, did not attend the School of the Americas. Undeterred by this 
inconvenient fact, the School of the Americas Watch still lists him among their 
“Notorious Graduates.” “Augusto Pinochet is not a graduate of the School of the 
Americas,” the page’s anonymous author concedes, “yet his influence is held in high 
esteem.”94  
Chile presents additional problems for the school’s critics. “Graduates of the 
School of the Americas have comprised 1 out of every 7 members of the command staff 
of DINA [Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional]” the School of the Americas Watch claims 
on its website, “the notorious Chilean intelligence agency responsible for many of the 
worst human rights atrocities during the Pinochet years.”95 However, Brigadier General 
Manuel Contreras, who designed, constructed and led the DINA, never attended the 
School of the Americas. Furthermore, Contreras reported only to Pinochet; also not a 
graduate of the school. 96   
The linking of the School of the Americas with training dictators is problematic. 
The overwhelming majority of the 60,000 plus Latin American officers, cadets and 
enlisted personnel who received training at the institution did not become dictators. 
Meanwhile, other regional dictators, such as General Augusto Pinochet in Chile, General 
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Emílio Garrastazu Médici in Brazil and General Jorge Rafael Videla in Argentina, 
achieved their infamy without having attended the school.  Becoming a dictator in Latin 
America required opportunity and ruthlessness, not training at the School of the 
Americas.  
Critics’ efforts to link the school to the training of human rights abusers also 
warrant scrutiny. Anthropologist Leslie Gill enjoyed extensive assistance from the School 
of the Americas in the early 2000s, including access to the school’s archives and course 
catalogs.97 However, in her book The School of the Americas: Military Training and 
Political Violence in Latin America, Gill chose to center her analysis and conclusions on 
personal interviews, perceptions and recollections, rather than documentary evidence. 
Like most other critics, Gill cites the so-called “Torture Manuals,” released by the 
Department of Defense in 1996 in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by 
the School of the Americas Watch. However, again like most other critics, it appears that 
Gill did not read the report or the manuals in question. The Department of Defense 
inquiry found seven questionable manuals in use at the School of the Americas from 
1989 to 1991. Army Mobile Training Teams in Latin America also employed these 
manuals between 1987 and 1989. These seven manuals, with a total of 1,169 pages, 
contained a mere twenty objectionable passages. 
Handling of Sources stands out as the most egregious of the group with eleven 
derogatory segments. However, none of these passages contains instructions on the 
conduct of torture. This manual describes how to utilize and control intelligence sources 
employed by local military forces against guerrilla or insurgent forces. It does not address 
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captured guerrillas, insurgent prisoners or other detainees. Although Gill and others cite 
these manuals as proof of U.S. training of torture, none of the manuals provides such 
training or even addresses torture. The Interrogation manual is the most logical area to 
look for such instruction. It is not there. The Department of Defense investigation found 
one questionable passage in this manual. “Page 1 refers to ‘extortion’ as a method of 
interrogation,” the reports’ authors noted.98 The school’s critics regularly cite these so-
called “torture manuals” as smoking gun evidence of U.S. torture training. However, 
even a casual researcher might more accurately describe this evidence as a smoldering 
innuendo.   
Katherine McCoy employed a detailed statistical analysis of the school’s 
graduates in her investigation of the claims that the school trained its students to violate 
human rights. McCoy constructed a sample of 11,792 graduates from Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador and Panama who attended courses between 1960 and 
2000.99 She culled this data from the course records of the nearly sixty thousand 
graduates between 1946 and 2000.100 In her research, McCoy defined “human rights 
abuses” as “torture, extrajudicial execution, forced disappearance, and illegal detention.” 
“I also include dictators,” she writes, “and persons directly involved in violent coups as 
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human rights abusers.”101 McCoy based her search for abuses on Truth Commission 
hearings and their subsequent published reports. Although her research has received some 
criticism, it is the most scientific investigation to date regarding the accusations that the 
School of the Americas trained human rights abusers.  
McCoy found almost no correlation. “Looking at the sample as whole,” she 
concludes, “only 1.3 percent of graduates are listed as human rights abusers.”102 Yet 
McCoy misspoke – her sample included only accusations not convictions. Ruth Blakeley 
takes McCoy to task for this oversight, calling her research “demonstrably false thanks to 
a flawed methodology.”103 But Blakeley also concedes that “only nine of the 153 
graduates have been convicted or 0.008% of all graduates” in McCoy’s sample.104 While 
McCoy’s terminology was inaccurate her definition was very broad. In the end, her 
findings are significant. A mere 1.3 percent of School of the Americas graduates in the 
sampled countries have been accused of human rights violations. If the school sought to 
train torturers and assassins it achieved a nearly 99% failure rate.  
Yet these critics miss the mark. Rather than investigating reference manuals or the 
aggregate statistics on human rights abusers, future researchers should seek out the POIs 
or Programs of Instruction for School of the Americas courses. These documents, the 
school’s version of a course syllabus, could reveal what was actually taught from the 
available reference manuals, what received emphasis and what was omitted—if they still 
exist. Army manuals are like not like textbooks. Few courses would have covered their 
contents in their entirety. Linking specific objectionable course content – as taught - with 
                                               
101 McCoy, “Trained to Torture?” 54. 
102 Ibid., 57.  
103 Ruth Blakeley, “Still Training to Torture? US Training of Military Forces in Latin America” Third 





alleged or convicted human rights abusers who attended that course during the same 
period would provide a direct link to School of the Americas training. However, causality 
would still be implied rather than proven.  
CONCLUSION  
The Kennedy administration sought to strengthen the internal security capabilities 
of Latin American nations. Counterinsurgency training was its preferred method. In 
support of that policy, the U.S. Army transplanted its new counterinsurgency doctrine 
from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to Panama in 1961. Yet the majority of Latin Americans 
receiving classroom training in counterinsurgency from the Army attended courses in the 
Canal Zone, not at Fort Bragg.  
The School of the Americas trained by far the most Latin American students of all 
Canal Zone schools. However, the school’s predilection for releasing cumulative 
graduation statistics has created confusion. Some authors have assumed that all, or most, 
students attending the school received counterinsurgency training. Others have accepted 
the notion that the school’s curriculum underwent a profound transformation in 1962 
shifting its academic focus almost entirely toward counterinsurgency. Colonel Edgar 
Schroeder, the school’s commandant at the time, claimed that “every course taught has 
definite application in the counterinsurgency field.”105 Few authors have investigated his 
statement. An analysis of the school’s curriculum reveals that most School of the 
Americas graduates during the 1960s did not receive counterinsurgency training.  Instead, 
most instruction related to conventional military skills as it always had. 
Counterinsurgency operated on two levels in the 1960s. At the national (strategic) 
level it was a comprehensive concern encompassing all “military, paramilitary, political, 
                                               




economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive 
insurgency.”106 At the operational level it focused on counter guerrilla tactics. 
Throughout the decade, the School of the Americas taught courses related to both aspects 
of counterinsurgency. Yet the majority of courses offered in 1964 only tangentially 
related to internal security. These conventional military courses provided merely an 
“awareness” level of counterinsurgency understanding, instilled through just four hours 
of instruction. The fruits of such training might have “definite application in the 
counterinsurgency field,” but that depended on how the host nation army used it.107 This 
minimal level of awareness training did not produce counterinsurgency experts or 
practitioners. However, it did allow school’s administrators to portray a robust effort to 
disseminate counterinsurgency training, muddying the waters for later researchers and 
historians.  
Internal Security training spread through the school’s curriculum during the 
1960s. Thirty-six percent of all courses offered in 1971 contained counterinsurgency and 
irregular warfare content, up from twenty-three percent in 1964. Counterinsurgency 
courses expanded from five in 1964 to fifteen in 1971. However, despite this increase, 
conventional military skills and technical training remained the predominant course 
content across the decade.   
Unpublished U.S. Army records also demonstrate that far fewer Latin American 
students received internal security training than previously understood. Despite the 
Kennedy administration’s intense focus on counterinsurgency, the School of the 
Americas saw no major increase in its overall attendance levels during the 1960s. 
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Participation in internal security-focused courses remained low, only a meager ten 
percent of the school’s total enrollment during the peak counterinsurgency training year 
of 1962. This was hardly the pervasive effort portrayed by some authors.  
A number of factors outside the United States’ control affected regional armies’ 
ability and willingness to send students to U.S Army schools and help explain the low 
attendance figures for internal security courses. American Army officers in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Paraguay cited budgetary issues as an 
impediment to student attendance at Canal Zone schools. Political turmoil also hampered 
several countries’ ability to dispatch students. Resistance to change and indifference to 
U.S. modernization and internal security efforts in some regional armies also stymied 
American efforts.  
Some countries accepted U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine; others did not. The 
Venezuelan and Peruvian Armies sent large numbers of students to attend internal 
security courses at the School of the Americas and based their training manuals on U.S. 
doctrine. The Brazilian and Chilean Armies rebuffed American counterinsurgency 
training. Instead, they developed their own concepts, wrote their own manuals, and 




Chapter Four: U.S. Army Mobile Training Teams in South America 
John F. Kennedy and his administration devoted more time and attention to Latin 
American affairs than any other United States government in the modern era. The 
rationale behind this unprecedented effort was multifaceted. Fears of a “second Cuba,” 
the desire to get rid of Fidel Castro and the loss of U.S. prestige over the Bay of Pigs 
fiasco all served to elevate the importance of Latin America in the minds of the president 
and his advisors. These men developed an enduring U.S. policy for the region that rested 
on two pillars: internal security and internal development. They conceptualized economic 
development as the mechanism to inoculate Latin American societies from the threat of 
Communist subversion. The fruits of modernization and economic prosperity would, if 
allowed time to succeed, eliminate the poverty and inequality that plagued the region and 
made democracy vulnerable. Internal security, on the other hand, served as the 
mechanism to protect local populations and weak regional governments from the 
Communist threat and to buy time for economic growth to generate positive results. From 
this theoretical framework, Kennedy derived his primary foreign policy strategies for 
Latin America: counterinsurgency (internal security) and the Alliance for Progress 
(internal development). The U.S. Army, through the Special Action Force, conducted 
mobile training team missions (small teams of skilled U.S. military experts dispatched to 
instruct foreign military and security forces in their own countries, usually in their own 
language) throughout Latin America in support of these two U.S. regional objectives.  
Kennedy generated intense momentum in support of counterinsurgency and 
internal development, and this momentum continued to shape U.S. policy even after his 




recede after the Brazilian military coup d’état in 1964 and the U.S. intervention into the 
Dominican Republic in 1965. Southeast Asia came to preoccupy President Lyndon 
Johnson’s foreign policy agenda - not Latin America. As the United States began a hot 
war in Vietnam, its counterinsurgency efforts in the Americas diminished. The Special 
Action Force conducted its greatest number of training missions to Latin American in 
1965 and thereafter they began a long decline.  
The Special Action Force was a cornerstone of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in 
Latin America during the 1960s. It was the primary organization conducting Mobile 
Training Team (MTT) missions in the region, yet this organization remains a shadowy 
and often unrecognized instrument of U.S. Cold War foreign policy. In 1965, its most 
active year, the Special Action Force conducted 107 MTT missions accounting for some 
eighty percent of Army MTT missions and over half of all MTTs conducted by U.S. 
forces that year.1 Up to now, historians have often exaggerated the impact of U.S. 
training of Latin American soldiers. This analysis finds its impact often quite limited and 
its training exceedingly perishable.  
A detailed analysis of the historical records of the Special Action Force and other 
Army offices involved in the conduct and management of mobile training team efforts 
sheds new light on these heretofore-overlooked organizations. Some authors have 
interpreted any U.S. mobile training team visit to a Latin American country as 
transferring lasting counterinsurgency doctrine and skills.2 In contrast, this dissertation 
                                               
1  “United States Southern Command Historical Report CY 1965,” 29 April 1966, (hereafter cited as 
USSOUTHCOM CY65), U.S. Army Center of Military History (hereafter cited as CMH), XII-5; Special 
Action Force for Latin America, “Historical Report 1965” (hereafter cited as SAF 65), U.S. Army Heritage 
and Education Center (hereafter cited as USAHEC), n. pag. 
2 See for example: Patrice J. McSherry, Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin 
America (Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 2005), 17-8; Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin 
America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 




argues that most instruction did not focus on counterinsurgency and that all training was 
more difficult to impart, less pervasive (affected fewer personnel), and less durable 
(competencies degraded over time) than previously understood. If the Special Action 
Force represented the spear’s point of military modernization, why did its activities yield 
few results for counterinsurgency in Latin America? Despite Cold War fears, when the 
United States offered Latin American governments and security forces military training 
missions in the 1960s, regional leaders overwhelmingly chose internal development 
(civic action) and technical assistance support – not internal security and 
counterinsurgency.  
THE ORIGIN OF THE SPECIAL FORCES 
The U.S. Army augmented Kennedy’s counterinsurgency emphasis with a robust 
effort to provide assistance to Latin American forces through Mobile Training Teams. 
These teams ranged in size from one man, to groups of fifteen or sixteen (or more), 
depending on the size of the force to be trained, the complexity of the subject, and the 
duration of the mission. All three U.S. military services dispatched MTTs to Latin 
America during the 1960s and 1970s. The United States Air Force undertook MTTs in 
counterinsurgency and conventional aviation skills for counterpart air forces, while the 
U.S. Navy carried out missions in conventional maritime skills for regional naval forces. 
However, the U.S. Army executed the majority of regional Mobile Training Team 
missions. The U.S. Southern Command (the joint military headquarters responsible for all 
U.S. military activities in Central America, South America and the Caribbean) reported a 
combined total of two hundred MTTs conducted in 1965. The Army implemented 131 of 
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those missions (sixty-five percent) while the Air Force completed forty-seven (twenty-
four percent) and the Navy accomplished twenty-two (eleven percent).3  
Before the Army could conduct multiple, repetitive training missions in Latin 
American countries, it had to build the capability to undertake this rather unusual mission 
on more than just an ad hoc basis. Few soldiers could immediately serve as foreign 
military trainers, and the Army lacked a specialized organization to coordinate and 
execute its new counterinsurgency mandate. In order to be successful, these teams of 
experts needed more than just the right military skills; they needed to speak their 
students’ language and understand their culture. One type of Army organization already 
possessed the required mix of skills and attributes: the Special Forces. The Army founded 
Special Forces in the early 1950s to conduct unconventional warfare in enemy controlled 
areas during times of war. Success in that mission required mastery of numerous 
advanced military skills, but it also necessitated language and cultural knowledge. This 
unique blend of skills and the similarities between unconventional warfare (fighting as 
guerrillas) and counterinsurgency (fighting against guerrillas) made the Special Forces 
the Army’s counterinsurgency experts in the 1960s. It became the logical choice to 
assume the new mission of training foreign security forces in their own countries. In 
Latin America, Army Special Forces executed the preponderance of counterinsurgency 
Mobile Training Team missions.  
The Army rapidly expanded its Special Forces units in the early 1960s in order to 
implement its new counterinsurgency efforts. In January1961, the U.S. Army had only 
1,800 Special Forces troops, “trained for guerrilla operations in communist-controlled 
                                               




areas.”4 By January 1963, the Army boasted 8,000 Special Forces soldiers reorganized 
into regionally-focused Special Forces Groups.5  In late 1962, the Army dispatched four 
hundred men from the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina to the U.S. 
Caribbean Command in the Panama Canal Zone. These men formed the nucleus of the 
new, regionally oriented 8th Special Forces Group officially activated on April 1, 1963.6 
The Army reinforced the 8th Special Forces with psychological warfare, medical, military 
intelligence, military police and engineer units. Together these units comprised the 
Special Action Force for Latin America. Between 1962 and 1973, the Special Action 
Force deployed hundreds of Mobile Training Teams from its base at Fort Gulick, Panama 
to conduct missions from Guatemala to Chile and from the Dominican Republic to 
Brazil.7  
In order to understand the mobile training efforts of the U.S. Army one must first 
understand the military organizations tasked to execute those missions. These 
organizations shaped the doctrine, tactics and methodology of counterinsurgency 
training. This analysis begins with the core element of the Special Action Force for Latin 
America: the 8th Special Forces Group. The U.S. Army has a long history in the conduct 
of unconventional warfare; however, prior to the Korean War the Army eschewed 
maintaining such units during peacetime. Instead, the Army preferred to organize, man 
and equip these formations on an ad hoc basis once hostilities had begun. The volatility 
and uncertainty of the Cold War convinced Army leaders to reconsider that approach. 
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 Prior to the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s, U.S. Army unconventional 
warfare encompassed three distinct missions: guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and 
resistance – all viewed as wartime operations.8 Each of these missions has a precise 
military definition and technical nuance that may be unfamiliar to many readers. During 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. Army defined these missions as follows:  
Guerrilla warfare is the conduct of combat operations inside a country in 
enemy or enemy-held territory on a military or paramilitary basis by units 
organized from predominately indigenous forces. The aim is to weaken 
the established government of the target country by reducing the combat 
effectiveness of the military forces, the economic means, and the overall 
morale and will to resist.  
Evasion and escape are those operations whereby friendly military 
personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from 
enemy-held or unfriendly areas to areas under friendly control.  
A resistance movement is an organized effort by some portion of the civil 
population of a country to resist the legally established government or an 
occupying power. Initially such resistance may consist of subversive 
political activities and other such actions designed to agitate and 
propagandize the population to distrust and lose confidence in the legally 
established government or occupying power. If not suppressed, such 
resistance can result in insurgency by irregular forces.9  
Two of these types of missions (guerrilla warfare and evasion and escape) – conducted 
behind enemy lines during the Korean War – proved their value to Army planners and 
formed the mission set for early unconventional warfare units. “Many North Korean and 
Chinese units were kept from a place in the main battle line by the necessity of 
conducting counterguerrilla operations,” Army historians later wrote, “The U.N. 
guerrillas were also of inestimable aid in rescuing downed flyers and escaped 
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prisoners.”10 The success of unconventional operations in Korea soon intermingled with 
Army planners’ fears of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. 
Major General Robert A. McClure, the Army’s Chief of Psychological Warfare, 
established a Special Operations Division in mid-1951 “to create a formal unconventional 
warfare capability for the Army.”11 McClure assembled a team of officers with varied 
and unique experience in guerrilla warfare that spanned World War II and Korea. Colonel 
Aaron Bank brought his experience fighting with the French Resistance, the Maquis, as a 
member of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Colonel Wendell Fertig led guerrillas 
in combat against the Japanese occupiers on the Philippine Island of Mindanao. 
Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann organized five Filipino guerrilla regiments on 
the island of Luzon and led them during three years of operations behind enemy lines.12 
In the interwar years, Volckmann authored Army Field Manual 31-20 Operations Against 
Guerrilla Forces and Field Manual 31-21 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla 
Warfare.13 Yet Volckmann was no ordinary scholar. General McClure recruited him in a 
hospital bed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center after Volckmann’s medical evacuation 
from Korea, where in December 1951 Volckmann had been planning and directing 
“behind the lines operations in North Korea.”14  
Colonel Marvin Waters and Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Blair brought their 
experience of guerrilla warfare in Burma. Each had served in the 5307th Composite Unit 
(Provisional), better known as Merrill’s Marauders.  The Army ordered Blair out of the 
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front lines in Korea in March 1951, reassigned him to the Special Operations Division, 
and tasked him with drafting the training program for a new unconventional warfare 
unit.15 However, these men all boasted experience in fighting as guerrillas – not against 
them, which reflected the U.S. Army’s thinking at this stage. Concerns over how to fight 
against guerrillas awakened only later, after the Army realized it also needed a capability 
to confront the guerrilla insurgencies that arose in multiple countries in the late 1950s.   
Together the men of General McClure’s Special Operations Division not only 
conceptualized the organizational structure of the soon-to-be Special Forces, they also 
strongly influenced its roles and missions. Bank and Volckmann “based their plans for 
the Army’s unconventional warfare capability on their World War II experiences with the 
Philippine guerrillas and the OSS,” Alfred H. Paddock Jr. explains in U.S. Army Special 
Warfare: Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952.16 Paddock 
goes on to cite Bank again writing that, “Special Forces units were developed ‘in the OSS 
pattern of tiny units with the prime mission of developing, training, and equipping the 
guerrilla potential deep in enemy territory.’”17 That enemy territory was Eastern Europe. 
Paddock’s research illustrates that, 
By the end of May [1951], the thinking in G-3 [Army Operations] and 
OCPW [Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare – General McClure] 
had begun to crystalize concerning the utilization of the Eastern European 
recruits who would be brought into the Army via the Lodge bill 
[legislation expediting U.S. citizenship for Eastern European nationals in 
return for five years of military service]…The mission of these aliens 
[under the supervision and leadership of U.S. officers] would be to 
organize guerrilla bands in Eastern Europe after war began and attack the 
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Soviet lines of communication, their purpose being to slow, or “retard,” 
the Soviet advance into Western Europe.18 
“Despite a ‘hot war’ in Korea,” Paddock concluded that, “the primary influence behind 
the Army’s interest in unconventional warfare was the desire for a guerrilla capability in 
Europe to help ‘retard’ a Soviet invasion, should it occur.”19 
In order to implement this new capability as soon as possible the U.S. Army 
established its first Special Forces unit while still fighting the Korean War. After 
recruiting, screening, and training several hundred volunteers, the Army made plans to 
establish its first permanent unconventional warfare organization. The Army officially 
activated the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina in June 
1952.20 The Army relocated the10th Special Forces to Bad Tolz in Southern Germany just 
over a year later.  
When it departed from the United States, the 10th Group left behind some five 
hundred trained men who were excess to its authorized personnel strength. The Army 
utilized these men to form a second group, designated as the 77th Special Forces, in 
September 1953. Both of these organizations centered their operational capability on 
small detachments of specially trained soldiers. A1965 historical report on Special Forces 
activities in Latin America observed that, “Each detachment was designed to be a self-
contained unit with some 10 to 15 men able to work as far as 1000 miles behind enemy 
lines. Such a detachment was capable of organizing and training guerrilla regiments of up 
to 1500 men.” Further, the report explained that, “guerrilla warfare was the main study of 
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Special Forces at this time, while the field of counterinsurgency was mostly overlooked,” 
mirroring U.S. Army doctrine in the late 1950s.21  
During this stage of the Cold War, the Army envisioned employing its Special 
Forces units primarily in an offensive role. “In a general war,” Army doctrine writers 
explained, “Special Forces organize guerrilla forces to support conventional military 
operations…Their operations are generally conducted in denied (enemy controlled) 
territory.”22 Thus during the formative years of the Special Forces in the 1950s, two key 
tenets defined unconventional warfare: it consisted of wartime operations, and it was 
conducted in support of regular or conventional forces.23 Counterinsurgency later 
overturned both of these tenets.   
The complexion of the Cold War changed as the 1950s became the 1960s, and the 
Special Forces adapted to meet the challenges. The 1950s national strategy of Massive 
Retaliation and its reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent to Soviet aggression gave 
way to Kennedy’s Flexible Response. President Kennedy sought new capabilities to 
respond to conflicts and instability in the Third World, often instigated or supported by 
the Kremlin. By 1959, insurgencies raged in Malaysia, Cyprus, Laos and Vietnam, and 
Fidel Castro’s guerrillas had toppled the Batista government in Cuba. Soviet Premier 
Nikita Kruschev proclaimed his nation’s support for wars of national liberation in 1961. 
Castro’s success and Kruschev’s threat gained the full attention of the Kennedy 
administration. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara delivered a speech in Chicago in 
February1962, in which he explained that,  
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What Chairman Kruschev describes as wars of liberation and political 
uprisings, I prefer to describe as subversion and covert aggression. We 
have learned to recognize the pattern of this attack. It feeds on conditions 
of poverty and unequal opportunity, and it distorts the legitimate 
aspirations of peoples just beginning to realize the reach of human 
potential. It is particularly dangerous to those nations that have not yet 
formulated the essential consensus of values, which a free society requires 
for survival… But we shall have to deal with the problems of “wars of 
liberation.” These wars are often not wars at all. In these conflicts, the 
force of world Communism operates in the twilight zone between political 
subversion and quasi-military action. Their military tactics are those of the 
sniper, the ambush, and the raid. Their political tactics are terror, 
extortion, and assassination. We must help the people of threatened 
nations to resist these tactics by appropriate means. You cannot carry out a 
land reform program if the local peasant leaders are being systematically 
murdered.24 
From the United States’ perspective, the Kremlin had taken a collection of 
unconventional warfare tactics and illegal methods and sought to apply them against non-
Communist nations during peacetime. The Army had recognized the threat of guerrilla 
warfare being used against U.S. forces long before Kruschev’s speech. Recall that 
Lieutenant Colonel Volckmann authored an Army manual on the conduct of counter 
guerrilla operations in 1951 (Field Manual 31-20 Operations Against Guerrilla Forces). 
However, in Volckmann’s manual and during much of the 1950s, the Army expected to 
confront “irregular forces” in its own rear areas and friendly territories “as a phase of 
normal war.”25 Confronting “wars of national liberation” conducted in times of peace 
rather than war was a fundamental change in the Army’s mission. This new Cold War 
threat compelled the Army to develop a defensive role for its Special Forces. The Army 
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added this new counterinsurgency capability to its existing unconventional warfare and 
psychological operations competencies under a new umbrella term, Special Warfare.26 
Special Forces provided part of the new flexibility for limited wars and began to 
grow even before Eisenhower left office. The 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg 
and its sister unit the 10th Special Forces in Germany both contributed personnel to 
establish a new 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa in 1957.27 In 1960, the Army 
redesignated the 77th as the 7th Special Forces Group. But 1957 was not the last time that 
the Army called on the 7th Special Forces Group to surrender trained personnel to serve 
as the nucleus of a new Special Forces unit. The 7th Group’s role as progenitor of other 
Special Forces units rested on several factors. The 7th Group was stationed at Fort Bragg, 
which meant ready access to newly trained replacements. It also operated within the 
Special Warfare Center, which provided the 7th with a direct link to emerging 
unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency concepts.28  
As concepts evolved into formal doctrine, one line of thinking centered on how 
the Army might employ its Special Forces in a defensive role during peacetime. “Special 
Forces units can assist in training military personnel in combating guerrilla and terrorist 
activities and subversion,” Army doctrine writers argued in 1961. “[T]hey may train 
foreign military personnel in the techniques of guerrilla warfare, thus enhancing the 
defense capability of the nation concerned.”29 Also in 1961, the 7th Group began an 
experimental reorganization to better meet the demands of counterinsurgency. “[It was] 
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pioneering the formation of a Special Action Force by integrating into its organization 
several highly specialized detachments primarily to assist in the fields of 
counterinsurgency and civic action,” Army historians later observed. “These units had 
special capabilities in fields of advanced medical technology, communications, security 
analysis, engineering, military police and psychological warfare.”30  
General George H. Decker, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, eloquently 
summarized the new reality facing the Army in 1962. “Our splendid field armies in 
Europe and Korea and in reserve in the United States, combined with sea and air combat 
units, are designed for conventional and tactical nuclear warfare. Their purpose is to meet 
clearly-defined, large scale military threats,” Decker explained. “Obviously, these units 
are not the proper response to a band of guerrillas which in a flash will transform itself 
into a scattering of ‘farmers.’ Neither are they best geared to move into a weak country 
and help it move up the ladder by training local forces to improve the people’s health, 
transportation and building program…That is where Special Warfare enters the picture as 
a ‘must’ capability.”31 By 1962 the U.S. Army’s top General envisioned employing 
Special Forces separate from conventional forces and during peacetime in support of 
“weak countries.” The Army now tasked its Special Forces to train local forces and 
conduct what the Army later termed Civic Action.  
The Kennedy administration’s Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) defined 
Military Civic Action for the United States government in 1962.  It is “[t]he use of 
preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all 
levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, 
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communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social 
development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with 
the population.” Kennedy’s advisors also noted that, “US forces may at times advise or 
engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.”32 President Kennedy directed 
formation of this top level coordinating body in January 1962, “[t]o assure unity of effort 
and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and 
resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly 
countries.”33 The President initially assigned the group “cognizance” for only three 
countries: Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand. By July 1962, the administration had 
expanded the mandate of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) to eleven countries 
including Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Venezuela. Nevertheless, despite the 
growing concerns of President Kennedy and his advisors regarding Latin America, the 
region had no assigned Special Forces units until late 1962.34  
THE SPECIAL ACTION FORCE FOR LATIN AMERICA 
The lack of Special Forces worried the commander of the U.S. Caribbean 
Command. To remedy the situation, General Andrew P. O’Meara requested the 
assignment of the entire 7th Special Forces Group in January 1962. The Army balked at 
sending a full Group and instead directed the 7th to detach 310 personnel for reassignment 
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to the Panama Canal Zone to form a new 8th Special Forces Group.35 The Army assigned 
an additional 85 non-Special Forces personnel to form augmentation teams and serve as 
the nucleus for the specialized detachments of a new Special Action Force for Latin 
America. However, the 8th was but one of four new regionally-aligned Special Forces 
Groups established during the Kennedy administration. It joined the 5th Group, activated 
in September, 1961(focused on Vietnam); the 6th Group, activated in May, 1963 (oriented 
on Africa) and the 3rd Group, activated in December, 1963 (oriented on the Middle 
East).36 The Kennedy administration also established several new Special Forces Groups 
in the U.S. Army Reserve and the National Guard but there is no indication that any of 
these elements operated in Latin America.  
The first adventure faced by the new members of the Special Action Force for 
Latin America was getting to Panama. The odyssey began with a survey team dispatched 
from Fort Bragg in January 1962 to select a location to house the new unit. The survey 
team visited Fort Clayton on the Pacific side of the Isthmus just outside Panama City and 
Coco Solo Naval Base on the Atlantic side located on the outskirts of Colón. However, 
the team ultimately selected Fort Gulick for its new home, not far from Coco Solo, and 
overlooking Gatun Lake (See Figure 1).37 “This choice was perhaps the most logical 
because, even though it was on the Atlantic side [away from the majority of U.S. Army 
forces],” the unit’s historians later observed. “Fort Gulick was the home of the School of 
the Americas. In this choice of location, there would be a close proximity of Latin 
American military students to the Special Forces personnel who were primarily interested 
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in aiding and training such people.”38 After locating a prospective new base, the team 
returned to Fort Bragg where it quickly gained approval of the new site.  
Major John H. Sawyer, having served on the survey team, went back to Fort 
Gulick in May 1962 to establish the unit headquarters and prepare for the arrival of the 
advanced party. Eleven officers and 49 enlisted men drawn from the 7th Special Forces 
Group formed the advanced party and departed Fort Bragg on July 10. After a brief bus 
ride to nearby Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, the men boarded a flight to Panama. 
After arriving at Howard Air Force Base on the Pacific side, they again boarded buses for 
the ride across the isthmus to Fort Gulick arriving late that same night. The main body 
was not so lucky.  
                                               




Figure 1: Panama Canal Zone and U.S. Military Locations Map.39   
 
On August 2, 1962, Major Melvin J. Sowards, led his D Company and other 
assigned personnel to the train station at Fort Bragg to begin their journey to Panama. 
Sowards and some 250 men boarded the train that morning heading not south, towards 
Panama, but north to New York City. Eventually arriving at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, the 
men boarded a Navy transport ship, the USNS Geiger, for their trip to Panama.40 
Sowards and his men endured over a week at sea, but after stops at San Juan, Puerto Rico 
and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, they finally docked in Colón, Panama on August 11 and 
wearily made their way to Fort Gulick. The Geiger returned for service in the Caribbean 
in 1965 in support of the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic and later 
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transported troops for combat in Vietnam.41 In 1962 Sowards and his men were probably 
glad to see it go. 
The new unit’s augmentation detachments departed last and completed the 
movement. These 85 or so men left Fort Bragg on 15 August bound for Charleston Air 
Force Base, South Carolina. There they boarded a plane for the brief seven-hour flight to 
Panama. With the new unit finally consolidated at Fort Gulick, recently promoted 
Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer assumed command of the organization that would soon be the 
Army’s first Special Action Force. The adventures and obstacles faced by the men who 
established the Special Action Force foreshadowed the challenges they and their 
descendants endured as they fanned out across the region over the next several years, 
journeying to both the urban centers and the remote hinterlands of Latin America to 
deliver their training courses.42   
The U. S. Army purposely built the Special Action Force for Latin America to 
train foreign military personnel. The unit retained its general war Special Forces mission 
to conduct guerrilla warfare in support of conventional forces, although it never executed 
that capability.  From its inception, the Special Action Force undertook a unique and 
expansive mission:  
1. To advise, train, and assist Latin American military forces in 
counterinsurgency activities. 
2. To develop, organize, train and direct native forces in the conduct of 
guerrilla warfare. 
3. To support the U.S. Armed Forces Southern Command contingency plans. 
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4. To assist Southern Command in developing plans to use the Special 
Action Force under varying conditions.  
5. To accomplish civic action projects.43  
An analysis of the Special Action Force’s historical record confirms that the men of the 
unit devoted a large percentage of their time and energy to the first mission objective of 
training Latin American forces for counterinsurgency. “[T]he business of the Special 
Action Force,” the organization’s 1966 historical summary bluntly stated, “is to deploy 
Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) throughout Latin America.”44 In fact, they deployed 
hundreds over the unit’s ten-year lifespan. 
When not deployed to train regional forces, the men of the Special Action Force 
still needed to maintain the competencies required to execute both their training and 
guerrilla warfare missions. At Fort Gulick, Panama, they honed their own skills in 
marksmanship, demolitions, parachuting, communications, medical aid, patrolling, and 
planning operations, to mention but a few areas of expertise. Those who were not native 
Spanish speakers--and there were many--also practiced their language skills. “The 
necessity for proficiency in this [Spanish] language was obvious,” the unit noted in its 
1965 historical report, “but not all personnel were able to attend language school before 
arrival in the Canal Zone.”  
The Special Action Force lacked a facility for language training in Panama so 
they simply decided to establish their own. An instructor arrived from the Defense 
Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California in early 1963 and “presented an 80-
hour seminar on methods of instruction and organization of DLI schools to the teachers 
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who were scheduled to teach the new course.”45 In May 1963, the first class enrolled and 
began a 12-week course consisting of 400 hours of instruction in speaking, reading and 
writing Spanish. In 1964, the school added Portuguese language instruction to its 
curriculum in order to expand the cadre of Portuguese speakers maintained by the Special 
Action Force. These men taught the Army’s jungle warfare course to a group from the 
Brazilian Army with all instruction delivered in Portuguese in August 1964. “[W]hen the 
Brazilian contingent finished,” unit historians noted, “they were able to return home and 
organize their own school in the Amazon basin.”46 
The men who comprised the Special Action Force for Latin America were an 
eclectic bunch. Those serving in the 8th Special Forces shared the bond that all had 
volunteered for airborne training (military parachuting) and all had volunteered for and 
completed the grueling Special Forces training course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 
Many of the original members were veterans of World War II and Korea with deep 
military experience forged through years in combat. Others were relative novices fresh 
from Fort Bragg. The unit also contained Latino members from the Southwestern United 
States and Puerto Rico. These men would have carried with them an innate cultural 
understanding of the region that others lacked.47  
Some of the older veterans had begun executing training missions in Latin 
America even before 1962.  As an example, the U.S. Army conducted seven MTTs in 
Bolivia in late 1961 and early 1962 training some 700 soldiers. Other early Company D, 
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7th Special Forces MTTs visited Venezuela and Colombia.48 Many of the later arrivals 
had to undergo extensive training in Panama under the tutelage of these veterans before 
they were qualified to train foreign troops. One young private, Kenny McMullin, later 
recalled his own odyssey to Panama in 1964:  
After a short language course and a shorter home leave, we flew to 
Panama, landing on the Pacific side, and boarded rail cars for the fifty 
mile trip across the Isthmus to the Caribbean and Fort Gulick. The rickety 
old train swayed as it clacked its way through the dense jungle and rain 
forest. As darkness fell, the conductor came through the cars lighting old 
oil lamps. I looked out the window half expecting Jesse James to attack.  
We were the first rotation of troops to the 8th; it wasn’t an even trade. 
Most of us were PFCs [Privates First Class] on our first trip outside the 
United States. The men we were supposed to replace were a truly 
awesome band of warriors. During a general’s inspection we saw that the 
commander wore on his right shoulder the combat scroll of the 6th Ranger 
Battalion from the Pacific War, and his executive officer wore the red 
arrowhead patch of the First Special Service Force. We saw the patches of 
Merrill’s Marauders, the Marine Raiders, the 82nd, 101st, and 17th 
Airborne Divisions of World War II. The Sergeant Major had jumped with 
the 101st Pathfinders at Normandy, and others had jumped with the 187th 
Regimental Combat Team in Korea… 
Our chance to serve with these soldiers was truly fortunate. Most of us 
would all too soon be serving in Vietnam, and the 8th was really a Special 
Forces graduate school for us. Exercises and training helped refine the 
basic skills we had learned at Fort Bragg. The tactics, techniques, and 
tradecraft we practiced in the jungle of Panama under the tutelage of those 
veterans undoubtedly were the contributing factors in our later survival. It 
was no six week “shake and bake” course for us. Those old professionals 
went out of their way make us feel accepted and to teach us as much as we 
could absorb.49 
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Many of these men served multiple tours in the 8th Special Forces, accepting assignments 
to Vietnam, or other locations, and then returning to the Canal Zone. Those who 
participated in mobile training team missions undoubtedly shared their skills and 
experience with their counterparts in Latin America.  
COUNTERINSURGENCY OR CIVIC ACTION? 
Mobile Training Teams varied greatly in size with each team specifically 
configured by size and composition of skill sets to meet the training needs of the host 
nation forces. The record of the Special Action Force’s activities reveals a surprisingly 
broad repertoire of skills. These men executed conventional military skills missions such 
as marksmanship and infantry training, but they also taught such diverse courses as soil 
conservation, road construction, and water purification. In its 1966 regulation on the 
training of foreign nationals, Army Forces Southern Command designated the 8th Special 
Forces Group primary responsibility for the conduct of twenty-five types of training 
missions. The Special Action Force also conducted some types of training not listed in 
the Army Forces Southern Command regulation (see Appendix A: Types of Special 
Action Force for Latin America Mobile Training Team Missions).50 
Several discrepancies exist between these two lists. The cursory explanation is 
that the first list covers missions assigned to the Special Action Force from its higher 
headquarters while the second is a compendium of missions conducted. However, 
digging deeper uncovers other issues. For example, the headquarters assigned its 
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subordinate as the subject matter expert for three types of environmental training: jungle, 
mountain and desert operations. Yet the Special Action Force makes no mention of 
training team missions for these operations in its very detailed 1966 historical 
supplement. The explanation for their absence is almost certainly related to the needs of 
regional forces. If a regional army did not see the need for particular type of training it 
simply did not request (or accept) it from its Army Mission. Countries with high altitude 
mountain ranges usually established specialized army units to operate in those regions. 
Although a few regions of South America do contain desert terrain, one would expect 
those country’s armies to understand how to operate on that terrain since it comprised 
part of their national territory.  
However, jungle operations training proved an interesting exception to this logic. 
Numerous Latin American countries include jungle terrain, or more precisely tropical or 
temperate rainforests. What their armies lacked was experience in conducting combat 
operations in that environment. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, had operated a highly 
regarded jungle training school in the Panama Canal Zone since the early 1950s. The 
school based its curriculum on the Army’s hard won expertise gleaned in the course of 
the Pacific Islands Campaign and in the China, Burma, and India Theater during World 
War II. As U.S. Special Forces gained more recent experience in Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Army incorporated those experiences into 
the course. Thus it made better sense for regional armies to send their troops to learn 
jungle skills from the American instructors in Panama rather than attempting to do so via 
mobile training teams. In fact, the Brazilian Army contingent who attended the jungle 




they had learned at the American-run course.51 Other discrepancies in the lists are 
explained by minor rearrangements in the subject matter or shifts in terminology.    
Why did the Army’s principal counterinsurgency trainers only offer two courses 
directly related to the subject (Internal Defense/ Counterinsurgency and Counter Guerrilla 
Warfare)? A Special Action Force officer of the 1960s might also categorize all the 
mobile training missions his organization conducted in Latin America as supporting 
counterinsurgency – and he would technically be correct. The answer to this paradox lies 
in the complexity of counterinsurgency doctrine, the nuanced meanings of the 
terminology, and the determination of whether a particular mission type directly or 
indirectly supported counterinsurgency. Understanding and applying the semantics 
related to special warfare and counterinsurgency precisely proved equally elusive in the 
1960s. To help educate its soldiers and officers, the Army published, Special Warfare, 
U.S. Army: an Army Specialty in 1962. In the article entitled “Use the Right Word!,” the 
Army urged its members to employ the correct terminology when discussing special 
warfare and counterinsurgency.52 Not everyone read the article.  
In “Use the Right Word!,” the Army defined counterinsurgency as “all military, 
political, economic, psychological, and sociological activities directed toward preventing 
and suppressing resistance groups.”53 The confusion arises in that the Special Action 
Force supported the overarching counterinsurgency efforts of host nation security forces 
in two distinct ways. First, the Special Action Force provided Latin American security 
forces with skills and training directly related to counterinsurgency. This training 
included doctrinal instruction (to enable them to understand and apply counterinsurgency 
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concepts) and counterguerrilla training (to assist them in conducting military operations 
against guerrilla forces). Adding to the confusion, the Special Action Force often labeled 
both these mission types as counterinsurgency MTTs in its reporting. However, these 
mission types represented only a small fraction of the mobile training team activities 
conducted in Latin America. The unit’s 1966 historical report notes that out of eighty-
three MTTs conducted in 1966, only “[n]ine of these missions dealt directly with 
counterinsurgency matters [i.e. doctrine or counterguerrilla training] and psychological 
operations, while seventy-four were indirectly valuable for counterinsurgency by dealing 
in such matters as technical or community assistance.”54  
This last category encompassed the Special Action Force’s second larger and 
indirect contribution to the host nation’s overall counterinsurgency efforts: civic action. 
The Army defined civic action as, “any action performed by military forces of a country, 
utilizing military manpower and skills in cooperation with civil agencies, authorities, or 
groups, that is designed to improve the economic or social conditions of that country. 
Civic action programs can enhance the stature of indigenous military forces and improve 
their relationship with the population. Thus such programs can be a major contributing 
factor to the elimination of insurgency.”55 Therefore, while civic action missions and 
counterinsurgency training both supported a country’s overall counterinsurgency efforts, 
only those labeled counterinsurgency focused their primary attention on imparting 
counterinsurgency concepts or counterguerrilla combat related skills to host nation 
security forces.  
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Yet even this close definition of terms is not sufficient to eliminate all ambiguity 
from the historical record of U.S. counterinsurgency training of Latin American forces 
during the Cold War. How the receiving country’s forces applied (or intended to apply) 
the skills taught by the Special Action Force is by far the most accurate determinant of 
where exactly the U.S. imparted counterinsurgency training. For example, some 
conventional military skills training missions merit categorization as counterinsurgency. 
In 1967, the Special Action Force dispatched a sixteen-man team to Bolivia to train a new 
Ranger Battalion. In its historical summary the unit lists this event as “Infantry 
Operations.”56 However, because the objective was to train a specialized counterguerrilla 
unit, event is most accurately classified as counterinsurgency training. The Bolivian 
Rangers eventually put down the insurgency led Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The Special 
Action Force also undertook several iterations of Ranger training for the Chilean Army in 
1962 and 1963. Yet these events focused on training conventional infantry units not 
related to an insurgency and therefore do not merit categorization as counterinsurgency 
related. The tactics may have been the similar but the intended uses were different.  
What is clear from the available records is that the Special Action Force 
conducted far fewer counterinsurgency (COIN) focused training missions than might be 
expected. By its own calculations the organization conducted a total of 107 training team 
missions in 1965. Of these only nineteen were categorized as 
counterinsurgency/psychological operations – four of which were survey deployments 
intended only to assess local forces and coordinate future training. The remaining eighty-
eight missions supported technical assistance or civic action (including eight surveys). 
Therefore, during its most active year, only eighteen percent of the Special Action 
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Force’s training deployments related directly to counterinsurgency training. Eighty-two 
percent of its missions only indirectly supported counterinsurgency. In 1966 this trend 
continued; out of eighty-three mobile training missions conducted only nine supported 
counterinsurgency/ psychological operations (eleven percent) while seventy-four focused 
on technical assistance or civic action (eighty-nine percent)(see Table 4.1).57  
Table 4.1: Special Action Force Mobile Training Team Missions by Type. 
 
Latin American governments chose what training they accepted from the United 
States and they overwhelmingly chose technical assistance and civic action – not 
counterinsurgency. An analysis of mobile training team missions to South America 
across the ten-year lifespan of the Special Action Force illustrates the point (see Table 
4.2).58 Colombia and Bolivia hosted the largest numbers of training team missions: 
Colombia received 75 missions and Bolivia accepted 54. Yet in both cases, 
counterinsurgency training comprised only a fraction of the total training received from 
the United States. Colombia’s nine counterinsurgency events (five of which were 
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psychological operations) represented just twelve percent of the training missions to that 
country. Only eight of Bolivia’s fifty-four training team deployments focused on 
counterinsurgency (two of which were psychological operations) equaling fifteen percent 
of the total. No South American country received a majority of its U.S. sponsored 
training in the form of counterinsurgency (see Table 4.3).59 Venezuela had by far the 
highest density of counterinsurgency training of any country in Latin America (fourteen 
missions) representing forty percent of total missions conducted in that nation. Other 
countries received far fewer counterinsurgency focused training missions if any. Uruguay 
accepted the fewest U.S. training visits in South America – only seventeen – and received 
no counterinsurgency training.60 Country focused analysis of the timing and significance 
of training team and counterinsurgency training team missions follow in subsequent 
chapters.  
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Table 4.2: Special Action Force Mobile Training Team Missions in South America by 




















Table 4.3: Special Action Force Mobile Training Team Missions in South America 1962-
1973. 





% of MTTs teaching 
Counterinsurgency 
Argentina 29 4 14% 
Bolivia 54 8 15% 
Brazil 19 3 16% 
Chile 39 2 5% 
Colombia 75 9 12% 
Ecuador 38 4 11% 
Paraguay 23 2 9% 
Peru 30 4 13% 
Uruguay 17 0 0% 
Venezuela 35 14 40% 
 
THE MANAGEMENT OF MOBILE TRAINING TEAM MISSIONS 
The Army managed its Mobile Training Team efforts in Latin America through 
the interplay of three types of organizations. No single source outlines the Army’s 
internal procedures and protocols for managing mobile training teams. However, a 
careful analysis and interpretation of a wide variety of reports, records, correspondence, 
personal accounts and secondary sources allows this author to reconstruct this complex 
process. A mosaic of fragmentary data yields the follow description.  
Mobile training team missions (and other counterinsurgency and conventional 




Groups (MAAGs) or Military Groups (MILGROUPs) stationed throughout the region. 
The names of these organizations varied by country depending on the term adopted in 
each country’s bilateral military agreement with the United States. However, these 
organizations performed largely the same functions regardless of country although they 
often differed greatly in size. In general, a U.S. Army Colonel, or occasionally an officer 
of equivalent rank from another service, commanded each office; although a few General 
officers also led selected U.S. missions. The Department of Defense organized each 
office around Army, Air Force and Navy elements (usually referred to as missions) and 
administrative staff (almost always including local nationals hired by the United States).  
Officers manning these Army Missions generated requests for mobile training 
team support. The U.S. Army officers based their requests on several factors. Foremost 
were the United States’ security objectives for the country. The officers then crafted their 
assessments based on the needs of the host nation army and/or security forces to meet 
those objectives. They also had to consider the willingness of those organizations to 
accept U.S. training, and the local political and security situation, among other factors. 
Each MILGROUP or MAAG integrated its mobile training team requests into a broader 
program of support to host nation security forces. These support programs included 
various combinations of schools attendance in the U.S. or the Canal Zone; military 
assistance requests for equipment, arms or munitions; and the support, training and 
evaluation requirements of U.S.-sponsored Military Assistance Program (MAP) units 
(although not all countries participated in this program). These officers had broad 
responsibility for coordinating with, advising, assisting, and sometimes training local 




Moreover, their job did not end when they submitted a request for mobile training team 
support. That was merely the first step in a long process.   
Approval was the first, and most crucial, step in the process. No U.S. Army 
officers possessed the authority to approve the training of foreign personnel. Likewise, 
foreign military officers could not grant approval for the U.S. military to enter their 
national territories to train their soldiers, sailors or airmen. Political leaders held the final 
approval authority for bilateral military training; usually at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs or Presidential level. U.S. Air Force Colonel Immanuel Klette led a joint 
counterinsurgency team (including Army Special Action Force members) to Venezuela in 
1963 and he recounted the approval process in a 1982 article in the journal Conflict. 
“U.S. officials in Washington, on the U.S. Country Team in Venezuela, and in the Canal 
Zone were acutely aware of both the explosiveness of the situation [in Venezuela in 
1963] and the sensitivity of the Venezuelan government officials to assistance identified 
as coming from the United States,” Klette explained. “Communist propaganda would 
have exploited such aid with a vociferousness proportionate to their ability to identify 
it.”61 Klette continued,  
The least obvious form of U.S. government operational assistance, a U.S. 
joint team, was finally agreed on. High ranking Venezuelan military 
representatives endorsed this course of action and pressed for its 
acceptance. The action chosen, although low-key, represented operational 
assistance on the part of the United States and therefore required the 
approval of the U.S. Country Team in Venezuela, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Departments of State and Defense, and the President. On the 
Venezuelan side, approval came from the Minister of Defense, the Foreign 
Minister and the President.62 
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In all cases, Latin American countries chose what missions they requested or 
accepted. The United States did not dictate the training regional military and security 
forces received although it did attempt to shape and influence the process. “[Special 
Action Force] teams are employed by direction of [the Commander, U.S. Army 
Caribbean] in response to country requests,” U.S. Army officers noted in an internal 1963 
report. “Full use of their mobile training team capability depends upon sufficient requests 
being received from collaborating countries. Missions and MAAG’s have intensified 
efforts to stimulate countries to increase their requests for teams.”63 
Each mobile training team request, if approved, then triggered a series of 
additional activities for the in-country Army mission. Before the training team arrived to 
deliver their instruction, the Chief of the U.S. Army Mission would task an officer (or 
perhaps a senior non-commissioned officer) to survey the training site(s) and conduct 
detailed coordination with the local forces receiving the training. For larger MTT 
missions, or those of long duration, one or two men from the Special Action Force might 
travel to the host country to assist in the planning and preparation. The local Army 
mission would also receive the MTT members as they arrived in country, brief them on 
local customs and conditions, advise them of any special security measures to be adhered 
to during their stay, and introduce them to the host nation forces they would soon be 
training. During the conduct of training, the Army mission bore responsibility to ensure 
the team received any necessary support not provided by the host nation forces and help 
to solve any problems the team encountered while in country. At the end of training the 
Army mission would likely receive a draft copy of the team’s after action report 
(detailing the conduct of the mission, any problems encountered, and making 
                                               




recommendations for additional training). The in-country Army officers then began the 
cycle anew, planning and coordinating future training for the host country forces.  
The rather unique nature of the internal Army documents that form the majority 
of the sources for this dissertation warrants consideration. First, the men who drafted 
these documents were committed to the concept of defending Latin American from the 
threat of Communist insurgency. They were usually seasoned officers in the ranks of 
Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel in the Army Missions. Captains or Majors commanded 
long duration mobile training team training deployments or those requiring the 
deployment of large numbers of U.S. personnel. Senior non-commissioned officers often 
led two, three or four-man technical training missions. Second is the fact that these 
documents were written for the internal use of the U.S. Army – many of which their 
authors classified to prevent dissemination. What these men wrote was not intended to be 
seen by the public or their host nation counterparts. The assessments they proffered were 
candid and often blunt. These men were engaged in a serious business and, if they 
observed weaknesses on the part of host nation individuals or units, they did not attempt 
to soften them for their superiors.   
One MTT to Venezuela in 1966 provided a five week counterinsurgency training 
course to a group of newly commissioned army lieutenants. “No major problems were 
encountered,” the unit’s after action report noted, but the Special Forces trainers also 
observed that, “the students lacked ambition, especially when they were tired.”64 
Although these sources are not written from the perspective of the Latin American forces 
the Americans trained, the perspectives of Latin Americans are not wholly absent. These 
men lived in the countries they supported, whether full time as in the case of those 
                                               




assigned to the Army missions or up to six-months at a time in the case of the mobile 
training teams. The attitudes, points of view and distinctiveness of their host nation 
counterparts often seeped in to their reporting. These internal U.S. Army documents 
provide a unique window into the implementation of American foreign policy during the 
Cold War. They also constitute the foundational primary source materials for this 
dissertation. 
CHALLENGES FACED BY MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS 
Student fatigue was far from the only challenge confronted by the men of the 
mobile training teams. Imparting military skills and concepts in a foreign country shared 
many of the problems of training foreign students in Army schools. However, some 
issues were unique to working overseas.  
Master Sergeant Isabelino Vazquez-Rodriguez, the Korean War veteran from 
Puerto Rico, recalled his experiences on a civic action mission to a remote area of the 
Peruvian Andes in the mid-1960s. His Special Forces team, enhanced with the addition of 
engineers, a small medical team and a dentist, constructed a school, a small clinic and 
drilled water wells for local inhabitants. “We found lodging in the closest town to the 
operational area,” he recalled. “[H]otels were not available, but we manage[d] to rent 
rooms in private residences. They did not have the conveniences normally found in 
hotels, but it was a good place to sleep for a few hours.” The men made the best of their 
situation taking turns teaching the locals in the new schoolhouse, caring for patients in 
the new clinic, and even presenting “basic medical classes to a small group of 
volunteers.” But the conditions were austere. “The Dentist performed dental extractions 




available; we had to build fires and heat water to disinfect the medical tools,” the Master 
Sergeant later recollected.65 
Of course different countries presented different challenges. Vazquez-Rodriguez 
also participated in a mobile training team mission to Chile to give instruction on the 
assembly, disassembly and firing of the 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles. Here the 
challenge was cultural. The Master Sergeant and his fellow trainers developed a training 
schedule for their Chilean students based on the U.S. Army’s regular ten-hour workday. 
In adapting to local customs, they quickly shortened the training day to only four hours. 
That was not the team’s only surprise. “We were forced to drink a lot of wine prior to 
lunch and could not refuse because they feel insulted if you decline,” Vazquez-Rodriguez 
later recalled. “I had to drink very slowly so as to comply with the protocols and still be 
able to concentrate on my training mission. I was not much of a drinker and Chile was 
not the place for me to get started.”66 
Another group conducting counterinsurgency training in Ecuador suffered from 
more mundane challenges. Their issues related to the transportation provided by the 
Ecuadorian Armed Forces, which loaned the team a jeep and a truck for its travel to and 
from the training site. “However, after leaving the Quito area no provisions were made to 
provide gasoline or maintenance for the two vehicles,” the team leader wrote in his after 
action report. “This forced the MTT to buy gasoline for the vehicles and obtain 
maintenance parts from civilian agencies.” Another group from this same mission was 
training in a separate location and fared even worse. Although they also received two 
vehicles from the Ecuadorian forces, these too quickly broke down. “At one time it 
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became necessary to use horses as a primary means of transportation for the MTT 
members due to the loss of both vehicles to maintenance problems.”67  
Beyond logistical and cultural issues, U.S. team members faced serious issues of 
reception and retention in their efforts to impart military training to Latin American 
forces. Conscripts made up the bulk of the manpower in most regional armies, many of 
whom –especially in the poorer countries – were illiterate. U.S. Army planners were 
aware of this challenge; both in Latin America and throughout the Third World. In its 
1963 Field Manual, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, the Army included an 
appendix titled “Guidelines for Advisors and Members of MTTs.” The appendix included 
advice and recommendations regarding “professional duties and interests,” “advisory 
techniques,” “personal attitudes and relations” and “social and military customs.” 
Illiteracy was but one of many challenges mentioned. “Understand that many indigenous 
soldiers may be illiterate, and that some do not speak even their own language well,” the 
authors cautioned. “Training must be repetitious and must emphasize practical work 
rather than lecture or conference-type instruction.”68  
The historical record indicates that Special Forces trainers did take pains to 
understand their intended audiences and shape the training to meet the needs of their 
students. For example, the horse riding American instructors in Ecuador wrote of their 
students that they “were motivated and their enthusiasm during the course was evident in 
their participation in the exercises which were assigned by the instructors. Not all were 
literate, but the comprehension of the students was good as indicated by their actions in 
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practical exercises.”69 Perhaps surprisingly, Special Action Force historical reports and 
training mission after action reports do not specifically mention problems related to 
indigenous languages. Presumably, the conscripts they encountered spoke enough 
Spanish to understand their lessons and instructions. 
Although the challenge of illiteracy varied by country and even by units within 
countries, literacy and education levels highlight an important difference between 
government forces and the revolutionaries. While national armies relied heavily on poor 
conscripts, usually from rural areas, the insurgent movements often drew the bulk of their 
membership from urban students who were literate and much better educated. Insurgent 
leaders could issue written training manuals and doctrinal treatises and expect their forces 
to comply with, or at least understand, the guidance.70 Government forces did not share 
that luxury. While such a procedure might suffice for military officers, the troops 
normally required instruction by way of oral lectures and hands-on practical exercises. 
One example of the successful application of this method for training conscripts was the 
1967 counterinsurgency mobile training team mission to Bolivia. This team trained a 
newly formed counter guerrilla unit of some 650 men to catch Che Guevara. It noted in 
its after action report that, “all personnel except the NCO’s [sic] [non-commissioned 
officers] and officers were fresh recruits [conscripts] with no previous military training.” 
American trainers also observed that, “[t]he average educational level of the personnel 
was 5 years.”71 
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Conscription presented other unique challenges. Even though some guerrilla 
fighters abandoned the cause and return to civilian life, and others fell victim to combat 
or capture in confrontations with government forces, they did not simply depart en masse 
at the end of their first year because their term of service had ended. Yet this is exactly 
the burden conscription placed on the armies of the region. In some cases it was even 
worse. In a 1962 report, the U.S. Army Mission in Bolivia lamented the problems caused 
by short terms of service for enlisted soldiers. “Although the term of conscription is one 
year,” the American officers wrote, “many conscriptees are released before completing 
the period due to budget limitations imposed on the Host Country [Bolivian] Army which 
result in a lack of funds to support conscriptees for the full year.”72  
A different group of U.S. Army trainers faced the conscription problem again five 
years later. The 1967 mission that trained the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion worried 
about the perishability of their investment in training conscripts and attempted to 
negotiate a solution. “The Ranger Battalion was composed of conscripts with an initial 
obligation of 1 year [of] service,” the Special Forces trainers wrote, “a 2-year obligation 
was promised by the Bolivian Army; however, no public announcement has been made in 
reference to this.”73 Fortunately for the trainees, they caught Che Guevara within days of 
their deployment. Nevertheless, one of the units most intensively trained in 
counterinsurgency by the U.S. Army’ Special Action Force had an operational lifespan 
(time available to conduct missions for its government) of slightly under six months.74 
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This represented a very low return on investment for the United States. The available 
records do not indicate whether the conscripts of the 2nd Ranger Battalion served an 
additional year. It seems unlikely that they did.  
The perishability problem of training conscript units is similar to a second, larger 
issue.  Throughout the decade and across all countries, U.S. trainers and Army mission 
personnel faced an early dissipation of their efforts. If the Americans only trained ad hoc 
groups of individuals, they diffused their efforts across the partner nation army with little 
to show for their time and trouble. The counterinsurgency mission to Ecuador in 1963 
(mentioned above) offers a window into this phenomenon. This mission was, on face 
value, a resounding success. Three officers and thirteen men of the Special Action Force 
spent some ninety days in Ecuador teaching counterinsurgency courses at three military 
installations. Each course consisted of three weeks of classroom instruction followed by a 
week of practical exercises in a field environment. They trained a cumulative total of 
twenty-three officers and two-hundred and sixty-eight enlisted men. The instructors set 
high standards for the students. To receive a certificate of completion at the end of the 
course students were required to meet the minimum requirements. Twenty-four students 
failed to meet the course requirements and did not receive a certificate of completion. Yet 
despite their efforts, and apparent success, the men who conducted the training courses 
struck a pessimistic note regarding what they had achieved. “[O]nly in two locations are 
these trained personnel located in sufficient quantities to be utilized as an effective unit,” 
the trainers lamented. “Personnel from the other units which were represented at these 
courses have returned to their parent units, representing only a small fraction with no 
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clearly defined plans for training other members of their units. In many cases, these 
returnees are of the lower grade structures who are not able to influence instruction of 
their units by their commanders.75 The impact of U.S. training dissipated rapidly. Many 
individuals who received counterinsurgency instruction returned to their scattered units 
and never put their training to use.    
In the recommendations section of their after action report, the trainers to Ecuador 
offered a solution to the dilemma of dissipation. They suggested that a follow-on mission 
focus their efforts exclusively on “two different 150-man Units which have been 
designated as Counter-Insurgency Units,” and that the course be extended to six weeks to 
give additional focus on field training. If that was not possible, the team recommended, 
“that a cadre consisting of at least one Captain and one Lieutenant with 12 Enlisted men 
be sent from three different units to Quito to attend one six week course in Counter-
Insurgency. Then, with the help and supervision of MTT personnel when returned to their 
respective units, conduct another course of six weeks for at least 75 members of each 
unit.”76 Rather than training a collection of individuals, the American trainers sought to 
focus their efforts solely on units with a designated counterinsurgency mission.  
When American trainers instructed groups of individuals, that training often 
dissipated across the host nation army when the students returned to their units. Training 
groups of individuals could be effective for imparting counterinsurgency doctrine – more 
so when directed at mid- or senior-grade officers. It was much less effective for teaching 
tactics. Training complete units was an effective way of imparting tactical skills and 
techniques and creating competent counterinsurgency units. But that effectiveness was 
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also perishable and declined as members departed the unit, especially if an annual cohort 
of conscripts departed en masse. The most effective (and least often achieved) method 
was the training of instructor cadres. Host nation army trainers had the potential to break 
past the issues of dissipation by teaching repetitive courses for large numbers of students 
across several years if necessary. Likewise, this method allowed American trainers to 
ameliorate the problem of perishability; rather than striving to retrain host nation 
counterinsurgency units every year or two, they could monitor and retrain a smaller group 
of local cadre on an as-required-basis. However, transferring the training role to local 
instructors did imply a loss of American control over course content.  
Despite all its advantages, training instructor cadres also presented its own unique 
problems. A counter guerrilla mobile training team to Venezuela in 1963 provided 
follow-on training and assistance to a newly formed Instructor Group of the Fuerzas 
Armadas de Cooperación (National Guard). The Instructor Group delivered a series of 
three counter guerrilla operations courses to National Guard personnel. But the training 
got off to a rocky start. “The first course presented by the Instructor Group was rather 
poor although it did satisfy the majority of the training objectives. Instructors were 
lacking in knowledge of the material, there was a lack of prior planning, there was a 
serious deficiency in reference material and the lesson plans that were available were not 
uniform or complete,” the Special Action Force trainers recounted.  “The second course 
went much better. The instructors were much better prepared and the classes were 
conducted in a very satisfactory[,] or in some cases[,] an excellent manner.” They ended 
their appraisal on an optimistic note concluding that, “[t]he Instructor Group is now well 
qualified to continue the Counter Guerrilla Training.” But they also recommended that, 




ensure that they are properly conducted and that Lesson Plans and Training Schedules are 
closely adhered to.”77 The training of instructors was not a panacea for all problems.  
National and international events and crises often interrupted mobile training team 
efforts in Latin America – as was also the case with foreign student attendance at U.S. 
schools. For example, in its 1963 Historical Report, U.S. Southern Command cited coups 
d’état in Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and Honduras, each of which triggered a 
suspension of military assistance of varying duration.78 A Guatemalan golpe de estado 
the same year apparently did not cause an interruption of military aid. However, in 
Brazil, the failure of the leftist João Goulart administration to sign an “internal security 
note” with the United States did cause an interruption. It first prompted a suspension of 
military assistance in January and later a full cancellation of the program, valued at 
approximately US $3 million, in June 1963. The Bolivian coup d’état of 1964 also 
triggered a suspension of military assistance to that country.79  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that these interruptions of military assistance 
(of which schools and mobile training teams were but one part) came as the result of 
diplomatic decisions by the United States. A successful military coup d’état could disrupt 
the work of training teams even if the United States did not choose to curtail military 
assistance. Host country officers might find themselves immediately reassigned to new 
duties within government ministries and agencies, while soldiers and units could expect 
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orders to conduct security patrols or guard key installations.80 An unsuccessful coup 
d’état could trigger purges of individuals and the disbandment of units.  
Other crises also disrupted military training. Instability, natural disasters, 
elections, and strikes could and did obligate regional security forces to respond, making 
them unavailable to attend U.S. sponsored training. The Special Action Force’s 1966 
historical report cites the challenges faced by a training team of five officers and ten men 
dispatched to the Dominican Republic to teach logistics related subjects. “This team was 
in country during the presidential elections,” the authors noted, “which caused problems 
with those units which were constantly on alert for operations and were not interested in 
training until the situation had calmed down.” The same report mentions a non-
commissioned officer who was conducting a four week explosive ordinance disposal 
course in Guatemala. “During the mission,” the authors noted, “the MTT member 
disarmed several live bombs which were placed in a Guatemalan military museum [by 
Guatemalans] without knowledge of their dangerous potential.”81 Not all crises were 
political. 
Instability in Latin America during the 1960s also struck closer to home for the 
men of the Special Action Force. Perhaps the most disruptive example was the 1964 
Panama Canal Zone riots which occurred literally where these men lived. The riots began 
with a confrontation between U.S. and Panamanian students over the raising of their 
respective flags as a sign of national pride. However, this seemingly minor event touched 
a nerve among many Panamanians who had long resented United States’ presence in the 
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Canal Zone perceiving it as an obvious infringement of their sovereignty. The riots lasted 
four days and caused the deaths of twenty-one Panamanians and four U.S. soldiers.82 The 
Special Action Force 1965 historical summary called it “[p]robably the most significant 
event of 1964.”83 The report’s authors explained the impact on the organization: 
During this troubled period the Special Action Force was on constant alert 
and was prepared to defend the Canal Zone on order. However, they were 
primarily active concerning intelligence and monitoring duties, plus 
guarding nearby Coco Solo Hospital. Even after rioting subsided, there 
was always the possibility that additional outbreaks would occur, 
especially during the ensuing Panamanian elections and holidays. The 
result of these incidents was that Special Action Force activities in 
Panama [outside the Canal Zone with Panamanian forces] were curtailed 
for the greater part of the year, as well as the fact that a tense and 
expectant attitude was prevalent in the unit for a period of several 
months.84 
Master Sergeant Richard “Dick” Meadows, a veteran of several mobile training 
team missions, faced the shock of the 1964 riots while serving in the 8th Special Forces 
Group. Meadows and his young wife, who was pregnant at the time, lived some four 
miles outside Fort Gulick in the American section of downtown Colón. Upon receiving 
news of the riots, Meadows immediately feared for the safety of his wife Pamela. He and 
a fellow Special Forces soldier requested the use of a military vehicle and their assigned 
weapons in order to rescue her. Unit officials denied the requests. Undeterred, Meadows 
and his partner grabbed their personal hunting shotguns, borrowed a car and set off for 
Colón. “Using back streets and grimly noting the smoke from burning buildings and 
listening to the increasing number of shots,” Meadows’ biographer explained, “they made 
it to the house. It was immediately obvious that it had been visited already. The fence was 
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down and windows were broken. There was no sign of Pamela or the car.” Frantically 
Meadows returned to the base. “When we got back I found out that Pam had made it out 
by the skin of her teeth,” he said. “The rioters had downed the fence and were at the back 
door when she got away in that little old Triumph car of ours.”85 
The authors of the Special Action Force’s 1965 historical report sought to 
downplay the impact of the riots on the unit’s mobile training team efforts. “Particularly 
commendable,” they wrote, “was the fact that the training commitment at home and in 
Latin America continued despite the disturbances. For instance, MTTs that were already 
active continued without interruption. Also, the Special Action Force instituted 
counterinsurgency training for all personnel within a few months of the riots.”86 Yet a 
closer reading of this passage also tells us that the 1964 Panama Riots did disrupt 
scheduled MTTs not underway and that the unit quickly shifted its focus from training 
regional forces to preparing its own personnel in case the situation worsened. 
By 1966, the international situation began to intrude on the efforts of the Special 
Action Force to train Latin American militaries. The pull of Vietnam was increasing. The 
unit’s historians chronicled that, “[b]y the year’s end, the U.S. Army commitment in 
Vietnam was more than 250,000 and the commitment of the Armed Forces was reaching 
375,000 personnel. In addition, the U.S. Commander in Vietnam was requesting still 
more troops. The result of this was a drain on the manpower of all units outside Vietnam. 
The Special Action Force, being no exception, lost many experienced and well-trained 
men to the Southeast Asian conflict.”87 One of the men who departed the Special Action 
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Force for Vietnam in 1966 was Master Sergeant Vazquez-Rodriguez. He returned to the 
Canal Zone in January 1968 after recovering from wounds he suffered in combat in 
Vietnam the previous July.  
Beyond reassignments, the growing war in Vietnam also created an increased 
demand for experienced instructors within Panama. In 1964, the Army’s Jungle 
Operations Center trained 1,164 U.S. personnel and 219 Latin Americans. By 1966, the 
center had shifted its focus to training replacements bound for Vietnam and the increase 
in throughput was astounding. The eleven training cycles carried out in 1964 had 
ballooned to forty-two cycles by 1966, training a total of 6,639 men–an almost six-fold 
increase!88 The Special Action Force, along with other Canal Zone units, contributed men 
to the Jungle Operations Center to support the massive increase in training. However, 
while local infantry units sent enlisted soldiers and a few non-commissioned officers to 
supervise them, the Special Action Force sent trained Instructors. At the height of the 
upsurge in early 1966, the command contributed 23 officers and 68 non-commissioned 
officers. Later, that commitment dropped to a more sustainable 12 officers and 40 non-
commissioned officers, but this was still a significant drain on manpower.89 In 1966, the 
U.S. Army authorized the Special Action Force an overall manpower (the number of men 
serving in the unit) strength of 1,018 personnel. In August of that year, the organization’s 
actual manpower was 296 men below its authorized level giving it an actual strength of 
only 722 men.90 Therefore, the diversion of 91 officers and men to the Jungle Operations 
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Center in early 1966 represented a drain of approximately twelve percent of the unit’s 
strength.    
The war in Vietnam had yet a third impact. Not only did it siphon off the Special 
Action Force’s manpower, the war reduced the quality of the few replacements who were 
assigned to the unit. “Towards the end of the year the Special Action Force began to 
receive additional personnel,” said the 1966 report. “However, these were frequently 
recruits having had little or no training beyond basic instruction.”91 Thus the command, 
already shorthanded, had to devote more of its scarce manpower to training its new men 
at its home station in the Canal Zone.  
The United States’ growing involvement in Vietnam coincided with a marked 
decrease in mobile training team missions in Latin America (see Table 4.4).92 The apogee 
of Special Action Force training team deployments came in 1965 (107 missions); the 
same year U.S. ground forces began combat operations in Vietnam. Training team 
deployments in Latin America tapered to 83 in 1966 before dropping again in 1967 (56) 
and 1968 (53). Nevertheless, the available historical records of the Special Action Force 
and other U.S. Army elements involved in managing and coordinating training for Latin 
American military and security forces do not cite Vietnam as the cause of this decline. 
Other factors undoubtedly also influenced the decline in training deployments.  
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Table 4.4: Special Action Force Mobile Training Team Missions in Latin America by 
Year. 
 
From the United States’ perspective, the trend line also reflects changes within the 
region. The initial fervor and momentum of counterinsurgency (and civic action) training 
begun under the Kennedy administration (1961-1963) and carried over into the early 
years Johnson presidency (1963-1965). However two events in Latin America likely 
shaped Johnson’s perception of the Communist threat in this arena of the Cold War. First, 
the Brazilian military coup of 1964 removed the fear that South America’s largest nation 
might turn Communist. Second, the United States’ intervention in the Dominican 
Republic in 1965 signaled to the region that Johnson was willing to deploy American 












had a chilling effect on support for insurgencies in the region and conceivably diminished 
regional governments’ demands for U.S. military training.  
The greatest blow to rural insurgency in the Americas came with the capture and 
execution of Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Bolivia in late 1967. The Special Action Force 
conducted no further counterinsurgency missions in South America after that year. Unit 
records and contemporary Army doctrinal manuals reveal the cause for this surprising 
absence. The U.S. Army had no urban counterinsurgency doctrine during the 1960s. The 
Special Action Force conducted its first training team mission related to urban 
counterinsurgency, what the unit termed “urban guerrilla warfare,” in the Dominican 
Republic in April 1970 – several years after the rise of the National Liberation Action 
(ALN) in Brazil (1968-71) and the Tupamaros in Uruguay (1963-73).93 A telling passage 
in the unit’s 1970 historical report underscores this limitation. “As urban guerrilla 
warfare is a relatively new field, and of ever increasing importance in Latin America of 
the 1970s,” the unit’s historians wrote, “CPT Dixon’s team had to spend extra time in 
preparation, studying all available doctrine and writings on the subject.”94 In other words, 
Captain Dixon and his men developed their own doctrine and training program for “urban 
guerrilla warfare.” 
An analysis of relevant doctrinal manuals confirms the Army’s rural-centric view 
of counterinsurgency. Operations Against Irregular Forces (Field Manual 31-15) 
published in 1961 set the tone for the Army’s view of insurgency as a rural-based threat. 
“Areas of rugged or inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, forests, jungles, and swamps, 
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are extremely difficult to control,” the manual’s authors confidently stated, “and the 
guerrilla elements of an irregular force are most likely to flourish in such areas.” The 
same authors acknowledged that insurgent elements might conduct limited operations in 
urban areas, but the responsibility for confronting such actions either fell on the local 
police or required a short-term military action leading to the swift return of forces to main 
area of struggle in the countryside.95 Counterguerrilla Operations, (Field Manual 31-16) 
published in 1963 reinforced this message. “Terrain such as jungles, mountains, swamps, 
etc., which restricts the observation, fire, communications, and mobility of the regular 
force,” the authors explained, “is ideal for operations of guerrilla forces.”96  
The Army’s rural-centric view of insurgency persisted throughout the1960s. In an 
update to the 1967 edition of Counterguerrilla Operations (published in 1969), Army 
doctrine writers devoted new attention to “Operations in Built-Up Areas,” but maintained 
their interpretation of guerrilla operations in urban areas as a secondary effort.97 “Built-
up areas usually are unfavorable for guerrilla force operations,” the authors definitively 
explained. “Guerrillas normally will not choose to fight in these areas; however, 
underground elements in cities and towns may incite organized rioting, seize portions of 
urban areas, erect barricades, and resist attempts of counterguerrilla forces to enter the 
area.”98 Despite the example of a new form of urban-centered guerrilla warfare in Brazil 
and Uruguay (and later Argentina), the U.S. Army apparently continued to rely on its 
own rural insurgency experience gleaned in Vietnam when writing and revising its 
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doctrine. “Concentrated, urban populations are more easily controlled and protected by 
host country forces,” Army experts pronounced, “than are scattered populations in rural 
areas.”99 Moreover, the Army, and the U.S. government, viewed the cities as primarily 
the domain of police forces. The U.S. Agency for International Development provided 
police training and material assistance through its Office of Public Safety while the CIA 
assisted with police intelligence functions.100 The U.S. Army’s lack of relevance (and 
perhaps lack of mandate) in confronting urban insurgency helps explain the absence of 
counterinsurgency training missions in South America after 1967.  
The much lower rates of training team deployments from 1969-1973 almost 
certainly reflect the diminished threat of rural insurgency in the region. The overall 
decline in mobile training team activity also likely reflects the much lower level of 
attention the Nixon administration allocated to Latin America, instead focusing its efforts 
on global geopolitics with China and Soviet Union and extricating the nation from 
Vietnam. 
The previously unavailable data contained in the Special Action Force’s historical 
reports also allows new insights into the question of the United States’ military support to 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America. Unsurprisingly, the unit supported both 
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democratic and non-democratic governments.101 During its ten-year lifespan, the Special 
Action Force conducted 359 missions in South America. Two hundred and twenty-four 
of these missions (sixty-two percent) supported democratically-elected governments 
while one hundred and thirty five aided non-democratic governments (thirty-eight 
percent). Overall, the record is mixed (see Table 4.5).102 All training missions to Chile, 
Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela supported democratic governments. Meanwhile, all 
training missions to Brazil and Paraguay supported non-democratic governments. In 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru the Special Action Force provided training to 
democratic and non-democratic governments.  
 Table 4.5: Special Action Force Mobile Training Team Missions in South America 1962 
– 1973 by Government Type.  
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Does changing the paradigm from democratic versus non-democratic to Leftist 
versus anti-Communist regimes generate different results?  While labeling governments 
as anti-Communist is problematic, two regimes in South America stand out as the ones 
most likely perceived by the United States as Leftist: João Goulart (1961-1964) in Brazil 
and Salvador Allende (1970-1973) in Chile. We can assume that the United States saw 
other regional governments as anti-Communist, although certainly in varying degrees. 
Yet this new paradigm still presents some ambiguities. For example, the Special Action 
Force conducted no missions with the Brazilian military during the Goulart presidency. 
Conversely, the Special Action Force did conduct several training missions to Chile 
during Allende’s term of office although none included counterinsurgency training. The 
periodization of these records also limits the conclusions that we can draw. The Special 
Action Force did not exist prior to João Goulart’s assumption of the presidency of Brazil 
in 1961 so it is not possible to compare mobile training team engagements before his 
tenure. Similarly, the U.S. Army deactivated the Special Action Force in 1973 so it is not 
possible to determine if training team support to the military authoritarian government of 
Augusto Pinochet increased or decreased after the 1973 coup d’état based the currently 
available U.S. Army records.103  
However, if we narrow the focus again to consider only counterinsurgency 
training, the data allows us new insights.  The Special Action Force conducted forty-nine 
counterinsurgency training missions in South America during its lifespan. Thirty-three of 
those missions supported democratic governments (sixty-seven percent) while sixteen 
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assisted non-democratic governments (thirty-three percent). These results are very similar 
to the percentages of total training team missions by regime type (see above). Yet 
changing the paradigm from democratic versus non-democratic to Leftist versus anti-
Communist regimes in the case of counterinsurgency training yields surprising clarity. 
The Special Action Force never provided counterinsurgency training to the security 
forces of a Leftist government in South America.104  
CONCLUSION 
The election of John F. Kennedy as President in January 1961 brought 
counterinsurgency to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. At the 
opening of the decade of the 1960s the U.S. Army lacked a specialized organization to 
teach its new counterinsurgency doctrine to foreign militaries. It quickly assigned that 
mission to its Special Forces. The Army formed these units in the 1950s to conduct 
unconventional warfare by training and leading guerrilla units in enemy controlled areas 
during wartime. In the late 1950s these formations underwent a dramatic expansion. 
Special Forces during this period became the Army’s counterinsurgency experts, adding 
the responsibility for training local forces to fight against guerrillas in friendly nation 
controlled areas to its repertoire of unconventional warfare skills.  
The Army deployed several hundred Special Forces men and other experts to the 
Panama Canal Zone in 1962 to establish a new Special Action Force for Latin America. 
This organization brought the specialized military skills, cultural knowledge and 
language capabilities required to undertake its mission to “advise, train, and assist Latin 
American military forces in counterinsurgency.”105 The unit accomplished its mission 
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through the deployment of mobile training teams of varying size, composition and 
duration–all specially tailored to meet the particular needs of host nation forces. During 
its ten-year lifespan, the Special Action Force conducted just over six-hundred mobile 
training team missions across Central and South America and the Caribbean training 
thousands of soldiers in the skills and concepts of counterinsurgency and civic action. 
The Special Action Force was a crucial element of U.S. regional counterinsurgency 
efforts, yet its origins, composition, and accomplishments have remained largely 
undiscovered by historians.   
The Special Action Force, U.S. Army Forces Caribbean (its headquarters) and the 
U.S. Army Missions stationed in Latin American countries all interacted to orchestrate 
the Army’s mobile training team effort. No single source outlines the complex internal 
procedures and protocols the Army developed and implemented to manage this endeavor. 
Nevertheless, analysis and interpretation of a wide variety of reports, records, 
correspondence, personal accounts and secondary sources yield a reasonably accurate 
recreation of this process. These same records also provide surprising new information. 
For example, although the Special Action Force trained thousands of Latin Americans 
during its lifespan, far fewer received counterinsurgency training than implied in the Cold 
War literature on Latin America. According to the organization’s own calculations, 
counterinsurgency doctrine and skills training comprised slightly less than twenty percent 
of its overall mobile training effort in 1965 and slightly over ten percent of its overall 
effort in 1966–its two most active years.106 Thus despite regional fears of Communism, 
most South American governments overwhelmingly chose to accept internal 
development (civic action) and technical assistance support from the United States 
                                               




through military training missions in the 1960s – not internal security and 
counterinsurgency.  
These same fragmentary records also allow new insights into the challenges the 
Special Action Force’s instructors faced. Imparting counterinsurgency (and other skills) 
to counterpart armies through mobile training teams was much more difficult and 
transitory than historians have previously assumed. The barriers to training were more 
than just cultural; although they faced those as well. Army instructors had to develop 
teaching methods that would allow them to transmit complex subject matter to poorly 
educated conscripts, many of whom were illiterate. Training conscripts (who composed 
the majority of lower ranking troops in all regional armies) also confronted the 
Americans with the problem of perishability. Exerting tremendous time and effort to train 
individuals and units whose members served only one-year terms of enlistment meant 
that sustaining counterinsurgency capabilities required training new individuals and units 
year after year.  
Furthermore, sending one or two counterinsurgency training teams did not equate 
to an enduring counterinsurgency capability in the partner nation’s security forces. One 
mobile training team mission could seemingly develop an effective counterinsurgency 
capability in a particular unit, as was the case with the training of Bolivian 2nd Ranger 
Battalion, the unit that captured Che Guevara. But that capability was very short-lived 
due to personnel turnover. More importantly, single units, no matter how effective, rarely 
defeated an insurgency on their own; the capture of Che Guevara in Bolivia by a U.S. 
trained unit was an anomaly, not the norm. Guevara had largely failed in his efforts to 
spark an insurgency. In fact, non-Ranger units of the Bolivian Army had detected and 




Rangers arrived just in time to capture and execute the ill and malnourished Guevara–and 
claim lasing fame for their exploits. Training local instructor cadres offered a potential 
solution, but also introduced new concerns related to the control of course content and the 
quality of training.   
Mobile training team missions also faced disruptions due to international and 
internal crises. Coups d’état, elections, strikes, riots and natural disasters could and did 
elicit responses by security forces making them unavailable to attend U.S. sponsored 
training. However, one of the most significant disruptions to the Army’s mobile training 
team effort in Latin America was the growing war in Vietnam. The war effort reduced the 
Special Action Force’s manning levels and those who remained found themselves 
burdened by the diversion of instructors to provide jungle operations training to 
American soldiers destined for Southeast Asia. The rising U.S. involvement Vietnam 
beginning in 1965, shifted attention away from Latin America at the same time 
perceptions of the Communist threat began to wane. While earlier momentum continued 
to drive U.S. training team engagement into 1966, Special Action Force missions 
declined dramatically in 1967 and 1968.  
Perhaps more importantly, the unit’s historical records reveal that the organization 
conducted no counterinsurgency training missions in South America after 1967. The 
Army’s rural-centric view of insurgency, and lack of doctrine for urban guerrilla warfare, 
made it largely irrelevant in confronting the rise of urban insurgencies in the Southern 
Cone in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Nevertheless, the barriers to imparting military 
skills and concepts to foreign troops appear to have been the greatest obstacle to success 





PART II: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE ANDEAN RIDGE 
 
The intensity of the Cold War experience varied tremendously between countries. 
No area better illustrates this phenomenon than the Andean Ridge of South America. The 
five nations of this sub-region, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, each 
faced their own threats and challenges during the 1960s. Each also accepted its own mix 
and measure of American internal security training. These nations all included remote, 
mountainous or jungle terrain that was conducive to guerrilla activity. All suffered 
insurgencies during the 1960s.  
Venezuela topped Fidel Castro’s list of countries for the export of revolution early 
in the decade. The Venezuelan Communist party adopted a program of both urban and 
rural insurgency designed to overthrow the country’s fledgling democratic government, 
and Cuba lavishly supported the revolutionaries. Havana provided guerrilla warfare 
training to hundreds of Venezuelan insurgents; it also sent money, weapons and even 
Cuban combat advisors to bolster their revolution. Colombia faced the consequences of a 
long-running internal civil war. Over time, armed groups had usurped Bogotá’s authority 
over large portions of the national territory. Bandit warlords terrorized the countryside 
and controlled their own fiefdoms. Rural Communists also commanded remote territories 
outside of government control, several of which they declared “independent republics.”  
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia all included large indigenous populations. Each also 
suffered from chronic rural poverty and underdevelopment that made them vulnerable to 




received unwanted attention late in the decade when Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” 
Guevara targeted it for revolution. Cuba’s leaders sought to strike a spark in Bolivia that 
would spread the flames of revolution across South America. They also intended to draw 
the United States into another Vietnam-like quagmire on the continent. To achieve such 
audacious aims, Che Guevara personally led the Bolivian foco aided by Cuban combat 
veterans of the Sierra Maestra, Santa Clara and Congo campaigns. The guerrilla threat in 
South America was real and persistent, although it took many forms across the decade. 
The effects of U.S. counterinsurgency training also varied greatly across South 
America. The degree of U.S. military involvement in each nation reflected the level of 
insurgent threat and that country’s willingness to accept American assistance. President 
Kennedy’s Special Group (Counter Insurgency) ranked Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Ecuador as critical watch countries during its first few months of operation in early 
1962.1 Colombia received by far the greatest number of U.S. Army Special Action Force 
mobile training team missions of any nation in the Americas, a total of seventy-five 
between 1963 and 1972.2 Bolivia ranked second, hosting fifty-four visits by these teams 
of American Green Beret instructors. Yet, in Colombia only nine of the mobile training 
teams taught counterinsurgency. In Bolivia, the number was eight. At the high end of the 
spectrum, Venezuela received a total of fourteen counterinsurgency mobile training team 
visits from 1962 to 1966. U.S Army trainers instructed approximately 1,600 Venezuelan 
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military personnel in 1966 alone.3 Seventy-nine Venezuelan officers received 
counterinsurgency training at the School of the Americas between 1961 and 1964. 
Colombia sent nine. This disparity in the levels of training across the Andean Ridge hints 
at the impact of local factors on the reception, efficacy, and outcome of American 
internal security efforts in Latin America.  
The power relationship between the United States and its regional allies in the 
Andean Ridge during the 1960s was, of course, unequal. However, unequal did not mean 
subordinate. Latin American civilian and military leaders accepted American military 
equipment and counterinsurgency training, but they did not serve as proxies of the United 
States. Colombian, Venezuelan and Bolivian leaders determined how much U.S. military 
advice and assistance they were willing to receive, how their forces were to be organized, 
and most importantly – they controlled the employment of those forces in combat. No 
U.S. military advisors ever accompanied national army units during combat operations in 
South America during the 1960s and 1970s. The Special Action Force helped build 
counterinsurgency tools in the Andean Ridge, but Latin American political and military 
leaders wielded those tools.  
Internal political and social factors, not the amount of U.S. training, determined 
how each country fared during the 1960s. American military assistance almost always 
played a secondary role.  The histories of Venezuela, Colombia, and Bolivia illustrate this 
point. These cases contradict the Cold War narrative that U.S. internal security doctrines 
led to military dictatorships and trained regional militaries to commit human rights 
violations. Despite all receiving the same U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and training 
(albeit in varying degrees of intensity), each nation experienced its own unique outcome. 
                                               





Bolivia suffered from coups d’état and dictatorships (as did Ecuador and Peru), while 
Venezuela and Colombia consolidated stable democracies. The stark divergence in each 
country’s internal social and political context in the 1960s and 1970s explains the 
disparity in their historical experiences. U.S. counterinsurgency training does not. Latin 
America’s Cold War historiography has too often overstated the impact of U.S. 
counterinsurgency training while understating the agency, and importance, of Latin 





Chapter Five: Counterinsurgency in Venezuela 
 
U.S. policymakers drafted a “Plan of Action” for Venezuela in September 1962. 
The plan’s central goal was to increase the stability of the elected government of Rómulo 
Betancourt and enable his administration to “complete its term of office democratically 
and constitutionally.”4 The U.S. military, and the Army in particular, worked in support 
of these goals. Venezuela sent the largest number of students to U.S. Army 
counterinsurgency courses and received the highest density of counterinsurgency mobile 
training teams of any nation in Latin America. During the early years of the Venezuelan 
insurgency, American training efforts sought first to inculcate U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine within the Venezuelan National Guard. However, the U.S. Army did not 
withhold counterinsurgency training from the Venezuelan Army. The Communist’s early 
focus on urban terrorism meant that government efforts to counter those activities 
primarily relied on police and National Guard forces. Meanwhile, developing the 
Venezuelan Army’s internal training capability, creating institutional and political 
acceptance, and forming specialized units to conduct rural counterinsurgency, all took 
time. Yet the United States was not alone in providing doctrine, arms, and military 
training to Venezuelans during the Cold War. Havana supported the revolutionaries.  
Cuba provided money, weapons, ammunition, and guerrilla warfare instruction to 
Venezuelan insurgents and helped sustain their struggling revolution through most of the 
decade. In 1962 alone, some 200 Venezuelans graduated from guerrilla warfare training 
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in Cuba and returned home to put their new skills to use.5 The Central Intelligence 
Agency estimated that the Cubans also provided their Venezuelan guerrilla brothers over 
one million dollars from 1960 to 1964.6 But Cuba’s efforts went even further – Fidel 
Castro sent a minimum of fourteen combat advisors to Venezuela, all experienced 
guerrilla warfare veterans.7  
Venezuela was by far the largest recipient of U.S. counterinsurgency training and 
support in all of Latin America, and Fidel Castro orchestrated a sustained military and 
political campaign to overthrow its newly-established democracy. Yet the nation 
stabilized its representative government and subordinated its military to civilian rule into 
the 1990s. How did Venezuela overcome both internal and external threats to its fledgling 
democracy? U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, as adopted and implemented by 
Venezuelan security forces, undermined Communist efforts to win peasant support. Over 
time, patient U.S. training efforts yielded specialized counter guerrilla units that 
eventually overwhelmed and eradicated the rural guerrillas. Nevertheless, in the case of 
Venezuela, counterinsurgency training was not the antidote to insurgency. Instead, 
effective democracy provided the best and longest lasting cure.  
CASTRO VERSUS BETANCOURT 
Venezuela stood on the front lines of Latin America’s Cold War. Yet one might 
ask, “why Venezuela?” since this aspect of Latin America’s Cold War remains largely 
overlooked in the region’s historiography. It has not received the intense academic 
scrutiny of the “Dirty Wars” in the Southern Cone during the 1970s or the Central 
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American civil wars of the 1980s. Although often unrecognized, Venezuela was one of 
the key battlegrounds during the early 1960s. Three factors help explain the intensity and 
longevity of this insurgency – counterinsurgency conflict: a bitter personal feud between 
Fidel Castro and Rómulo Betancourt, an ideological contest between Communism and 
Democracy, and a behind-the-scenes regional cold war struggle between Cuba and the 
United States.  
Betancourt and Castro were erstwhile allies among the Latin American Left 
during the 1950s, although they later became bitter rivals. Betancourt was the elder 
statesman of the two. He served his first term as President of Venezuela from 1945 to 
1948 while the younger Castro was still studying law at the University of Havana and just 
beginning his political activism. A decade later, Betancourt supported Castro’s M26 
movement in the Sierra Maestra by sending weapons and supplies to the guerrilla 
fighters.8 Betancourt also offered Venezuela as a location for the formation of a Cuban 
government in exile. Betancourt hosted discussions in Caracas in 1958 which brought 
together Cuba’s many disparate anti-Batista political and insurgent organizations. These 
talks resulted in the drafting of the Pact of Caracas which united them into a single Cuban 
insurrectionary movement.9 Fidel Castro adroitly maneuvered the drafting of the pact to 
establish M26 as the central anti-Batista political organization and himself as the sole 
leader of Cuban revolutionary forces.  
In January1959, Betancourt and Castro congratulated one another on the 
overthrow of their respective dictators. Betancourt called Castro’s victory “another 
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decisive episode in the march toward the recovery of public liberties by Latin 
America.”10 “We consider Venezuela part of Cuba,” Castro declared from Havana just 
three weeks after Batista’s ouster, “and Cuba part of Venezuela.”11 Fidel then traveled to 
Caracas to thank President-elect Betancourt for his support of the insurgency.12 It was 
Castro’s first trip abroad since his return to the island aboard the Granma in 1956 to 
launch his revolution.13 Yet rather than cement an alliance, Castro’s visit marked a 
turning point for both men. During their brief face-to-face meeting Castro asked 
Betancourt for a $300 million dollar loan or an equivalent amount in crude oil. 
Betancourt offered to sell Cuba the oil “at prevailing prices” but refused to loan Castro 
the $300 million.14 Castro never forgot the slight. The Cuban revolutionaries’ drift 
towards Communism over the next several years dismayed Betancourt and other Latin 
American democrats. Meanwhile, Castro’s embrace of Communism increasingly pitted 
him against Venezuela’s fledgling democracy.   
The two men’s personal animosity also defined their places in the larger 
international conflict of the Cold War. By 1963, Fidel Castro openly supported the 
Venezuelan Communist guerrillas struggling to overthrow Betancourt. Castro announced 
his position in a speech on July 26th celebrating the tenth anniversary of his failed attack 
on the Moncada army barracks. “From this tribune,” Fidel declared, “face to face with the 
Cuban people, we send greetings to the heroic Venezuelan revolutionaries.”15 Castro’s 
opposition to Betancourt was ideological, political and economic. “For a Marxist 
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revolution to topple a leader of Betancourt’s stature would represent an enormous victory 
for Fidel Castro” historian Robert Quirk explained. “It would not only demonstrate the 
fragility of the democratic left in Latin America but also give Cuba immediate access to 
Venezuelan oil and iron and free the island from its absolute dependence on the distant 
Soviet Union for energy supplies.”16  
President Rómulo Betancourt opposed Castro out of both principal and necessity. 
He faced two threats capable of extinguishing his new democratic government. The first 
was a growing communist insurgency. The second was the ever present prospect of a 
return to military dictatorship – since its declaration of independence from Spain in 1810 
until Betancourt’s inauguration in 1959, military strongmen had ruled the country nearly 
continuously.17  Embracing anti-Communism allowed Betancourt the means to oppose 
both threats. Confronting Cuba’s export of revolution gave him the opportunity to ally 
Venezuela with the United States. Meanwhile, confronting the insurgency and the receipt 
of U.S. military goods and training enabled Betancourt to allay the military’s fears of a 
communist takeover. It also served to reinforce civilian control of the military. 
Venezuela’s generals undoubtedly remembered Fidel Castro’s speech in downtown 
Caracas in 1959.  “Your revolution is not over yet,” Fidel told the masses, “You have 
done only part of your job. You still have not got rid of the military.”18  
INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN VENEZUELA 
Insurgency in Venezuela traces its roots not to the verdant jungles or lush 
mountains of the interior, but rather to the barren streets of Caracas. Massive, 
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spontaneous street protests in 1960 and 1962 spread throughout the country and 
convinced Venezuelan Communists that the country was ripe for revolution.19 Inspired 
by the example of Cuban success, the revolutionaries developed and implemented a plan 
for “rapid victory” by the end of 1962.20 The plan envisioned a combination of urban 
terrorism and rural guerrilla warfare to topple Betancourt’s newly-elected government.  
However, the Venezuelan Communists faced multiple obstacles in their efforts to 
replicate Fidel Castro’s revolutionary success in Cuba. They sought to overthrow a 
popular democracy rather than Batista’s corrupt and despised dictatorship. Venezuela 
boasted reasonably effective security forces, not the inept military that confronted Castro. 
Moreover, the United States never wavered in its support of Venezuelan democracy. The 
U.S. decision to withdrawal military and diplomatic support from the Batista regime 
hamstrung that government’s anti-revolutionary efforts and proved a boon to Castro’s 
guerrillas. But the greatest obstacle faced by Venezuela’s would-be revolutionaries was 
their Communist affiliation.21 Fidel Castro succeeded as a nationalist revolutionary, not a 
Communist supported by foreign powers. Venezuela’s revolutionaries sprang from the 
country’s urban Communist political parties and the population never embraced them. 
Nevertheless, Fidel Castro supported them and expressed confidence in their 
revolutionary efforts. “[O]n April 19, 1962,” Rómulo Betancourt later recalled, “Fidel 
Castro exultantly predicted that my government would be overthrown within a year.”22  
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The Communists diligently pursued “rapid victory” in late 1961 and into 1962. 
Their efforts at urban terrorism in the cities included strikes, riots, bombings and the 
murder of policemen.23 They did not shrink from targeting Americans officials in 
Venezuela either. In January 1962 the Communists bombed the United States Embassy in 
Caracas. Equally embarrassing, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) 
guerrillas raided and burned the offices of the U.S. Military Mission to Venezuela the 
following June.24  
In early 1962, the Communists launched their first attempt at rural guerrilla 
warfare. It foundered. “Details about the guerrilla movement flooded newspapers after 
April 1962,” American researchers noted. “Captured guerrillas reported that they had 
been recruited largely from the secondary schools of Caracas or on the campus of the 
UCV [Central University of Venezuela]. They said that in training camps they were often 
taught by Cuban instructors and that their training had included actual combat attacks on 
rural towns and other places where guns, transportation and communication equipment, 
and food could be found.”25 But city boys made poor rural guerrillas. American 
researchers later described their travails, 
The [foray] into rural guerrilla warfare quickly turned into a series of 
almost unrelieved insurgent disasters. In most areas, the student guerrillas 
ran into a hostile peasantry which refused them food, informed the 
authorities of their whereabouts, and sometimes had to be restrained by 
police and military units from slaughtering the guerrillas with shotguns 
and machetes. In some areas, the guerrillas fled from the peasantry and 
floundered about in wild and unpopulated regions until government forces 
caught up with them and, in some instances, literally rescued them.26 
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The Communists launched seven rural focos (guerrilla elements designed to spark and 
lead peasant uprisings) in early 1962.27 Only two of them, in Falcón state and the El 
Charal region, survived their first few months in mountains (see Figure 2). “The guerrilla 
leadership in these areas,” American analysts explained, “included men with family 
connections among the local populations. This circumstance enabled them and a handful 
of followers to find shelter and concealment after government forces rounded up 71 of 
the guerrillas originally sent into Falcón and El Charal.”28   
In spite of these setbacks, Venezuela’s revolutionaries did brush with success in 
May and June 1962 when leftist navy and marine officers led mutinies in Carúpano and 
Puerto Cabello. Army battalions loyal to the government managed to crush the revolts 
and achieve partial success in their first rural counterguerrilla operations. In doing so, 
they helped stymie the Communists’ first attempt at “rapid victory.”29  
As the Communists stepped up their attacks and the Cubans increased their 
support of the guerrillas, the U.S. Army began its training of Venezuelan security forces. 
During the first years of the insurgency the American army provided only limited support 
to its Venezuelan counterparts. Thirty-four Venezuelan officers received 
counterinsurgency training from the Caribbean School in the Panama Canal Zone in 
1962, up from just three the year before. The first counterinsurgency mobile training 
team to visit Venezuela arrived early that same year. The Army dispatched this first team 
from the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg; it predated the establishment of the 8th 
                                               
27 Georgetown Research Project, “Castro-Communist Insurgency,” 32.  
28 Georgetown Research Project, “Castro-Communist Insurgency,” 33. The Charal region included portions 
of the states of Lara, Trujillo and Portuguesa. 




Special Forces Group at Fort Gulick, Panama by several months.30 This first team taught 
counter guerrilla warfare techniques to “personnel of the Venezuelan Army and National 
Guard.”31 This notation from the U.S. Army mission in Caracas in July of 1962 is 
important. It demonstrates that from the outset of U.S. Army training support, American 
officers recognized and accepted the Venezuelan Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación 
(Armed Forces of Cooperation - FAC) as a fourth military branch and a legitimate 
internal security organization.  
Venezuela’s National Guard served in a unique capacity among its security 
forces. It stood between the civilian police and the traditional military services. “The 
Armed Forces of Cooperation (FAC), is a fourth active-duty force under the Ministry of 
Defense,” American officers noted in 1963. It “is a professional, highly motivated career 
organization made up of volunteers. Turnover in personnel is low.”32 The duties of this 
approximately 12,000-man force included “security of frontiers, ports of entry, coastal 
waters…rivers and main highways; internal security during disorders; protection of 
natural resources; and control of smuggling and enforcement of customs laws.”33 
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Figure 2: Venezuela Political Boundaries Map.34    
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The FAC’s volunteer (as opposed to conscript) composition, longer terms of 
service, and its innate internal security functions made it a natural object of U.S. 
counterinsurgency training. However, the organization still suffered from several 
weaknesses. “While the FAC is the best trained, most highly motivated military force,” 
U.S. officers judged, “its lack of heavy armaments and wide dispersal of personnel 
minimizes its effectiveness as a force individually capable of maintaining order in event 
of intensive, widespread, anti-government activity.”35  
Nevertheless, the Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación became the focus of early 
American training efforts, not the Venezuelan Army. This ordering of U.S. training 
priority flowed from Venezuelan government policy. The United States did not dictate 
this arrangement. President Betancourt adopted a three-tiered response to the insurgency 
based on his commitment to democracy and the rule of law.  Betancourt conceptualized 
the struggle as a challenge to law and order, not an internal war.36 Therefore, the civilian 
police assumed primary responsibility for “the maintenance of public safety, law, and 
order.”37 The Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación served in a second-tier role supporting 
police units in urban areas and conducting rural counter guerrilla operations. The 
Venezuelan Army formed the third-tier. It reinforced police and FAC units in 
emergencies.38 The Army conducted direct counterinsurgency operations in rural areas 
only by exception until the later years of the insurgency.39  
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The second counterinsurgency mobile training team to visit Venezuela focused its 
training on the Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación. A team of two officers and twelve 
enlisted men, this time from the newly-activated Special Action Force in Panama, arrived 
in mid-1962. The Special Forces trainers spent the following six months training several 
groups of National Guard personnel. Deploying a full Special Forces A-Team enabled the 
Green Berets to break into smaller elements and spread their capabilities. The American 
instructors primarily taught counter guerrilla tactics over the course of their visit. 
However, this team also laid the foundation for future counterinsurgency training. “In 
addition” to the counter guerrilla training conducted, American officers in Caracas wrote 
in October 1962, “the Army and FAC have special courses organized by the US Mobile 
Training Team in which members of the tactical units are given this [counter guerrilla] 
instruction.”40 This team earned its pay. Not only did it train “more than 500 members of 
the Venezuelan Armed Forces…in counterguerrilla tactics and techniques” and prepare 
courses for future instruction, it also organized a FAC “instructor group” to continue 
those courses in the future.41  
Based on these reports, the first mobile training team from the Special Action 
Force employed two of the three mechanisms for imparting counterinsurgency training. It 
trained individuals and it developed instructor cadres to sustain and expand that training 
after its departure. American efforts to raise and train specialized counter guerrilla units, 
the third mechanism, soon followed.  
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The existing capabilities of the Venezuelan security forces, coupled with some 
preliminary U.S. Army training, thwarted the Communists’ first bid for “rapid victory.”42 
After their initial failure to topple the government, the Communists reorganized their 
forces in late 1962. They created the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) 
as the armed wing of the movement. This unified organizational structure allowed the 
revolutionaries to move personnel and supplies between their urban and rural operational 
areas.43 The Communists also critiqued their strategy. Some revolutionaries argued for a 
shift to protracted guerrilla warfare. Others still sought the quick road to success. The 
latter group held sway, and the Communists developed a second plan for “rapid victory.” 
This plan aimed to discredit the Betancourt government by disrupting the 1963 elections. 
Urban terrorism and rural guerrilla warfare would intimidate the voting populace and 
derail Venezuelan democracy in its first real test. So they imagined.  
The U.S. Army increased its internal security training for Venezuelan forces 
during 1963. Most of that effort took place in Venezuela, even while the country’s 
security forces dispatched another seventeen students to attend counterinsurgency courses 
in the Canal Zone. A total of six teams from the Special Action Force visited the country, 
up from just one the year prior.44 Three of these mobile training teams focused on 
counterinsurgency. One was a survey mission for which little detail is available. The 
second team consisted of just two men. Although small in number, this team also 
achieved big results. Captain Robert Foote, accompanied by a sergeant first class, arrived 
in April with the mission to reinforce “Counter Guerrilla training as conducted by the 
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previous MTT.”45 The American trainers joined the “Venezuelan Instructor Group” of 
the FAC which their predecessors helped establish. The instructor group, comprised of 
four officers and twelve enlisted men, then conducted three counterinsurgency courses at 
different locations across Venezuela under the supervision of the Green Berets. The 
instructor group trained a total of ninety-four of their National Guard colleagues over the 
course of the American’s fourteen-week mission.  
The Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación trainers conducted their first five-week 
counterinsurgency course outside Caracas utilizing the facilities built by the previous 
MTT. The team then shifted its focus. The group next taught a three-week course at the 
FAC headquarters – most likely this was a counterinsurgency orientation program for 
senior officers much like those taught at Fort Bragg and in the Canal Zone. After this 
short respite, the American and Venezuelan instructors moved to a new site in Barinas 
some 350 miles to the west of Caracas. The teams spent a week constructing new 
facilities at this site before conducting a second five-week counter guerrilla course. They 
erected outdoor classrooms and constructed rifle, machinegun, mortar and demolitions 
ranges. The Green Berets were proud of the work they and their counterparts had 
accomplished. “Facilities of this type,” Foote wrote in his after action report, “are in 
general not available in Venezuela except for a few in the Caracas area.”46  
Captain Foote gave a more somber assessment of the instructor group’s teaching 
skills. “The first course presented by the Instructor Group was rather poor,” he judged, 
“although it did satisfy the majority of the training objectives.” The National 
Guardsmen’s performance improved with practice. “The second course went much 
                                               





better,” Foote concluded. “The instructors were much better prepared and the classes 
were conducted in a very satisfactory or in some cases an excellent manner [sic].”47 
Foote’s team left additional legacies beyond just the additional personnel trained 
in counterinsurgency and a more polished instructor group. The FAC now boasted a new 
multi-purpose range and training facility in Barinas. The Green Berets and the instructor 
group also “prepared a revised program of instruction, training schedules for the five (5) 
week course, complete[d] detailed lesson plans and complete lists of training materials.” 
Armed with these tools, the National Guard planned to “conduct six (6) of these courses 
each year, and the instructor group is now well qualified to give this training,” Foote 
explained.48 In their report of July 1963, American officers noted another new capability. 
“In FAC,” they noted, “a mobile training detachment for counter insurgency type 
operations was formed under the auspices of the Army Mission and the Special Forces 
MTT.”49 The Green Berets had replicated their mobile training team capability in 
Venezuela.  
Although his mission was to “reinvigorate” the previous counterinsurgency 
training, Foote and his sergeant also broke new ground. They planned and coordinated 
the first joint counter guerrilla operations exercise ever conducted in Venezuela.50 
“Twenty-two Guards were used as guerrillas in the area west of Barinas,” Foote 
recounted in his report. “Seventy (70) personnel including the Counter Insurgency 
students were used as the Counter Insurgent Force and given the mission of securing the 
area and eliminating the insurgent group. The action started with the CI force securing 
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certain critical points and placing an extensive patrol plan into effect.”51 The Venezuelan 
Air Force provided reconnaissance and aerial resupply support to the FAC units. The 
National Guardsmen located the guerrillas on 1 June and the Green Beret trainers planned 
to “drop two Platoons of Parachutists into blocking positions while the CI force moved in 
the pursuit. Also reconnaissance aircraft were to be overhead with strike aircraft on call. 
A loudspeaker broadcast mission was also scheduled.”52 Unfortunately, the weather in 
the training area did not cooperate, forcing the team to divert the airborne jump to the 
Barinas airport. Nevertheless, Foote judged the five-day exercise a success. 
“Headquarters GN (FAC) was well satisfied with the operation and plans to have another 
one in the near future,” he added.53  
Over the summer, attentions within Venezuela turned to the elections scheduled 
for December 1963. The Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional developed an 
elaborate plan to sabotage the elections with the goal of seizing power, or at least 
improving the group’s position, in the aftermath of national crisis. American researchers 
explained that: 
The plan to wreck the elections had two parts. “Operation Caracas” called 
for the seizure and fortification of a large sector of Caracas by 800 
insurgents armed with mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, automatic rifles, 
submachineguns [sic] and ammunition smuggled in from Cuba. 
“Operation Moto” was to support the Caracas uprising in the remainder of 
the country by oilfield sabotage, forest fires, and attacks on 
communications facilities, military garrisons, and other strategic locations. 
The approach of Operations “Caracas” and “Moto” was heralded in 
October 1963 by a spectacular surge in the volume of urban terrorist 
actions.54 
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In response to the increasing attacks and in preparation for the elections, the U.S. Army 
dispatched Military Police riot control and bomb disposal mobile training teams to assist 
Venezuelan forces. A Military Police criminal investigation team arrived late that fall to 
aid in the “establishment of an investigative capability in the Venezuelan Army.”55 These 
missions contributed to Venezuela’s internal security. Although they did not teach 
counterinsurgency, they directly aided the Venezuelan Army’s ability to confront the 
FALN’s urban insurgency.   
Meanwhile, fate intervened to thwart the Communists’ plans. “[O]n 1 November 
the insurgent scheme for ‘Operation Caracas’ was dealt a mortal blow,” American 
analysts observed. “A fisherman in Falcón State discovered the cache of Cuban arms 
needed to support the operation on an isolated beach. A few days later, police in Caracas 
seized the detailed plans for ‘Operation Caracas’ and thereby averted the chance that it 
might be attempted without the Cuban arms.”56 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cuban arms cache discovery, President 
Betancourt asked President John F. Kennedy for “advice on surveillance, infiltration 
intercept tactics, and counterinsurgency.”57 Kennedy’s response was swift. “A team of 
fourteen Army, Navy and Air Force representatives, including Special Forces and Air 
Commandos, formed in the Canal Zone and departed for Venezuela nine hours after that 
country’s formal request for assistance,” the American team leader later wrote.58 The 
American’s alacrity made quite an impact on their hosts. “Venezuelan officials were most 
impressed by – and grateful for – this quick reaction,” U.S. Air Force Colonel Immanuel 
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Klette, the American team leader, later recalled. “The Caracas newspapers had 
announced that morning that 120 people had been killed or wounded in Caracas the 
previous day as a result of FALN activity.”59 
After analyzing conditions on the ground, this team spent the following eight 
months working with senior Venezuelan officers from all services to develop a joint 
operations center. Its role would be to coordinate and synchronize all counterinsurgency 
efforts. Although they arrived at the behest of a presidential request, the Venezuelan 
Minister of Defense, General Briceño, still harbored some doubts about the American 
team. Colonel Klette allayed Briceño’s concerns by linking U.S. support for Venezuela to 
the broader U.S. regional conflict with Castro’s Cuba. Briceño asked Klette why his team 
was in Venezuela. “It was there,” Klette told him, “not only because of Venezuela’s 
request but because the United States faced serious problems with respect to Cuba and 
needed Venezuela’s help. Possibly no North Americans had ever asked him, or perhaps 
any other Venezuelan, for help. But from that moment on the door was open to the team 
[sic].”60 This passage demonstrates that at least some American and Venezuelan officers 
perceived U.S. assistance to Venezuela as part of a broader anti-Communist struggle 
against Cuba. It also highlights Klette’s diplomatic skills.  
Cuba’s leaders also saw their support to Venezuela’s guerrillas as part of a 
broader struggle against the United States. “When the people of Venezuela are 
victorious,” Blas Roca, Cuban Communist Party spokesman, declared from Havana in 
January 1963, “when they get their total independence from imperialism, then all 
America will take fire, all America will push forward, all America will be liberated once 
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and for all from the ominous yoke of Yankee imperialism. Their fight helps us today, and 
their victory will mean a tremendous boost for us. We will no longer be a solitary island 
of the Caribbean facing the Yankee imperialists, for we will have land support on the 
continent.”61 
As the December 1963 elections neared, Venezuelan security forces again 
marshalled their efforts and confronted the rebels throughout the country. But it was the 
Venezuelan voter that crushed the Communists’ second bid for “rapid victory.” 
Undeterred by threats and terrorism citizens marched to the polls in droves. Some ninety-
one percent of eligible voters cast their ballots on 1 December 1963.62 “Although the 
element of fear was present,” American researchers later noted, “voters stood for hours in 
long lines outside the polling places. The voter participation in the December 1963 
elections was a stunning rebuff to the entire Castro-Communist terrorist campaign…The 
elections were clear proof that the Venezuelan people preferred democratic procedures to 
the Castro-Communist insurgency as a means of registering political dissent.”63 
Many contemporary researchers and historians later rightly cited the 1963 
elections as a watershed moment in Venezuela’s fight against insurgency. However, the 
government laid the foundations for this success much earlier. One major element was 
Betancourt’s land reform policies. “Between 1959 and 1963,” one historian notes, 
“Betancourt’s government distributed more than one and one-half million hectares [of 
land], more than half of which had been expropriated from big landowners.”64 The 
government also gave out agrarian credits, constructed roads and aqueducts, improved 
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schools and invested in rural electrification.65 “The loyalties of the majority of 
campesinos lie with the present administration,” American officers judged in 1963, 
“whose efforts in the fields of education and land reform appear to impress the people.”66 
President Betancourt himself later elucidated his success. “The basic fact that explains 
the survival of democracy in Venezuela against all attempts to destroy it,” he wrote, “is 
that it had the support of the decisive majority of all Venezuelans.”67 Public support was 
critical – and here is where U.S. counterinsurgency instruction made its most important 
contribution. Venezuelan Army officers rapidly internalized the counterinsurgency 
concepts they learned from their American counterparts. Instilling the tactics and raising 
counter guerrilla units took longer.  
Venezuelan officers adopted and applied U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine 
from as early as January 1963. This doctrine focused on uplifting the population rather 
than terrorizing it. Not only did it help prevent rural campesinos from joining the 
insurgency, the new counterinsurgency doctrine converted many of them into willing 
collaborators of the government forces. In February 1963, Lieutenant Colonel Jorge E. 
Osorio-García of the Venezuelan Army gave a press interview regarding his unit’s recent 
counter guerrilla operations in the Falcón area. His comments illustrate the impact of the 
new counterinsurgency concepts. “At first they [the residents of the mountains] were 
reactionary,” Osorio- García explained. “This was because they thought that we – the 
military – were going to cut off heads and commit atrocities.”68 The Army had brutalized 
the peasantry under the Gómez dictatorship and the locals remembered. “The Chief of 
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Operations explained that in the area now under military occupation, they were utilizing a 
doctrine different from that employed in earlier epochs. Previously, they believed it was 
the Army which must be feared, not the guerrillas or bandits,” Osorio- García continued. 
“At present, the new [counterinsurgency] technique proclaimed the complete opposite: 
‘We must capture or destroy the active guerrilla, but we must win the population to our 
side, as well as the collaborators and the passive guerrillas’”69 In other words, the 
Venezuelan Army sought to win hearts and minds. An Army General Staff officer 
reinforced the point. “The Army is studying and has initiated activities in Falcón which 
are independent of the persecution of the guerrillas,” he explained. “It believes that 
popular education, and the solution of problems which seemingly are minor but are of 
great importance in peasant life, are the best weapons to combat the deplorable activities 
of those ambitious persons who rebel against the legitimate government and attempt to 
drag the peasantry into their absurd adventure.”70 
The newly imported counterinsurgency doctrine quickly bore fruit. In March 
1963, the head of the Falcón Campesino Federation told reporters that, “In my constant 
visits to the peasant regions [in Falcón], the peasants carry out their work in the most 
complete normalcy. They have not presented denunciations of any kind of abuse,” he 
added, “very much to the contrary, they feel protected and benefited by the presence of 
detachments of government forces, which has already removed the danger of the 
outlaws.”71  
This patient and careful approach by the Venezuelan Army, together with other 
beneficial government policies and programs, exemplified the tenets of U.S. Army 
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counterinsurgency doctrine. It closely mirrored the Special Warfare Center’s admonition 
that “suppressive action alone will not eliminate an insurgent movement. Rather, any 
program for countering an insurgency must be coupled with positive efforts to remove 
the basic causes of discontent and to facilitate social and economic progress through 
peaceful means… [and rests on] the absolute necessity for popular support.”72 Not all 
militaries in Latin America embraced the positive aspects of U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine, as did the Venezuelans. Other armies utilized state terror to the opposite effect, 
as subsequent chapters will demonstrate.  
Meanwhile, the Venezuelan Communists did not abandon revolution after the 
failure of their second bid for “rapid victory.” Instead, they turned to protracted guerrilla 
warfare.73 Cuba continued the fight as well. “Venezuela remains a priority target in 
Communist efforts to promote violent revolution in Latin America,” Central Intelligence 
Agency analysts warned in February 1964, “primarily because Fidel Castro cannot afford 
to allow such an important democratic reformist regime to succeed.”74 As the 
Communists and their Cuban benefactors shifted their efforts to training and equipping 
guerrilla bands in 1964, the U.S. Army turned its attention to training specialized 
Venezuelan Army and FAC counter guerrilla units to find and eradicate them.75  
The Venezuelan Army began planning its first cazadores (“hunters” in Spanish) 
counter guerrilla unit in mid-1963.76 However, it took considerable time for the unit to 
take shape. The Army constituted the new “Destacamento de Cazadores Páez,” (Páez 
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Hunters Battalion) named after independence hero José Antonio Páez, in early 1964. The 
new unit then underwent six months of basic training through that August. A Special 
Action Force mobile training team arrived that same month to commence thirteen weeks 
of specialized counter guerrilla training for the 350-man unit. The Green Berets 
conducted their training into two phases. Between August and mid-September, the 
training focused on individual skills. Cazadores troops received advanced instruction in 
weapons, communications, medical skills, demolitions, and scouting.77 During the second 
phase, which lasted from mid-September to the end of October, the Cazadores trained as 
a unit. They learned “the tactics and techniques of counterguerrilla operations” from their 
Special Forces instructors.78 The new Cazadores battalion completed its training on 30 
October, but there was no time for celebration. Instead, “the new unit was committed to 
field operations on 1 November 1964,” American officers in Caracas reported. “The 
[Cazadores battalion] to date has been the most successful Venezuelan unit in the 
prosecution of counterguerrilla operations.”79 
While the first Cazadores battalion was completing its basic training, American 
and Venezuelan officers sought to dramatically increase the number of specialized 
counterguerrilla units in the Venezuelan Army. In early August, the U.S. Army made 
tentative plans to dispatch a Special Forces company headquarters and five “A” 
detachments to Venezuela, a total of sixteen officers and fifty-six enlisted men. The 
mission of this massive MTT would be to train five battalion-sized Cazadores units.80 By 
                                               









early September, U.S. Southern Command in Panama had approved the Army’s plan 
“contingent on approval by the Venezuelan President and the availability of [U.S.] 
funds,” but the now joint team would include a smaller Army contingent. The revised 
plans called for fifty-two Army and thirty-one Air Force personnel.81   
The plans faltered on 11 September due to domestic political sensitivities 
concerning external assistance. “The president of Venezuela refused approval of the MTT 
program,” American staff officers bluntly recorded. Yet they noted that the commander 
of the U.S. Military Group in Venezuela was undeterred. He “is proposing a new plan for 
conducting COIN training in the Canal Zone,” they wrote. Betancourt’s successor, 
President Raúl Leoni, apparently shared his trepidation regarding U.S. military 
assistance. After all, Betancourt did not directly ask Kennedy for military assistance until 
the final months of his term of office. American officers in Venezuela detected Leoni’s 
sensitivities. “The term ‘Counterinsurgency Mobile Training Team’ coupled with the 
distinct uniform of the 8th Special Forces Group (ABN) personnel,” Army officers in 
Caracas wrote in their late 1964 report to the Canal Zone, “comprise a political problem 
for the Venezuelan Army since all MTT’s [sic] must be approved by the president. A 
change in designation and uniform may be requested to alleviate the political aspect when 
deemed appropriate.”82 Although President Leoni rejected the plans to train five new 
Cazadores units in 1964, he did approve training of one more battalion. Consequently, the 
men of the 8th Special Forces Group arrived in September to begin instruction as planned.   
While the Venezuelan president harbored his doubts about specialized units (and 
their American trainers), his army was convinced. The success of first Cazadores 
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battalion spawned efforts to raise more dedicated counterguerrilla units. After training the 
Destacamento de Cazadores Páez, the Green Berets did not go home. Instead, they 
immediately began training two “especially selected” infantry companies of about 280 
personnel in “Counterinsurgency operations.”83 The Venezuelan Army intended these 
companies to go into action in January 1965. Meanwhile, the Venezuelan Army made 
plans to raise a second 350-man Cazadores battalion in July 1965.  
Because of its overwhelming success, the U.S. Army mission in Caracas did not 
want to see the Special Action Force mobile training team leave the country. It was the 
sole counterinsurgency MTT deployed to Venezuela in 1964. “The Counterinsurgency 
team completed its original project [training the Cazadores] and then worked with other 
Army units [the two infantry companies] and will be extended into the second half of the 
fiscal year,” the Army mission reported in January 1965. “Continual efforts are being 
made to extend the utilization of this team.” The Army mission also reassigned its own 
counterinsurgency advisor and Special Forces non-commissioned officer to the 
Venezuelan Army base outside the city of Maracay “to better assist in advising the 
Cazadores and the Airborne Battalion.”84  
Other counterinsurgency efforts continued as well. Venezuela sent twenty-five 
students to the School of the Americas counterinsurgency courses in 1964. The Army 
mission added two new advisors to the Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación, doubling its 
presence with that organization. The U.S. Army also planned to deliver two UH-1B 
“Huey” helicopters to the Venezuelan Army on 15 December in Caracas. “Venezuelan 
pilots and mechanics are being trained in CONUS [Continental United States] by the U.S. 
                                               






Army,” officers in the Canal Zone recorded, “and their instructors will then form an MTT 
which is scheduled to arrive in Venezuela at the same time as the aircraft.” Venezuela’s 
capability to airlift troops to remote areas, especially members of the newly trained 
counterguerrilla units, would greatly increase its Army’s effectiveness in internal security 
operations.  
American counterinsurgency training continued in 1965. As the rural guerrilla 
menace abated in late 1964, the U.S. Army mission’s attention refocused on classroom 
education. “The combined efforts of schooling – both in and out of country – with MTT 
operations from Panama and CONUS,” American officers in Caracas wrote, “currently 
have produced an adequate number of trained personnel in the areas of 
counterinsurgency, riot control, and psychological operations within the Venezuelan 
Armed Forces.” The Army mission also reported that, “The presence of US Army 
advisors in the FAC schools greatly contributed to the development of a common 
doctrine based on U.S. Army doctrine.” 85  
The Special Action Force deployed three counterinsurgency mobile training 
teams to Venezuela in 1965. However, the unit’s annual historical report provides little 
detail on these missions. It is probable that at least one of them trained the second 
Cazadores battalion in early 1965. The other two missions may have trained other counter 
guerrilla units or “reinvigorated” counterinsurgency instruction in Armed Forces schools. 
What these teams, or any others, did not do was advise Venezuelan units in combat. “On 
site evaluation of the effectiveness of government counter guerrilla forces is prohibited 
for US Military Mission personnel, as a matter of policy,” American officers in Caracas 
told their superiors in Panama. “Capability of units therefore is judged only by the results 
                                               





of operations and by observation of units in garrison and training areas [sic].”86 The 
policy emanated from Caracas, not Washington. “U.S. military personnel in Venezuela 
are not permitted to accompany local forces into combat areas,” the Special Group 
(Counter Insurgency) noted in an April 1965 meeting. “This limits their capability to 
observe and take corrective action.” The American policymakers then “discussed the 
advisability of a high-level approach to the Venezuelan Government on the seriousness of 
this limitation.” However, there is no indication that Caracas ever relented on this point.87  
Nevertheless, Venezuela remained a concern in Washington. In its meeting of 7 
October 1965, the Special Group (CI) received a brief report on Africa and then turned its 
attention to the “Guerrilla Problem in Venezuela.” “The Country Team is urging 
increased GOV [Government of Venezuela] pressure on the guerrillas,” the senior 
policymakers learned during the meeting. Meanwhile, “Ambassador Bernbaum considers 
the scheduled delivery of helicopters, and…training of pilots and maintenance personnel 
satisfactory.” Surprisingly, the group also recorded that “A request for a Venezuelan 
military observer team to go to Viet Nam [sic] has been sent to the Embassy and 
concurrence received.” U.S. Army General Earle Wheeler assured the group that 
“obtaining concurrence from MACV [Military Assistance Command Vietnam] is no 
problem.”88 Wheeler was in a position to know. He was serving as the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time. The available records do not indicate if the Venezuelan 
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military observers ever made their trip to Vietnam, but their own counterinsurgency 
struggle continued. 
In January, the Special Action Force dispatched the first of four 
counterinsurgency mobile training teams that visited Venezuela in 1966. A team of one 
officer and six enlisted men arrived to train a third Cazadores battalion. The team spent 
nine weeks conducting basic and advanced training.  “Classes included [a] patrol leaders 
course, radio operators course, medical course, heavy weapons, demolitions and drivers 
training.” The Green Berets concluded the battalion’s training with “nineteen (19) days of 
unit tactical training.” The course of instruction they employed was quite similar to the 
one first utilized in 1964, but it was of shorter duration. “Unfortunately some of the 
training time was curtailed,” the Special Action Force’s historians later wrote, “because 
of the operational commitments of the unit.”89  
In February another mobile training team arrived. This team of two officers and 
six sergeants conducted a “fairly rigorous” training program for two groups of students.  
The first consisted of a one hundred fourteen-man airborne company; “three officers and 
one hundred twenty-six technical sergeants” made up the second group. The composition 
of these companies and the instruction they received indicate that both were almost 
certainly specialized counter guerrilla units assigned to duties in mountainous areas. The 
five week course included “infiltration and exfiltration, instinctive firing, rappelling, 
suspension traverse [a technique for constructing a rope bridge], and ambush tactics,” the 
Special Action Force later recorded.90 
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Two other counterinsurgency training teams focused their efforts on individuals. 
Both teams taught a five-week course of instruction. The first trained “over 1,000 
[recruits] who had recently completed basic training” in “counter guerrilla 
operations…basic mountaineering, instinctive rapid fire, combat intelligence and river 
crossing techniques.” The second team “provided formal instruction and field training in 
counterinsurgency to sixty-four newly commissioned lieutenants. The field training 
included patrolling, raids, ambushes, and escape and evasion.” While the only problem 
mentioned in relation to recruit training was the large number of men assigned for 
training, the Green Berets found dealing with the new officers somewhat more 
challenging. “No major problems were encountered,” they later recorded. However they 
also observed that, “the [officer] students lacked ambition, especially when they were 
tired.”91 The Venezuelan Army leadership almost certainly assigned the men of these 
groups as replacements for their Cazadores battalions and other counter guerrilla units.  
The Venezuelan Army put increasing pressure on the guerrillas during the 
summer and into the fall of 1966, but the guerrillas still managed to carry out a growing 
number of attacks. The American military command in Panama observed a “serious 
resurgence of terrorism” later that year. “The level of guerrilla activity in October,” they 
noted, “was the highest for one month since 1963.”92 The same report also noted that that 
the United States had delivered eight new UH-1D helicopters to Venezuela during the 
year, and that the country has also purchased twenty Allouette helicopters from France, 
and fourteen Canberra bombers from Great Britain.93 
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Not to be outdone, Fidel Castro also reinforced his support of the Venezuelan 
insurgents. Forty men, fresh from their guerrilla training in Cuba, landed on the shores of 
Falcón state in July 1966. Their Venezuelan leader symbolically chose the 24th for their 
debarkation – the birthdate of famed Venezuelan independence leader Simón Bolívar, the 
Liberator of South America.94 Luben Petkoff, in command of the group, later recounted 
several attacks by bombers of the Venezuelan Air Force. Nevertheless, the 
revolutionaries persevered and made their way into the mountains to join their fellow 
insurgents.95 Cuba dispatched an additional seventy armed and trained guerrillas, mostly 
Venezuelans, in November. Yet another group arrived in May 1967.96  
By spring 1967, President Leoni had had enough. He reconsidered his earlier 
refusal of increased U.S. support for counter guerrilla unit training. In April, he requested 
President Lyndon B. Johnson’s help in training and equipping ten (later reduced to nine) 
new “Ranger-type battalions.” Again the U.S. response was swift. “DOD sent a special 
team to Caracas to assist the Venezuelans,” Walt Rostow informed President Johnson in 
late June. The Department of Defense “gave a special priority to the Venezuelans and all 
of the equipment will be delivered by July 1967,” Rostow reported.97  
This major increase in the number of Cazadores battalions tipped the balance. The 
guerrillas disdained the Army’s conventional units, but they feared the Cazadores. One 
guerrilla leader later recalled “the regular army, which seemed like a clumsy, helpless 
and blind elephant stumbling up the mountain.” The Cazadores were different. He 
acknowledged them as “a special body… a kind of counterguerrilla.” Other guerrilla 
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leaders also singled out the Cazadores as tenacious and very effective. “They were a 
politically indoctrinated group, superbly trained and clever,” Luben Petkoff recounted. 
“[T]hey utilized guerrilla tactics to fight the guerrillas. They lived and slept in the 
mountains, keeping their camp as though they were themselves guerrillas. Therefore, of 
course, when you see that you are fighting an enemy that not only is not foolish, as we 
had believed, but is in fact clever and much more numerous that you, you have to begin 
changing your mind.”98  
The nine new Cazadores battalions, joining those previously trained and other 
counterguerrilla formations, proved too much for the revolutionaries. By 1968, “the 
government [had] fielded 13 battalions of specialized and heavily armed antiguerrilla 
troops,” CIA analysts noted.99 That same year the number of active guerrillas dwindled to 
about two hundred.100 This was a significant drop from the four hundred or so estimated 
by U.S. policymakers to have been fighting in summer 1967.101 The Venezuelan Army 
relentlessly pursued the remaining guerrilla bands throughout 1968 and beyond, but by 
then the revolution was essentially over. In April 1969, the Venezuelan Minister of 
Defense met with the United States Secretary of Defense in Washington. According to 
the notes of the meeting, General Marín García Villasmil told his American counterpart 
“that the problem of insurgency in Venezuela is under control.” “There are two or three 
major insurgency groups,” Garcia explained, “but they are not effective. The Venezuelan 
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armed forces have gone into isolated areas of the country, where they have engaged in 
civic action projects and give[n] the local populace a chance to voice their problems to 
representatives of the government.”102 Adoption of a benign counterinsurgency doctrine 
and years of patient American counterinsurgency training, coupled with effective 
democracy and reasonably good governance, had thwarted the Communist’s decade long 
attempt at revolution.  
CONCLUSION 
Fidel Castro selected Venezuela as one of the first countries he targeted for the 
export of revolution. Although largely overlooked in the historiography of Latin 
America’s Cold War, Venezuela was a key battleground throughout the 1960s. The 
United States supported Venezuela’s fledgling democracy with military assistance while 
Cuba sent its own financial and military aid to the Venezuelan Communists. Yet despite 
almost ten years of effort and external backing, the revolutionaries in Venezuela never 
overcame their lack of popular support. The transplanted urban guerrillas failed in their 
bid to put down roots in the countryside. The goodwill engendered by effective electoral 
democracy undermined the Communists’ calls for revolution. Land reform eased rural 
discontent. Meanwhile, patient and careful counterinsurgency operations and civic action 
by Venezuelan security forces, based on the tenets of U.S. Army counterinsurgency 
doctrine, also helped deny the insurgents the ability to gain peasant support. Venezuela 
exemplified the validity of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center’s 1964 admonition that 
“any program for countering an insurgency must be coupled with positive efforts to 
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remove the basic causes of discontent and to facilitate social and economic progress 
through peaceful means.”103  
U.S. Army counter guerrilla training took longer to reach fruition, but it was only 
a matter of time for Venezuelan forces to develop the organizational expertise and a 
sufficient number of specialized units required to finally eradicate the guerrillas. The 
Venezuelan Army and National Guard undertook the three elements required to develop 
effective and durable counterinsurgency forces. First, they accepted individual training. 
Venezuela dispatched ninety students to U.S. Army counterinsurgency schools between 
1961 and 1964 – the highest attendance of any Latin American nation.  Second, they 
developed specialized counter guerrilla units, most of which received training from the 
Special Action Force. Fourteen counterinsurgency mobile training teams visited 
Venezuela from 1962 to 1966, again the highest of any Latin American country. Lastly, 
the Venezuelan Army and National Guard developed their own instructor cadres to 
overcome the challenges of conscription and to sustain and spread their newly-acquired 
counterinsurgency training across their respective forces. The case of Venezuela aptly 
demonstrates that these three elements were crucial to developing an effective and 
enduring counterinsurgency capability.  
Venezuela received the highest density of U.S. counterinsurgency training of any 
armed forces in the Americas during the 1960s. Yet despite this supposedly corrosive 
training, Venezuela did not suffer any military coups d’état attempts between 1963 and 
1992, nor did its military forces resort to “dirty war” tactics in facing a prolonged 
insurgency. Despite this high density of American counterinsurgency training, successive 
Venezuelan presidents controlled what training the country accepted. They alone 
                                               




determined the number of counter guerrilla battalions formed in the country. Moreover, 
Venezuelan civilian leaders directed the employment of counterinsurgency forces and 
Venezuelan military officers led them in combat. Americans did not. Venezuela’s 
democratic presidents of the 1960s all exhibited due caution in employing armed force to 
counter the guerrilla threat. Rómulo Betancourt assigned the police and National Guard 
to the primary responsibility for confronting the insurgency in the cities.  He restricted 
the army’s combat and counter guerrilla operations to the countryside. The presidents that 
followed him maintained these policies and in doing so they liked spared unintended 
civilian casualties. Adopting the tenets of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, and 
maintaining civilian control, gave the Venezuelan military the means to defeat a Cuban-
supported Communist insurgency without resorting to dictatorship, murder, 
disappearances, or torture. Nonetheless, counterinsurgency was only an antidote to 




Chapter Six: Counterinsurgency in Colombia 
 
Colombia’s post-World War Two history made it unique among Latin American 
nations. Its troubles began earlier than most. Colombia’s violence problem of the late 
1950s and early 1960s stemmed from an incomplete process of reconciliation in the 
aftermath of an earlier period of civil war rather than Communist insurgency. Internal 
security efforts in that nation predated both Cuba’s export of revolution and the United 
States’ “counterinsurgency era” under the Kennedy administration.  This bloody era, 
known as “La Violencia,” began with an urban riot in Bogotá in April 1948. The violence 
quickly spread to countryside as Liberal and Conservative political factions took up arms 
against each other. Policymakers and historians later estimated that some 150,000 to 
250,000 people perished between 1948 and 1959 during La Violencia.1 Government 
responses alternated between military repression and political reconciliation, but all 
proved incapable of bringing lasting peace. Meanwhile, over the decade rural violence 
slowly morphed from political to criminal in nature.    
By the end of the 1950s, rural violence was endemic and persisted in “five of 
Colombia’s richest provinces” according to U.S. presidential advisors.2 The Americans 
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also noted that this phenomenon was “characterized more by lawlessness, murder and 
banditry than by politically-motivated guerrilla warfare.”3 Colombian and American 
officials of the time recognized that rural violence was mainly criminal and not 
ideological in nature. Most rural armed groups sought local autonomy to conduct illicit 
activities and control territory rather than seeking to overthrow the central government. 
However, the Cuban Revolution and the Cold War did affect Colombia. These same U.S. 
and Colombian officials feared that rural insecurity left the country vulnerable to Cuban-
style guerrilla warfare, and they often referred to Colombia’s violence problem as a form 
of insurgency.  
The year 1958 ushered in a new era of political compromise between the Liberals 
and Conservatives. Alberto Lleras Camargo, Colombia’s first president elected under the 
National Front agreement, issued an amnesty in 1958 forgiving all previous political 
violence committed since 1948. Although the amnesty did reduce rural bloodshed, some 
bandits and guerrillas rejected reconciliation. Lleras Camargo was unable to eliminate 
these remaining armed groups. Therefore, in 1959, he sought assistance from the United 
States. In response, President Dwight D. Eisenhower dispatched a special 
counterinsurgency survey team to investigate Colombia’s violence and provide 
recommendations to the government on how to counter the persistent insecurity. These 
efforts achieved only partial success. Yet, Colombia’s 1959 request for U.S. assistance 
and the special team visit did help establish an enduring United States-Colombian 
security relationship.  
During the 1960s, Colombia accepted the greatest number of Special Action 
Force mobile training team visits of any Latin American nation. Seventy-five Green 
                                               




Beret teams visited Colombia from 1962 to 1972, but only nine taught counterinsurgency 
skills. Five of those missions focused on psychological operations -- just four related to 
doctrine and tactics. Colombia dispatched a mere fourteen students to attend U.S. Army 
counterinsurgency courses between 1961 and 1964. By comparison, Venezuela sent 
ninety. Colombia confronted ongoing rural violence in the early 1960s and asked for and 
accepted high level U.S. internal security assistance. But Colombia apparently received 
only the barest level of counterinsurgency training. What explains this seeming 
disconnect?  
The 1959 American survey team found that Colombian security forces had 
already developed basic counter guerrilla tactics. In fact, due to years of conflict in the 
hinterlands, some Colombian officers boasted greater counter guerrilla experience than 
their American counterparts. In 1960, the Colombian Army also already possessed an 
effective light infantry school and several small counter guerrilla units. However, 
American survey team members found the Colombian Army’s tactics limited and their 
overall posture defensive. Colombian units were capable of responding to armed groups 
when and if they encountered them, but they did not actively seek them out.  
Colombia also lacked a counterinsurgency doctrine. What the country needed was 
a strategy that would enable them to resolve rural violence and reestablish government 
support and control in conflict areas rather than simply reacting to each new incident and 
atrocity. American counterinsurgency concepts filled this gap. From 1948 to 1958, 
successive Colombian governments had vacillated between offering political amnesty to 
the armed factions and, when amnesty failed, using conventional military force to repress 
rural populations. In essence, these policies forgave the bandits and punished the 




Colombian government would seek reconciliation with the rural population through civic 
action and psychological operations while utilizing specialized counter guerrilla units to 
more selectively apply military force against the remaining armed groups. The 
Colombian military also found their efforts hampered by the absence of knowledge and 
expertise in the military skills that augment and compliment counterinsurgency efforts. In 
response, the United States provided many more mobile training teams related to 
intelligence, psychological operations, communications, and civic action, than it did for 
counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine.  
U.S. military efforts in Colombia did not seek to implant American-style 
counterinsurgency capability from scratch. Instead, U.S. support centered on enhancing 
and improving Colombia’s preexisting internal security capabilities. The U.S. Army did 
provide counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics, but in smaller measure than previously 
understood. However, because the country’s political leaders chose short-term military 
solutions over long-term political and social reforms, rural insurgency reemerged in the 
late 1960s.  U.S. Army counterinsurgency assistance proved successful at curtailing 
Colombia’s rural violence, but it did not end it.  
COLOMBIA’S LINGERING CIVIL WAR 
Colombia’s modern civil war began in the years after World War Two. As society 
split between the traditionally oriented Conservative party and the more progressive 
Liberal party, the country became increasingly polarized. “The two traditional parties, the 
Liberals and Conservatives, dominated politics,” one historian noted. “While leadership 




rivalry that developed expressed itself at all levels of Colombian society.”4 The 
assassination of popular Liberal politician Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Bogotá in 1948 
provided the spark that touched off years of intense violence between the two groups. 
Two student radicals from Cuba observed “the waves of destruction in the streets” of the 
Colombian capital in 1948. Fidel Castro was one of them. A biographer later noted that 
the young Castro was “fascinated by the violence.”5 
Gaitán’s murder triggered five days of urban rioting in Bogotá, and the 
lawlessness soon spread to other cities and the countryside.6 “Pent up frustrations and 
hatreds found release in an orgy of violence far beyond the control of scattered public 
security forces,” Central Intelligence Agency analysts later wrote. “Conservative and 
Liberal groups formed in the countryside with almost religious fervor to attack each other 
with the most brutal disregard for life.”7  
Government efforts to quell the violence swung back and forth between 
repression and reconciliation. From 1948 to 1953, the ruling Conservative government 
employed the nation’s armed forces for the “ruthless repression of the Liberals.”8 “With 
neither side willing to back down,” U.S. diplomats later judged, “violence entered its 
worst period of killings, atrocities, burnings and pillaging.”9 Ongoing violence and 
political meddling in the armed forces led to a successful military coup d’état by Army 
General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in June 1953. Rojas sought to end the violence by offering 
an amnesty to the political factions. The reconciliation policy achieved some initial 
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success. “Although most of those fighting the Government took advantage of the amnesty 
and laid down their arms,” U.S. diplomats observed, “others, particularly in the 
Department of Tolima, continued fighting for their own purposes.”10 Groups in other 
areas also rejected Rojas’ bid to end the lawlessness. The political amnesty plan of 1953 
failed to end Colombia’s rural bloodshed, and violence was once again on the rise by 
1956. Having tried reconciliation, Rojas next turned to repression. “Rojas made several 
ill-considered campaigns to clean out pockets of Liberal and Communist resistance by 
resorting to torture, concentration camps, and indiscriminate aerial bombing of the 
inhabitants of these regions,” American State Department officers later wrote.11 
Government brutality tarnished the Colombian Army’s reputation and eventually led to 
Rojas’ ouster.   
Another military coup d’état ended Rojas’ rule in 1957 and ushered in a new era 
of political cooperation. Liberals and Conservatives formed a pact to topple Rojas and to 
create “a coalition system [of government] termed the National Front. This system called 
for the sharing of power for sixteen years in an attempt to cool the passions which had 
provoked the violence,” American diplomats later explained.12 However, Colombian 
government efforts to end the disorder soon stalled again. “The apparent reason for this 
was that the violence which had begun as political insurrection, was now continuing 
largely as criminal banditry,” U.S. diplomats reported to Washington. “That is, outlaw 
elements in the rural areas were now operating in a number of individual armed bands, 
associated in some cases with ex-guerrilla groups or drawn from old guerrilla units, 
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which murdered and pillaged in a pattern of banditry and protection racketeering.”13 Yet 
Colombia also faced a number of Communist enclaves in remote areas. The lack of 
government presence allowed six of the enclaves to function as de facto autonomous 
zones.14 
Alberto Lleras Camargo, Colombia’s first president under the National Front 
compact, took office in August 1958.15 “When he assumed the Presidency…Lleras 
declared an amnesty for all those who wished to lay down their arms and also offered 
sizeable stipends for rehabilitation and relocation,” American diplomats noted.16 The 
amnesty forgave “politically-motivated criminal acts” committed since 1948. After the 
pardon period concluded in June 1959, the government considered all future acts of 
violence as criminal or subversive in nature and not political. This was an important 
distinction as it allowed the security forces to aggressively pursue any recalcitrant groups 
without appearing to take political sides.17 “Although some bandits and guerrillas did 
take advantage of the Government’s generous offer and stopped fighting for good, others 
refused to trust the Government, while still others took the money but later returned to 
banditry. At any rate, the Lleras policy of placating the bandits was soon discredited,” 
U.S. diplomats later judged.18 Having found reconciliation an incomplete solution, the 
Colombian President again sought a military response.  
Just over a year after taking office, President Lleras Camargo requested help from 
the United States in dealing with the interminable security problem. Although most of 
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Colombia’s lingering rural violence centered on criminal banditry, in the aftermath of the 
successful Cuban revolution of January 1959 and the heated rhetoric of the Cold War, 
political leaders in Bogotá and Washington worried about the potential for Communist 
insurgency. Lleras Camargo adroitly played on these American fears to gain U.S. military 
assistance. 
President Lleras Camargo met with the American officers of the Military 
Assistance and Advisory Group in Bogotá in June 1959 “for consultation on the violence 
question.” The Colombian president sought U.S. assistance “to activate and arm within 
the Colombian Army a special counter-guerrilla force to be deployed for immediate 
impact in emergency zones.”19 During the meeting, Lleras Camargo also mentioned the 
failure of U.S. policy in China and Cuba. He told the American officers that he did not 
worry about the Communists’ ability to topple his government in the short term, but he 
intimated that “such elements, if permitted to grow in this fertile breeding ground of 
guerrilla activity, would later become a serious threat to the stability of his 
government.”20 The Colombian President’s comments triggered a high level U.S. 
reaction.  
President Eisenhower dispatched a special survey team of American 
counterinsurgency experts to Colombia in October 1959 in response to President Lleras 
Camargo’s request. This team of “anti-guerrilla warfare experts,” drawn from the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense, boasted members with experience in 
“the Philippines, Vietnam, Korea… and others who had background in the Latin 
American situation.”21 When the team arrived in Colombia, its presidential mandate from 
                                               
19 Rempe, “The Origin of Internal Security in Colombia,” 29.  
20 Ibid., 31. 




Lleras Camargo allowed them a remarkable degree of access and mobility despite a 
requirement for secrecy. “Only Lleras and his closest advisors were to know of the 
existence and actual purpose of the team,” Canadian historian Dennis Rempe later noted, 
“in order to avoid political embarrassment to the Colombian president for inviting 
‘foreigners’ to review domestic security problems.”22 Rempe continued,  
With Lleras’ personal backing, the team worked its way through Colombia 
in November and December [1959], travelling more than 23,000 
kilometers, visiting over 100 military garrisons, towns, and cities with the 
complete co-operation of local military commanders and civilian 
authorities in emergency zones. Lleras’ support also gave the team access 
to both official and private documents from military, police, and 
intelligence services, church and political leaders, and rehabilitation 
organisations. In the field they observed both civic action efforts and 
combat operations against bandits, and interviewed over 2,000 people, 
including refugees and campesinos, labour leaders, jailed bandit and 
guerrilla fighters, as well as “a number of guerrilla leaders in control of 
substantial regional fighting potentials.”23 
The team completed its comprehensive survey in mid-December 1959 and set about 
analyzing what it had learned in order to develop recommendations. 
The special survey team completed its draft report in late-January 1960. In the 
report the team discussed the security problems in Colombia in terms of active violence 
(due to banditry) and potential violence (from Communist guerrillas). This differentiation 
of Colombia’s internal security problems as two distinct phenomena had far reaching 
consequences for policy makers. Events will show that Colombian and U.S. leaders chose 
to first grapple with the short-term problem of rural banditry, while taking only cursory 
steps to address the longer-term (and more complex) issues of rural discontent. The team 
also found a garrison-bound army, a despised National Police force, ineffective 
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intelligence organizations, and “security forces [that] lacked any kind of information, 
public relations, or psychological warfare capabilities.”24  
The American survey team prescribed six steps for the Colombian government to 
take to rectify these deficiencies. The team recommended the establishment of a 
specialized counter-guerrilla force drawn from the Lancero (U.S. Ranger equivalent) 
units of the army, improved civilian and military intelligence capabilities, and the 
establishment of a government public information service. The survey team also urged 
efforts to “rehabilitate public opinion about Colombia’s security forces,” a complete 
reorganization of the National Police, and renewed emphasis on internal development 
programs and projects.25 
In its final report of May 1960, the American survey team confirmed President 
Lleras Camargo’s earlier assessment that “active violence” caused by rural banditry 
posed the most critical, short-term threat to Colombia’s stability.26 However, the team’s 
final report also included its earlier division of internal security problems into short- and 
long-term issues. In doing so, they may have unwittingly tempted policymakers to focus 
their attentions on the easier short-term military problems rather than implementing 
deeper political and social reforms. “The team judged that the Colombian government 
could eradicate [bandit] groups more easily because, unlike real guerrillas, [the bandits] 
lacked ideological motivation and popular support,” one historian later concluded. 
“Lancero units, guided by qualified advisors and supported by a functioning intelligence 
service as well as basic psychological warfare and civic action programmes, could 
alleviate this problem relatively quickly. By employing counter-guerrilla methods to 
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‘capture, kill, or adequately discourage bandits and outlaws,’ the team estimated that 
current, active violence could be ‘substantially eliminated’ in 10-12 months.”27 Prospects 
for containing Colombia’s violence were good, the team judged.  
On the other hand, resolving the risk of potential violence in Colombia posed a far 
more intractable problem. One historian later summarized the survey team’s conclusions 
as follows:  
To bring long-term stability to Colombia required wide-ranging reform of 
that country’s social, political, and economic system. Military solutions 
were secondary and largely a derivative of nation-building efforts that 
would entrench a broadly respected, democratic society… Internal 
security could only be achieved by co-ordinating [sic] military and law-
enforcement activities with ongoing efforts to eliminate widespread social, 
political, and economic injustice.  The ‘cardinal principle’ to achieving 
this goal in Colombia was the development of a true democratic 
government, reflecting the will of the majority of its people, while 
concomitantly protecting minority rights.28 
In other words, a lasting solution entailed both the diffusion of good governance 
throughout the national territory and an enduring reconciliation of Colombia’s earlier 
civil war. The nation achieved political reconciliation during the 1960s, but proved 
incapable of spreading governance throughout its national territory.  
U.S. INTERNAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA 
Colombia’s acceptance of the special survey team’s recommendations paved the 
way for increased U.S. internal security assistance. When President Lleras Camargo met 
with President Eisenhower in Washington in April 1960, Colombia’s internal security 
problem was a key item on the agenda. Violence had begun to rise again from its deep 
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decline in 1958.29 American State Department advisors recommended that Colombia 
“pay for the modest (estimated $600,000) military arms and equipment which the Survey 
Team has recommended in order to avoid exposure to charges U.S. gift arms and 
equipment are being used in domestic civil strife.” However, Eisenhower’s advisors left 
the door open to U.S. funding. “If Colombia does not consider it is in a position to do 
this,” they suggested, “the United States would give the matter further consideration.”30 
President Eisenhower evidently agreed. On January 5, 1961, just fifteen days before the 
end of his term of office, he approved a presidential determination for internal security 
aid to Colombia totaling $1.67 million dollars.31 This assistance package included “three 
helicopters and some arms and light equipment for two ranger battalions.”32  
The U.S. Army Mission in Bogotá also redirected its assistance to the Colombian 
Army towards internal security in mid-1961. “[I]nstead of their utilization in the 
[Colombian Army] school system” American embassy officers later wrote, the U.S. 
advisors now utilized “the bulk of their [American military] personnel in influencing the 
entire [Colombian] Army on priority aspects of internal security.”33 Similarly, “during 
the latter part of 1961 and early 1962 the Army Mission influenced the training of 
[Colombian] Army recruits,” American diplomats reported. The Colombian Army 
centralized its previously dispersed recruit instruction “to provide better training, closer 
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supervision, and improved instruction.” Perhaps most importantly, the U.S. Army 
Mission officers convinced their Colombian counterparts to emphasize counter guerrilla 
training. “Stress was placed on increased Ranger training at Melgar for officers and [non-
commissioned officers],” American embassy officers reported to Washington, “and there 
was begun the rotation, through the Melgar Ranger School, of whole platoons from the 
five ranger companies located in the brigades. These ranger units were actually the 
workhorses of the brigades.”34 Two new Ranger battalions, funded in part by the 1961 
U.S. internal security assistance package mentioned above, provided additional counter 
guerrilla forces. The new battalions also improved the army’s ability to reinforce any 
brigade requiring assistance.   
Although it rose to a new prominence in the early 1960s, the Colombian Ranger 
School was the fruit of earlier U.S. military assistance. Colombia contributed an infantry 
battalion to the United Nations forces in Korea from 1953 to 1954.35 No other Latin 
American nations participated in the Korean War. Colombian forces fought in several 
conventional engagements during that conflict, serving under an American infantry 
regiment. While serving overseas, Colombian officers became aware of the capabilities 
of U.S. Army ranger companies which excelled at small unit infantry operations behind 
enemy lines and in difficult terrain. Colombian officers in Korea recognized the value of 
such unconventional training for their own struggles against bandits and guerrillas in the 
mountains, forests, and jungles back home. In 1955, American officers helped the 
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Colombian Army establish the Escuela de Lanceros (Lancers school) modeled on the 
U.S. Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia.36  
Despite the initial security assistance efforts in 1960 and 1961, American embassy 
officers in Bogotá gave a pessimistic assessment of the rural violence problem and the 
Colombian Army as it stood in late 1961.  
During this period, there was a tendency to ignore violence or pretend that 
it was as inevitable as the July 4 traffic toll in the United States. Even 
many elements in the [Colombian] military seemed to have this outlook. 
The Army was psychologically unprepared to fight and kill fellow 
Colombians and militarily untrained to wage guerrilla-type warfare. The 
units were stationed in fixed garrisons throughout the country and many 
officers were more concerned about continuing their studies in traditional 
type warfare than in learning to fight bandits with positive results. Also, 
their morale was very low because of their scant belief in what they were 
doing. Lacking the desire and proper training, the military also was 
without an overall plan to defeat the bandits. And if there was no 
organized plan at the upper level, there was a tendency at the lower levels 
to improvise and forget the basic principles of warfare: economy of force, 
surprise, and mobility.37 
To help address these weaknesses, American officials dispatched a follow-on 
counterinsurgency survey team.  
Brigadier General William P. Yarborough, commander of the Special Warfare 
Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, led a second advisory team to Colombia in 
February 1962. Army leaders charged Yarborough with several tasks. Foremost among 
them, he was “to evaluate the effectiveness of Colombian counter-insurgency operations” 
as well as “to formulate recommendations… for the use of the Special Warfare Mobile 
Training Team scheduled for Colombia.”38 Over the course of its twelve-day visit, the 
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general’s team detected numerous problems related to the country’s counterinsurgency 
efforts and the Colombian Army’s effectiveness. The absence of centralized planning and 
control degraded the country’s security efforts into a series of smaller, less effective 
campaigns. “Fixed outposts place the Army on the defensive,” Yarborough reported, 
“giving the advantage of the initiative to the dissident elements and to the bandits.”39  
Although critical of the Colombian Army’s planning and the disposition of its 
forces, Yarborough apparently believed that American assistance could easily improve its 
tactics. He did not mention unfamiliarity with counter guerrilla or counterinsurgency 
tactics among the problems plaguing the Colombian Army. “The Army’s most serious 
deficiency,” he wrote instead, “is its lack of essential communications needed to control 
maneuvering elements, to relay timely intelligence, as well as to maintain contact among 
fixed installations.”40 “[T]he Army’s second greatest deficiency is its lack of 
transportation, both air and surface,” Yarborough added. Inadequate national and military 
intelligence, a “sporadic” civic action program, and “little evidence of an Army 
propaganda or psychological operations program” also made the American general’s list 
of problems.  
Yarborough also identified several strengths among his Colombian counterparts. 
“The Army has numerous officers principally in field grade, who are highly competent 
and who understand the principles of counter-insurgency in all of their ramifications,” 
Yarborough reported to Washington. “The enlisted men of the Army appear to be 
generally healthy, intelligent, responsive to leadership and are well disciplined.”41  
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In his final report, Yarborough recommended fifteen actions for the Colombian 
Army to undertake to improve its internal security efforts and sixteen for the United 
States. However, a closer analysis of Yarborough’s report reveals his Cold War mindset.  
Yarborough advocated that American Special Forces assume a direct role in Colombia’s 
internal security. “[T]he minimum Special Warfare Units and personnel now needed to 
assist the Colombian Army in establishing internal security are,” Yarborough wrote, 
“Five detachments “A” to be used with battalions of the four brigades most heavily 
engaged with bandits and guerrilla elements.”42 Beyond these sixty Green Berets (twelve 
men per A detachment), Yarborough added six Special Forces officers and soldiers as 
“control personnel for each of the above brigades,” another nine “control personnel for 
use by the Chief US Army Mission,” and “a psychological operations officers and three 
enlisted psychological operations specialists.” 43 In total, Yarborough recommended the 
immediate deployment of ninety-seven American Special Forces personnel to Colombia!  
In retrospect, Yarborough’s recommendations may seem shocking but they 
reflected the U.S. Army’s unconventional warfare doctrine of the time and the Cold War 
pressures of the early 1960s. American Special Forces doctrine of the day anticipated 
raising and training indigenous forces for guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines in 
wartime. Yarborough expanded this approach. He also envisioned his Green Berets 
training, advising, and also controlling Colombian Army formations in the conduct of 
counterinsurgency operations during a period of internal conflict. This modification 
reflected Yarborough’s fears of another Cuba in Latin America. In a secret classified 
supplement to his report, he conceded that,  
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Even complete implementation of the recommendations made in the basic 
report will not bring decisive or lasting results unless there is an 
appreciative amelioration of the political climate and the economic 
situation in Colombia. In view of the propensity of most leaders in both 
political and economic fields to ignore their national responsibilities and to 
seek personal aggrandizement instead, it is considered that positive 
measures should be taken to influence the situation if a debacle occurs in 
Colombia.44 
Yarborough recommended the deployment of U.S. Special Forces to immediately 
bolster Colombian counterinsurgency activities. In case those efforts failed, Yarborough 
also recommended the establishment of covert forces to fight on after the fall of a 
democratic government. “It is the considered opinion of the survey team,” he wrote in the 
secret supplement to his report, “that a concerted country team effort should be made 
now to select civilian and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance 
operations in case they are needed later. This should be done with a view toward 
development of a civil and military structure for exploitation in the event the Colombian 
internal security system deteriorates further.”45 This recommendation was not a blueprint 
for death squads, as some authors have claimed. 46 Instead, Yarborough’s concept related 
to the failed U.S. efforts to establish a resistance effort in Cuba. He was making the 
argument that the time and place to create a resistance movement was internally before 
the country fell, not externally and after the fact. He was thinking in terms of the 
spectacular failure to overturn the Castro regime at the Bay of Pigs just ten months 
earlier.  
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In any event, both Colombian and American officials balked at Yarborough’s 
proposal for the direct intervention of American Green Berets. The Commanding General 
of the Colombian Army “General Ruiz was very receptive to everything,” Yarborough 
tersely reported, “except deployment of the Special Forces A detachments.”47  State 
Department officials in Bogotá later provided an additional account of the U.S. and 
Colombian reaction to Yarborough’s proposal. “His initial recommendation for the use of 
a U.S. Special Forces Team,” the diplomats reported, “was not favorably considered by 
the Colombian Minister of War, [the Commander U.S. Military Group], or the U.S. 
Ambassador.” 48 Colombian political leaders needed American military support, but 
national sensitivities limited how much intervention they would tolerate. Colombian 
politicians and military officers accepted American advice. They also retained full control 
of their Armed Forces throughout the 1960s.  
PLAN LAZO 
One element of Yarborough’s recommendations proved much less contentious, 
but it had far-reaching consequences. He recommended that the Army dispatch two field 
grade Special Forces officers to Colombia to assist in the development of a 
comprehensive counterinsurgency plan. Despite Yarborough’s pessimism regarding 
Colombia’s situation, the Army sent the two-man Special Forces team later in 1962.49 
The advisory team’s planning efforts with the Colombian Army resulted in Plan “Lazo” 
(snare or noose in Spanish). This three-year action plan prescribed:    
• the expansion of counterguerrilla units,  
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• strengthened command and control over all security forces (police and 
military) to ensure unity of effort,  
• increased civic action and propaganda to win public support, and 
• improved intelligence operations to identify guerrillas and agents from 
amongst the civilian population.50  
Plan Lazo provided, for the first time, a single standard reference of sound tactics 
for the elimination of bandits and guerrillas. “This plan was principally the setting down, 
in one document, of all of the techniques and tactics taught in U.S. Doctrine Guidance,” 
American Embassy officers explained, “and the issuance of the document as a Plan and 
Directive to all field commanders… Nothing was particularly new in the plan. It 
consisted in an emphasis on training, aggressive patrolling by hunter-killer teams, 
intelligence coordination, civic action, etc., that is, the compilation of U.S. doctrine and 
techniques into a modified field manual.”  
Plan Lazo also provided a five-phase template for operations. The first phase 
incorporated “Preparatory Actions” to include training, organizing, and coordinating 
local security forces. “Initiation of Counter-Action,” the second phase, included initial 
intelligence and psychological operations to gain information on bandits and guerrillas. 
“Assumption of the Offense” involved military operations to locate the armed groups, 
displace them away from populated areas, and cut them off from their bases of supply. 
Phase four, “Destruction of Bandit Bands,” encompassed the employment of “major 
reaction forces” to defeat the isolated groups. The final phase, “Reconstruction,” involved 
the intensification of military civic action and “all programs and activities necessary to 





establish the [affected] community in a favorable political, economic, and sociological 
setting wherein bandit activities are not likely to recur.”51 
Plan Lazo incorporated the tenets of American counterinsurgency doctrine. It 
emphasized the role of specialized counter guerrilla units to detect, engage and destroy 
insurgent forces. However, it also stressed the winning of hearts and minds and the need 
for internal development to remove causes of discontent. “Each officer and soldier will be 
made aware of the psychological effect of his actions on the civil population,” a précis of 
Plan Lazo explained. “Reasonable precautions should be taken to ensure that no harm or 
unjustified fear is incurred with respect to innocent elements of the population.”52 Such a 
concern for the civilian populace stands in stark contrast to earlier Colombian 
government policies which viewed the peasantry as the enemy, or, if the campesinos 
were lucky, with indifference.  
This sea change in Colombian internal security policy also reflects a convergence 
of American and Colombian views. “Early in the National Front period,” Dennis Rempe 
explains, “Lleras Camargo attempted a two-track policy against the guerrilla zones. 
Peasants were encouraged to participate in rehabilitation programmes while guerrilla 
leadership which resisted government efforts to gain local support were eliminated.”53   
U. S. counterinsurgency efforts and Plan Lazo codified and reinforced this new concept. 
“An essential part of [internal security] operations is the concurrent employment of civic 
action to win the support of the populace and gain a measure of political stability and 
socio-economic improvement, thereby reducing or eliminating conditions which would 
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contribute to further outbreaks of banditry,” the Plan Lazo précis explained. Then, 
perhaps most surprisingly, the précis directed that “Commanders should consider civic 
action fully as important as combat actions.”54 Plan Lazo set the intellectual framework 
for Colombian counterinsurgency in the 1960s.  It also reoriented the Colombian Army’s 
counter guerrilla tactics from defensive to offensive in nature.  
U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING IN COLOMBIA 
U.S. Army counterinsurgency training in Colombia accelerated after 
Yarborough’s February 1962 visit. “With the arrival during the period [1 January to 30 
June 1962] of MTTs for counterinsurgency, intelligence and psychological operations, 
considerable progress has been made in the field of internal security training,” American 
officers in Bogotá wrote. “Numerous courses have been conducted and all teams assisted 
in the preparation of a Colombian Army counterinsurgency plan [Plan Lazo].”  Yet not 
all Colombian officers rallied to the new internal security mission. A major obstacle “has 
been a lack of appreciation on the part of senior officers for modern concepts and 
techniques used in combatting insurgency,” the U.S. officers added.55  
Yet some senior officers did understand counterinsurgency.  One of them was 
General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, Commanding General of the Colombian Army, and later 
Minister of War. “Ruiz argued that the Army must not only destroy the guerrillas, once 
they were raised in arms,” one historian concluded, “but also must attack the social and 
economic causes as well as the historic political reasons for their existence.”56 “We 
learned from Cyprus, Algeria and other such experiences,” Ruiz later told Time 
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magazine, “that you cannot defeat a guerrilla by regular warfare. You have to take away 
the support of the population.”57 
Nevertheless, despite the apparent intransigence on the part of some Colombian 
Army officers, their organization already boasted a rather robust counterinsurgency 
training capability.  “Service schools continue to devote large numbers of hours to 
counter insurgency training,” American officers noted in July 1962.  However, instead of 
sending large numbers of its soldiers and officers abroad to attend American 
counterinsurgency courses, the Colombian Army taught its students at home, in its own 
institutions. But it did adopt American tactics and doctrine.  
Colombian Army tactics evolved over time. Increasing American support and the 
counterinsurgency concepts espoused in Plan Lazo drove these changes. U.S. Army 
assistance aided the Colombian Army in revamping its counter guerrilla tactics, raising 
new counter guerrilla units, and enhancing its mobility through the use of helicopters. 
The Americans also helped to improve Colombia’s capabilities for communications, 
intelligence, and psychological operations.  
In 1961, the Colombian Army deployed approximately twenty-five percent of its 
manpower in rural areas. It dispersed most of these forces throughout the countryside in 
fixed platoon sized fortines (forts). Each fortín was located within a short distance of 
several others. “A bandit caudrilla [gang] which had a chance encounter with an army 
patrol now found that the [engaged] unit was linked by sight, sound, or radio to four more 
units of the same size, all capable of reacting to the danger in movements that resembled 
defensive plays by a professional football team in the United States,” historian Russell 
                                               




Ramsey explained.58 Yet it took time to reinforce a platoon in contact with bandit forces, 
especially in mountainous or jungle terrain. The Colombian Army sought to rectify this 
deficiency by establishing two special flecha (arrow in Spanish) companies which “were 
entirely airmobile [trained for helicopter operations] and capable of moving into a danger 
zone on a few minutes’ notice…”59 The Colombian Army also added an air-mobile 
infantry battalion in May 1961, intended “for the counterinsurgency environment.”60 
Although these early efforts to establish quick reaction forces did improve the mobility of 
some army units, the overall concept remained primarily defensive. Colombian tactics 
focused on responding to bandits rather than seeking them out, as American officers such 
as Yarborough later complained.  
Plan Lazo, and ongoing American internal security assistance, soon altered that 
approach. The U.S. Army Mission in Bogotá reported a “greatly increased emphasis on 
ranger-type training for all Colombian Army units to better enable these units to more 
aggressively combat violence” among its major accomplishments as of July 1962.61 This 
observation encompassed two significant changes. First, it recognized a shift in the 
Lancero School from developing individual leaders, which had been its primary purpose 
since 1955, to a new focus on training counter guerrilla units.62 Second, it demonstrated 
the beginnings of a movement away from small conventional units conducting limited 
local patrolling to an emphasis on aggressive long range patrolling by specialized ranger-
type unconventional units.  
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By mid-1962 the Colombian Army had fielded several new Grupos de 
Inteligencia Localizadores (Intelligence Locator Groups). Plan Lazo dictated the 
development and employment of these Localizadores groups, which some American 
military officers and diplomats also referred to as “hunter-killer teams.”63 In the 8th 
Brigade area, consisting of parts of the Departments of Antioquia, Tolima and Valle, 
these units varied from two to eight men (see Figure 3). These teams specialized in 
“quick-reaction counter guerrilla operations” such as “small-unit raids, ambushes, the 
capture or killing of bandits and especially the gang leaders when they were operating 
alone or accompanied by two, three or four men.”64 In other areas the units were larger, 
“composed of 25 veteran officers, NCOs, and civilians, heavily armed, and trained to 
operate in the field for long periods… were used to both fight and penetrate hostile 
groups as well as work with informants.”65   
The Localizadores groups also conducted surveillance and tracking missions in 
support of larger forces. Here they served as the detection mechanism. The larger and 
more heavily armed Lancero and airborne battalions provided the quick reaction forces. 
The Colombian Army employed these units to defeat the bandit or guerrilla bands after 
their detection by the smaller “hunter-killer” teams.66 While the Colombian Ranger 
School trained the reaction forces, U.S. intelligence mobile training teams helped train 
the Localizadores groups.67 
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In 1962, the Colombian Army estimated that it faced some seventy-five armed 
bandit gangs, totaling just under one-thousand men. The army identified just four of 
these, with only eighty-nine men, as Communist affiliated. 68 Despite these seemingly 
small numbers, rural armed groups caused immense suffering. “[I]n 1962 there were 
2,919 deaths attributed to rural violence,” the Central Intelligence Agency later 
reported.69 Many of the Communist groups also proclaimed sovereignty over their 
territory, declaring them “independent republics” -- an obvious affront to the Colombian 
government. Under orders from their president, the Colombian Army soon moved to 
crush the bandit gangs and eradicate the Communist enclaves.    
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Figure 3: Colombia Political Boundaries Map.70  
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Colombian forces underwent a remarkable transformation in 1962. By year’s end, 
the newly-elected president, Guillermo León Valencia, had deployed seventy-five percent 
of the nation’s security forces for Orden Público (public order) internal security missions 
to the countryside under Plan Lazo.71 More importantly, Valencia swiftly changed the 
mission of the armed forces from maintaining tranquility to seeking and destroying bandit 
groups.72 Colombian security forces quickly embraced their new, more aggressive role. 
“[B]oth the Army and National Police,” American officers in Bogotá reported in January 
1963, “have demonstrated an increased aggressiveness which has produced such 
excellent results that in many areas the Army has been able to withdraw platoon outposts 
and consolidate into company-sized patrol bases.”73 These changes yielded impressive 
results. “In 1962 the armed forces had killed 388 bandits and guerrillas from about 75 
active cuadrillas,” historian Russell Ramsey later wrote. “As the new low violence tactics 
and civic action took root, bandits began to fall in substantial numbers.”74  
The Colombian Army gained confidence and experience as the counterinsurgency 
campaign under Plan Lazo stretched into 1963. It also gained new counterguerrilla units 
and much greater mobility. “A continued aggressive counter-banditry campaign is being 
waged by the Army based upon Plan ‘Lazo’ with considerable success,” the U.S. Army 
Mission in Colombia reported in April 1963. “This is substantiated by the increased 
casualty rate sustained by the bandits and government forces and a decreased civilian 
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casualty rate.”75 American military assistance supported the new internal security 
emphasis. The U.S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) underwrote four infantry 
brigades with small arms, transportation, and communication equipment. More 
importantly, American military assistance also helped establish a new Ranger brigade. 
“The first two battalions [of the four planned for the brigade] have been organized and 
trained since FY 1962,” American officers reported in mid-1963, “and have been 
successful in combat against bandit groups. Much of their success can be attributed to the 
excellent training received by the unit cadres at the Colombian Ranger Training 
Center.”76   
As part of their specialized counter guerrilla mission, Colombian cadres and 
American advisors trained and equipped the Ranger battalions to operate in difficult 
terrain. “It is anticipated,” U.S. officers explained, “that [the Ranger brigade] will provide 
a lightly equipped, highly mobile and effective force capable of combatting guerrilla[s] 
operating in either of the two traditional strongholds, namely, the jungles or the 
mountains.”77 However, Colombia contained yet a third type of terrain challenging 
internal security operations – the Llanos. In order to address this challenge the U.S. Army 
also began efforts to establish an airborne infantry battalion. “When organized, equipped, 
and trained,” American officers explained, “this unit will be designated as the elite unit of 
the army and will provide a specialized internal security capability for one of the most 
critical areas of Colombia from an insurgency standpoint, namely, the extensive Eastern 
plains areas which are occupied by less than three hundred thousand inhabitants.”78  
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The Special Action Force assisted these efforts. After deploying the 
counterinsurgency mobile training team (MTT) in 1962 that aided in the development of 
Plan Lazo, the Green Berets from Panama sent a second counterinsurgency MTT to 
Colombia in 1963 and two in 1964. The Special Action Force also deployed an airborne 
survey team in 1963 to help determine the feasibility and requirements for a Colombian 
airborne (capable of deploying by parachute) unit. After Colombian and American 
officials approved the plans for the new airborne infantry battalion, Special Action Force 
trainers returned to Colombia in mid-1963 to teach the unit’s officers and soldiers how to 
safely conduct parachute operations. A second team arrived later to teach the unit the 
intricacies of packing and rigging parachutes as well as their proper maintenance. Two 
parachute maintenance and repair training teams visited the country again in 1966 as a 
follow-on to their earlier efforts. 79 
Meanwhile, the Special Action Force also deployed training teams to instruct 
Colombian forces in other skills related to counterinsurgency. Five psychological 
operations teams and four intelligence training teams visited Colombia between 1964 and 
1966. Colombia received a total of eight communications (signal) related visits between 
1963 and 1967. During the same time period, other teams also assisted their Colombian 
counterparts with medical training, weapons and ammunition, and supply procedures, 
among other topics. In total, Colombia received seventeen Special Action Force training 
teams visits in both 1964 and 1965 – the highest number of visits hosted by any Latin 
American nation in a single year during the 1960s.80 
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American assistance also continued to support Colombian efforts to establish a 
robust helicopter capability. Building on the initial U.S. transfer of three helicopters in 
1961, the Military Assistance Program helped establish a new helicopter squadron in the 
Colombian Air Force by 1963. A total of nine medium helicopters provided by the 
United States were to join fifteen light helicopters purchased by the Colombian 
government. “Since there is no Colombian Army aviation,” American officers explained, 
“this unit has provided the only means for army commanders to exercise proper 
command over isolated outposts. It has also provided a rapid means for the transport of 
reaction forces, emergency supplies and evacuation of wounded. The reconnaissance 
capability of the light helicopters has been of inestimable value in locating bandit 
strongholds,” the U.S. officers judged.81 
Yet despite their growing success, American and Colombian counterinsurgency 
efforts did face significant challenges – and not just from Colombia’s armed groups. Not 
all Colombian officers proved capable of implementing the new counterinsurgency 
doctrine and tactics. In early 1963, American officers in Bogotá informed their 
commanders in Panama that,  
The majority of brigades involved in active counter-banditry operations 
are implementing Phase III [Assumption of the Offensive] of Plan “Lazo.” 
The I Brigade is lagging far behind the III, VI and VIII Brigades in 
implementing the plan. It is considered that the I Brigade is still in Phase I 
[Preparatory Actions] due to poor leadership and a lack of aggressiveness 
on the part of the brigade and subordinate unit officers. This was brought 
to the attention of the [Colombian] Army Commander in January 1963. 
The majority of the Brigades are conducting aggressive operations with 
increasingly good results.82 
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Yet poor leadership was not the only challenge. “The principal obstacle facing the 
Colombian Army is a lack of funds,” U.S. Army officers tersely reported in the same 
dispatch. “Although operating on the same budget as in 1962, inflation has required pay 
increases and caused a 25% increase in food prices and a 50% increase in the price of 
gasoline.” “The present financial crisis is seriously reducing the number of students” able 
to attend U.S. military schools, the officers in Bogotá explained. In order to ameliorate 
these financial problems, they recommended that, “requests for Mobile Training Teams 
be favorably considered since the economic situation in [Colombia] is extremely critical 
and limits the number of students to attend US schools in [the United States and 
Panama].”83 American commanders in the Canal Zone apparently concurred with this 
proposal, which explains the high number of mobile training team missions to Colombia 
and the low rate of attendance at U.S. schools. Colombia’s military officers could not 
remedy the nation’s financial woes, but they did control their own formations. “The I 
Brigade, under a new commander and subordinate unit commanders,” American officers 
reported several months later, “has implemented counter action [phase II of Plan Lazo] 
and for the first time in months inflicted bandit casualties. Further progress is expected in 
this area…”84 
APPLYING COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Orden Público internal security operations continued, and 1963 proved a 
landmark year. “The armed forces lost 58 men in the violencia in 1963, a remarkably 
small number for the scope of operations undertaken,” Russell Ramsey judged. “About 
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460 bandits and guerrillas of all kinds were killed, and for the first time since 1946 the 
total number of human beings who died in the violencia was less than two thousand.”85 
Colombian forces had greatly reduced the bandit menace. However, peace was not yet at 
hand – the guerrilla threat of the “independent republics” remained as a thorn in the side 
of the Colombian government.  
In early 1961, Communist guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez (aka Tiro 
Fijo or “sure shot”) declared the independent “Republic of Marquetalia” in southern 
Tolima department.86 Marquetalia was but one of several Communist enclaves, or self-
styled “independent republics,” established in the 1950s and 1960s.87  Marulanda 
founded his “Republic of Marquetalia” in southern Tolima Department on the same 
ground as earlier enclave known as Gaitania (named after Gaitán), established by other 
Communists in 1949.88 However, in the highly charged atmosphere of early 1960s Cold 
War, Marulanda’s declaration sounded more like an allusion to Fidel Castro’s Sierra 
Maestra than it did a re-branding of an earlier Communist zone. It quickly gained the 
attention of the Colombian government.  
But these Communists were different. Student revolutionaries, with their 
imaginations fired by the example of Cuba’s bearded insurgents, plagued many Latin 
American nations in the 1960s as they sought to overthrow their government by 
establishing a rural foco (nucleus) as dictated by Ernesto “Che” Guevara. In contrast, 
Colombia’s guerrillas arose from the peasantry. Unlike city boys, who often struggled to 
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adapt when transplanted to the rugged interior, the Communist campesinos hailed from 
the mountains and jungles of the interior. These men were hardened to the challenges of 
outdoor life. Local ties and an innate fortitude made the peasant guerrillas a challenging 
adversary. However, Marulanda’s Communist guerrillas largely lacked any linkage to the 
cities, and until sometime after 1964 seem to have sought local autonomy rather than the 
overthrow of the distant central government.  
In any event, the Colombian government in Bogotá perceived the “independent 
republics” as threat to and an encroachment on its sovereignty. The Army launched a 
major operation against Marulanda’s rebels in early 1962 and narrowly missed capturing 
him.89 Later, employing the tenets of Plan Lazo, the security forces sought to rehabilitate 
the area after reestablishing government control. “Judges were installed, police stations 
built, and a road building program initiated,” one historian later noted. “This operation 
established a pattern which became characteristic in the 1960s, whereby armed guerrillas 
brought nothing but terror to each region, but the dragnet operations employed to drive 
them out were invariably followed by a substantial quantity of construction and 
improvement in living standards.”90  
These remediation efforts in former conflict areas were part of a much larger 
military civic action program in Colombia. The U.S. Military Assistance Program aided 
these efforts. It helped with the “establishment of twelve [medical] dispensaries [clinics] 
in various parts of the country,” American officers explained in a 1963 report, “eight of 
which will be located in violence areas where no medical facilities exist and four in very 
remote areas where existing medical facilities are completely inadequate.”91 The 
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Colombian Army also built and maintained roads with American help, “enabling the 
populace in the areas concerned to move their products to market by vehicle rather than 
by mule.”92 Civic action projects also drilled wells to improve access to potable water. 
“A joint survey made by the [Special Action Force] civic action mobile training team and 
representatives of the host country revealed that potable water is currently almost non-
existent in…small villages in rural and remote areas.” Well drilling projects “will be 
another indication to the populace that its government is aware of its problems and is 
taking action to eliminate suffering,” the American officers asserted, “thus lessening the 
influence of anti-government elements.”93 
By mid-1964 the government forces, having eliminated most of the bandits, again 
turned their attention to the “independent republics.” In May, they commenced Operation 
Marquetalia to eliminate Marulanda’s “republic” of the same name. The Colombian 
strategy encompassed both conventional and unconventional warfare aspects. It 
employed some 3,500 men in a “combined arms approach that included heavy artillery, 
air force bombing, and infantry and police encirclement of suspected guerrilla villages.”94 
Later, “170 elite troops were airlifted into Marulanda’s hacienda redoubt in an attempt to 
capture the guerrilla leader. The government [also] recruited Paez Indians with notable 
success against the rebels as scouts and guides through difficult terrain.”95 But the wily 
Marulanda again escaped the government noose. “The so-called ‘separate republic’ of 
Marquetalia is definitely under Army control,” American officers in Bogotá later 
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reported, “its one-time chief Tiro Fijo has been reduced to a state of impotency.”96 
Marulanda’s incapacity was short-lived. Although they couldn’t know it at the time, 
Marulanda and his guerrillas would continue to pose a threat to the Colombian 
government for decades to come.  
After driving the rebels from the area, the Army again employed another element 
of its counterinsurgency doctrine - civic action, in an effort to prevent their return. “To 
backstop the military campaign,” Time magazine reported in June 1964, “new roads, 
schools and other civic-action projects were planned to draw the peasants closer to the 
government.”97 “The Colombian peasant is the soldier’s friend now,” Time quoted an 
army commander as saying, “and we can’t let him down.”98 Plan Lazo’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine, and civic action, appeared to be wining the struggle for the 
hinterlands. “Northern Tolima, [another contested area and] a one-time ‘hot-bed’ of 
bandit activity,” American officers reported in January 1965, “has been pacified to an 
extent (estimated at 90%) that has permitted normal life to be resumed in this area.”99  
Operation Marquetalia was the culmination of a long counterinsurgency struggle 
in Colombia. Internal violence statistics clearly demonstrate several distinct phases 
between 1957 and 1964 (see Table 6.1).100 The 1958 amnesty issued by President Lleras 
Camargo greatly diminished rural violence, but did not end it. In 1960 and 1961, violence 
was again on the rise. However, the impact of the Colombian Army operations – and U.S. 
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counterinsurgency assistance – beginning in late 1961 are also evident in a decrease in 
civilian casualties. Plan Lazo, which began in mid-1962, accelerated those gains and 
civilian casualties declined to their lowest levels since the start of la Violencia in 1948. 
By late 1964, Colombian security forces had reduced internal violence to a tolerable 
level, although some violence remained.101 The “Colombian Army,” American diplomats 
assessed in May 1964, “after considerable experience in bandit fighting, is more 
experienced than nouveaux guerrillas in non-conventional warfare.”102 
Table 6.1: Internal Violence in Colombia 1957-1964. 
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As combat operations declined in 1964 and 1965, civic action grew. In 1963 the 
Special Action Force conducted two civic action training team missions in Colombia. 
The following year they undertook two direct civic action missions and deployed another 
four teams in support of developing the Colombian Army’s engineering and medical 
capabilities. The year 1965 saw five engineer related mobile training team visits followed 
by another six in 1966. The Special Action Force conducted additional engineer mobile 
training team missions in 1968, 1970, 1971 and 1972 – long after its counterinsurgency 
support ended in 1966.103  
By 1965, Plan Lazo’s integrated counterinsurgency campaign had greatly reduced 
the amount of territory controlled by the guerrillas and diminished their strength. Many 
insurgents were on the run. That year Colombian Army Intelligence estimated that only 
thirty guerrilla and/or bandit groups remained active with an overall strength of just 700-
800 men.104 Plan Lazo did not end insurrection in Colombia but it did force the 
insurgents into a period of dormancy with guerrilla forces ceasing active operations until 
February 1967.105 “The Colombian armed forces, which are well-trained and 
disciplined,” Walt Rostow informed President Johnson, “are putting pressure on them… 
The guerrillas do not represent an immediate threat to [President] Lleras.”106 As noted 
above, the Colombian Army required no additional counterinsurgency support from the 
Special Action Force after 1966, although it did continue to accept mobile training team 
visits.   
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Yet the guerrilla menace in Colombia was far from over - despite a decade of U.S. 
counterinsurgency assistance. Shortly after he fled Marquetalia in 1964, Marulanda met 
with other regional guerrilla leaders in what they termed the “First Southern Guerrilla 
Conference.” The disparate groups consolidated themselves into the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias Colombianas (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – FARC) in 
1966 with Marulanda emerging as the group’s leader.107 The FARC, along with the 
Ejército Nacional de Liberación (Army of National Liberation – ELN), plagued the 
Colombian government for decades to come. In fact, for all their counterinsurgency 
training and years of mounting operations against him, the Colombian forces never 
caught Marulanda. He died, not from the guns of a counter guerrilla unit, but from a heart 
attack in his jungle hideout in March 2008. He was seventy-six.108 
CONCLUSION 
Colombia’s internal security problems predated both the Cuban Revolution and 
the “counterinsurgency era” in American foreign policy implemented by President John 
F. Kennedy. Rural violence in Colombia during the late 1950s and early 1960s traced its 
roots to a lingering civil war that began in 1948. No foreign power inspired or supported 
insurgency. Most armed groups in the hinterlands sought local autonomy for their 
criminal activities, rather than the overthrow of the distant central government. 
Successive Colombian governments failed to end the protracted violence. Therefore in 
1959 an elected President, Alberto Lleras Camargo, requested help from Washington. 
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In order to aid Colombia, the Americans sent counterinsurgency survey teams to 
assess the problem and implemented internal security assistance and training programs. 
However, American military efforts in Colombia did not build a U.S.-style 
counterinsurgency capability from scratch. Instead, U.S. support centered on enhancing 
and improving Colombia’s preexisting internal security capabilities. The U.S. Army 
provided counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics through schools and mobile training 
team missions, but perhaps its most important contribution was its assistance in the 
development of Plan Lazo - a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan and a compilation 
of tactics and doctrine. Although American military officers helped, Colombian civil and 
military leaders controlled the crafting and implementation of Plan Lazo. They adapted 
American counterinsurgency concepts and tactics to fit their situation and their forces, 
but they did not cede control to the Americans. Colombian authorities rejected General 
Yarborough’s recommendation that American Special Forces soldiers assume control of 
Colombian Army battalions and lead them in combat against the guerrillas and bandits. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of American internal security assistance dramatically 
altered the country’s history.  
Plan Lazo transformed the Colombian Army. It rested on the three principal tenets 
of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine: military action against bandits and insurgents, civic 
action to improve rural life, and psychological operations to publicize government efforts 
and gain popular support. Earlier government policies to end rural violence had alternated 
between the military repression of the rural peasantry and amnesty plans seeking 
reconciliation with armed groups. American counterinsurgency concepts reflected in Plan 
Lazo inverted this approach. The government now sought to target the bandits and armed 




American military assistance supported Plan Lazo by improving the Colombian 
Army’s counter guerrilla tactics, creating specialized counter guerrilla units to conduct 
offensive operations against armed groups, and greatly enhancing the army’s mobility 
through the use of helicopters. It also created new intelligence and psychological warfare 
capabilities, which along with civic action, aided government efforts to gain the support 
of the population.109  Like their counterparts in Venezuela, the Colombian Army 
undertook the three elements required to develop effective and durable counterinsurgency 
forces. They accepted individual training, but unlike other countries, they sent few 
students to U.S. Army counterinsurgency schools. Due to budget constraints, only 
fourteen Colombian officers received counterinsurgency training at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina or in the Canal Zone between 1961 and 1964. Among South American nations, 
only Brazil and Uruguay sent fewer students during the same time frame. Nevertheless, 
the Colombian Army adopted American counterinsurgency doctrine. Its own preexisting 
military education system included the well-renowned Lancero School, which had 
training courses modeled on the U.S. Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia. 
This internal instructional capability allowed Colombia to sustain and expand the training 
of its specialized counter guerrilla battalions. Several of these units also received local 
instruction from the U.S. Army Special Action Force.  
Colombia accepted U.S. tactics and doctrine, but suffered from a lack of 
government commitment to reform. By 1965, counter guerrilla operations under Plan 
Lazo had eliminated most bandit groups and toppled the Communist “independent 
republics.” As the rural violence declined to its lowest levels in many years, the 
government considered the problems solved; it once again relegated internal security to 
                                               




the national police and reform efforts lost momentum and urgency. U.S. Army 
counterinsurgency assistance proved successful at reducing Colombia’s rural violence, 
and the country’s army gained valuable counterinsurgency experience, but it did not 
solve all of Colombia’s problems. A lessening of government internal security and 
rehabilitation efforts led to a resurgence of guerrilla movements in the late 1960s. These 
groups, while initially posing little threat to the central government, plagued Colombia 
long into the future. As was the case in Venezuela, the Colombian Army eschewed 
involvement in politics. Colombia has suffered no military coups d’état since 1957. In the 
1980s, as it faced the dual menace of drug cartels and rural guerrilla groups, some 
Colombian military units and officers did commit human rights violations. Nevertheless, 
Colombia did not suffer the repression of the Southern Cone “dirty wars,” nor did it ever 
again revert to military dictatorship.  
Venezuela and Colombia received the highest levels of U.S. counterinsurgency 
assistance of any nations in Latin America during the 1960s. These two countries also 
avoided the legacy of military dictatorship that plagued other regional countries. The 
foregoing analysis does not suggest that U.S. military aid or American counterinsurgency 
enabled democracy to survive, but it does indicate that U.S. military assistance did not 
inexorably lead to coups d’état. The survival of democracy, however, has complicated 




Chapter Seven: Counterinsurgency in Bolivia 
 
At first glance, Bolivia seemed fertile ground for revolution in the 1960s. The 
country suffered from political instability, social and economic inequality, and had strong 
student, peasant and union movements. Fidel Castro’s lieutenant, Ernesto “Che” Guevara 
chose to personally lead the struggle to foment a revolution in this land-locked nation as 
the first stage of his dreams of sparking revolutions throughout South America and 
creating “two, three, many Vietnams."1 Yet Bolivia in the mid-1960s was home to angry 
miners, not angry peasants. Although it experienced a leftist and elected revolution a 
decade earlier, the country fell under military rule in 1964. Less than two years later, 
Bolivians took to the polls, restored democracy, and overwhelmingly elected former Air 
Force General René Barrientos Ortuño as their new president. Despite these obstacles, 
Guevara chose Bolivia. His efforts to establish a guerrilla foco among the Andean 
campesinos failed within a span of eighteen months.  
Guevara’s death in October 1967 at the hands of a U.S.-trained Bolivian Ranger 
battalion was a major turning point in Latin America’s Cold War. It effectively 
terminated Cuba’s “export of revolution.” It also marked the end of the Special Action 
Force’s counterinsurgency training efforts in South America. American policymakers of 
the time, such as White House advisor Walt W. Rostow, touted the Bolivian Ranger’s 
success as proof of the “soundness of our ‘preventative medicine’ assistance to countries 
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facing incipient insurgency.”2 Latin American historians and researchers have since 
placed much of the blame for Guevara’s failure on the guerrillas themselves. Other 
historians have viewed the Green Beret’s training of the Second Ranger Battalion, and 
that unit’s subsequent role in the defeat of Che Guevara, as a showcase of successful U.S. 
counterinsurgency efforts in Latin America.3 However, placing the Special Action 
Force’s 1967 mobile training team effort in a longer historical context complicates this 
view.  
U.S. Army efforts to instill a counterinsurgency capability in the Bolivian Army 
began in 1961 - not 1967.  Sixty-five Bolivian students attended U.S. counterinsurgency 
courses from 1961 through 1964.4 Meanwhile, the Special Action Force deployed thirty 
mobile training teams to the country between 1962 and 1967 - eight of them focused on 
counterinsurgency.5 Most importantly, the American Military Assistance Program had 
trained and equipped two other Bolivian Ranger Battalions, and other counterinsurgency 
focused units, before 1966.6 But when the crisis of a Cuban-supported guerrilla 
movement, led by none other than the famed Ernesto “Che” Guevara himself, arose in 
early 1967, national leaders in La Paz and American authorities lacked confidence in the 
Bolivian Army’s ability to counter the threat.  
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Rather than deploying existing internal security units, some previously prepared 
and equipped for counterinsurgency, they chose to raise and train a new formation from 
scratch. Why did they make such a decision? A deeper analysis of American military 
efforts yields several clues. The documentary evidence points to two problems that undid 
earlier training efforts: unit personnel turnover of conscript soldiers and the inability of 
Bolivian Army schools to sustain counterinsurgency training. These issues exemplified 
problems of perishability. Many Latin American armies proved unable to maintain or 
expand the training levels of their soldiers. When faced with the challenge of a Cuban-
instigated insurgency, La Paz and Washington had to form a new counter guerrilla 
Ranger battalion that eventually captured Che Guevara. American Special Forces’ 
training of the Second Bolivian Rangers was a U.S. foreign policy success, but it also 
underscored the perishability of U.S. Army counterinsurgency training efforts.  
BOLIVIA’S INCOMPLETE REVOLUTION  
Only two Latin American nations experienced social revolution in the 1950s: 
Bolivia and Cuba. Bolivia’s revolution came in early 1952, a year before Fidel Castro’s 
failed Moncada Barracks attack and seven years before he and his bearded comrades 
marched into Havana. The upheaval of the Bolivian revolution tempered some of 
Bolivia’s long simmering social tensions but exacerbated others. Like enduring 
revolutions in Mexico, and later in Cuba and Nicaragua, Bolivia’s revolution generated 
irreversible changes; land reform, voting rights and mine nationalizations all 
fundamentally altered Bolivia’s social, political, and economic landscape.  
Tin miners, students, and the national police banded together under the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in April 1952 and toppled Bolivia’s 




during three days of bloody fighting that left some 2,000 to 3,000 dead. Miners and 
peasants made significant political and economic gains in the aftermath of the revolution. 
In one of its first acts, the new government decreed “universal adult suffrage, without 
literacy or property requirements.” MNR leaders also quickly nationalized Bolivia’s 
mines, later granting miners a fifty percent wage increase.7 Bolivia’s peasantry also 
prospered as a result of the revolution. “After the 1952 revolution,” one author noted, 
“indigenous peoples, now officially known as campesinos, became citizens, voters and 
property owners.” While Bolivia’s peasantry did not achieve all they might have dreamed 
of, they did garner a significant land reform program. Between 1952 and 1973, some 
“400,000 peasant families became owner-operators” of small-holdings.8 In turn, the rural 
campesinos were generally quiescent during the 1960s and content to farm their newly-
acquired plots.  
However, not all sectors of society prospered as a result of the revolution. The big 
loser was the Bolivian military. Although the army escaped the complete destruction that 
befell the Mexican, Cuban, and Nicaraguan armies after their revolutions, it did suffer 
severe degradation as an institution. “Apprehensive about any potential threat to its own 
government,” American researchers later explained, “the MNR moved rapidly against the 
army through forced retirement of about 80 percent of its commissioned and non-
commissioned officers.”9 “Between April 1952 and January 1953,” another historian later 
calculated, “the armed forces were reduced from 20,000 to a little over 5,000 total 
personnel.” Times were bleak for those who remained in uniform. The “army was 
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rendered virtually impotent in the first year of the revolution,” one analysis concluded, 
“military expenditures dropped from 23 percent of the national budget in 1952 to 6.7 
percent in 1957.”10 
The MNR government also sought to counterbalance the power of the military by 
raising and arming civilian militias. These organizations, most formed around miner and 
peasant syndicates, soon surpassed the military in terms of numbers and clout. “Existing 
militias were legitimized, and weapons taken from the army were made available to new 
[militia] units sponsored by peasant, miner, and factory leaders,” American researchers 
later declared. “By 1953 the civilian militias were the strongest military forces in the 
country. The numerical strength of the militias has fluctuated widely… They probably 
reached their peak strength in 1956 (between 50,000 and 70,000 armed men).”11 “The 
civilian militias,” a U.S. officer later wrote, “…outnumbered the regular armed forces by 
over 10 to 1.” By 1956, U.S. policymakers had begun to express alarm regarding the 
militias. American officials feared that the Communists might exploit Bolivia’s 
instability and come to power by seizing control of the militias. Without the bulwark of 
an effective military, only the nation’s small police forces would stand in their way. The 
MNR government shared at least some of those concerns by 1958. Unlike the Cuban 
regime, the Bolivian government did not control the civil militias. La Paz undertook a 
rebuilding of the military to counterbalance the threat of the militias – it also began 
accepting U.S. military assistance that same year.12 
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By the late 1950s, the revolution had begun to unravel. Falling tin prices, 
declining production, and higher wages plagued the mining sector and hurt the national 
economy. Meanwhile, few peasants grew enough on their new plots to send a surplus to 
the cities. “Consequently the food supply for the urban population was significantly 
smaller than it had been before the land reform. Declining revenues from the sale of tin 
meant that there was less foreign exchange to underwrite the import of food; thus the 
continuance of shortages was reinforced.”13 Inflation resulted.  
The economic crisis helped to shatter the MNR’s political coalition. The 
government increasingly turned to the revitalized army to quell the worsening dissent, 
primarily among miners, during the early 1960s.14 The campesinos, for their part, drifted 
away from national politics. “After achieving their goal of landownership,” American 
researchers wrote in the early 1970s, “the most critical purpose of the [peasant] sindicatos 
had been accomplished, and [the] tendency to focus on local issues and needs hampered 
their effectiveness as a national interest group.”15 For most of the 1960s, Bolivia’s 
internal threat was radical miners, not rural guerrillas.  
U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING IN BOLIVIA 
The United States sought to instill a counterinsurgency capability within the 
newly-restored Bolivian Army in the early 1960s, despite the absence of an active 
insurgency.16 Nevertheless, eight Bolivian students attended the first counterinsurgency 
courses at the U.S. Army Caribbean School in Panama in 1961 and another ten followed 
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them the next year.17 In June 1962, American officers in La Paz formalized their goal to 
“establish an effective counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency capability within [the 
Bolivian] army based on US Army doctrine” in reports to their Canal Zone superiors.18 
But Bolivia’s economic woes affected its ability to send students outside the country to 
attend military courses. “Lack of funds in the [Bolivian] Army to pay allowances 
required for personnel going to U.S. Army Service Schools,” American officers in La Paz 
reported in June 1962, “results in schools quotas frequently being declined.”19 Bolivia 
declined two seats at U.S. Army schools in late 1962 and another fifteen in early 1963.20  
Despite Bolivia’s financial challenges, its national army did manage to continue 
sending students to American counterinsurgency courses. A total of twenty-three 
Bolivian officers took counterinsurgency courses at the Special Warfare Center at Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina between 1961 and 1963 and another twenty-four officers received 
counterinsurgency training in the Canal Zone in 1963 and 1964.21 As was the case in 
many other countries, the U.S. Army augmented its classroom-based counterinsurgency 
training efforts by offering Bolivia U.S. mobile training team visits. Although inadequate 
Bolivian Army finances did affect U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, more than the lack of 
money impeded internal security training.  
Like other regional armies, conscription hamstrung the Bolivian Army’s 
effectiveness. A “one-year conscript system,” American officers in Buenos Aires 
explained to their Canal Zone superiors in 1963, “results in an army that is born, 
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flourishes and dies each year.”22 The same was true in Bolivia. One author estimated that, 
during the early 1960s, the strength of the Bolivian Army “varied in strength from eleven 
thousand to as few as four thousand when down to cadre strength between annual intakes 
of conscripts.”23 American officers in La Paz were keenly aware of the problem. They 
listed the “short term of service for conscriptees” as the first item in the “Obstacles and 
Problems” section of their June 1962 report to the Canal Zone. However, the U.S. 
officers also noted that Bolivia’s financial woes compounded the problem. “Although the 
term of conscription is one year,” they explained, “many conscriptees are released before 
completing the period due to budget limitations imposed on the [Bolivian] Army which 
result in a lack of funds to support conscriptees for the full year.”24 Conscription proved 
an enduring problem. Turnover of unit personnel due to conscription plagued U.S. 
counterinsurgency efforts in Bolivia throughout the 1960s. It also became a point of 
contention between the U.S. ambassador and the Bolivian president during the crisis of 
Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s insurgency in 1967. Nevertheless, American internal security 
training continued.  
Bolivia received its first mobile training team for counterinsurgency in May 1962. 
A full Special Forces “A” Detachment of twelve men taught courses in La Paz and 
Cochabamba. Four officers providing expertise in civil affairs, military intelligence, 
psychological warfare, and the medical fields augmented their efforts. During the first 
course, the Special Action Force team presented three weeks of classroom instruction to 
225 officers and cadets. The Americans then put their students through a two-week field 
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exercise to reinforce their lessons and hone their new skills. After a short respite, the 
Green Berets moved to the Cochabamba area and taught the same course to a second 
group of Bolivians. “Personnel (students) of these courses,” American officers in La Paz 
wrote in mid-1962, “are to be assigned to schools and frontier units to provide a nucleus 
for the training and organization of personnel in the counter insurgency field.”25 Training 
individuals would prove to be problematic, but the U.S. Army also trained and equipped 
Bolivian units.  
Mobile training team visits and classroom-based counterinsurgency training 
formed parts of a larger American effort to improve Bolivia’s internal security 
capabilities. Those efforts began in 1958 when “a grant of $500,000 was provided to 
strengthen the internal security capability of the Bolivian Army.”26 This first grant 
established the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Bolivia and included weapons, 
equipment, and radios for several units stationed in and around the capital. In 1961, the 
United States began supporting the First Infantry Battalion, located some twenty miles 
outside La Paz and organized “along U.S. lines,” with weapons, wheeled vehicles and 
communications equipment. “Training has been provided for personnel of this unit, in 
[the continental United States] and the Canal Zone,” American officers reported in 1963, 
“in operation and maintenance of equipment furnished and in other subjects such as 
infantry tactics, counterinsurgency, military intelligence and logistics.” “Personnel of this 
unit,” the same dispatch noted, “participated in counterinsurgency training presented by a 
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MTT during FY [Fiscal Year] 1962.” “A MAP supported truck transportation company is 
available to supplement the battalion transportation when required,” the report added.27 
The Military Assistance Program in Bolivia shifted much of its effort to internal 
development in 1962. That year American assistance began supporting four engineer 
battalions. Bolivia raised two of the battalions from scratch and the United States 
provided them with military construction equipment, vehicles, weapons, and radios. 
These units greatly contributed to what American officers termed the “vast Civic Action 
Program in Bolivia,” which included highway and road construction, road repair and 
maintenance, and colonization efforts. Civic action missions also undertook water 
system, airfield, and school construction, as well as numerous medical projects.28 
However, U.S. officers soon realized that Bolivia’s ability to absorb civic action 
development projects far exceeded the American ability to fund them. “The principal 
obstacle encountered in the civic action category,” U.S. officers in La Paz wrote in 1962, 
“is the inability of the host government to provide sufficient economic support. 
Manpower is available in limitless quantities and the desire is evident but dependence is 
placed on outside sources (principally U.S.) for necessary funding.”29 The United States 
budgeted the total Bolivian Civic Action program at an average of just over $2 million 
per year from 1964 through 1969. The American taxpayers contributed eighty-five 
percent of the total, while the planners expected Bolivian government to furnish the last 
fifteen percent -- about $300,000 per annum.30 “It is important to note that this 
undertaking of Civic Action had a favorable outcome,” a senior Bolivian officer later 
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explained, “particularly in the campesino sectors of Bolivia, because it replaced the 
image of the arrogant and abusive military man – who was to be feared – with that of a 
friend in uniform – who, through a shared effort, helped communities to solve some of 
their fundamental problems such as the need for drinking water, the building of schools 
and sanitary facilities, and the improvement of local highways.” How much these civic 
actions projects contributed to Bolivia’s development is difficult to estimate. 
Nevertheless, some Bolivian officers claimed such programs did bear fruit in 1967 as 
Bolivian peasants shunned Che Guevara’s efforts to establish a guerrilla foco and 
informed on him to local army units.31  
In 1963, American efforts again turned to internal security. The Military 
Assistance Program added an Airborne Infantry Company to its growing list of supported 
units. The new unit, organized in Cochabamba, received “parachutes, M-1 rifles, 
automatic rifles, 60mm mortars, 3.5 in. rocket launchers, light machine guns, portable 
radio sets, and equipment for a [medical] field dispensary.”32 “The company will 
acquire,” American officers wrote, “the capability to contribute to the internal security 
posture by opposing any subversive activity in any part of Bolivia.” The Special Action 
Force assisted the training of the Airborne Company by dispatching an airborne survey 
mobile training team, followed by a team providing an airborne orientation, and a third 
providing airborne training - all in 1963.33  
These MAP-supported units faced their first internal security test later that same 
year. The U.S. Southern Command Historical Report for 1963 explains that,  
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Bolivia experienced a national emergency during December 1963, when 
rebellious tin miners in the Catavi Siglo XX Mines openly defied the 
government and captured hostages, four of whom were U.S. citizens. 
Principal military units which maneuvered into position around the mines 
as measures to bring the striking miners under control were MAP 
supported units employing U.S. methods and using U.S. provided 
equipment. Participating forces included the 1st Infantry Battalion, the 
Airborne Company, and the 2nd Transportation Truck Company.34 
This passage demonstrates three important points. First, the internal security challenge in 
Bolivia during the early 1960s mainly centered on civil disturbances in mining and urban 
areas, not rural insurgency. Second, it shows the ongoing deterioration of the 1952 
revolution as the government used its newly revamped army to quell unrest among its 
former supporters the now rebellious miners. And lastly, it indicates that the Bolivian 
Army could move units from their local regions (in this case La Paz and Cochabamba) to 
respond to internal security threats in other areas when the elected president, Victor Paz 
Estenssoro, ordered the army to do so.  
The Military Assistance Program added two specialized counter guerrilla units to 
its list of supported units in 1964. “The 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions were organized 
based on recommendations to the [Bolivian Army] by [the U.S. Army Mission to 
Bolivia],” American officers reported.35 The Bolivian Army organized the First Ranger 
Battalion in early 1964 and assigned it to the Oruro area, near Bolivia’s biggest tin mines. 
The United States, for its part, provided training and sufficient equipment to supply a unit 
of approximately 500 men. However, internal unrest disrupted the unit’s initial training. 
“During April, conditions became so unstable that a special air delivery of MAP 
equipment to the 1st Infantry Ranger Battalion became necessary,” American officers in 
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the Canal Zone later recorded. “Three U.S. Air Force C118s landed at La Paz [on] 20 
April with 405 rifles, 417 bayonets, 142 pistols, 24 mortars, 16 rocket launchers, 61 
radios, clothing, and eating utensils… During this national emergency period, the value 
of providing MAP equipment and training for reducing instability was evident. MAP-
supported units, including the 1st Infantry Ranger Battalion, the 1st Infantry Battalion 
from Viacha [outside La Paz], and the Airborne Company from Cochabamba cooperated 
with [the] national police in suppressing the unstable mine workers in and around 
Oruro.”36 After helping restore calm, the First Ranger Battalion continued its initial 
training.  
Bolivia also created the Third Ranger Battalion in 1964. However, rather than 
belonging to the Army, this unit formed part of the new River and Lake Force 
inaugurated the previous year.37 The mission of the new service (which the government 
redesignated as the Bolivian Navy in 1966), was “internal security and conducting public 
works of improvement in the northeastern area of Bolivia.”38 “The new force,” American 
officers observed, “has been established on a status equal to that of the Bolivian Army 
and Air Force.”39 However, the River and Lake Force of some 1,500 men remained much 
smaller than the 9,000-man Army.40 
The River and Lake Force officially activated the Third Ranger Battalion in May 
of 1964. It organized the unit “at Riberalta which is located in the Beni Department of 
northern Bolivia,” American officers wrote. “The battalion will operate in the Pando, 
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northern Beni and northern La Paz Departments,” they added. The United States provided 
the new battalion with enough equipment for a unit of approximately 250 men, it also 
furnished four 40-foot boats. “This unit was formerly the Cavalry Squadron (Horse),” 
U.S. officers explained. “It was recommended to [the Commander of U.S. Caribbean 
Command] that the designation of this unit be changed from Cavalry Squadron (Horse) to 
Infantry Battalion (Ranger) because the Government of Bolivia will not be able to 
purchase and support the necessary horses and equipment to mount a horse cavalry 
squadron.”41 In any event, U.S. officers designed for these new units to have the ability to 
do more than just respond to occasional disturbances. Moreover, the positioning of these 
units also supported broader internal security efforts. Bolivian officials chose not to 
station the Third Ranger Battalion in Riberalta. Rather than position the new unit in that 
remote city far to the north of the country near the Brazilian border, they chose the more 
centrally located Trinidad (see Figure 4). Re-exerting central government control over 
Bolivia’s hinterlands also influenced this decision. “Trinidad up until January of this year 
had accepted no troops in the city since the revolution of 1952,” American officers in La 
Paz observed in 1964. “The 3rd Ranger Battalion now has its headquarters there.”42 
American officials continued to worry about both civil unrest and the potential for 
insurgency during the early 1960s. “The communists [sic] control many units of the 
estimated 15,000 man armed civilian militia, located in the mining areas,” American 
officers wrote in 1963, “and could use them in provoking civil disorder and uprisings… 
The communist threat is a continuing danger by reason of economic backwardness, low 
standard of living, frustrated hopes of 1952 revolution,” and political instability, among 
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several other maladies. “There exists in Bolivia a very good possibility of insurgent 
uprisings against the government,” they added. “The most probable source of such 
insurgency could be from small groups of armed guerrillas led by in-country communists 
and supported by Cuba and Czechoslovakia,” they concluded. In order to meet these 
threats, and as part of their ongoing efforts to build a counterinsurgency capability in the 
Bolivian Army, U.S. officers planned “to train MAP units in counterinsurgency [and] 
schedule CI [counterinsurgency] MTTs to work with [the] Ranger [battalions] as 
activated.” In turn, the Special Action Force deployed counterinsurgency mobile training 
teams to Bolivia in 1964 and 1965. The Airborne Company also conducted training on 
“techniques of Guerrilla/Counter Guerrilla Warfare” in mid-1964.43  
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Figure 4: Bolivia Political Boundaries Map.44   
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In 1966, the U.S. Army produced a short film entitled “The U.S. Army in Andes” 
as part of its “The Big Picture” television series.45 This episode, long overlooked by 
historians, shows the U.S. Army’s training of Bolivian counterinsurgency units prior to 
1967. After discussing civic action efforts in the country, the film turns its attention to a 
Special Action Force mobile training team providing a counterinsurgency course to the 
Bolivian First Ranger Battalion. The training, most likely undertaken in mid-1964, took 
place near the village of Challapata, some seventy-five miles south of Oruro. The course 
began with separate classes for the battalion’s eighteen officers and twenty-four non-
commissioned officers – with each group receiving approximately 180 hours of 
instruction. The film then shows the Green Berets putting the Rangers through individual 
and tactical training including instinctive firing, negotiating an infiltration lane, 
rappelling and crossing rope bridges, the use of demolitions, and patrolling – all 
conducted in the high altitude, arid environment of the Altiplano.  The course ended with 
a counterinsurgency training exercise in which the unit undertook a simulated counter 
guerrilla mission. After reacting to a mock guerrilla ambush, the Rangers pursued the 
guerrillas (portrayed by local civilians and other soldiers) to a nearby village. They then 
searched for the guerrillas from among the local campesinos.  At the conclusion of the 
exercise, “the U.S. Army instructors were proud of their student’s performance,” the 
narrator tells us. “The Bolivian Rangers had demonstrated competence in handling a 
typical counterinsurgency situation, a problem which had been simulated for the 
occasion,” he added, “but the next time could well prove to be the real thing.”46 The 
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Special Action Force also sent mobile training teams for psychological operations (two), 
civic action (three), and medical (one) to Bolivia during 1964.47 
U.S.-sponsored MAP units formed the core of the Bolivian Army’s internal 
security capability. By the end of 1964, the country boasted one infantry battalion, two 
ranger battalions, and an airborne company, all of which had received at least some 
American counterinsurgency training. Additionally, U.S. officers had plans to add a 
second infantry battalion and a third ranger battalion in upcoming years.48 The United 
States also supported four engineer battalions, primarily for civic action, and two truck 
transportation companies. Other Bolivian military units also participated in civic action 
but were generally in poor shape. “Non-MAP units have a limited capability to maintain 
internal security or offer resistance to external aggression,” American officers in La Paz 
assessed in 1964. These “units are all understrength and poorly equipped. Combat 
readiness of Non-MAP units is estimated at 15%.”49 A fully manned, trained, and 
equipped unit capable of undertaking all of its assigned missions would be considered 
100% combat ready. In contrast, Bolivia’s non-MAP units, with a combat readiness 
rating of 15%, would have been woefully unprepared to execute even the most 
rudimentary military tasks.  
The Bolivian military located its internal security forces within the country based 
on both perceived threats and an understanding of the country’s widely divergent 
geographical environments. The Army stationed the First Infantry Battalion at Viacha 
outside La Paz to protect the capital and the First Ranger Battalion in Oruro in the mining 
zone to keep watch on the miners. Both units trained for and acclimated themselves to the 
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high altitude environment of the Altiplano. The River and Lake Force established the 
Third Ranger Battalion in the country’s tropical lowlands in the north where it received 
equipment and training to enable it to operate in riverine and tropical environments. The 
Army stationed the Airborne Company in Cochabamba to cover the sub-Andean region 
and highland valleys, although its parachute capability and air mobility provided it the 
ability to quickly deploy to any region. American officers began planning for the Second 
Ranger Battalion as early as 1963 and expected the Bolivian Army to station it near Santa 
Cruz, where it could respond to trouble in both the sub-Andean region to the west and the 
Chaco region to the east (see Figure 4).50 However, the Bolivian Army resisted 
organizing this third counterinsurgency-focused battalion until the guerrilla crisis of 
1967.51 Ironically, Che Guevara established his foco in Santa Cruz province - exactly 
where American officers had expected the Bolivians to station the Second Ranger 
Battalion several years earlier.  
The MNR coalition continued to crumble and Bolivia again faced civil unrest in 
1964. Under pressure from the military, President Victor Paz Estenssoro named General 
René Barrientos of the Air Force as his Vice President in August 1964. However, the 
social and political crises continued unabated. “Strikes and demonstrations in late 
October 1964 brought the popular discontent to a head,” one historian noted. “On 
October 29, President Paz ordered the army to crush a strike by the miners of the large 
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Huanuni-Catavi mining complex. The government also forcefully repressed the striking 
teachers and students of San Andrés University in La Paz.”52 In early November the 
military rebelled and toppled the civilian government, replacing it with a military Junta 
led by General Barrientos of the Air Force and General Alfredo Ovando of the Army. 
The U.S. Ambassador suspended Military Assistance Program deliveries after the coup 
d’état, but the program resumed shortly after the United States recognized the new 
government on 7 December.53  
Former Vice President Barrientos, who was much more popular than Ovando, 
swiftly assumed the presidency. Barrientos’ popularity stemmed in part from his humble 
roots in Cochabamba and his fluency in Quechua, but he also cultivated the peasants as a 
political base of support. “Since 1962,” former Ranger officer Gary Prado Salmón 
argues, “General Barrientos had carried out a domestic political campaign aimed at 
capturing the sympathy and support of the majority campesino sector of the nation, which 
had transformed him into an important political figure.”54 Barrientos also capitalized on 
American-sponsored Civic Action projects to cultivate his popularity among the Bolivian 
peasantry. “The general had used civic action funds to build schools and recreation 
centers,” one historian explained, “upon entering the town where the school was located, 
Barrientos was greeted with abrazos by the intendente and the alcade. He [Barrientos] 
proceeded to speak in Quechua to about a thousand gathered Indians on the importance of 
education, bettering living conditions, and strengthening the military.”55 Soon after 
taking office in 1964, President Barrientos leveraged his popularity among the peasantry 
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to cement a political alliance. He formalized the agreement in the Military-Campesino 
Pact. The Armed Forces and the peasants not only formed a coalition against the power 
of the miners, the military also enlisted the rural campesinos as counter-subversive agents 
of the state in the hinterlands in return for political support at the national level.56  
With the MAP program restored in late 1964, the U.S. Army continued its 
counterinsurgency and civic action efforts in Bolivia in 1965 and 1966. The Special 
Action Force deployed eleven mobile training teams in 1965, a small increase from the 
seven visits of the year before. Beyond the one counterinsurgency training team 
previously mentioned, the Green Berets also conducted three medical and two military 
police visits, as well as engineer, ordnance and marksmanship training.57 The year 1965 
proved the high water mark for mobile training team missions to Bolivia. In 1966, 
Special Action Force teams visited Bolivia on only three occasions. One team taught 
advanced marksmanship skills to the Bolivian Army Rifle Team to enable them to 
compete in the Pan-American Rifle matches hosted by the U.S. Army in Panama. A 
second team trained Bolivian medical personnel so that they could man and operate rural 
clinics. The third team taught counterinsurgency.  
Bolivia returned to democracy in 1966. President Barrientos won a landslide 
election in July with over sixty percent of the vote.58 Although Che Guevara and Fidel 
Castro may have misread Barrientos’ election as the continuation of the previous military 
dictatorship, Barrientos won a democratic election based on his broad popular support. 
Barrientos’ popularity, and the Military-Campesino Pact, raised tremendous barriers to a 
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rural insurgency. Meanwhile, American internal security efforts continued after the 1966 
elections.  
The Special Action Force sent four officers and one enlisted man to Cochabamba, 
Bolivia in August 1966 to deliver a nine-week course on counterinsurgency. However, 
the team did not train any of Bolivia’s existing counter guerrilla units. Instead, their 
purpose “was to teach the requirements and concepts of a National Defense Plan for 
Counterinsurgency,” unit historians later reported. “The team emphasized such fields as 
community and civic action as means to preventing insurgency.” The Green Berets taught 
twenty-four Bolivian officers “from the grade of Major to Colonel” in a course format 
that was “partly formal instruction and partly practical exercises.” The instructors and 
their students devoted the last two weeks of the course to “writing up an actual a National 
Defense Plan for Counterinsurgency which was completed in its basic form and 
submitted to the Commander of the Bolivian Army.” The team concluded its visit by 
conducting a one-week counterinsurgency orientation at the Bolivian War College in La 
Paz. The Special Action Force team departed Bolivia in late October 1966.59 That very 
month Ernesto “Che” Guevara, in disguise, flew into La Paz from São Paulo, Brazil to 
establish his guerrilla foco.60 
However, despite years of American effort to develop a counterinsurgency 
capability in the Bolivian Army, it was not prepared to face a Cuban-instigated 
insurgency of fifty guerrillas in 1967. The incessant turnover of Bolivian army troops 
caused by conscription undermined the U.S. Army’s efforts to establish specialized 
counter guerrilla units. This same phenomenon plagued American efforts in other Latin 
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American countries during the 1960s; one U.S. official called it the “frustrating 
treadmill” of training conscripts.61 The Bolivian Army’s “effectiveness is limited by the 
fact that its conscripts serve only a one-year tour of duty,” CIA analysts noted, “leaving 
only a minimal period of service after completion of basic training.”62 The same held true 
for the country’s counterinsurgency units. Bolivian soldiers, meticulously trained by the 
Green Berets of the Special Action Force and formed into specialized units, returned to 
civilian life when their one-year term of enlistment ended. When the conscript soldiers 
left these units, the advanced training they had received departed with them. New 
draftees replaced them. 
The Bolivian Army was unable to sustain its American-provided training. It 
lacked a formal instructor cadre for counterinsurgency (as in Venezuela) or an effective 
counter guerrilla school (as in Colombia). Instead, the institution relied on the initiative 
and skills of unit officers to train their men for counterinsurgency – something the Army 
senior leadership did not wholeheartedly support. “[O]ne thing was clear by the end of 
1966,” Captain Gary Prado Salmón, who would command B Company of the Second 
Ranger Battalion in the fight against Che Guevara, later explained. “Although some 
training courses had been given for subordinate personnel, and some coordination had 
been set up at the level of the Latin American armies, the problem of subversion was not 
considered fundamentally important at the higher levels of the armed forces…Subversion 
was treated in a very superficial theoretical framework.”63 Even though some Bolivian 
officers might have tried to reproduce at least portions of the previous training received 
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from the Americans, they could not replicate the intensive training provided by the 
Special Action Force without institutional support from their army. That institutional 
support, in the form of counterinsurgency instructor cadres or a specialized counter 
guerrilla school did not exist in the Bolivian Army. Conscription and the lack of an 
institutional capability to sustain internal security training meant that by 1967 Bolivia 
lacked an effective counterinsurgency force.  
COUNTERING CHE GUEVARA’S INSURGENCY 
The Bolivian Army began receiving indications of potential insurgent activity in 
remote areas of the country early in 1967.  “After considerable prodding,” Central 
Intelligence Agency analysts later wrote, “Army patrols began to follow up on reports of 
bearded strangers in southeast Bolivia.”64 The revelation of an active guerrilla movement 
caused immediate consternation in La Paz, but U.S. policymakers remained skeptical.65 
At first, American diplomats perceived the Bolivian reports of an armed guerrilla 
movement as exaggerated and a ploy to gain increased American financial and military 
aid. “We are as unconvinced of the validity of the alleged threat and the requirement for 
U.S. assistance as before,” U.S. embassy officials reported to Washington in mid-March. 
The diplomats saw this as an effort to “get more from the US while the getting is good.”66 
A clash on 23 March changed American attitudes. On that day, a Bolivian “Army patrol 
stumbled into an insurgent hideout. The guerrillas reacted immediately, killing one 
officer, five soldiers, and one civilian guide. In addition, they also wounded another five 
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troops and took 21 prisoners.”67 The chance encounter shocked the Bolivian Army, 
especially after it later confirmed the presence of Cuban agents among the guerrillas.68 
Six days later, CIA analysts concluded that the guerrilla movement “is an independent, 
international operation under Cuban direction.”69 “Initial battles between the guerrillas 
and the Bolivian Army,” American diplomats reported to Washington, “proved almost 
disastrous to the poorly trained, ill-equipped troops who suffered heavy losses in every 
encounter. The failure of the army to deal effectively with a handful of insurrectionists 
shook the entire Bolivian government and led to desperate appeals for US assistance.”70 
Yet rather than sparking the American overreaction and intervention Che Guevara 
dreamed of, the news of a Cuban guerrilla cell operating in Bolivia trigged caution on the 
part of the United States. During these early days of the crisis American officials had no 
evidence Che Guevara was still alive, much less operating in Bolivia. However, larger 
political considerations also influenced their guarded response.   
The Cold War of 1967 was not the Cold War of the early 1960s. The Bay of Pigs, 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965, and the growing 
U.S. war in Vietnam all augured for a limited United States response in Bolivia. “We 
fully support [the] concept of providing limited amounts of essential material [to] assist 
[a] carefully orchestrated response to [the] threat,” the State Department instructed its 
embassy in La Paz in late March, “utilizing to maximum extent possible [the] best trained 
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and equipped troops available.”71 Unfortunately, even after years of patient U.S. effort to 
develop Bolivia’s internal security and counterinsurgency capability, the country suffered 
from a dearth of trained and equipped troops. 
Che Guevara chose southeastern Bolivia as the site for his insurgency. Socially, 
the area’s prospects for revolution were dim. Unlike the Andean highlands, Santa Cruz 
province did not suffer from a scarcity of land. In fact, the region had been a focus of 
Bolivian government resettlement programs since 1952.72 It was also far from the mining 
regions and their discontented workers. Militarily, however, it was fortuitous choice. The 
Bolivian Army in that region was better suited to serve as peasants than as soldiers. “In 
those years (1966-67),” Bolivian historian Gary Prado Salmón explains, “the garrisons in 
the East and the South as a general rule had to undergo a short training period of three 
months and then use the other nine months of their time as draftees in farm labor, 
construction of living quarters and barracks, and production of materials (railroad ties, 
bricks, lime and so forth)…This practice undoubtedly affected the troops’ combat ability 
and also led to administrative irregularities, since in many cases soldiers were rented out 
as peons to area landowners for the personal profit of the commander.”73 This passage 
highlights several of the challenges confronting the Bolivian Army; conscription meant 
limited terms of service while the lack of training resulted in unprepared forces.   
Bolivia’s Military Assistance Program units, trained and supported by the United 
States, fared better, but not by much. The First Infantry Battalion at La Paz, the First 
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Ranger Battalion at Oruro, and the Airborne Infantry Company at Cochabamba also 
suffered from personnel turnover due to conscription which made sustaining their 
counterinsurgency training without outside assistance nearly impossible. Maintaining a 
level of military competency adequate to intimidate a crowd of angry miners proved 
much less challenging than maintaining the skills required to face experienced Cuban 
guerrillas and their Bolivian pupils in combat. “When a regiment had been sent to occupy 
a mining center, a campesinos area, or any locale,” Prado Salmón points out, “the mere 
presence of troops had ended the conflict. The situation in the Southeast was a different 
story. They were facing an organized and experienced enemy who … required different 
tactics and techniques, for which the army was not adequately prepared… It was clear 
that even troops such as those of the CITE [Center for Instruction of Special Troops – 
which included the MAP-supported Airborne Infantry Company] were not prepared for 
this kind of operation.”74  
American analysts shared Prado’s assessment. “The [Bolivian] Army is 
handicapped by the fact that most officers have been trained in traditional warfare and 
have no comprehension of guerrilla tactics,” they wrote. “The majority of the men are 
raw recruits with little or no training.” After describing the 23 March ambush, the State 
Department analysts continued, “In subsequent clashes, the Army faired [sic] no better. 
The guerrillas repeatedly escaped virtually unscathed, enriched by the spoils of battle, 
while the Army suffered mounting losses in dead and wounded, even when MAP-trained 
troops were engaged.”75  
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The American Ambassador in La Paz, Douglas Henderson, also worried about the 
proficiency of the Bolivian Army as well the continuing drain on its readiness due to 
conscription. In private meetings with President Barrientos in late March, Ambassador 
Henderson pushed for reform of the Army’s annual conscription policy. He noted that 
even after two years of prodding by the Americans, the country still “replaced most of its 
army every year, losing its training investment,” according to diplomatic historian Henry 
Butterfield Ryan.76  
Compounding Bolivia’s problem was the fact the government still faced civil 
unrest in the mining and urban areas. Bolivian leaders feared that their indigenous 
opponents might rise up while the military was occupied facing the foreign-led guerrilla 
threat. American diplomats and military officers shared those concerns. Therefore, 
instead of deploying MAP-supported units to confront the insurgents, or seeking to re-
train exiting units, the Bolivians and Americans agreed to raise and train a new 
counterinsurgency unit from scratch.77  
In late April, the U.S. Military Group signed an agreement with the Bolivian 
Army to provide a sixteen-man team from the 8th Special Forces Group to train and 
organize a new 650-man counterinsurgency unit. The text of the agreement makes clear 
that this was to be no routine mobile training team mission. Instead, this was the United 
States responding to an internal security crisis in a friendly nation, albeit with restraint. 
First, the agreement specified a sixteen-man team – one and a half “A” Detachments of 
Green Berets – a very large team for the Special Action Force to deploy at a time when it 
                                               
76 Ryan, The Fall of Che Guevara, 56.  
77 Ibid., 80; Department of State, “Editorial Note.” The Bolivian Army dispatched small elements from 
some MAP-supported units to the guerrilla zone, but it did not deploy entire units – see Prado, The Defeat 
of Che Guevara, 264 for a detailed list of units engaged in counter guerilla operations against Che 




was losing trained instructors to combat duty in Vietnam and to support the Jungle 
Warfare School in Panama. Second, the memorandum specified that all the team 
members were to be “ranger-qualified and combat experienced,” an unprecedented 
stipulation for a mobile training team mission. Lastly, the team was to be “commanded 
by an officer not less than the grade of Major.”78 Only two Special Action Force officers 
met the criteria to lead the team. One was on orders for Vietnam so the duty fell to Major 
Ralph “Pappy” Shelton, then serving as the Operations Officer of the Special Action 
Force in the Canal Zone.  
In recognition of the problem of conscription, the Americans also added their own 
requirements in the agreement. “The reassignment of personnel from or within this unit 
will be minimal,” the memorandum stated, “and their period of service will be not less 
than two years.” The last page of the memorandum contained several restrictions. “The 
members of this [mobile training] team will not exercise command authority over any 
member of the Bolivian Armed Forces,” the Bolivian and American military leaders 
ordered. “All members of this Special Training Team are specifically prohibited from 
participating in actual combat operations either as observers or advisors with members of 
the Bolivian Armed Forces.”79 The Bolivians granted the Green Berets broad latitude in 
developing the course of instruction for the new counterinsurgency unit, but they retained 
absolute control over the employment of their military formations in combat. Training of 
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the new unit, designated by the Americans as the Second Ranger Battalion, began in 
May.  
Major Shelton arrived in Bolivia in early April. Among his first priorities was 
locating a suitable area for the training of the new ranger battalion. Bolivian authorities 
initially offered a site in Guabirá, north of Santa Cruz, but the Green Berets rejected it 
because too many people lived in the area and it lacked space for training. Instead, Major 
Shelton and his officers selected an abandoned sugar mill outside La Esperanza seven 
miles west of Guabirá. The new location had several advantages. First it was remote, and 
thus better for maintaining security. Second, the old mill’s buildings and warehouse 
offered enough shelter to house both the sixteen American trainers and their 650 Bolivian 
students. Lastly, the mill structures proved ideal for rappelling training. Its grounds and 
the surrounding area were large enough to support maneuver training and firing ranges. 80 
By late April, the Special Action Force’s coordination and preparations were complete. 
On 29 April 1967, fourteen Green Beret instructors boarded two U.S. Air Force C-130 
Hercules planes packed with their equipment and supplies for the new ranger battalion 
and departed for Bolivia. They landed on a dirt airstrip outside Santa Cruz where two of 
their team members and soldiers of the Bolivian 8th Division met them and provided 
transportation to La Esperanza.81 Although the American trainers did not know it at the 
time, they would remain in Bolivia for the next eight months.  
The counter guerilla training regimen devised by Major Shelton generally 
followed what his predecessors had used to train the two previous Bolivian Ranger 
battalions. However, the training of the Second Ranger Battalion was longer in duration 
                                               
80 Charles. H. Briscoe, “The Bolivia Mission, Site Survey, and MTT Mission Prep” Veritas, vol. 4, no. 4, 
47.  




and of greater intensity. Shelton prescribed and executed a nineteen-week, five phase 
training plan: basic individual training (six weeks), advanced individual training (three 
weeks), basic unit training (three weeks), advanced unit training (five weeks), and finally, 
a two-week combined field exercise to integrate all the previous skills and lessons.  
Before training could begin the Americans and their Bolivian students first had to 
adapt the abandoned sugar mill and its surrounding terrain to fit their new purposes. 
Some areas served the Green Beret’s needs with little or no modifications. “Classroom 
instruction was conducted in old workshops, garages and compartments of the huge 
building housing the mill machinery,” the Americans reported to their superiors in the 
Canal Zone. “Field training was conducted on the huge expanse of land surrounding the 
sugar mill.”82 The men had to construct other training facilities from scratch. “We built a 
full-scale Ranger training camp by hand,” Shelton later explained, “an obstacle course, 
confidence course, quick-reaction course – where jungle footpaths are rigged with pop-up 
cutouts of enemy figures – a river course, [and] a target range.”83 After the Special 
Forces team completed the construction of training ranges and other facilities, and after 
making accommodations to house themselves and their Bolivian students, the Americans 
were finally ready to start training the new battalion.  
Meanwhile, the Bolivian Army continued to suffer at the hands of the better-
trained insurgents. On the 10th of April, army patrols stumbled into a series of guerrilla 
ambushes. When the smoke cleared, the army had suffered eleven killed and thirteen 
wounded. Embarrassingly, the guerrillas had also taken twenty-three men captive, 
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including one major, while suffering only one man killed. “An appreciable amount of 
arms and ammunition fell into the guerrillas’ hands,” Prado Salmón noted.84 The 
insurgents, being unable to care for prisoners, soon released their captives, but they kept 
the other spoils of battle. The following day the army issued Operations Order 4/67 
directing that units in the guerrilla zone “should be organized defensively, undertaking 
patrols with a short radius of action in their respective areas, under conditions that will 
prevent guerrilla groups from obtaining vital supplies. They should isolate the probable 
area occupied by the guerrillas.”85 The Bolivian Army High Command had decided to 
contain the Cuban-sponsored foco while it waited for the Americans to train a specialized 
counter guerrilla unit to defeat them.  
When Major Shelton and his Green Beret’s began their formal instruction of the 
Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion on the 8th of May 1967, they started with a blank slate. 
“The troops had no previous military training,” one Special Forces sergeant recalled, 
[and] “their education level was just about zero.” The first phase of training began with 
individual soldier skills such as physical fitness drills, how to fire and clean weapons, 
techniques of camouflage, and an introduction to patrolling.86 The Americans also taught 
the new soldiers land navigation skills (how to read terrain and use a map and compass), 
the throwing grenades, bayonet fighting, and basic medical skills. Although the Bolivian 
officers and the American trainers all spoke Spanish, communicating with the Bolivian 
enlisted troops posed a challenge. Most Bolivian officers could not speak the indigenous 
languages. “The altiplano conscripts spoke Quechua and Aymara primarily, but they 
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understood some rudimentary Spanish,” another Green Beret instructor recounted. 
“While classes often evolved into ‘monkey see, monkey do’ learning, the soldiers were 
always enthusiastic and eager to learn.” 87  
Major Shelton faced a formidable challenge in determining how a mere sixteen 
Special Forces instructors could effectively manage the training of some 650 Bolivian 
troops. To solve the problem the Americans applied a novel solution.  “[T]he Battalion is 
divided into three (3) groups for training,” the Green Berets explained in report to the 
Canal Zone. “Each group trains under separate schedules. At the end of each week, the 
groups are then rotated until all groups have received all subjects.” The plan worked. 
“This method has proven successful to date,” the Special Forces men reported. Bolivian 
authorities agreed. The Bolivian Army Commander, General Alfredo Ovando, arrived to 
inspect the training on 10 May. “He appeared highly pleased with the activities being 
conducted,” the Green Berets told their superiors in Panama.88  
However, the American trainers also faced cultural challenges in dealing with the 
Bolivian Army. Major Shelton asked Bolivian Captain Julio Cruz, “How many rounds 
per rifleman for the course?” “How many what?,” Cruz responded. “How many live 
bullets,” Shelton explained.  Captain Cruz told him, “I think 10 bullets are authorized for 
a recruit.” “Ten rounds?” Shelton exclaimed, “How can you teach them anything that 
way?” “First we tell them,” the Captain explained, “then we kick them.” Shelton ended 
up allocating each rifleman 3,000 rounds for training. The Americans eschewed kicking 
the Bolivian conscripts.89 
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After six weeks the Bolivian soldiers progressed to advanced individual training. 
During this three-week phase the Americans separated the conscripts into training groups 
based on their assigned military occupation specialties, or MOS. As some troops honed 
their medical skills, others received specialized instruction in communications, the use of 
crew-served weapons, or advanced marksmanship for the snipers. The Green Berets also 
trained a battalion reconnaissance platoon. Seven men from this group received 
additional training in intelligence collection methods. Meanwhile, the officers and non-
commissioned officers studied leadership and staff planning skills.90  
The Special Forces men gave the Bolivians their first introduction to “Ranger 
training” during this phase. Ambushes, raids and patrols entered the curriculum, as did 
rappelling, confidence and obstacle courses, and specialized weapons. “We did rappelling 
off the side of the mill, about thirty feet high,” Master Sergeant Millard later recounted. 
“We set up a confidence course there with a rope climb and a “Slide for Life” into the 
[nearby village] pond.”91 The Bolivian Rangers also learned how to fire the 3.5 inch anti-
tank rocket (potentially useful against a vehicle or machine gun position) and U.S. and 
French mortar systems. Again, the Special Action Force instructors were pleased with 
their students. “The Battalion has shown tremendous progress since the beginning of 
training,” the Americans reported at the end of June.92  
With their individual training completed, the Special Forces next turned their 
attention to teaching the Bolivian conscripts how to operate in squad, platoon, and 
company formations. This basic unit phase of training began on 10 July. The Green 
Berets taught the Rangers how to move as members of unit – as they would do while on 
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patrol, but also the intricacies of “fire and maneuver.” Controlling groups of men while in 
close combat with an enemy is extraordinarily demanding. Fire and maneuver involves 
directing one element to move forward towards the enemy while a second element keeps 
the enemy engaged with fire from their weapons. Because the sound of weapons firing 
overwhelms the human voice and blunts the hearing, leaders must often transmit their 
commands using hand and arm signals. The Green Berets taught that as well.  
Learning these complicated tasks required repetition. Because the training took 
place in Bolivia, the Special Forces trainers did not have the benefit of the modern 
infantry training ranges on American military bases with their mechanized target systems. 
So like their predecessors on earlier mobile training team missions, they improvised. 
“Our pop-up targets for the live-fire immediate action drills were simple, but effective,” 
Sergeant First Class Daniel Chapa recalled. “Some were hinged to trees with rubber tire 
tubing and pulled around with commo wire. Others were mounted in a row on logs and 
we ‘daisy-chained’ the targets together so that you could pull all of them up 
simultaneously.”93 The “U.S. Army in the Andes” film shows the Special Action Force 
trainers employing many of the same techniques while training the Bolivian First Ranger 
Battalion near Challapata in 1964.  
The Bolivian conscripts also did well in this more complicated stage of their 
preparation. “Training during this phase has been arduous and fruitful,” the Special 
Forces instructors told their superiors in Panama. “The individual soldier has improved 
tremendously during this phase, and the interest of the entire Battalion remains high.” 
The American officers added their assessment that, “if fully equipped and manned, the 
Battalion could be an effective fighting force at this time.” They did not share that 
                                               




evaluation with the Bolivian authorities, who were anxious to get the new Ranger 
Battalion into the fight against Che Guevara’s guerillas. Shelton had just such an 
opportunity on 29 July. On that day, “General Rene Barrientos Ortuno (president of 
Bolivia) visited this site and addressed the Battalion and Detachment members at a 
formation,” the Americans reported to the Canal Zone. “He presented each of the 
Battalion Officers and NCOs [non-commissioned officers] with a gift. His address was a 
great moral[e] booster to the Battalion.” Apparently, Shelton kept his assessment that the 
Second Ranger Battalion was capable of being “an effective fighting force at this time” to 
himself. The Green Berets were not in Bolivia to train just another unit. Their mission 
was to create an elite counter guerrilla unit capable of defeating the best insurgents the 
Cubans could export to Bolivia. Doing so took time. “We needed every day of that 
training schedule,” Shelton later recalled.94 More training lay ahead for the Rangers. 
President Barrientos’ visit “came at an opportune time,” the Americans reported, “and 
may carry [the new unit] through some of the more arduous training which will come in 
Phase IV.”95  
The advanced unit training phase began on 31 July and focused on company and 
battalion level operations. This fourth phase also included an increased emphasis on 
counter guerrilla tactics. The battalion reconnaissance platoon began fine-tuning its skills. 
U.S. Captain Margarito Cruz, a Special Action Force officer from the 801st Military 
Intelligence Detachment, trained seven men of the recon platoon as “agents.” These men 
later donned civilian clothes, and infiltrated the guerrilla area to collect intelligence on 
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Guevara’s insurgents. The Americans even equipped them with wristwatches so that they 
could accurately record the timing of their observations.96 
 The American counterinsurgency training was methodical, but like most combat 
instruction it also entailed risks. During this phase the new battalion suffered its worst 
training accident. On 11 August, a “Bolivian sergeant, on his own initiative, decided to 
take his squad out for some additional training one Sunday afternoon,” Special Forces 
sergeant Jerald Peterson recalled,  
No one in the Bolivian chain of command nor any of the Americans were 
notified. How he got the ammunition was unknown. The sergeant had his 
squad set up the French mortar for a fire mission. Then, he took several 
men about a hundred meters in front of the position along the gun-target 
line to show them how to call for fire. The first round fell short, killing 
one (the sergeant) and seriously wounding several others. The explosion 
caught us by surprise… SSG [James] Hapka [a Special Forces medic] did 
an emergency triage and started first aid, got IVs flowing, and stabilized 
them as best he could. Then, the dead man and the two most seriously 
wounded were loaded aboard a truck. SFC [Richard] Kimmich 
accompanied them to the province hospital in Santa Cruz [two hours 
away]. The primitive, early 1900s-vintage, medical facility did have a 
doctor on duty. [However, o]ne of the wounded died in the hospital.97 
Another conscript had died a few weeks earlier when he accidentally discharged the 
pistol a Bolivian lieutenant had ordered him to clean, killing himself.98 Despite these 
casualties, training continued.  
The battalion completed its formal training at the start of September. However, 
the Special Forces trainers knew the Bolivian authorities would almost certainly send 
their charges into combat against the guerrillas immediately after graduation. Therefore, 
in order to reinforce their previous training and to provide the new Rangers with every 
                                               
96 Finlayson, “Turning the Tables on Che,” 80, 85; St. George, “How the U.S. Got Che Guevara,” 99.  





possible advantage in their upcoming fight against Che Guevara’s insurgents, Major 
Shelton decided to extend the preparations just a bit longer.99 He added “a two-week field 
exercise approximately 15 miles southwest of Santa Cruz” near the “Red Zone” where 
the Bolivian Army had contained Che Guevara’s guerrilla foco. “The purpose of this 
exercise,” the Americans reported to the Canal Zone, “was to accustom the 2d Ranger 
Battalion to the terrain found in the Guerrilla Warfare Operational Area.”100  
Although much of the Second Ranger Battalion’s training focused on counter 
guerrilla tactics, they also practiced applying the tenets of counterinsurgency during the 
final field exercise. “As part of the immediate action training,” Sergeant First Class 
Daniel Chapa recalled, “we set up a little mock village to teach the soldiers how to 
properly clear buildings without harassing the local people. Some of the role players 
dressed up as women. That got a real ‘hoot’ from the troops, but they did learn.”101  
The Bolivians also learned from the example of their American instructors 
throughout the training period. The Special Forces men undertook a civic action project 
to rebuild the local school in La Esperanza. “The existing school is in a horrible state of 
repair,” the Americans reported soon after their arrival, “and a new one is essential for 
the community.”102 The Green Berets combined about $1,000 of U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) money, the labor of the village inhabitants and the 
Ranger students, and the technical expertise of an American construction company 
working in the area to renovate and expand the school for the local townspeople.103  
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The Special Forces troops also provided extensive medical support to the local 
population around La Esperanza during their deployment. The American medics treated 
one-thousand Bolivian military men and a whopping 2,500 Bolivian civilians. They 
expended approximately $10,000 worth of medicine during their stay in the country. 
These civic action activities presented a very visible altruistic gesture, but they also 
served more practical military purposes. “The harmony and good will created by the 
[civic action] program served many real and worthwhile causes,” the team reported to the 
Canal Zone in their final dispatch. “One of those causes was the accurate and timely 
intelligence available to the team providing the invaluable security that was absolutely 
necessary in this operation.”104 
While the Special Forces focused their efforts on raising a new counterinsurgency 
unit, other formations of the Bolivian Army continued to suffer a series of defeats at the 
hands of Guevara’s guerrillas. At one point the Bolivian Army lost 28 men in six 
engagements while only killing two or three rebels.105 The situation strained U.S.-
Bolivian relations. In June, the Department of State lamented that the Barrientos 
government “has repeatedly demonstrated its total inability to cope with the guerrillas” 
and declared that most army officers have “no comprehension of guerrilla tactics.” The 
same report cited the lack of training of Bolivian soldiers, their low morale, and 
unreliable communications among other Bolivian Army maladies and opined that, “This 
is aggravated by the fact that officers reporting on skirmishes do not hesitate to distort the 
facts to cover their own ineptitude.”106  
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Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, kept President 
Johnson apprised of the situation in Bolivia. After a 24 June meeting on the “guerrilla 
problem in Latin America,” Rostow informed the president that “we have put Bolivia on 
the top of the list [of countries of concern] more because of the fragility of the political 
situation and the weakness of the armed forces than the size and effectiveness of the 
guerrilla movement.”107 The guerrillas “have so far clearly out-classed the Bolivian 
security forces,” Rostow explained to the president in a memorandum the day before. 
“The performance of the government units has revealed a serious lack of command 
coordination, officer leadership and troop training and discipline.” However, Rostow was 
also aware of earlier U.S. efforts to train Bolivian Ranger units and the challenges 
inherent in that undertaking. “Soon after the presence of the guerrillas had been 
established, we sent a special team and some equipment to help organize another Ranger-
type Battalion,” Rostow explained. “On the military side, we are helping about as fast as 
the Bolivians are able to absorb our assistance.”108  
Some Bolivians also expressed their frustrations.  “The guerrilla tactics we were 
taught in Panama are useless here,” a Bolivian lieutenant complained in a July 23rd 
Baltimore Sun article. “In Panama we were taught to respond to an ambush with heavy 
fire. But the ambushes here are totally different. The guerrilla tactics are scientific, 
something we never anticipated in Panama training.”109 A few days later Covey T. 
Oliver, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, forwarded a copy of 
the Baltimore Sun article to Rostow adding his own observations, 
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I personally doubt that the counter-ambush tactics taught at the Canal 
Zone school are inappropriate, but it is obvious that the training is 
ineffective as far as total Bolivian army performance is concerned. It may 
be that training Latin American officer cadre of combat units is useless in 
itself because they do not have the inclination or the capability to pass on 
their learning to the conscript troops they command when they return 
home… Our Special Forces MTT’s [sic] from the Canal Zone have done 
some training of Latin American units in their entirety, the most successful 
being the development of the first Venezuelan Ranger Battalion in 1964. 
There is an MTT in Bolivia training a Ranger Battalion right now. But we 
are looking into the advisability of focusing more of our training effort on 
integral elite units in their home territory.110 
Oliver astutely recognized the failure of the Bolivian Army to sustain and spread its 
American-supplied counterinsurgency training.  
Despite these pessimistic assessments, the Bolivian Army enjoyed several 
advantages the guerrillas could not match. First, it had the resources of an entire nation at 
its disposal. While the insurgents had limited arms and manpower, the Bolivian Army 
faced no such impediments. The weaponry of its non-MAP supported units may have 
been antiquated, but they were plentiful. The Army had thousands of men at its disposal 
in the Santa Cruz region and it could move in units from other regions to reinforce its 
counter guerrilla operations at will. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Army 
enjoyed popular support. After many years of American assistance in implementing 
Bolivia’s “vast Civic Action program,” the peasantry viewed the national army in a 
favorable light.111 The country also had a democratically elected president. René 
Barrientos won an impressive electoral victory in 1966, in large part due to his popularity 
among the campesinos. Moreover, the peasants in Santa Cruz Department seemed 
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committed to fulfilling their role under the Military-Campesino Pact of 1964, which cast 
them as counter-subversive agents of the state in the countryside.  
The guerrillas, on the other hand, sorely lacked support. Frank Pais’ urban 
network had sustained Fidel Castro’s embryonic foco with men, money and arms during 
their early years in the Sierra Maestra Mountains. Che Guevara had no Frank Pais in 
Bolivia; he lacked a pipeline to send him supplies and fresh recruits. The Bolivian 
Communist party rejected the idea of a foreign led insurgency and left Guevara to try to 
establish his own urban network. The effort failed.112 The local peasants also shunned the 
insurgents. The well-educated, world-traveler and revolutionary theorist and his fellow 
guerrillas, had difficulty connecting with the Bolivian campesinos. One encounter 
illustrates their plight. “When the National Liberation Army triumphs,” a member of the 
guerrilla foco told one village peasant, “you will have tractors, schools and even a 
university.” “What’s a university?” the campesino asked. The guerrilla told him it was 
where high school students went to study. “And who are high school students?” “Those 
who have finished secondary school,” the guerrilla explained. “And where are they going 
to come from?” the befuddled peasant wondered. “They will have to come from 
yourselves,” the exasperated guerrilla told him.113 Although they walked the same ground 
– the guerrillas and peasants lived in different worlds. Guevara’s foco consisted of a mere 
38 men by mid-June: seventeen Cubans, three Peruvians and eighteen Bolivians.114 
Because of the lack of support every guerrilla was irreplaceable. Recruiting new 
members from among the local campesinos was simply not an option.  
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On the other side of the cordon, the pessimism continued. In early August, the 
Central Intelligence Agency observed that, “Most of the insurgents’ successes [sic] to 
date results from the fact that the Bolivian Armed Forces are almost totally inept in 
counterinsurgency operations.”115 CIA analysts also emphasized that both the Armed 
Forces High Command in La Paz and President Barrientos continued to seek a 
“miraculous solution” or a “spectacular victory” and believed that obtaining modern 
firepower from the United States would solve their guerrilla problems – the opposite of 
U.S. advice which argued for improvements in training, maintenance and logistics, 
among other remedial actions.116 In the meantime, the Green Berets continued their 
training of the Second Ranger Battalion. However, the tide of battle soon shifted. In 
hindsight, the Bolivian Army performed better than many contemporary observers had 
realized. As Bolivian forces gained strength and experience, the guerrillas weakened. 
President Barrientos did not have long to wait for his “spectacular victory.”  
The Bolivian Army’s first victory was very welcome, although it did not seem 
spectacular at the time. On 30 August, the Bolivian’s turned the guerrilla’s favorite tactic 
against them. An army patrol ambushed the rearguard of a guerrilla formation killing ten 
rebels and capturing one.117 In a single encounter, Bolivia’s conventional forces had 
reduced Guevara’s insurgent foco by one quarter. The conscript army had discovered its 
bite. 
The Bolivian Army’s momentum continued when the newly activated Second 
Ranger Battalion took the field on 26 September. By that point the guerrillas were worn 
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down from being on the run for months. They were suffering due to the constant 
marching and their relentless harassment by Bolivian conventional forces. The 30 August 
engagement eliminated an entire wing of the dwindling foco. Guevara himself was in ill 
health from asthma. He had run out of medicine and his men lacked food and water. The 
arrival of a fresh 650-man counter guerrilla battalion doomed Che Guevara and the 
remnants of the Bolivian foco. After only two weeks in action, the Rangers caught up 
with the insurgents. As had been the case in earlier encounters, when faced with actively 
supporting Guevara’s guerrillas, or passively supporting them through silence, Bolivian 
campesinos instead chose to immediately denounce them to the nearest military 
authorities.  
On the evening of 7 October, a rural farmer saw seventeen men pass near his 
potato field and continue on into a nearby canyon. He told an officer of the Second 
Ranger Battalion who relayed the sighting to other members of the unit by radio.118 The 
next morning the Rangers caught up with the insurgent column. In the ensuing firefight, 
Rangers under the command of Captain Gary Prado Salmón killed several guerrillas and 
wounded Che Guevara. Seeing that escape was impossible, Guevara surrendered to the 
Rangers on the afternoon of 8 October.119 Bolivian forces executed him the following day 
on direct orders from Army Headquarters in La Paz.120  
Guevara’s death sent shockwaves across the Americas. Coupled with the failure 
of other attempted foco-style insurrections, Che’s death signaled the decline of Cuban-
inspired rural revolutions in Latin America. The Americans celebrated what they 
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considered an important Cold War victory and attributed much of their success to the 
U.S.-trained Second Ranger Battalion. Walt Rostow (Deputy Special Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs) wrote to President Johnson that Guevara’s death 
“shows the soundness of our ‘preventative medicine’ assistance to countries facing 
incipient insurgencies.”121 In fact, the sustained pressure from Bolivia’s conventional 
units choked off and ground down the Cuban-sponsored guerrillas. The Rangers 
delivered the coup de grâce and claimed credit, but in reality they stole the spotlight in 
the last act of a much longer drama.  
In any event, Guevara’s death and the demise of his foco did not immediately end 
U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Bolivia. American authorities wanted one more 
insurance policy against a renewed guerrilla outbreak in the country. “In early July, I was 
called back to Panama by [General Robert] Porter, the U.S. Southern Command 
commander” Shelton later revealed. “Before leaving La Paz, the [CIA] Station Chief and 
I had a long conversation. He felt that the U.S. needed to maintain a training presence in 
Bolivia after we finished training the 2nd Ranger Battalion. This became the genesis of 
our follow-on mission: to provide refresher tactical and COIN [counterinsurgency] 
training to nine Bolivian infantry companies.”122  
Shelton’s Special Forces instructors began training the first three companies at La 
Esperanza on 9 October, the same day a Bolivian soldier executed Che Guevara at La 
Higuera. “The rifle companies who received refresher training were composed of 
personnel with varied military experience,” the Americans reported. “Most all personnel 
have served in the combat area before arriving at the [La Esperanza] training site.”123 The 
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four-week training course began with a week of weapons training. In the second week, 
the infantry companies reviewed individual combat skills. The American trainers spent 
the third week covering squad and platoon tactics as well as patrolling. In the final week 
the Green Berets taught counterinsurgency. After four weeks the Bolivian Army rotated 
in a new group of three infantry companies for refresher training.  
During the second cycle the American trainers and their Bolivian Army 
counterparts finally began a concerted effort to train Bolivian instructor cadres for 
counterinsurgency. The Bolivian Army also incorporated the sugar mill site at La 
Esperanza as an official army training center. It assigned Colonel Constantino Valencia 
as the first commander of the new Centro de Instrución Especial de Operaciones, 
(CIEOP, or Center for Special Operations Instruction). The American then implemented 
a “train-the-trainer” program to develop a cadre of Bolivian instructors to man the new 
center. “The POI [Program of Instruction] was changed to reflect [Valencia’s] emphasis,” 
Shelton explained later, “which was on counter-guerrilla operations. Courses in 
intelligence collection, target detection, and more practical work in patrolling and 
operations against irregular forces were added.”124  
During the final rotation of infantry companies, the Green Berets turned over 
primary responsibility for instruction to their newly-trained Bolivian counterparts. Major 
Shelton had one last goal for his mission to Bolivia. “Well, Che was dead,” he recounted 
in an interview in 1969, “and it occurred to me right afterward that there was only one 
thing I really wanted – I wanted everyone in the team home for the holidays. I went up to 
Panama and spoke to the boss [General Porter], and on the 19th of December we had our 
last breakfast in Santa Cruz. We were all home – every one of us was home the night 
                                               




before Christmas.”125 The new Bolivian instructors finished the last two weeks of 
training for the third rotation of infantry companies on their own.126  
In 1967, the Bolivian Army, aided by its U.S. Special Forces trainers, did nip an 
insurgency in the bud – and in doing so they changed the course of revolutionary warfare 
in the Americas. But it was a crisis response by both the United States and Bolivian 
forces. Reacting to Cuban guerrillas with untrained conscript units and raising a new 
counterguerrilla from scratch was not what American advisors envisioned in 1962 when 
they set out to “establish an effective counter-guerrilla, counter-insurgency capability 
within [the Bolivian] army based on US Army doctrine.”127  
CONCLUSION 
Bolivia’s counterinsurgency experience in the 1960s differed dramatically from 
that of either Colombia or Venezuela. For most of the decade, Bolivia’s internal threat 
was radical miners, not rural guerrillas. U.S.-sponsored military units quelled miner 
uprisings and riots. They were not prepared to face a Cuban-sponsored guerrilla 
insurgency attempt in 1967. All three countries faced the challenge of rapid personnel 
turnover due to conscription. Venezuela and Colombia each developed an internal 
training capability to sustain and spread their American instilled counter guerrilla and 
counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine. Bolivia did not even try - until the last days of 
1967.  
Bolivian military authorities chose not to invest the effort needed to develop an 
internal educational capability to sustain their U.S.-imparted counterinsurgency training. 
In their assessment, the persistent threat of rebellious miners outweighed the potential 
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threat of a rural insurgency. Bolivian officials considered two counterinsurgency-trained 
ranger battalions established in 1964 and 1965 sufficient to meet their needs. They did 
not approve another U.S.-trained battalion until faced with the threat of a Cuban-
supported insurgency in 1967. Yet without effective schools, the Bolivian Army proved 
incapable of maintaining a high level of counter guerrilla competency in its U.S.-trained 
Ranger battalions due to the annual personnel turnover caused by conscription. When the 
foco crisis came in 1967, the Bolivian Army’s poorly trained forces could at first only 
circumscribe the guerrillas’ mobility while they waited for the Special Action Force to 
train yet another Ranger battalion to find and finish Guevara’s insurgents. Yet over time, 
Bolivia’s conventional forces improved. By the time the newly-trained Ranger battalion 
took the field, the guerrillas were nearly defeated. In one of the Cold War’s ironies, the 
Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion, which many historians have assumed was the only 
counterinsurgency unit trained by the United States, was actually the third. Nevertheless, 
the Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion ended the Bolivian guerrilla saga by capturing and 
killing Che Guevara. In doing so, it achieved lasting fame.  
Throughout the decade, Bolivia maintained military autonomy from the United 
States. Bolivian authorities approved all American military training and assistance. They 
accepted all the civic action projects and military equipment that they could garner from 
the United States, but they also set limits on American efforts to establish 
counterinsurgency trained forces. Bolivian officers, rather than Americans, determined 
whether or not to embed counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine in their military schools 
system. Most importantly, Bolivian civilian and military leaders maintained full control 
of their nation’s response to Che Guevara’s insurgency attempt in 1967. Bolivian officers 




movements and denied them access to the outside world. Although American Special 
Forces spent months training the Second Ranger Battalion, Bolivian officers led them in 
combat. Like their Venezuelan and Colombian counterparts, Bolivians accepted U.S. 
military training and assistance on their own terms and they determined when and where 




COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE ANDEAN RIDGE: CONCLUSION 
Latin America experienced a tumultuous decade during the 1960s. Cuba sought to 
export its revolution while the United States labored to prevent “another Cuba” in the 
hemisphere. The United States Army’s counterinsurgency training efforts in the region 
formed part of larger American effort to prevent the spread of Communism. Yet the 
United States also had to contend with the national political and military sensitivities of 
its regional allies, even as it sought to assist them in bolstering their security. The effect 
of U.S. military support for internal security, and its concomitant counterinsurgency 
training, varied tremendously between countries in the 1960s. Political, economic, and 
social differences in each country – and the nature of the threat each faced – determined 
whether a country accepted or rejected American counterinsurgency doctrine. It also 
strongly influenced the mix and measure of training and assistance each country’s 
security forces received.  
The nations of the Andean Ridge of South America clearly demonstrate this 
diversity. Colombia faced the lingering vestiges of civil war and first sought American 
internal security assistance in 1959. Lawlessness and bandit gangs wracked the 
Colombian countryside, although Bogotá also confronted the threat of Communist 
enclaves. Fidel Castro targeted Venezuela for revolution soon after seizing power in 
Cuba. He supported Venezuela’s Communist insurgents throughout most of the decade. 
Castro’s military trained hundreds of Venezuelans in guerrilla warfare techniques in 
Cuba, he also sent arms and ammunition, money, and even combat advisors to 
Venezuela. In Bolivia, the recurrent security threat was riotous miners, not rebellious 




targeted Bolivia for a revolution that he dreamed would sweep across South America and 
liberate the continent.  
Because each country’s situation was unique, each country’s leadership developed 
its own understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine and applied its training as it saw fit. 
Colombia embraced American counterinsurgency doctrine as part of Plan Lazo. This plan 
inverted the policies of earlier Colombian governments which had vacillated between 
offering political amnesty to rural armed factions and using conventional military force to 
repress rural populations. Under Plan Lazo, the Colombian government sought to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the rural population and used its specialized counter guerrilla units 
to attack bandit gangs and Communist “republics.” In Venezuela, the government of 
Rómulo Betancourt and his successors used electoral democracy, land reform, and 
counterinsurgency to thwart the urban Communists’ attempt to foment a Cuban-style 
rural insurgency. Bolivian leaders embraced civic action in the countryside to earn the 
good will of the peasants, but they also used military forces to repress unruly miners. 
Because they faced no active insurgency until 1967, they adapted their U.S.-sponsored 
counterinsurgency capabilities to confront the extant threat of recalcitrant miners rather 
than the latent threat of a rural uprising.  There was no rural tinderbox as Che discovered. 
Each country also accepted a differing mix of U.S. counterinsurgency training. 
Developing an effective counterinsurgency capability required training individuals and 
units in counterguerrilla tactics, civic action, and psychological operations. It also 
required raising specialized counter guerrilla units capable of besting the guerrillas at 
their own game. Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia each accepted individual and unit 
training and raised specialized units, although in differing ways. Financial constraints 




schools. Instead, the Colombian Army accepted the highest number of Special Action 
Force mobile training team visits of any nation in the hemisphere. It also adjusted its 
preexisting counterguerrilla tactics based on American advice.  Venezuela sent large 
numbers of National Guard and Army officers to U.S. Army counterinsurgency schools 
and received the highest number Special Action Force counterinsurgency training 
missions in the region. Bolivia sent students to counterinsurgency schools and raised 
several counter guerrilla units based on the U.S. Army model. It also accepted eight 
Special Action Force counterinsurgency mobile training teams between 1962 and 1967.  
However, counterinsurgency training proved to be highly perishable. Personnel 
turnover due to conscription could swiftly undo American efforts to instill a counter 
guerrilla capability. Venezuela’s Army and National Guard developed instructor cadres 
to sustain and spread internal security skills and knowledge throughout their 
organizations. The Colombian Army disseminated its newly-enhanced counterinsurgency 
tactics and techniques through its own robust military schools system. However, Bolivian 
forces proved incapable of sustaining their American imparted counterinsurgency 
training. They failed to integrate counterinsurgency into their limited formal schools 
system and unit officers proved unable to sustain counter guerrilla skills within their 
specialized formations. When Che Guevara targeted Bolivia for revolution in 1967, 
Bolivian and American leaders judged the army’s previously trained counter guerrilla 
units as incapable of meeting the threat. Instead, in response to Bolivian requests for 
assistance, American policymakers ordered the Special Action Force to deploy an 
oversized team and train yet another Ranger battalion from scratch.  
The cases of Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia aptly illustrate that internal 




during the 1960s. U.S. military training was not. These cases also cast doubt on the Cold 
War narrative that U.S. counterinsurgency training led to military dictatorships and that 
Americans trained regional militaries to commit human rights violations. Despite all 
accepting the same U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and training (albeit in varying 
degrees), each nation developed and applied American doctrine in its own way and each 
experienced its own unique outcome. Colombia and Venezuela consolidated lasting 
democracies with their military forces subordinated to civilian rule. Bolivia did not 
establish an enduring democracy; it experienced military coups d’état before, during, and 
after the 1960s. Nevertheless, none of these countries embarked on a Southern Cone-style 
“dirty war” during the 1960s or 1970s. Colombia did experience a resurgence of rural 
violence in 1980s in which some military units committed human rights abuses, but 
attributing those abuses to earlier U.S. counterinsurgency training is obviously 
problematic.  
These cases also highlight the paramount importance of Latin American agency. 
Political and military leaders in the Andean Ridge exhibited a high degree of autonomy in 
their security relationship with the United States. Although the power behind these 
relationships was not equal, Americans did not dictate the terms of internal security 
training to their counterparts in the Andean Ridge. For example, Colombian leaders 
rejected General Yarborough’s recommendation that five Green Beret “A” Detachments 
assume control of Colombian brigades and lead them in counterguerrilla operations. 
Colombian political leaders also determined how much internal security their country 
needed. When military operations reduced the level of rural violence to tolerable levels in 
the mid-1960s, Colombian authorities returned responsibility for internal security to its 




the employment of military forces within their national territory. Police and National 
Guard units led the counterinsurgency efforts in the cities. They restricted the Venezuelan 
Army’s operations to the hinterlands. Venezuela’s civilian presidents also controlled the 
pace of development for counter guerrilla units. They refused American plans to raise and 
train additional Cazadores battalions until they decide the guerrilla threat situation 
warranted the extra formations.   
Likewise, Bolivian leaders determined how many counterguerrilla units they 
would form in the country. They resisted American efforts to train additional Ranger 
battalions after 1965 until they faced an armed insurgency. Bolivian authorities also 
decided how much effort and expense they would invest in maintaining their American-
provided counterinsurgency training. Forces capable of intimidating striking miners met 
their needs. Controlling riots required much lower levels of training so they allowed 
counterinsurgency skills to atrophy in their specialized units. In each of these Andean 
Ridge cases, Latin American countries requested U.S. military training. However, each 
nation also controlled their own forces, commanded their own units, and fought their own 
campaigns. Colombians, Venezuelans, and Bolivians exhibited a considerable degree of 
agency in their security dealings with the United States. That autonomy has frequently 
been overlooked in a regional historiography that often overestimates the negative impact 





PART III: COUNTER REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL AND THE 
SOUTHERN CONE 
 
The Southern Cone of South America was not immune to the upheavals and Cold 
War challenges of the 1960s and 1970s. The Cuban Revolution inspired Leftists and 
stoked fears of Communism among military officers and conservatives, just as it had in 
the rest of the hemisphere. Havana spared Chile in its efforts to export revolution, but it 
did support guerrilla movements in Brazil and Argentina. Security forces detected and 
defeated the nascent focos before they could achieve their goal of sparking a revolution. 
Nevertheless, the absence of successful rural insurgency did not equate to social 
harmony. Instead, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile each faced growing urban unrest and 
ideological polarization during these decades.  
Just as in the Andean Ridge, the internal political, economic, and social factors 
affecting each country varied greatly, as did their responses. Brazil faced a deep 
economic crisis in the early 1960s and military officers perceived President João Goulart 
as increasingly pro-Communist. In 1964, the military seized power and established an 
enduring military authoritarian regime. In Argentina, the country confronted a series of 
worsening political and economic crises. The military feared the return of the country’s 
populist “demagogue,” former president Juan Perón. They also proscribed the nation’s 
largest political party, founded by Perón, from participating in elections. Military and 
civilian governments alternated in power with neither proving able to solve the country’s 
persistent problems. Meanwhile, Chile encountered an ongoing shift to the left in its 




1970. The country appeared on the verge of civil war by 1973. On September 11 of that 
year, the Chilean Armed forces deposed Allende and installed a dictatorship.  
American counterinsurgency doctrine proved a poor fit for the circumstances 
facing Southern Cone armies in the 1960s. The security forces of Brazil, Argentina, and 
Chile confronted urban unrest, and later urban terrorism, during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Rural insurgencies were uncommon and usually short-lived. More importantly, the 
armies of this sub-region perceived the rise of elected leftist governments as the most 
immediate threat to their countries and their institutions, not rural insurgency. 
Nationalism also played a role in these armies’ indifference to American 
counterinsurgency doctrine. The armies of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile believed 
themselves fully capable of managing their own internal security problems without 
foreign interference. Because of these and other factors, the armies of the Southern Cone 
largely rejected U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine.  
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile sent far fewer students to American internal security 
courses than their Andean Ridge neighbors. During the same time period that Venezuela 
dispatched ninety students to attend U.S. Army counterinsurgency schools, Brazil sent 
only six. Argentina boasted the highest number of students from the Southern Cone with 
twenty-six graduates while Chile had fifteen. These armies also accepted fewer Special 
Action Force mobile training team missions. Venezuela earned the distinction of 
accepting the most Special Action Force counterinsurgency training visits in the 
Americas with fourteen; Argentina led the Southern Cone by accepting just four. Brazil 
accepted three counterinsurgency missions. Chile allowed only two. Yet each of these 
countries did confront social and political instability during the 1960s and 1970s. They 




development as a means to ease those tensions. Yet if they rejected American 
counterinsurgency, what doctrine took its place?  
The armies of the Southern Cone adopted what was later termed the National 
Security Doctrine in order to confront the Cold War challenges of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Some Latin American historians have mistakenly conflated the National Security 
Doctrine (NSD) with American counterinsurgency, perceiving NSD as an “imported 
doctrine” introduced to South America from the United States.1 Other scholars have 
attributed the origins of the National Security Doctrine to the Brazilian Army’s Escola 
Superior de Guerra (ESG) and French revolutionary warfare theories.2 Argentina and 
Chile each later developed their own variants of the NSD based on their distinct threat 
assessments and unique circumstances. The confusion between American 
counterinsurgency and the National Security Doctrine likely arose because each broadly 
sought the same results: to ensure internal security and promote internal economic 
development. Yet the two doctrines advocated starkly different means for achieving those 
aims.  
American policymakers and military strategists conceived their counterinsurgency 
doctrine as a mechanism to support and strengthen friendly democratic governments 
facing the threat of insurgency. This doctrine sought economic development to ameliorate 
the causes of discontent coupled with civic action and psychological operations in an 
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effort to win the support of the population – it represented a “hearts and minds” approach. 
Military efforts were but one component of, and supported, an overall civilian-led 
development program. Tactically, American counterinsurgency doctrine selectively 
targeted guerrilla forces through the training of specialized counter guerrilla units. 
Military operations strove to protect the civilian population while attacking armed 
insurgent elements.  
In contrast, the armies of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile each eventually considered 
their elected civilian governments incapable of achieving either economic development 
or internal security. These armies overturned their elected democratic governments and 
established enduring military authoritarian regimes to implement the tenets of their 
National Security Doctrines. They restricted political competition and civilian 
participation in government to pursue a technocratic plan of national development 
managed by military officers. These dictatorships also eschewed winning the hearts and 
minds of their populations. Instead, they ruthlessly repressed “subversive” organizations 
and groups using torture, disappearances, and murder and created a climate of fear to 
intimidate the population into obedience. Southern Cone armies rejected American 
counterinsurgency in favor of their own home-grown internal security doctrines. The 
“Dirty Wars” of South America owe their origins to these home-grown National Security 






Chapter Eight: Contra Revolucionario in Brazil 
  
Unlike most of its regional neighbors, Brazil faced all three primary types of 
Leftist revolutionary challenges during the 1960s. Early in the decade the nation faced the 
potential for revolutionary change from above as elected Leftist politicians pursued a 
progressive social agenda that threatened the military as an institution. In 1964, the armed 
forces responded by ousting President João Goulart and establishing military rule. The 
country also confronted revolution from below as it encountered both rural and urban 
insurgencies. Brazil’s Cold War was mainly an internal Brazilian affair, although outside 
actors such as Cuba, the United States, and France did exert considerable influence at 
certain times. 
Cuba did not directly target Brazil for its export of revolution prior to 1964. There 
was no need to do so. Brazil boasted a strong Communist party and Leftist presidents 
ruled the country in the early 1960s. President Jânio Quadros reestablished relations with 
Cuba and the Soviet Union during his brief term of office in 1961. He also decorated 
Fidel Castro’s most famous lieutenant, Argentine revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara, 
with Brazil’s highest award, the Order of the Southern Cross. However, officially lauding 
Guevara with the country’s most prestigious medal caused considerable outrage among 
Brazilian military officers, compounding Quadros’ political problems. In a surprise 
move, Quadros resigned in August 1961. He had apparently hoped to garner additional 
political clout by forcing Brazilian elites to beg for his return to office. Instead, they 
accepted his resignation.  
Yet Quadros’ departure did not bring stability. Vice President João Goulart 




acknowledged as being more radical than Quadros, was out of the country on a visit to 
Communist China when the president resigned. Several of Brazil’s political and military 
elites seized on his absence and sought to block him from becoming president. Eventually 
they struck a bargain whereby Goulart assumed office, but under a parliamentary 
arrangement which reduced his presidential powers. Undeterred, Goulart continued to 
shift the country towards the left. He deepened relations with Cuba by signing an 
agreement with Fidel Castro authorizing Cubana airlines to run charter flights to Brazil. 
Some four hundred Brazilians availed themselves of these and other flights to travel to 
Cuba by mid-1963. At least forty of them received guerrilla warfare training on the 
island, according to U.S. Department of Defense reports.3 Yet Brazilians created, led, and 
sustained the later urban and rural insurgencies – they received limited support from 
Havana.  After the 1964 coup d’état, Fidel Castro sought to form alliances with Brazilian 
leftists and he supported their revolutionary efforts with money and training.  
Brazilian security forces faced these insurgent threats on their own. They accepted 
only minimal American internal security assistance. Just four Brazilians attended 
American counterinsurgency courses in the Panama Canal Zone between 1961 and 1964. 
Among South American nations, only tiny Uruguay sent fewer students during the same 
period with just three graduates.4 In the meantime, only two Brazilian officers undertook 
training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but neither of them enrolled in the 
counterinsurgency course.5 Brazil also largely shunned American internal security mobile 
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training teams. The Special Action Force executed nineteen mobile training team 
missions in Brazil during the decade. However, just a scant three of the visits taught 
counterinsurgency, all of them in 1965 and 1966. The first internal security team 
conducted a survey to coordinate future instruction. Two missions followed with both 
providing parachute and counterinsurgency training to the Brazilian Army’s Airborne 
Brigade in Rio de Janeiro. However, the training was brief and focused mainly on the 
skills related to parachute operations. During the third and final internal security visit, the 
American Green Berets taught just thirty Brazilian students – out of an army of some 
150,000.6 The Brazilian Army also eschewed American military advice as it faced its 
rural (1962, 1966, 1970, and 1972-1975) and urban (1968-1970) insurgencies. The 
Special Action Force deployed no counterinsurgency training teams to Brazil after 1966.  
Rather than import the foreign internal security doctrine espoused by the United 
States, Brazilian Army officers developed their own. Military theorists from the Superior 
War College (Escola Superior de Guerra – ESG) conceptualized an interpretation of the 
Cold War threat facing Brazil. They then designed responses based largely on the 
nation’s previous experiences with development and internal security. Their anti-
communism was also home-grown. It derived from the military’s earlier fights against 
Communism in 1930s and 1950s. The ESG’s military intellectuals collected their theories 
and policies into what was later termed the National Security Doctrine (NSD). The 
Brazilian generals that ousted President Goulart in 1964, many of whom had served on 
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the faculty of the Escola Superior de Guerra, implemented the tenets of NSD as national 
policy. Meanwhile, the Brazilian Army developed and disseminated its own “Contra-
Revolucionario” tactics and conducted its own exercises to reinforce the training.7 If the 
Brazilian Army developed its own internal security doctrine and tactics, how did they 
differ from American counterinsurgency? Throughout the 1960s and beyond, Brazil 
employed its own internal security doctrine and tactics. In turn, Brazilian generals had 
little need for American counterinsurgency training.  
THE ORIGINS OF BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNAL SECURITY DOCTRINE 
Brazil’s challenges with development and internal security did not begin in the 
1960s. Their roots run much deeper. President Getúlio Vargas began the first efforts at 
centralization of political control and state-directed economic development in the 1930s. 
In the aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression, Brazilian political and 
military leaders saw the nation’s lack of industrialization and reliance on commodity 
exports as a weakness which made the country vulnerable to the great powers and its 
regional rivals.  
Vargas’ terms in office as dictator (1930-34), president (1934-37), and dictator 
again (1937-45) established several enduring themes in Brazilian history. First, Brazil 
needed to modernize to ensure its national security and meet its potential for greatness. 
Second, implementing economic development required centralized governmental 
authority. Third, the needs of the State legitimated the use of repression to maintain 
internal security and pursue development.  
Vargas sought to modernize Brazil through industrialization. He also worked to 
break the power of Brazil’s agricultural oligarchs and end the country’s overreliance on 
                                               




exports. Vargas adopted policies designed to replace dependence on imported goods with 
the ability to manufacture those products domestically. Economists later coined the 
phrase Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) to describe this new development 
model.8 Although policymakers implemented ISI to remedy the disruption of imports 
during World War I and the Great Depression, many regional politicians also saw it as a 
path to modernization. During his nearly fifteen years as head of state, Vargas made great 
progress in his efforts to modernize the nation by reorienting the economy from oligarch 
controlled agriculture to state-directed industrialization. He also created enemies and 
generated a backlash against his policies. Vargas responded to the most serious 
challenges with repression and state-directed terror. “[G]rowth and repression,” one 
historian notes, “were the twin orders of the day.”9 
Vargas’ efforts increase the power of the federal government sparked a revolt in 
1932. Regional elites in São Paulo attempted to secede from the nation and they 
employed the state militia to enforce their newly-claimed sovereignty. Vargas sent 
federal forces to subdue the rebellion and reestablish the authority of the central 
government. The military succeeded in quelling the revolt, but only after four months of 
armed struggle.10 In 1934, Vargas won a new four-year term of office. A year later he 
faced a Communist rebellion from within the military. The secret police and military 
leadership employed state-directed terror to quash the insurrection. “[M]ilitary 
commanders were in no mood for mercy” in the aftermath of the uprising, historian 
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Shawn Smallman observes. “The special police and military officers tortured not only 
their prisoners, but also their victims’ wives and children…Some prisoners simply 
disappeared. Many people unconnected to the conspiracy suffered. The state and the 
military seized upon this opportunity to repress not only communists, but also anarchists, 
union leaders, ‘socialists, progressives, and reformers of all stripes.’”11  
Vargas dissolved the Congress and established the dictatorship of the Estado 
Nôvo (New State) in 1937. Authoritarianism allowed Vargas the luxury of implementing 
his policies by decree rather than struggling for consensus under a democracy. “The 
Estado Nôvo furnished a centralized apparatus through which Vargas and his aides could 
pursue economic development and organizational change.” historians Thomas Skidmore 
and Peter Smith note. “The federal government assumed an aggressive role in the 
economy, organizing and strengthening market cartels (in cocoa, coffee, sugar, and tea) 
and creating new state enterprises, such as the National Motor Factory (to produce trucks 
and airplane engines).”12 During the Estado Nôvo, Vargas also sought to encourage 
colonization of Brazil’s vast interior through his “March to the West” program. 13 This 
internal development initiative foreshadowed later resettlement efforts under military rule 
in the 1960s.  
Yet despite Vargas’ nationalist rhetoric, coercion and political violence remained 
key tools of the state. “The Estado Novo also had its darker side.” Skidmore and Smith 
explain. “The security forces had a virtual free hand. Torture was routine, against not 
only suspected ‘subversives’ but also foreign agents… Censorship covered all the media, 
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with a government news agency…furnishing the ‘official’ version of the news. There 
were resemblances to Germany and Italy, but the Brazilians stopped well short of those 
extremes.”14 Brazilian generals later employed torture and censorship to maintain social 
control in the 1960s and 1970s, just as Vargas had done two decades earlier. 
World War II provided President Getúlio Vargas with new opportunities to 
advance his development agenda. He negotiated with United States to provide air and 
naval basing rights along Brazil’s northeast coast. In return, Brazil received American 
investment and technology.15 Together the two nations constructed Brazil’s first large-
scale steel mill at Volta Redonda and Vargas established a new entity, the National Steel 
Company (CSN), to manage its operations and distribute its output. It quickly became 
“Brazil’s foremost state-owned company and its largest industrial enterprise in the mid-
twentieth century,” historian Oliver Dinius notes. “It symbolized the state’s capacity to 
effect economic change. Once production began, in 1946, the CSN instantly became the 
country’s main supplier of steel, cutting imports by half.”16  
World War II also profoundly influenced the Brazilian Army. In mid-1944, Brazil 
dispatched a 25,000-man division known as the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (Fôrça 
Expedicionária Brasileira - FEB) to fight alongside the Allied Forces in the Italian 
campaign.17 World War II combat opened the eyes of the Brazilian officers who fought 
overseas. All of them gained combat experience, but some also came to lament the lack 
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of organization and modern equipment in their own army and Brazil’s still 
underdeveloped industrial capabilities.18 
The Army deposed Vargas in 1945, in part due to fears of populism and Vargas’ 
efforts to mobilize the working classes into a political base. Yet, the drive towards 
development continued. Army General Eurico Gaspar Dutra served as president from 
1946 to 1951 and completed numerous infrastructure improvements including highway 
construction, a rural schools building effort, railway improvements, and an expansion of 
electrical generation and distribution systems. Vargas won election as president again in 
1951 under a platform of “accelerating industrialization and expanding social 
legislation.” However, his social policies soon ran afoul of the military once more. Under 
the threat of another military coup, Vargas committed suicide in 1954.19  
Juscelino Kubitschek became the first elected president of the post-Vargas era in 
1956. Kubitschek managed to achieve both rapid industrialization and a cooling of social 
tensions during his term in office. His administration largely delivered on its ambitious 
slogan of “Fifty Years Progress in Five.” It supported the creation of a domestic 
automobile industry, expanded the highway network, and raised a new national capital in 
Brasilia from scratch. Unfortunately, Kubitschek’s government financed much of this 
development through foreign borrowing. When obtaining new loans became impossible, 
Kubitschek began printing money. Rising inflation and heavy foreign debt set the 
conditions for a worsening economic crisis in the early 1960s.20 
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THE ORIGINS OF THE BRAZILIAN NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE 
Brazilian generals continued to worry about both internal security and economic 
development in the post-World War II era. In the late 1940s, they sought the assistance of 
the United States in establishing an institute of higher learning to formalize their research 
and thinking about these and other issues. The Brazilian Army established the Superior 
War College (Escola Superior de Guerra – ESG) in 1949. The National War College in 
Washington D.C. served as the model for the new school and American officers provided 
their Brazilian counterparts with the curriculum of the college as a blueprint. However, 
Brazilian officers did not intend the school to be a duplicate of its American forbearer. 
They quickly set about imparting their own ideas and adapting the curriculum to meet the 
Brazilian reality and needs.21  
The founders of the Superior War College understood from the outset that their 
national situation was unique and therefore required modification from the American 
National War College model. First, they recognized that because the United States was a 
developed country its military officers had the luxury of focusing their studies primarily 
on issues of fighting wars. American officers did not have to overcome national problems 
of underdevelopment. Second, the Brazilians realized that the United States had access to 
a pool of national security “elites formed by an educational system of proven 
effectiveness,” which Brazil lacked.22 Therefore, the Brazilian ESG would focus much of 
its attention on internal issues of national economic development and it would seek to 
train a corpus of civilian and military national security experts.23 “In Brazil,” the Escola 
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Superior de Guerra’s historian, Antônio de Arruda, notes, “rather than preparation for 
war, the priority [of the school] would be to form elites to solve the country's problems in 
peacetime.” 24  
The Escola Superior de Guerra conducted its first course in 1950. After 
establishing the school, and installing its faculty, the ESG began its efforts to define 
national policies and doctrine in the late 1950s. During this period a U.S. Army mission 
directly participated in the ESG. An American Army officer served on the faculty and 
also delivered lectures to the students. However, by the late 1950s rising Brazilian 
nationalism led one leftist student to “question the presence of an American officer when 
sensitive subjects were discussed.”25 Brazilian officials eliminated the U.S. Army 
mission to the ESG and downgraded the American officer’s position to that of a liaison in 
1960.26 Therefore, the U.S. Army did maintain an officer on the teaching faculty of the 
ESG in the late 1950s when Brazilian officers developed their concepts on internal 
security. However, Brazilian authorities eliminated the American presence on the ESG 
faculty several years before the United States refocused its foreign policy efforts towards 
internal security. Brazilian officers expressed pride in their ownership and control of the 
Escola Superior de Guerra.  “The ESG is a daughter of the Americans,” Marshal 
[General] Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias, the school’s first commandant, later explained, 
“but it has naturalized itself Brazilian.”27  
Brazilian generals relied on lessons drawn from their past national experiences in 
developing their National Security Doctrine. For them, countering an externally-
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supported Communist insurgency was not a theoretical exercise. Their predecessors had 
faced just such a threat during the 1930s when the Brazilian Communist Party, allied with 
the Soviet Union, sought to foment a rebellion among sergeants in the Brazilian military. 
“Army generals believed they were under attack from external agents,” one historian 
explains, “and they had to respond ruthlessly. They targeted not only communists, but 
also all those they perceived as a threat.”28 The Brazilian Army leadership later sought to 
obscure the fact that the rebellion originated from inside the organization, but within the 
officer corps the incident helped to reinforce strong anticommunist sentiments, fears of 
internal subversion, and an acceptance of repression as a legitimate tool of the state.29 
Government efforts to suppress the Communist Party sparked another uprising in 
1948. “Fierce battles between police and communists raged throughout Brazil,” historian 
Shawn Smallman notes. Attacks included the bombing of the Army’s ammunition plant 
outside Rio de Janeiro and an arson attack on an army barracks at João Pessoa. The 
government again responded with mass arrests and repression.30 The Brazilian military 
faced the threat of communist infiltration yet again in 1952. The arrests of several Air 
Force members for posting communist propaganda on their base and the discovery of a 
list of five hundred names of military members in shop producing communist leaflets “set 
the stage for a wave of ‘anticommunist’ repression.”31   
Military fears of communist infiltration and subversion, based on its own past 
experiences, ensured a prominent role for internal security in the Superior War College’s 
development of national security policies. Centralization of control and a predilection for 
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authoritarianism also formed key tenets of the ESG’s conceptualization of internal 
security in the 1950s. Ildefonso Mascarenhas de Silva argued in a 1956 ESG lecture that,  
We live in a climate of worldwide war that will decide the destiny of 
Western civilization. A decentralized system is fundamentally weak in 
periods of war, which demand a centralized and hierarchic structure. As 
total war absorbs all people, institutions, wealth, and human and natural 
resources for the attainment of the objectives, it seems certain that 
centralization and concentration will increase the efficiency and ability of 
the political and national power.32 
Centralization of government control for internal security was an important element of 
ESG thinking. The school also advocated a strong government role in the economy.  
Brazilian and American internal security doctrines shared the same goals of 
economic development and internal security. This fact, combined with the American role 
in the establishment of the Escola Superior de Guerra, has led some scholars to conclude 
that the United States developed the National Security Doctrine and exported it to Brazil 
via the ESG.33 This thesis suffers from a problem of timing, among other issues. 
American economists and policymakers only began linking internal security and 
economic development in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For example, Walt W. Rostow 
published his influential The Stages of Economic Growth in 1960. Rostow later served as 
a national security advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson where his concepts of 
economic development heavily influenced American counterinsurgency policy. In Brazil, 
however, this linkage came much earlier. “Security and development,” the school’s 
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historian explains, “have been constant concerns of the ESG since the first days of its 
creation” in 1949.34 
An analysis of the two doctrines reveals important differences. The mechanisms 
by which their adherents expected to achieve economic development and internal security 
were not the same. U.S. counterinsurgency envisioned insulating friendly democracies 
from the challenges of modernization and the threat of insurgency. It promoted economic 
development assistance under the Alliance for Progress and military civic action to 
bolster public support for the friendly government and its policies.35 The National 
Security Doctrine, on the other hand, encouraged replacing democracy with military rule 
as the most effective path to promoting development and ensuring internal security. 
Moreover, the National Security Doctrine did not seek public support. Instead, it 
advocated imposing social control under authoritarianism to enable a military 
government to rule by decree rather than consensus. “Liberal democracy, with its 
contradictions, showed itself unable to guarantee peace and the necessary internal order 
to achieve these goals,” one Brazilian researcher investigating the origins of the National 
Security Doctrine explains. “It would be up to the military, the most disciplined and 
organized sector of society, to ensure the application of a security policy in which the 
government ‘coordinates, in a fundamental strategic concept, all political activities, 
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economic, psychosocial and military.’”36 In other words, both doctrines sought to 
establish a coordinated government program incorporating all political, social, economic 
and military actions to counter subversive insurgency, but for the Brazilian generals the 
best way to do that was under a military dictatorship – not an elected democracy.  
Brazil’s doctrine also differed from American counterinsurgency in how it sought 
to achieve economic modernization. The United States supported development to 
ameliorate economic conditions in order to reduce social unrest. However, senior 
American policymakers also recognized that the country had an “economic interest in 
assuring that the resources and markets of the less developed world remain available to us 
and to other Free World countries.”37 Although decried by some critics as maintaining 
dependency, free markets and economic access are also key tenets of capitalism. 
Brazilian theorists of the Escola Superior de Guerra, on the other hand, sought greater 
economic independence. General Golbery do Couto e Silva, the intellectual author of the 
ESG’s National Security Doctrine in Brazil, advocated a state-directed economy, not the 
free-market capitalism encouraged by the United States. In fact, much of Brazil’s 
industrial development in the 1960s and 1970s replaced U.S. imports with newly-
developed Brazilian products. The rise of the country’s defense industry provides a stark 
example. “Arms production by Brazilian industry began in a limited manner in the early 
1960s” under military rule, American researchers explain, “with the manufacture of 
rifles, pistols, and machine guns…from that small beginning a large, thriving industry 
evolved.”38 By the early 1980s, Brazil not only broke its reliance on American industry 
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for its weaponry, it had become a competitor with sales from its arms exports reaching 
US$1.2 billion in 1981.39 
 External influences also played a role in the development of the National 
Security Doctrine. The Superior War College’s theorists relied heavily on the writings of 
French military officers and academics in crafting their internal security doctrine. The 
French Army’s practical experience confronting insurgencies in the late 1950s endowed 
those authors with a credibility that contemporary American writers lacked. “The greatest 
influence on the Brazilian military's ESG was not American, but French,” Brazilian 
historian Gustavo Marques Bezerra argues. “Especially the experience of the French 
army in the fight against communist guerrillas in Indochina and later in Algeria … 
French authors such as Gabriel Bonnet in the field of insurrectional or revolutionary war, 
[also] had a decisive influence on the NSD.”40 
The Escola Superior de Guerra began its study of insurgency, using the French 
term “Revolutionary War,” in 1959. Colonel Agusto Fragoso gave a lecture at the school 
in May of that year as an introduction to the study of the new concept. Revolutionary war 
“is a type of war that seeks to seize power,” Colonel Fragoso explained, “through the 
active participation of the population – conquered physically and morally - by destructive 
and constructive technical processes, following precise stages.”41 During the conference, 
Colonel Fragoso cited the work of the French War College in Paris and told his audience 
that, “the French bibliography on GR [Guerra Revolucionária or Revolutionary War] is, 
you might say, the only one in existence. A bibliography of North American origin has 
not yet given the subject the merit it deserves: in the last fourteen editions of Military 
                                               
39 Nyrop, Brazil: A Country Study, 304.  
40 Bezerra, Da Revolução, 249-250. Translation by author.  




Review (from January 1958 to February 1959) there was not a single study, article or 
topic that began with the title Revolutionary War, Insurrectionary War, or Subversive 
War.”42 General Octavio Costa later recalled the impact of this new French doctrine on 
the Brazilian Army,  
At that time [in the late 1950s], we were professionally bewildered, not 
knowing which direction to take. . . . So we started to become aware of 
new experiences . . . On that occasion, the French military literature . . . 
began to formulate a new kind of war. It was the infinitely small war, the 
insurrectionary war, the Revolutionary War. . . . It came [to us] through 
our ESG channel, it was [the ESG] who introduced the ideas of the 
insurrectional or revolutionary wars and brought them to the table of our 
own possible war. For we have not had nuclear war, conventional war was 
already outdated. But there was a war that seemed to us be here . . . This 
all contributed to the formulation of our own doctrine of revolutionary 
war, which resulted in the military movement of 64.43 
Many of the lessons contained in the revolutionary war doctrine grew out of the 
French experience in Algeria in the late 1950s. Contained within it were four tenets that 
came to shape the National Security Doctrines of the Southern Cone. First, the French 
conceptualized “revolutionary war” as a global total war for the survival of Western 
Civilization. Internal dissent and revolution were therefore markers of new form of 
warfare that necessitated a military response. Second, the use of terrorism by the 
insurgents legitimated the use of harsh measures including torture and executions as an 
antidote, according to French practitioners and authors such as Roger Trinquier.44 Third, 
the French created specialized intelligence organizations to implement systematic 
repression in order to defeat the insurgency. Finally, they applied terror, through mass 
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arrests, disappearances and torture, to intimidate the population away from supporting the 
guerrillas. These hallmarks of French “revolutionary war” doctrine are also present in 
how the Brazilian generals applied their National Security Doctrine in the 1960s and 
1970s.  
BARRIERS TO U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING IN BRAZIL 
Two major obstacles impeded the transmission of American counterinsurgency 
concepts to the Brazilian Army in the 1960s. Nationalism proved the greatest barrier, but 
the timing of American doctrinal development also prevented its diffusion to Brazil. 
Language problems played only a minor role. A late start was the first issue to impact 
U.S. counterinsurgency training in Brazil in the early 1960s and it set the tone for much 
of the rest of the decade. 
Brazilian Army strategists outpaced their American counterparts in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s as each army sought to develop a holistic counterinsurgency doctrine. 
The Brazilian Army Chief of Staff established a commission in September 1959 to 
develop a course of instruction on modern war emphasizing internal insurgency.45 In July 
1961, General Oswaldo Cordeiro de Farias, then serving as the Chief of Staff of the 
Brazilian Army, issued a formal publication promulgating doctrinal definitions of 
revolutionary war, insurrectionary war, subversive war, and psychological warfare.46 In 
contrast, the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) did not disseminate its 
counterinsurgency definitions until May 1962. The U.S. Army published its own 
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explanation of counterinsurgency terms in an article entitled “Use the Right Word!” 
which appeared in Special Warfare, U.S. Army: an Army Specialty later that same year.47 
 The Brazilian Army had codified a comprehensive “Contra-Revolucionario” 
doctrine by mid-1962. It disseminated its new internal security doctrine through the 
training of individuals from basic recruits to senior officers. Several U.S.-supported units 
in Brazil “conducted a combined arms exercise of 5 days’ duration” in the fall of 1962, 
American officers reported. “This exercise involved the reduction of elements of an 
insurrection army, counter-guerrilla clean-up, and restoration of properly constituted 
government.”48 Meanwhile, the U.S. Army lagged behind. While Brazilian Army units 
were conducting complex internal security exercises based on their “Contra-
Revolucionario” doctrine, the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg and the Caribbean 
School in Panama each offered only one narrowly focused counter-guerrilla course as 
1962 drew to a close. That same year, Brazilian generals were busy training the senior 
leadership of their military on their new concepts. On 31 August 1962, General 
Humberto de Castello Branco, Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Army (and future president 
of Brazil), delivered a seminar on revolutionary war attended by ninety officers in Rio de 
Janeiro. “Courses followed at various centers of the military,” Brazilian historian João 
Roberto Martins Filho notes.49 The Special Warfare School added a one-week 
counterinsurgency orientation course for general officers, but not until later in 1963. The 
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U.S. Army did not publish its first comprehensive internal security manual, Field Manual 
31-22 U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Forces, until November 1963.50  
Therefore, it is evident that the Brazilian Army did not base its “Contra-
Revolucionario” doctrine on American counterinsurgency concepts or methods. Brazil 
sent a mere four students to attend counterinsurgency training at the School of the 
Americas between 1961 and 1964, all of them in 1962.51  Similarly, Brazil sent only two 
officers to the Special Warfare School during the same time period – again both attended 
in 1962. Yet, neither officer took the counterinsurgency course.52 The Special Action 
Force did not conduct its first counterinsurgency training visit to Brazil until 1965.  
The Brazilian Army’s minimal participation in U.S. Army internal security 
courses during the early 1960s indicates its rejection of American counterinsurgency 
training. Or does it? Just six Brazilian officers received internal security related 
instruction at the School of the Americas or at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in in the early 
1960s and all of them attended courses in 1962.  Meanwhile, Brazil accepted no Special 
Action Force mobile training team visits before 1965. The Brazilian Army’s trepidation 
regarding U.S. counterinsurgency training seems clear. However, when considered 
against the backdrop of Brazil’s polarized political atmosphere of the early 1960s, a more 
complicated picture emerges.  
Nationalism also played a role in Brazil’s rejection of American internal security 
doctrine. In October 1962, the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) dispatched an 
Interdepartmental Survey Team “to visit Brazil and submit appropriate 
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recommendations.” General William H. Draper Jr. led the team which spent sixteen days 
traveling in the country and meeting with American and Brazilian officials. “The 
Brazilians are convinced that theirs is a great country with a great future and that they are 
competent to manage their own affairs,” the team reported to President Kennedy. They 
“are highly sensitive to any implication of U.S. tutelage or direction.”53 International 
military training operated in this same political atmosphere, it did not take place in a 
vacuum.  Latin American political leaders authorized or rejected their military 
personnel’s foreign schools attendance and the hosting of U.S. military trainers on their 
sovereign soil. Military leaders did not. In Brazil, the pro-Communist governments of 
Jânio Quadros and João Goulart ruled from 1961 to 1964. New research indicates that 
both men curtailed the Brazilian Army’s participation in U.S. internal security training.  
The Brazilian Army sent twelve students to the Caribbean School during 
President Quadros’ brief term of office in 1961, but none undertook counterinsurgency 
courses.54 After Quadros’ abrupt resignation in August 1961, Vice President Goulart 
should have assumed the presidency. However, Goulart was visiting Communist China at 
the time. His absence allowed Brazilian political and military leaders to contest his 
ascension.55 Goulart did eventually take office, but he governed under a parliamentary 
system with reduced powers. All Brazilian officers attending U.S. Army internal security 
courses in the early 1960s did so under this brief period of limited presidential powers.  
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Goulart regained the full presidency as a result of a national plebiscite in January 
1963. During this period American diplomats sought to re-designate two U.S. Military 
Assistance Program-sponsored Brazilian Army units from hemispheric defense to 
internal security. However, the Goulart administration refused to sign the “internal 
security note” requested by American diplomats. This refusal triggered the suspension, 
and later the cancellation, of all American internal security training with Brazil from that 
point forward.56 In early 1963, Goulart cut funding for overseas military training and 
reduced Brazilian draftees’ training time from twelve to eight months, both ostensibly as 
economy measures.57 As a result, Brazil sent no students to any Canal Zone schools or 
the Special Warfare School during that year. The first Special Action Force 
counterinsurgency mission to Brazil came during Fiscal Year 1965, after the military 
coup in April 1964.58 
The Brazilian Army developed its own concepts and doctrine for internal security 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is now also evident that pro-Communist 
Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart curtailed Brazilian Army interactions with the 
U.S. Army during the years of greatest American counterinsurgency emphasis between 
1961 and 1964. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Army retained sufficient autonomy to 
develop and begin implementing its “Contra-Revolucionario” doctrine even as Goulart 
shifted the country farther to the left. Pro-Cuba Presidents Quadros and Goulart impeded 
the Brazilian Army’s ability to receive U.S. counterinsurgency training, but they could 
not alter internal army functions.  
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Yet if civilian resistance to foreign military training was the only barrier to the 
Brazilian Army’s acceptance of U.S. counterinsurgency, then training with the 
Americans should have flourished after the 1964 coup d’état. It did not. After seizing 
power, Brazilian generals had full authority to determine their military’s attendance at 
foreign schools and the hosting of U.S. military trainers in the country. Civilian oversight 
no longer constrained their actions. The United States and Brazil also resolved their 
earlier impasse over the internal security note. However, there was no sharp increase in 
U.S. schools attendance post 1964.  This indicates that other considerations also affected 
these decisions.  
The Brazilian Army’s own internal nationalism also impeded U.S. Army schools 
attendance. Brazil sent a total of 181 students to attend courses at the School of the 
Americas in Panama between 1961 and 1970. The average participation rate was a mere 
eighteen students per year out of an army of some 150,000 members. In contrast, Bolivia 
(with a 15,000-man army) sent 1,291 students. Venezuela sent 1,983. Brazil’s attendance 
at the school did increase to twenty-three students in 1964, but it dropped to only seven 
the following year. Presidential restrictions on foreign military training were not a factor 
after the Army seized control of the government in April 1964, so what explains the 
continued lack of participation?  
Nationalism within the Brazilian Army affected its willingness to accept 
American counterinsurgency doctrine and training. However, the Brazilian army was not 
a unitary actor in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Two factions competed for influence 
within the organization. Nationalist officers favored state-led development, but “feared 
the economic power of the United States and its multinationals,” according to historian 




Internationalist officers, on the other hand, “worried about the threat from communism 
and wished to ally with the United States in its global struggle.”59 Ironically, both groups 
had reason to reject adopting American counterinsurgency. Nationalist officers would 
have spurned any foreign military doctrine, especially one that potentially made them 
subordinates of the United States. The Internationalist officers formed the intellectual 
backbone of the Escola Superior de Guerra. Ironically, although these officers were pro-
United States, they had no need for American counterinsurgency. They had spent the last 
decade developing their own Brazilian concepts for internal security and the running of 
the country. After seizing control of the government in 1964, the Internationalists officers 
implemented their National Security Doctrine as Brazil’s national policy.  
The Brazilian Army sought just enough training to understand American 
counterinsurgency. It did not seek to adopt it. A similar dynamic affected American 
efforts to increase Brazilian participation in U.S. Army military intelligence courses in 
the Canal Zone. “These courses have been repeatedly offered to the Brazilian Army,” 
American Army officers wrote, “[b]ut have been turned down based on the host country 
evaluation that local training parallels or exceeds training offered at the [U.S. Army 
Caribbean School] course.” The same January 1963 report from Brazil also mentioned 
that spaces in U.S. Army military intelligence courses were “placed in lower priority in 
[the] Brazilian Army Training budget in favor of maintenance training requirements.”60 
The Brazilian Army sought American training only for those technical skills it did not 
already possess. It did not need or want a large infusion of U.S. counterinsurgency 
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training because it had already developed its own “Contra-Revolucionario” doctrine, 
which it considered superior to American counterinsurgency.  
The Brazilian Army was reluctant to accept American military training or advice 
during the 1960s, but jungle training was a notable exception to this rule. General 
Andrew P. O'Meara, the commander of U. S. Southern Command in Panama, visited 
Brazil in early 1964. During the trip Brazilian Army leaders asked for American 
assistance in their efforts to establish a jungle school. “In conjunction with General 
O’Meara’s visit to Brazil earlier this year,” American staff officers in Panama wrote, “a 
request was made for training of Brazilians in jungle warfare for the purpose of preparing 
cadre for a planned Brazilian Jungle Warfare School.”61 The Brazilian generals clearly 
intended to model their new school on the U.S. Army Jungle Warfare Training Center in 
the Panama Canal Zone.62 The United States funded the training for the Brazilians, but 
because it was not a budgeted request (i.e. planned a year in advance) American officers 
in Panama had to delay the course from June until August 1964. Eleven Brazilian officers 
and twelve enlisted men arrived in Panama in early August to begin their training, but 
this was not an ordinary event.  
The American instructors tailored the course to meet the needs of their students. 
The Brazilians received three weeks of instruction at a time when the standard course was 
just two weeks in duration. Presumably, the American instructors spent much of that 
extra time on curriculum development, instructor preparation, and teaching methods. In 
mid-1964, the jungle warfare course focused on “teaching men to fight under jungle 
conditions,” U.S. Army South Historian Hugh Gardner explains. “Subjects presented 
                                               
61 U.S. Army South (hereafter cited as USARSO), “Weekly Staff Conference,” dated 7 August 1964, 
NAAFC.  




included escape and evasion techniques, jungle firing, communications, navigation, 
tactical and logistical operations … Although a few basic elements of survival were 
taught, this phase was incidental to the combat training.”63 The course also covered 
small-unit patrolling, ambushes and other combat skills. However, counterinsurgency 
tactics were not yet a part of the curriculum in 1964.  
Language also made the course different for the American jungle school cadre. 
They normally conducted their courses in Spanish, so “consequently the School of the 
Americas requested the help of Portuguese-speaking personnel from the Special Action 
Force.” “As a result of this request,” Special Action Force historians noted, “selected 
personnel conducted the course completely in Portuguese and did such a successful job 
that when the Brazilian contingent finished they were able to return home and organize 
their own school in the Amazon basin.”64 Special Action Force unit historical reports 
support this assessment of the success of the Portuguese language jungle warfare course. 
The Brazilians required no further U.S. Army assistance with jungle training after 1964.  
Language was an obstacle to military training between the United States and 
Brazil, although not an insurmountable one. The Brazilian Army did send students to 
U.S. Army schools in Panama and Fort Bragg, North Carolina as noted above. The jungle 
school course in 1964 demonstrates that American trainers in the Canal Zone had the 
ability to successfully conduct courses in Portuguese when requested by the Brazilians. 
The Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg also worked to ameliorate language problems 
in its curriculum. By 1965, the school offered “simultaneous interpretation in French and 
Spanish for all resident instruction received by foreign officers.” However, the small 
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number of Portuguese-speaking students taking courses there precluded a heavy focus on 
that language. “Most all Portuguese speaking officers also use the Spanish translation,” 
American officials noted.65 Nevertheless, Brazil also had the option of sending English 
speaking students to American courses throughout the 1960s. Likewise, the Special 
Action Force deployed multiple Portuguese-speaking mobile training teams to Brazil 
between 1965 and 1970.  
The greatest barriers to Brazilian acceptance of American counterinsurgency 
doctrine were timing and nationalism. The Brazilian Army, and its generals that ruled the 
country after 1964, simply did not need or want American internal security assistance. 
They had developed and implemented their own National Security Doctrine to guide the 
nation and “Contra-Revolucionario” tactics to deal with insurgencies before American 
counterinsurgency came into being. Major General George S. Beatty, the commander of 
the Joint U.S.-Brazilian Military Commission, summed up the situation in 1971.  In 
testimony in front of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs 
(commonly known as the Church committee, for its Chairman Senator Frank Church), 
Beatty responded to series of questions about American internal security assistance to 
Brazil. “[O]ne of your jobs is to counsel on the strategy and tactics for dealing with the 
threat,” a committee member asked. “What advice have you given or do you give the 
Brazilians for dealing with the threat to their internal security?” “Not a bit; none,” 
General Beatty explained, “because they don’t ask.”66  
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Two additional factors support the conclusion that the Brazilian Army relied on 
its own “Contra-Revolucionario” concepts and tactics during the 1960s. First, unlike 
Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia, Brazilian authorities did not request American 
military assistance when confronting rural or urban insurgencies. Second, the way that 
Brazilian forces responded to those insurgences showed a marked difference from 
American counterinsurgency tactics as applied by other Latin American armies of the 
time.  
CONTRA REVOLUCIONARIO IN BRAZIL: RURAL FOCO ATTEMPTS IN THE 1960S 
The first Cuban-inspired guerrilla foco in Brazil began in 1961. The roots of this 
initial rural insurgency effort grew out of the widespread poverty and inequality of 
Brazil’s sugar zone in the northeast. The guerrilla foco was an offshoot of the Peasant 
League organizations formed there in the late 1950s. “Northeastern Brazil, an area of 
970,000 square miles with a population of 22,000,000,” CIA analysts explained, “is 
rivaled in Latin America as a depressed area only by Bolivia and Haiti.  Per capita 
income is estimated at less than $100 annually, one third of the average for Brazil as a 
whole.”67 The area’s problems, and its potential for revolution, first gained the attention 
of American journalists in late 1960. “Northeast Brazil Poverty Breeds Threat of Revolt,” 
warned a page one headline in the New York Times on 31 October. Tad Szulc, author of 
the article, based his reporting on extensive travel and numerous interviews in the sugar 
zone. “The Northeast will go Communist,” a local Brazilian official told Szulc, “and you 
will have a situation ten times worse than in Cuba – if something is not done. If the 
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Brazilian Northeast is lost to you Americans the Cuban revolution will have been a picnic 
by comparison.”68  
By 1961, U.S. policymakers were also taking note of the Peasant Leagues and the 
potential for revolution in the sugar zone. “The Communist Party (PCB) and its pro-
Castro allies will probably be able to keep the poor, rural northeast in ferment,” CIA 
analysts explained. “There, the 25,000-member Peasant Leagues, led by pro-Communist, 
pro-Castro Francisco Julião, have become a powerful force for social agitation among the 
rural laborers and tenant farmers.”69 In July 1961, President John F. Kennedy met with 
Brazilian economist Celso Furtado, the director of the Superintendency for the 
Development of the Northeast (SUDENE).  During their meeting Kennedy told Furtado 
that, “he had become aware of the problems of the Northeast which were now a matter of 
great interest and understanding in the [United States].”70 American policymakers sought 
to defuse the revolutionary potential of the Peasant Leagues through development 
programs and aid under the Alliance for Progress. They also partnered with Furtado and 
SUDENE as a means to implement their projects. However, despite dire warnings and 
inflammatory rhetoric, the Peasant Leagues proved to have little revolutionary potential.  
Francisco Julião sought to organize the Peasant Leagues into a political base, not 
a guerrilla army. Julião was a lawyer, like Fidel Castro, but unlike his Cuban benefactor, 
Julião harbored no aspirations to become a guerrilla revolutionary. However, his 
principal lieutenant did. It was Clodomir dos Santos Moraes who established the first 
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armed foco in Brazil. Yet rather than seeking to implant a guerrilla cell in the Peasant 
League strongholds of the northeast, Moraes inexplicably choose the town of Dianópolis 
in the state of Goiás – some 1,700 kilometers from Recife (See Figure 5). Several 
Northeasterners bought farms in the area in late 1961 with the announced plan of raising 
cattle and growing grains. Moraes then began recruiting would-be guerrillas, most of 
them students from São Paulo. “The young guerrillas-to-be collected small arms and 
trained on long marches throughout the countryside,” one historian notes. “They also 
tried, without much success, to enlist the local peasants.” As their Venezuelan 
counterparts later discovered, school boys often made poor guerrillas. Moraes soon 
learned this for himself. “The expenses of the training camps soared as a result of the 
insistence of these young people on complementing the sparse guerrilla diet with a steady 
supply of cookies, jellies, and canned food,” Moraes later complained. “In addition, they 
maintained they were entitled to weekly visits to the prostitutes of the neighboring 
villages…”71  
This first foco attempt in Brazil was short-lived. A proclivity for the local ladies 
was not the guerilla trainees’ only vice; they also talked too much.  Besides proselytizing 
among the local peasants, “[i]n São Paulo students talked freely about the camp,” one 
historian notes, “and some even visited Dianópolis on a lark as part-time guerrillas.”72 In 
late November 1962, the Brazilian authorities raided the camp, arrested several of the 
student guerrillas, and captured a few weapons. The Rio de Janeiro state police caught 
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Moraes in December and quickly put him in prison. The whole episode lasted just one 
year and never became a challenge to the Brazilian security forces.73  
The perceived menace of the Peasant Leagues was also fleeting. Under pressure 
from the Catholic Church, the Communist Party, and others to gain the peasants’ loyalty, 
the Leagues began to fracture in 1963. By the time of the military coup d’état in April 
1964, the Peasant Leagues crumbled. Their leaders chose not to resist the Brazilian 
Army’s seizure of the government. “In the course of a single day,” historian Joseph Page 
recounts, “a movement which had begun in the 1950s and had been threatening to alter 
the balance of political and economic power in the most important state of Northeast 
Brazil collapsed like a house of cards.”74 The military authorities, however, were not 
convinced that the threat was over. “The repression was most severe in the Northeast” 
after the coup, one historian notes, “where the Fourth Army and state and local police 
cracked down on the peasant leagues… Some peasant organizers simply disappeared, the 
victims of summary executions. Others suffered torture, usually at the hands of the 
Fourth Army.”75 
The conditions that made insurgency possible did not end when the military took 
power, despite the initial repression. “There is no active guerrilla movement in Brazil,” 
State Department analysts judged in November 1964. They continued, 
A number of reports state that Leonel Brizola, a former Federal Deputy 
from Guanabara State now in exile in Uruguay, is trying to recruit more 
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guerrillas in the hope of organizing an effective force. However, the 
military and police seem to be well informed about the plotting of Brizola 
and his followers. Moreover, the situation in Brazil, held in check as it is 
by the revolutionary government of President Castello Branco, offers little 
to encourage would-be guerrillas.76  
Although there was no active guerrilla threat, American military training with 
Brazil did increase after the 1964 coup d’état, but not dramatically. The first event took 
place not in Brazil, but in the jungles of Panama. As described above, the Special Action 
Force taught a Portuguese language version of the U.S. Army jungle warfare course to a 
group of twenty-three Brazilians in August 1964. The American Green Berets undertook 
their first mobile training team missions to Brazil the following year. The Special Action 
Force conducted eight visits in 1965, but only two of them focused on internal security. 
Early in the year the Americans deployed a counterinsurgency survey team to assess 
Brazilian capabilities and coordinate plans for future missions. Yet rather than developing 
a plan to establish a comprehensive counterinsurgency program across multiple army 
units as had been the case in Venezuela, Colombia, and Bolivia, the initial American 
internal security survey visit and follow-on training in Brazil focused on just one 
organization.  
The Brazilian Army only accepted American counterinsurgency instruction for its 
Airborne (parachute) Brigade in Rio de Janeiro. The Special Action Force conducted 
several training missions with this unit, three of them listed as counterinsurgency. 
However, it appears that much of the Brazilian’s interest lay in improving their military 
parachuting skills, not learning American internal security doctrine and tactics. After the 
initial counterinsurgency survey mission of early 1965, the Green Berets returned twice 
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more to teach airborne operations and freefall parachuting techniques to the Brazilian 
Airborne Brigade. These missions followed the same pattern of Brazil’s attendance at 
U.S. Army schools. The Brazilian Army sought and accepted courses and instructor visits 
related to technical skills it needed, in this case military parachuting, it was mostly 
indifferent to American counterinsurgency training. The Special Action Force conducted 
several other technical skills mobile training team missions in 1965. They taught two 
courses on marksmanship, as well as instructing other Brazilian Army units on 
intelligence, interpreter, and ordinance subjects.  The Green Berets completed a total of 
eight missions to Brazil in 1965. It was the high water mark of their interaction with that 
army.  
The Special Action Force undertook six mobile training team missions in Brazil 
during 1966, but only one related to counterinsurgency. Five Green Beret instructors 
visited the Brazilian Airborne Brigade during May and June. The Americans trained 
seven officers and twenty-three soldiers in techniques of airborne resupply, “personnel 
parachute drops, landing zone and drop zone preparation, ambushes, raids, and 
counterinsurgency techniques.” “The final field training exercise,” the Special Action 
Force historians noted, “included a guerrilla and counter-guerrilla force with airborne 
operations for personnel and supply.” The American team judged its mission “highly 
successful, but recommended more practical work in these types of operations on the part 
of the Brazilians.”77 The Green Berets conducted some counterinsurgency training with 
the Brazilian paratroopers during this mission, but much of their efforts related to 
teaching the skills required to execute airborne operations.  
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The Special Action Force undertook five additional mobile training missions in 
Brazil during 1966, all of them focused on technical skills. The courses taught included 
signal (radio operations and maintenance), logistics (repair parts control and inventory), 
and intelligence subjects. Language was not a barrier for the Green Berets on these 
missions to Brazil.  For example, the officers conducting the logistics mobile training 
team “will lecture in Portuguese,” the Southern Command News explained, “and discuss 
engineer, ordnance, and signal supply using slides charts, supply manuals and tests as 
teaching aids.”78 The American officers of that team spent twelve weeks in Brazil giving 
classes in Rio de Janeiro, Vacaria in Rio Grande do Sul state, and João Pessoa in Paraiba 
state. All went well with the two units in the south, but the Brazilians in the northeast did 
not appreciate being lectured to by Americans. The team reported “a lack of enthusiasm 
in their instruction” among the students of the 1st Engineer Battalion in João Pessoa, “as 
well as apparent anti-American feelings.”79 
The final two visits to Brazil in 1966 supported civic action. “[A]t the request of 
the Brazilian government,” Captain Leo Rutter and Sergeant First Class James Varnes 
spent six weeks aiding “in the construction of a new rail line between Puerto Alegre and 
Brasilia,”  the Southern Command News reported.80 This two-man team trained eighteen 
officers, twenty-eight enlisted troops, and fifty-seven civilians employed by the Brazilian 
Army during their stay. The second team of two Green Beret non-commissioned officers 
taught the operation and maintenance of rock crushing machinery near the city of Natal. 
The American sergeants trained five officers, fifteen enlisted men and ten army civilians 
at the site. “The rock crushing plant [machinery] was in poor condition,” the team 
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reported, but in spite of this they were “able to instruct the personnel in nearly all aspects 
of operations and maintenance of the plant machinery.”81  
These two visits highlight the uniqueness of American civic action assistance to 
Brazil. Special Action Force civic action missions to Brazil supported mainly engineer 
construction units. The Brazilian Army’s most intensive civic action efforts during the 
1960s supported infrastructure development, mainly road and railway construction. Army 
engineer units in the Northeast engaged in “the construction of highways, railroads, dams 
and catch basins, irrigation works, municipal water supply systems, [and] well-digging 
projects,” U.S. Army officers reported in 1963. Meanwhile, engineer units in the South 
engaged in “the construction of the main southern railroad trunk line… which will 
eventually link the industrial-commercial complex of São Paulo with the industrial-
agricultural areas of the south and Porto Alegre. The [Brazilian] Army’s mission” the 
Americans reported, “consists of the construction of 622 kilometers of this line plus 
ancillary facilities.”82 
These civic action infrastructure projects contributed to the military government’s 
internal economic development program. They were very similar in objective to Getúlio 
Vargas’ “March to the West” program of the 1930s and 1940s and Juscelino 
Kubitschek’s construction projects of the 1950s. However, in the polarized climate of the 
Cold War, these programs also served another purpose. They enabled the military 
government to ameliorate rural discontent in the Northeast and other areas without 
alienating the landed oligarchy. The Brazilian generals promoted internal colonization of 
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the country’s vast interior, which allowed them to avoid the much thornier issues of land 
reform or redistribution.83  
In most countries in which the United States supported civic action, Washington 
paid the bulk of the costs. That was not the case in Brazil. American military planners 
budgeted slightly less than $15 million U.S. dollars for civic action programs in Brazil 
from 1964 through 1969. They expected the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) to contribute another $7 million. Over the same time period the estimated 
contribution of the Brazilian government was $135 million. In other words, Brazil funded 
some eighty-six percent of the country’s civic action program, while the United States 
contributed about fourteen percent. The numbers were the inverse of civic action 
programs in other South American nations. In Bolivia, for example, the United States 
funded almost ninety percent of the program.84 Of note as well is the fact that military 
construction was only one part of a larger national effort. “The military government 
expended an estimated $7.5 billion in public funds on colonization,” historian Seth 
Garfield notes, “more than half of which went to road building.”85 
Unlike the situation in most other South American countries, the Brazilian Army 
already conducted civic action type missions as part of its Ações Cívico-Sociais (ACISO) 
program. American officers noted “the Brazilian Army[‘s] historical role in civic action,” 
in a report from early 1963. “To varying degrees,” U.S. Army officers explained, “all 
active Brazilian Army units contribute directly or indirectly to the improvement of the 
health of the civilian population.” “In the interior,” the authors continued, “it is an 
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accepted practice for military medical and dental personnel to treat the civilian population 
which, in many cases, would otherwise be without qualified medical assistance.” Army 
formations also conducted literacy programs, provided some vocational training, 
occasional transportation, and food supplements. 86 Army units also assisted in times in 
natural disaster. For example, in 1963 army units operated “pontoon bridges and ferries 
where bridges were washed out by floods in Minas Gerais,” American officers reported. 
Other units established “10 field kitchens and aid stations for several thousand people 
waiting for flood waters to subside.”87 
Meanwhile, in 1966 Brazilian security forces confronted the second wave of 
efforts to establish rural guerrilla focos in the country. The military’s assumption of 
power in 1964 did not end Brazil’s internal security problems; in fact it inadvertently 
created the manpower that supported several attempts at armed revolution. One of the 
important triggers for the military overthrowing the government of João Goulart was his 
efforts to gain support among enlisted military personnel. The commanders of the armed 
forces viewed Goulart’s sympathy for leftist sergeants and sailors as an echo of previous 
Communist attempts to spark subversion within the ranks. Goulart openly supported 
efforts to unionize the ranks and publicly supported the sailors of the naval mutiny of 
March 1964.88 “In addition,” CIA analysts reported on 30 March, Goulart “has given the 
navy men who defied their superiors a promise of no reprisals. This open disregard of 
military discipline has drawn the line between Goulart and military leaders even more 
clearly. There is now a real chance for a direct confrontation between Goulart and his 
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opponents.”89 The CIA analysts were correct in their prediction. The generals ousted 
Goulart the following day.  
After the coup d’état, military commanders swiftly purged the ranks of leftist 
soldiers, sailors, and officers. The authorities imprisoned some of the mutineers, while 
others fled the country. Some cashiered military men sought refuge in Montevideo, 
Uruguay. These men gained the attention of Leonel Brizola, whom the State Department 
had warned of in 1964. Brizola was also living in exile in Montevideo and had continued 
his efforts to foment an armed revolution in Brazil. Brizola was not a Communist, 
although he was an ardent leftist. He also happened to be Goulart’s brother in law. 
Brizola had formerly served as governor of Rio Grande do Sul and as member of the 
Chamber of Deputies. The military purged him after the coup d’état and later revoked his 
political rights for ten years by cassation.90 But that did not end Brizola’s efforts to regain 
political power in Brazil. From exile, he established the Movimento Nacionalista 
Revolucionário (National Revolutionary Movement – MNR) to coordinate insurrectional 
actions against the dictatorship.91  
Brizola sponsored his first attempt to spark an uprising in Brazil in 1965. 
Jefferson Cardim, a former Brazilian Army colonel forced to retire after the 1964 coup, 
led thirty men across the border from Uruguay into Brazil. The men conducted an attack 
on an army base in Rio Grande do Sul state. The rebels “overcame Brigada Militar 
soldiers at Tres Passos, then took over a local radio station and transmitted an anti-
government manifesto,” one historian notes. “Subsequently they clashed with the local 
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police and were finally captured in Paraná, two states north of Rio Grande do Sul.”92 The 
hoped-for uprising never materialized. Despite the failure of Cardim’s raid, Brizola 
remained undeterred.  
Brizola next turned his attention to the more patient foco approach to revolution 
as espoused by Che Guevara. By late 1966, at around the same time that Guevara sought 
to establish his own foco in Bolivia, Brizola was supporting several guerrilla cells, or 
focos, in various parts of Brazil. However, unlike the younger Che, the forty-four year old 
Brizola left the leadership of the guerrilla cells to the former soldiers. He remained in 
Montevideo. Brizola’s guerrilla’s received some Cuban support, but they were not under 
Cuban control or direction. “There are no references in Guevara’s diary,” one historian 
notes, “to the possibility of making contact with Brizola and the Brazilians.”93 
Brizola located his first foco in the southern state of Mato Grosso near the 
Bolivian border.94 The second cell operated in Maranhão state in the Northeast. The men 
of the third foco established their guerrilla base in the Caparaó Mountains between the 
states of Minas Gerais and Espírito Santo (See Figure 5). All three efforts soon 
foundered. “After a week, the Brazilian guerrillas [in Mato Grosso] had to give up” 
historian Richard Gott notes. “They had contracted bubonic plague and were forced to 
surrender.”95 Meanwhile, the fifteen men Brizola dispatched to establish a foco in 
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southern Maranhão state opened a six hundred meter airstrip in anticipation of receiving 
an aircraft load of weapons from Guyana. Yet the plane never arrived.96  
Ex-sergeant Felipe Amadeu da Luz led the third guerrilla foco. He located his cell 
in the Caparaó Mountains, some four hundred kilometers northeast of Rio de Janeiro. 
Brizola and the sergeants hoped that Brazil’s highest mountain range would be remote 
enough to avoid early detection by the security forces. Amadeu and thirteen guerrillas 
ascended the mountains in November 1966. The foco later grew to twenty-two 
revolutionaries: thirteen former military men (including a former captain) and five 
civilians. Of the group, only four had received guerrilla training in Cuba. The rest relied 
on their previous military training or, in the case of the civilians, what they learned from 
the others in the forest.97  
The Caparaó foco collapsed in early 1967. The Brazilian Army captured two ex-
sergeants who were members of the guerrilla cell on 23 March. It was the same day that 
Che Guevara executed the ill-fated ambush against the Bolivian Army that alerted them 
to presence of armed guerrillas in that country. The Brazilian First Army, acting on 
information gleaned in Rio de Janeiro, had increased its surveillance in the Caparaó 
region. It located and detained the two former sergeants in a barbershop in the village of 
Espera Feliz. The luckless guerrillas had missed the train to Rio and were killing time 
waiting on a bus. It was the beginning of the end.  “Caparaó crumbled within a week,” 
Brazilian historian Elio Gaspari writes, “without having fired a shot and without a single 
contact with the inhabitants of the region.” A few days later, a state military police 
                                               
96 Elio Gaspari, A Ditadura Envergonhada (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2002), 201-202.  




corporal leading a patrol captured another eight guerrillas. “One of them, according to his 
jailers, had the first symptoms of bubonic plague.”98  
Figure 5: Brazil Political Boundaries and Guerrilla Locations Map.99  
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Despite the success of the security forces in capturing the guerrillas using a small 
scale approach, the Brazilian Army and Air Force decided to flex their muscles. They 
mounted a large joint operation in April to apprehend the few remaining revolutionaries. 
The Air Force used helicopters to search for the guerrillas by air, while the Army 
established a camp “in the middle of the mountain.” However, the infantrymen from 
coastal Rio de Janeiro were ill-equipped for the high altitude and rugged terrain of the 
Caparaó Mountains. Many of the troops deployed for counter-guerrilla operations still 
wearing their stiff parade boots. “Before they were issued tennis shoes,” Elio Gaspari 
claims, “more than sixty soldiers went to the infirmary” with “flayed feet.”100 
Nevertheless, on 16 April the Army captured another five guerrillas fleeing the 
mountains, including the foco commander Amadeu. After the collapse of Caparaó, 
Brizola reportedly gave up on guerrilla insurgency as a means for achieving revolution in 
Brazil.101  
Brazil’s generals did not request American internal security assistance as they 
confronted the rural insurgencies of 1967. The Special Action Force, the U.S. Army’s 
premier counterinsurgency experts Latin America and its only group of Portuguese-
speaking instructors, conducted only three mobile training team missions to Brazil in 
1967. None of them taught counterinsurgency. The Green Berets made no visits to Brazil 
in 1968 or 1969. By that time the Brazilian security forces were facing a new threat – 
urban terrorism.  
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CONTRA REVOLUCIONARIO IN BRAZIL: CONFRONTING THE URBAN TERRORISTS 
The death of Che Guevara in October 1967 discredited his foco theory of rural 
insurgency. However, it did not end leftist radicals’ dreams of sparking revolutions to 
“liberate” their countries. Instead, other took up the banner and shifted to battleground 
from the countryside to the cities. Urban terrorists in South America “have stolen 
millions of dollars,” CIA analysts noted, “ransacked arms depots, engaged in various 
kinds of sabotage, and murdered local and foreign officials.”102 Urban guerrillas first took 
up arms in Brazil in mid-1968. They conducted bombings and assassinations as well as 
bank robberies and kidnappings to fund their operations.103 Although numerous groups 
played a role, two organizations stood out as among the most dangerous. One sprang 
from the Communist Party. The other, oddly, had links to the Brazilian Army.  
Urban terrorism in Brazil began in part by way of a side trip to Cuba. Fidel Castro 
hosted the inaugural meeting of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS) in 
August 1967 in an effort to unite the Left. The Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), 
following the official Soviet line that the only true path to revolution lay through a 
workers movement, boycotted the conference. The PCB’s unwillingness to take up arms 
against the dictatorship frustrated its more radical members. One of them was Carlos 
Marighella. In defiance of the party, Marighella attended the OLAS conference and the 
PCB expelled him for his disobedience. Marighella was a committed communist, he had 
been a member of Brazilian Communist Party since the 1930s, but after 1964 he found 
himself increasingly at odds with his comrades over the issue of taking up arms against 
the dictatorship. Marighella traveled to Havana in July 1967 to consider other options. 
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The OLAS conference ended on 10 August, but Marighella remained in Cuba until 
December refining his theories and developing a revolutionary strategy for Brazil.104 
Shortly after his return from Cuba, Marighella formed his own movement in São 
Paulo to begin the armed struggle. Marighella’s Ação Libertadora Nacional (National 
Liberation Action - ALN), which operated in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, took its first 
armed actions in 1968 –many of them bank robberies to finance the group. Marighella 
also availed himself of Cuban support. Between 1967 and 1970, the ALN sent ninety-two 
guerrillas to the island. Fidel’s trainers instructed them in “marksmanship, explosives 
formulas, weapons assembly and disassembly.” “There was also, at the end of the 
course,” a Brazilian researcher notes, “a survival exercise including simulated combat 
with Cuban army.”105 “Havana offered Marighella arms and financial assistance,” 
analysts of the CIA judged, however, “he apparently did not want to commit his 
organization to outside influence or direction.”106 Brazilian revolutionaries could be just 
as nationalistic as their military adversaries. 
Many Ação Libertadora Nacional insurgents may have learned their guerrilla 
warfare skills in Cuba, but the theory guiding them was a product of Brazil. Carlos 
Marighella became one of the leading theorists of urban terrorism in South America. 
Marighella converted Guevara’s rural foco theory into an urban guerrilla strategy more 
suited to the changing social demographics in South America. “Latin America has been 
urbanizing at accelerating rates,” CIA analysts explained in a 1971 report. “In 1940 there 
were five Latin American cities with more than a million inhabitants; in 1960 there were 
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nine. It is estimated that today there are 17.”107 Marighella emphasized a war of urban 
movement instead of fixed rural focos, which the failure of earlier attempts in Brazil, 
Bolivia, Argentina, and Peru had shown were vulnerable to early detection and 
destruction by the security forces.  
Marighella rejected Che Guevara’s prescription for beginning the revolution in 
the countryside, but the Brazilian’s tactics were no less violent than those of the 
Argentine Che. “In Brazil, the number of violent actions carried out by urban guerrillas, 
including executions, explosions, seizures of weapons, ammunition and explosives, 
assaults on banks and prisons, etc…” Marighella wrote, “is significant enough to leave no 
room for doubt as to the actual aim of the revolutionaries; all are witness to the fact that 
we are in a full revolutionary war and that this war can be waged only by violent 
means.”108 Marighella compiled his urban guerrilla strategy and tactics in the 
Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla. Although not published openly until after his death, 
the Minimanual was influential in Brazil and across the region. “Marighella,” CIA 
analysts later wrote, “has replaced both Guevara and [Régis] Debray as the primary 
theoretician of violent revolution in the hemisphere.”109  
However, even Marighella could not escape the siren song of the guerrilla foco. 
Instead, he altered the sequence. The revolution would begin in the cities with urban 
terrorism, according to Marighella, then transition to rural guerrilla warfare. He 
envisioned that the ongoing rebellion in the cities would tie down the security forces and 
                                               
107 CIA, “The Latin American Guerrilla Today,” 5. 
108 Carlos Marighella, Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla (Montreal: Abraham Guillen Press, 2002), 7.  
109 CIA, “The Latin American Guerrilla Today,” dated 22 January 1971, 2. Régis Debray, a Frenchman, 
elaborated on the foco theory of revolutionary warfare based on Che Guevara’s strategies in Revolution in 
the Revolution? (1967). See for example, Paul J. Dosal, Comandante Che: Guerrilla, Soldier, Commander, 




allow the rural movement to develop into a revolutionary army.110 Yet Marighella still 
organized the ALN into a series of small urban cells that closely resembled Guevara’s 
focos. Other Brazilian insurgent groups also followed Marighella’s urban first, rural 
second guerrilla warfare strategy.  
Other São Paulo radicals formed the second major group urban terrorist group that 
plagued Brazil. The Vanguarda Popular Revolucionária (Popular Revolutionary 
Vanguard –VPR) also began its armed actions in 1968. The VPR often competed with the 
ALN to see which group could carry out the most spectacular attacks. The VPR attacked 
an army hospital in São Paulo in June 1968 and stole a cache of weapons. When the 
Second Army commander complained, “They attacked a hospital! Let’s see them attack 
my barracks!” the guerrillas truck bombed his headquarters. That October, VPR 
guerrillas kidnapped and executed U.S. Army Captain Charles Chandler in São Paulo. 
The situation worsened in January 1969 when Brazilian Army Captain Carlos Lamarca 
“defected to the VPR with three sergeants and a truckload of weapons.” Lamarca was an 
expert marksman and turned his talents to training his new guerrilla comrades.111 He also 
quickly became the leader of the organization.  
The growing urban insurgencies of 1967 and 1968 embarrassed the Brazilian 
government. “Washington was alarmed” after Chandler’s assassination, Thomas 
Skidmore explained, “and assigned its deputy chief Public Safety Officer in Brazil to 
work full-time with the Brazilian authorities investigating” the case.112 However, the 
Brazilian generals ruling the country did not request American military assistance in 
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confronting the new urban terrorism threat. The Special Action Force conducted their 
final counterinsurgency training mission in Brazil in 1966. Brazilian authorities were 
willing to accept American help in investigating specific guerrilla crimes when pressured 
by Washington, but they employed their own doctrine and tactics for defeating urban 
insurgency.  
For its part, the U.S. Army had little to offer Brazil in the way of urban 
counterinsurgency doctrine during the late 1960s. Throughout the decade the American 
Army focused its attention on countering rural insurgencies in mountains and jungles, 
where it expected guerrillas to operate, not urban terrorism in the cities. “Areas of rugged 
or inaccessible terrain, such as mountains, forests, jungles, and swamps, are extremely 
difficult to control,” the U.S. Army declared in Operations Against Irregular Forces 
(Field Manual 31-15 published in 1961), “and the guerrilla elements of an irregular force 
are most likely to flourish in such areas.” The manual recognized the possibility of 
limited guerrilla operations in urban areas, but envisioned responding to such actions as a 
matter for the local police or a short-term military action that would allow the quick 
return of forces to the main struggle in the countryside.113 
The U.S. Army’s rural-centric view of insurgency persisted in the late-1960s. In 
an update to the 1967 edition of Counterguerrilla Operations (published in 1969), Army 
doctrine writers devoted new attention to “Operations in Built-Up Areas,” but maintained 
their interpretation of guerrilla operations in urban areas as a secondary effort. “Built-up 
areas usually are unfavorable for guerrilla force operations,” the authors definitively 
explained. “Guerrillas normally will not choose to fight in these areas; however, 
underground elements in cities and towns may incite organized rioting, seize portions of 
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urban areas, erect barricades, and resist attempts of counterguerrilla forces to enter the 
area.”114 
Although Brazilian security forces had been confronting urban terrorism since 
1968, the Special Action Force did not conduct its first urban counterinsurgency training 
mission until several years later. The Green Berets executed their first “urban guerrilla 
warfare” mobile training team mission in the Dominican Republic in April 1970. The 
unit’s historical report underscores the U.S. Army’s lack of preparedness for this new 
threat. “As urban guerrilla warfare is a relatively new field, and of ever increasing 
importance in Latin America of the 1970s,” unit historians commented, “CPT Dixon’s 
team had to spend extra time in preparation, studying all available doctrine and writings 
on the subject.”115 In other words, Captain Dixon and his men developed their own 
doctrine and training program for “urban guerrilla warfare.”  
The U.S. Army was not alone in its lack of experience in confronting urban 
terrorism. Few armies had faced an insurgency rooted in the cities. However, one army 
did claim a record of “victory” against just such an enemy – the French army in the 
“Battle of Algiers” in 1957. French forces first confronted an insurgency in Algeria in 
1954. Two years later the revolutionaries of the National Liberation Front (Front de 
Libération Nationale –FLN) shifted their focus to the capital city of Algiers. FLN 
terrorists executed strikes, indiscriminate bombings, and random assassinations in an 
attempt to undermine French authority, generate public support, and garner international 
publicity.116  
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The French responded by conducting military operations heavily influenced by 
revolutionary war theory.117 Several French officers who fought in Algeria, including one 
with direct participation in the “Battle of Algiers,” later incorporated their experiences 
into treatises on the conduct of counter revolutionary warfare.118 The publication of these 
works, especially Roger Trinquier’s Modern Warfare, made French urban counter 
terrorist tactics available to Latin American military audiences. Brazilian strategists of the 
Escola Superior de Guerra had based much of their internal security doctrine on French 
revolutionary war theory during the late 1950s. As they faced growing urban terrorism in 
the late 1960s, they again looked to the French army for inspiration. Among French 
tactical innovations in Algiers two elements stand out: the creation of specialized 
intelligence organizations and the use of terror, through mass arrests, disappearances, and 
torture to intimidate the population. Brazilian security forces defeated the urban terrorists 
of the late 1960s by emulating these repressive tactics developed by the French Army 
during the “Battle of Algiers.”  
As the terrorists increased their attacks in 1969, the Brazilian security forces 
responded by ratcheting up their repression. The Brazilian generals did not blithely copy 
all of the French Army’s tactics in Algeria; they adapted French techniques to meet their 
needs. However, the similarities are striking. “In June 1969 the São Paulo police and 
military introduced a new repressive technique,” historian Thomas Skidmore explains, 
“the massive dragnet, which detained thousands, all of whose identity papers were 
checked. The innocent were intimidated, while the guerrillas now had to be much more 
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cautious when moving about.”119 The French employed similar tactics during the “Battle 
of Algiers” in 1957. “[T]he Muslim sectors of Algiers were completely sealed off from 
the city at large,” one historian notes. “To leave or to enter the Casbah… its inhabitants 
had to show their identification papers at police checkpoints manned by soldiers.”120 
However, checkpoints in Algeria and dragnets in Brazil served as more than just a 
mechanism to arrest guerrillas, they were the precursor to torture.   
French counter terrorism officers in Algeria believed that conventional police and 
military forces were not well-suited to confront armed clandestine groups. Therefore, the 
French reorganized their police and military structures to create new, specialized 
intelligence organizations to defeat the urban terrorists. It was these new organizations 
that institutionalized the use of torture to extract intelligence. French General Jacques 
Massu’s Tenth Parachute Division took charge of the Battle of Algiers in January 1957. 
Massu immediately reorganized the division’s intelligence wing to form the Centre de 
Coordination Interarmées (Interservice Coordinating Center - CCI) to better synchronize 
intelligence information. He also established new Dispositif Opérationel de Protection 
(Operational Protection Detachment - DOP) units to gather intelligence. The DOPs, 
Massu later admitted, “specialized in interrogation of suspects who did not want to say 
anything.”121  
Meanwhile, the French also created a second “parallel staff” with responsibilities 
for interrogations and executions. Lieutenant Colonel Roger Trinquier led a secret group 
that specialized in intelligence gathering and interrogation. Suspects that resisted 
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interrogations by the regular military units or the police found themselves handed over to 
the DOPs or to Trinquier’s group. Although most low-level suspects were imprisoned 
and a few released, those identified as important Front de Libération Nationale members 
or as bombers met a different fate.122 Commandant Paul Aussaresses led a second 
clandestine unit that specialized in what he called “action implementation.” Aussaresses 
and his men tortured their victims to extract information that helped them unravel the 
FLN organization, but they also executed most of the captives passed to his unit. “We 
would hold on to the others who were either positively dangerous, or thought to be so,” 
Aussaresses later explained, “and make them talk quickly before executing them.” The 
“action implementation” group established its operations in a remote villa outside 
Algiers. “The mere fact that they were at the villa de Tourelles,” Aussaresses noted, 
“meant they were considered so dangerous that they were not to get out of there alive. 
These were men who had directly participated in deadly attacks.”123 
Brazilian authorities also implemented an elaborate institutional apparatus for 
intelligence gathering. São Paulo police and military officers created the first joint 
clandestine intelligence organization, Operaçao Bandeirantes (OBAN), in early 1969. 
Later that same year, Marighella’s Ação Libertadora Nacional executed its most 
spectacular operation. On 4 September 1969, the group kidnaped U.S. Ambassador Burke 
Elbrick. The ALN, and its partner group the MR-8 (Movimento Revolucionário-8 named 
for the date of Che Guevara’s capture on 8 October 1967), blackmailed the Brazilian 
government and demanded the release of several notorious urban guerrillas in exchange 
for the ambassador’s life. Elbrick “was released unharmed,” CIA analysts reported, 
                                               
122 Cradock and Smith, “No Fixed Values,” 87; Paul Aussaresses, The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and 
Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957 (New York: Enigma Books, 2002), 119.  
123 Commandant is a French rank equivalent to Major. Cradock and Smith, “No Fixed Values,” 86-7; 




“when 15 terrorists were flown to Mexico. Most of them went on to Cuba, where they 
were greeted by Fidel Castro.”124 The kidnapping was a propaganda victory and the 
insurgents secured the release of several of their comrades. However, this action soon 
cost the ALN dearly.  
The Elbrick abduction triggered a massive expansion in the Brazilian intelligence 
apparatus. State and local police, as well as each military service, already had functioning 
intelligence organizations before the military took control of the government. However, 
shortly after the coup d’état the generals created a new National Intelligence Service 
(Serviço Nacional de Informações - SNI). In 1967, the Army expanded its intelligence 
capability and established the Centro de Informações do Exército, or CIE. In late 1969, in 
part due to the Elbrick kidnapping, military authorities greatly enlarged the intelligence 
system. They also began creating “parallel structures” like those employed by the French 
in Algiers and recommended by Trinquier in Modern Warfare.125 The generals created 
new Comandos Operacional de Defense Interna (Operational Commands for Internal 
Defense – CODI) in each military region. These joint military-police organizations 
served an intelligence sharing and coordination role similar to the French Centre de 
Coordination Interarmées (CCI) used in Algiers. Each CODI ostensibly controlled a 
series of local Destacamentos de Operaçaoes Internas (Internal Operations Detachments –
DOIs). These units were a “’strike force’ of military and police,” historian Thomas 
Skidmore notes, “all operating in plain clothes.”126 The purpose of the Destacamentos de 
Operaçaoes Internas “was to provide operational autonomy to the entities responsible for 
intelligence gathering, conducting stake-outs and other actions, and capturing and 
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interrogating ‘terrorists.’” These organizations closely resembled the French Dispositif 
Opérationel de Protection (DOPs), but they also combined some of the functions of the 
units led by Trinquier and Aussaresses.127 These “parallel structures” served to obscure 
responsibility for the organizations that employed torture and conducted executions. They 
existed outside normal police and military organizations and operated with a high degree 
of autonomy.   
French officers created specialized intelligence units and used them to attack the 
urban terrorist’s “armed clandestine organization.”128  The purpose of harsh 
interrogations – including the use of torture – was to quickly gather time-sensitive 
intelligence. “In the absence of spontaneous information,” historian Martha Crenshaw 
explains, “the French army resorted to brutal interrogation methods to extract information 
about the FLN. The recommended practice was to obtain information from suspects as 
rapidly as possible, through the use of torture if necessary, and to exploit such 
intelligence immediately, regardless of any standards of legality.” Captured FLN 
members “would talk quickly,” Aussaresses later dryly commented, “or never.”129 
The same need for intelligence to attack “armed clandestine organizations” also 
drove the use of torture in Brazil. “Despite the guerrillas’ best efforts to guard their 
secrets,” one historian notes, “there was almost always some clue – a nickname, an 
address, a code word – the interrogators could extract. With the scrap (and sometime 
more) the police and military would leap into action, dragging in new suspects to be 
beaten and given electric shocks in the hunt for clues.”130 Extracting information under 
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torture and exploiting it immediately also worked in the aftermath of mass arrests, 
whether in Algiers in 1957 or São Paulo in 1969. In response to U.S. Ambassador 
Elbrick’s kidnapping, “the security forces carried out a truly massive crackdown,” 
historian Anthony James Joes explains, “a great dragnet resulted in thirty-two thousand 
arrests. Information extracted from captured guerrillas in this operation revealed the 
whereabouts of Marighella himself, who was shot dead on the streets of São Paulo on 
November 4, 1969.”131  
Brazil’s urban terrorists attempted to mitigate the consequences of interrogations 
and torture.  The guerrillas “had a pact that, once captured, a prisoner must withhold vital 
information for 24 hours,” Thomas Skidmore recounts. “Thereafter, his or her comrades 
would have abandoned all of the prisoner’s known addresses and contacts, thereby 
making a confession harmless.” But the security forces soon developed a counter tactic. 
“They made the first day’s interrogation relentless,” Skidmore continues. “It was an 
assault that few prisoners could withstand – electric shocks, beatings, near-drownings, 
mock executions, and forced viewing of the torture of friends or family.”132 
State-directed terror also served a second purpose – it was a brutal form of 
population control. The French Army employed harsh tactics in Algeria, but the target 
was not French citizens. Instead it was France’s de facto colonial subjects, the vast 
majority of them native Algerian Muslims, who suffered from the intimidation, tortures, 
disappearances and murders executed by the security forces. “[T]orture was not only a 
means of obtaining intelligence,” one researcher notes, “but also a way of terrorizing 
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Algerians and making the cost of aiding the FLN greater than the risks of refusing to do 
so.”133  
Brazilian generals unleashed many of these same harsh tactics against their own 
citizens in the late 1960s. They employed state-directed terror, not against an overseas 
department or foreign colony, but within their own national territory. Torture, mass 
arrests, and executions by the Brazilian security forces had decimated the urban guerrilla 
organizations by 1970. “Terrorist capabilities appear to have declined during 1970,” CIA 
analysts observed, “as police became more effective in apprehending and killing 
important guerrilla leaders as well as a significant number of militants.”134 These brutal 
methods also served to intimidate Brazilian society. Torture “became a stark warning to 
other Brazilians who might contemplate active opposition” to the military regime. “Yet 
torture became something more,” historian Thomas Skidmore continues, 
Nothing travelled faster, especially among the younger generation, than 
the news that your friend, or a friend of your friend, had fallen into the 
hands of the torturers. The latter warned their victims not to talk their 
torture, knowing full well that many would. In short, torture was a 
powerful instrument, if degrading to its users, for subduing a society.135 
“The ‘repressive apparatus,’ as it was often referred to, cast a shadow of fear and drew an 
invisible pale through Brazilian society to dissuade the educated classes from crossing 
it,” American researchers later judged. “It also served to dissuade opposition from within 
the military itself.”136 The Brazilian army applied brutal methods again in the 1970s as it 
faced another outbreak of rural insurgencies in the countryside.  
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CONTRA REVOLUCIONARIO IN BRAZIL: RURAL GUERRILLAS IN THE 1970S  
In the early 1970s, the Brazilian Army faced two rural insurgency attempts. 
Although they were not Cuban-inspired focos, the Brazilian military still perceived these 
armed groups as an internal security threat. In contrast to the tenets of American 
counterinsurgency, the Brazilian Army made little effort to win the loyalty of the 
peasants, nor did it expect them to willingly inform on the guerrillas. Instead, the army 
viewed the peasants as guerilla sympathizers at best, if not active supporters. It eschewed 
forming specialized counter guerrilla battalions and relied on overwhelming conventional 
military force in its place. However, when that method failed to defeat a Maoist guerrilla 
insurgency in Araguaia in 1972, the Brazilian Army withdrew its forces. The army then 
reorganized and implemented a novel counter guerrilla approach. It placed all its 
deployed forces under the command of its intelligence arm, the Centro de Informações do 
Exército, rather than its infantry formations, special operations units, or the regional army 
command. The Brazilian Army’s response to this second wave of rural insurgencies 
reveals similarities to its past urban counter terrorism tactics. Its operations also 
demonstrated the legacy of French counter terrorism techniques. The Brazilian Army 
relied on intelligence units that undertook infiltration, implemented mass arrests, and 
used torture to target guerrillas, they did not raise and train specialized counter guerrilla 
units. Brazilian military units also adopted a policy of intimidating the local populace. 
They did not pursue the winning of hearts and minds.  
In mid-1970, Brazilian security forces detected the first rural guerrilla activity 
since the demise of the Caparaó foco in 1967. They also demonstrated a lack of 
preparedness to conduct counter guerrilla operations outside the cities. One Vanguarda 




Lamarca had established two guerrilla camps some 200 kilometers southeast of São 
Paulo. There, in the remote Vale do Ribeira, Lamarca was training sixteen VPR cadres in 
weapons firing, tactics, uniform making, and booby trap skills (See Figure 5).137 
In response, the Second Army launched the largest deployment in its history. It 
immediately sent 1,500 soldiers to the area to conduct “Operation Registro.” The force 
soon grew to nearly three thousand – all in pursuit of just seventeen guerrillas. Although 
the government reaction was impressive in terms of numbers, it suffered from multiple 
problems. Elements of ten different organizations took part in the operation, making 
coordination difficult. The Second Army quickly deployed a large force, but its mostly 
conscript soldiers were ill-prepared to conduct counter guerrilla operations in the dense 
forests and rugged terrain of the Ribeira Valley.  “They were almost all recruits with only 
three months of training,” Brazilian historian Emilio Gaspari notes, “no practice shooting, 
and many were carrying antiquated rifles.”138 The army also employed improvised tactics 
and achieved few results. Rather than scouring the forests for the guerrillas, security 
forces focused on areas they could more easily access. They cordoned off several local 
villages, establishing roadblocks and imposing curfews. The military arrested 120 people 
during its initial operations, but only two of them turned out to be VPR members. Eight 
other guerrillas had escaped the area before the army arrived. Meanwhile, Carlos 
Lamarca and six fellow militants remained on the loose. They successfully eluded the 
army dragnet for the next several weeks.  
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The Army, apparently frustrated by its inability to locate the guerrillas, soon 
began threatening the population. It paraded two captured VPR guerrillas through the 
town of Jacupiranga. “They made us march 200 meters in the little town,” one of the 
victims, ex-Sergeant Darcy Rodrigues later recounted, “practically naked, in shorts, our 
bodies covered in marks, the torture inflicted upon us visible to the naked eye, in a 
grotesque and undignified scene.”139 The military also tortured several of the civilians it 
arrested including the former mayor of Jacupiranga who had sold the VPR the parcels of 
land used for the training camps.140  
The military next employed a new tactic in its efforts to defeat the guerrillas. 
After coercing some locals into helping it locate the guerrilla hideouts, it attacked the 
hidden bases using napalm, a liquefied incendiary bomb which was also well suited to 
frighten the inhabitants into cooperation. “Since Friday [24 April] the [Brazilian Air 
Force] has been dropping incendiary bombs on spots in the forest in the region of the 
Ribeira Valley where there were close to 20 guerrillas belonging to the Popular 
Revolutionary Vanguard,” Jornal do Brasil reported on 28 April. “The bombardments 
began on Friday afternoon, after government forces managed to determine the probable 
location of the guerrillas, led by reconnaissance groups which included civilians familiar 
with the forest. The use of incendiary bombs was the only way the military could find to 
make the guerrillas leave their hiding places, which are difficult to access.”141 The 
guerrillas were unimpressed. “I have no idea what their [the air force’s] criteria were,” 
ex-Sergeant José Araújo Nóbrega explained. “I think they thought we that we were 
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hiding out in a certain area and they bombarded that region based on conjecture, but we 
had already passed through.” Carlos Lamarca and the remaining guerrillas continued to 
elude capture. The Air Force bombarded several other areas during the operation, but the 
airstrikes never killed any guerrillas. “It seems to me that [the bombing] was just to 
intimidate,” one local resident later reflected, “because in a land mass of 1,200 hectares if 
you’re going to drop bombs, you’re not going to hit anyone.”142 
The military’s roadblock system also proved less than fully effective. Lamarca 
and his band of six guerrillas drove into an army checkpoint on 8 May while trying to 
break out of the security cordon. The revolutionaries reacted first. They burst out of their 
vehicles and began firing, wounding two policemen, and then made their escape. Later 
that same night the guerrillas encountered a Military Police patrol sent to interdict them. 
Lamarca and the militants again jumped out firing and again overwhelmed their 
adversaries. The firefight wounded fourteen soldiers, eight others fled into the woods, 
and another eighteen surrendered to the VPR, according to one Brazilian historian.143 
Lamarca left the wounded Brazilian Army soldiers and released the captives except for 
the Lieutenant commanding the patrol. The VPR insurgents executed the young officer in 
the forest a day or two later. Two of the guerrillas lost contact with their comrades during 
the confrontation. The security forces arrested them a few days later after locals 
denounced them to the authorities.144 
Lamarca and the remaining militants again bested the security forces on 31 May. 
After nearly six weeks on the run, two of the guerrillas donned military uniforms, and 
along with the three remaining members of group, they attempted another break out of 
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the encirclement. As they awaited inspection at a military roadblock, one of the disguised 
guerrillas shouted out, “by the Colonel’s orders!” The startled troops manning the 
checkpoint lifted the barrier and let the “official” vehicle pass through.145 Intimidation 
worked for the guerrillas as well.  
The military deployed nearly three thousand men in mid-1970 to confront 
seventeen guerrillas. After six weeks of roadblocks, arrests, torture, and aerial 
bombardments, they managed to capture just four guerrillas. The rest, including Carlos 
Lamarca, escaped. During the operation, the Brazilian Army allowed their French 
counterparts a surprising level of entrée to the security zone. French “attaché Yves 
Boulnois had free access,” Agenica Publica later reported, “and accompanied Operation 
Registro with great interest for a month.”146 Boulnois sent a detailed report to the French 
Ministry of Defense in May 1970 describing and evaluating the Brazilian counter 
guerrilla action. “[D]espite the recovery of a relatively large amount of material 
(weapons, ammunition, radios, uniforms, etc...) and the arrest of several dozen people 
including some rebels,” Boulnois reported, “the results are, as often happens in this kind 
of operation, quite disappointing.”147 Meanwhile, the Brazilian Army requested no 
counter guerrilla assistance from the Special Action Force. The Green Berets conducted 
only one mobile training team visit to Brazil in 1970 – a course on supply procedures. 
The Brazilian Army caught up to Carlos Lamarca again in a desolate region of Bahia 
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State in September 1971. Taking no chances with the expert marksman, the soldiers shot 
and killed him as he slept under a tree.148 
In 1972, the Brazilian government faced its most dangerous rural guerrilla threat. 
Militants from the Communist Party of Brazilian (Partido Comunista do Brazil – PC do 
B), an off-shoot of the main Brazilian Communist Party, successfully established three 
guerrilla bases in the Araguaia region of the Amazon (See Figure 5). By the time of their 
detection by security forces in 1972, sixty-nine PC do B militants were living in the 
Araguaia region – an area at the confluence of three states. The guerrillas mainly 
operated between the cities of Marabá (Pará state) and Xambioá (Goiás state). Maranhão 
state began just to the northeast across the Tocantins River. The Maoist revolutionaries 
established three guerrilla “detachments” comprised of twenty to thirty insurgents, each 
group operating from a separate hidden jungle base.149 
PC do B activist first began infiltrating the area in the late 1966 and 1967. They 
selected the location because of the poverty of its residents, many of them migrants from 
the Northeast who had moved to the area to subsist by farming small plots or taking the 
few available seasonal jobs. The discovery of mineral deposits in the area put even this 
precarious lifestyle at risk for the local camponeses and Indians. The majority of the 
guerrillas, most of them students from the cities, arrived a year or two before the military 
detected their presence in 1972.  
                                               
148 Skidmore, Military Rule in Brazil, 122.  
149 Comissão Nacional da Verdade (herefater cited as CNV), “Capítulo 14: A Guerrilha do Araguaia” 
Relatório, vol. 1, (Dezembro de 2014), 688, 685. Accessed online 12 April 2016 at 
http://www.cnv.gov.br/todos-volume-1/658-documentos-sobre-a-guerrilha-do-araguaia.html. Xambioá was 
located in Goiás state during the period of the Araguaia guerrilla outbreak. The Brazilian government 





The security forces confirmed the PCdoB militants’ revolutionary project through 
torturing a former guerrilla. He had fled the group with his pregnant wife to avoid a 
forced abortion decreed by the militants.150 The Brazilian Army again responded with a 
large conventional force deploying some 1,500 men to the area under “Operation 
Papagaio.” It also “carried out arbitrary arrests and tortured guerrillas and villagers,” 
according to Brazil’s National Truth Commission. The Brazilian Air Force once more 
assisted with aerial bombardments including the use of napalm. During the operation the 
military arrested eight guerrillas and listed another ten as killed.151  
The Brazilian Army undertook some civic action activities during this phase in an 
attempt to pry the local inhabitants away from the guerrillas. Yet army reports lamented 
that their Ações Cívico-Sociais (ACISO) efforts had only temporary success. The use of 
mass arrests and torture, firebombing jungle areas, and “army helicopters machine 
gunning near houses” evidently negated the army’s desultory civic action goodwill 
efforts. Following the precepts of French revolutionary warfare strategy, when 
confronting a subversive insurgency, the security forces primarily relied on wielding the 
stick. The carrots would only come later – after the guerrilla menace had been 
defeated.152  
Like the earlier “Operation Registro,” the Army’s initial counter guerrilla 
operation in the Araguaia area resulted in an overall failure. Military units were unable to 
locate and capture or kill the insurgents. “President Emilio Garrastazu Medici,” CIA 
analysts reported to Washington in September 1972, “reportedly is angered both by the 
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inconclusive results from operations mounted by the Eight Army, and the unfavorable 
publicity from their sometimes heavy-handed and over-zealous efforts.”153 Consequently, 
the Brazilian high command ordered an end to the operation in October 1972.  
The Army then reorganized its forces and adopted a new approach. 154 It 
responded with “Operation Sucuri,” which began in April 1973. This new phase 
employed a blend of French counter guerrilla methods and lessons derived from the 
Brazilian Army’s own urban counter terrorism efforts. First, the army placed 
responsibility for eliminating the guerrilla threat under its intelligence command -- the 
Centro de Informações do Exército. It also brought in intelligence specialists with 
previous experience in interrogations. However, rather than operating officially and 
openly as members of the military, the army employed the technique of infiltration. The 
French Army had successfully infiltrated undercover agents into the structure of the 
National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algiers in 1957. In fact, French officers established a 
special unit, the Groupe de Rensiegment et d’Explotation (Intelligence and Exploitation 
Group - GRE), which specialized in interrogations “as well as infiltrating the FLN/ALN 
ranks to a high level.”155 Brazilian security forces also used infiltrators to gather 
information from within urban guerrilla movements and to target their members for 
arrest.156 
However, the Brazilian Army added a new twist to the technique of infiltration for 
its operations in the Araguaia jungle. Rather than posing as guerrillas, its intelligence 
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operatives masqueraded as civilians. As they entered the region some posed as 
government officials, while others played the role of migrants. The Army “called in the 
DOI-CODI of the Planalto Military Command and the 3rd Infantry Brigade, based in 
Brasilia, and assigned three captains, two lieutenants, nine sergeants and 16 
noncommissioned officers and soldiers to work in the region,” the National Truth 
Commission explained. They were “disguised as officials of the National Institute of 
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), the Superintendency of Public Health 
Campaigns (SUCAM), health workers, winemakers and squatters - they were referred to 
as "cover stories" in military reports.” Two other soldiers testified to the National Truth 
Commission that the Army sent them to the Araguaia region in 1973. The men donned 
civilian clothes and leased small plots of land in order to pose as squatters. “Both had 
served as soldiers in the 1972 campaign,” the commission noted, “before acting as 
intelligence agents.”157 
After several months of planning and preparation, the CIE executed “Operation 
Sucuri” from April to August 1973. This was “a major intelligence operation,” Brazilian 
Colonel Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro later explained, “to survey in detail the FOGUERA 
[Araguaia Guerrilla Force], the terrain, and the local population.” A key part of the 
operation was the work conducted by the infiltrators. Their purpose, the Truth 
Commission’s report noted, “was to survey the hiding places and transit areas of the 
guerrillas, to map the guerrilla support network among the local residents, and then, later, 
to eliminate them.”158  The Army’s Centro de Informações do Exército put its newly-
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acquired information to use in the third phase of the counter guerrilla struggle, 
“Operation Marajoara” which it conducted from September 1973 until March 1975.   
The Maoist insurgents from the cities provided some social services to the local 
residents which earned them at least a little gratitude among the inhabitants. However, 
the revolutionaries counted few peasant converts and had hidden their political agenda 
and guerrilla training activities from the local residents. Although only approximately ten 
camponeses took up arms with the transplanted urban guerrillas, others did provide the 
revolutionaries some basic support after the military began pursuing them.159 As the 
Army began renewed combat operations in September 1973, it targeted both the 
guerrillas and this meagre local assistance, which it termed the “guerrilla support 
network.”160  
The final phase of the Araguaia campaign, “Operation Marajoara” also 
demonstrated a blend of French counter guerrilla techniques and Brazilian urban counter 
terrorism tactics. Rather than focused military operations targeting just the armed 
guerrillas, the Brazilian Army also arrested and tortured civilians suspected of aiding the 
Maoist insurgents. Overt military operations, like those undertaken in the preliminary 
phase (“Operation Papagaio”), gave way to clandestine military operations. Teams of 
soldiers joined with a few civilians – usually woodsmen – and formed special mixed 
detachments called “zebras.” These forces, often guided by the infiltrators put in place 
during “Operation Sucuri,” first attacked what the military feared was an elaborate 
“guerrilla support network.” They also searched out and destroyed the guerrilla supply 
depots and hidden weapons caches located previously by military agents. 
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However, by the Centro de Informações do Exército’s own reporting the army 
had determined that ninety percent of the camponeses arrested were guilty of only 
“circumstantial support.” That is they provided “hospitality as was customary in the area, 
assistance when pressed by the presence of the armed group,” or they “provided food or 
lent small favors to the guerrillas.”161 Although draconian, the targeting of even 
incidental supporters followed the principles of French revolutionary warfare doctrine. 
“Any individual who, in any fashion whatsoever, favors the objectives of the enemy” 
Roger Trinquier argued in 1964, “will be considered a traitor and treated as such.”162 
“We know that in modern warfare [italics in original] we are not clashing with just a few 
armed bands,” Trinquier further explained, “but rather with an organization installed 
within the population – an organization that constitutes the combat machine of the 
enemy, of which the bands are but one element. To win we must destroy his entire 
organization”163 The Brazilian Army dutifully attacked what it perceived as the Araguaia 
guerrilla’s organization, and it did so using the familiar techniques of mass arrests and 
torture.  
By 15 November 1973, the Brazilian Army had arrested 161 civilians for being 
members of the guerrilla support network. Although it recognized that many of the 
people detained were only guilty of "inadvertently supporting guerrilla actions," the army 
arrested them, and immediately subjected them to torture just as it had the guerrillas. The 
need to immediately extract information was a lesson gleaned from urban counter 
terrorism operations. It was also a practice recommended by the French veterans of the 
“Battle of Algiers.” Moreover, the French likely reinforced those techniques at the 
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Brazilian Army’s jungle school. “French military veterans of Indochina and Algeria 
personally administered a course in ‘Interrogation Techniques’ at Centro de Instrução de 
Guerra na Selva (CIGS) in Manaus, between 1970 and 1973,” the National Truth 
Commission documented.  “Among the instructors, was an old companion of Roger 
Trinquier, Colonel Paul Aussaresses.”164 Although the Special Action Force helped train 
the Brazilian jungle school cadre in 1964, it played no role in Brazil’s counter guerrilla 
operations in the early 1970s. The unit conducted its last mobile training team mission to 
Brazil in 1970, the Green Beret’s last counterinsurgency mission in South America took 
place in Bolivia three years earlier.  
While the Brazilian Army focused much of its attention on eliminating the 
guerrilla support network during “Operation Marajoara,” it also directly attacked the 
insurgents. In January 1974, the Serviço Nacional de Informações reported that 
successive guerrilla losses had caused a “decline in strength and fall in their actions.”165 
After cutting the guerrillas off from what little support they received from the local 
population through arrests and intimidation, and destroying the insurgent’s jungle bases 
and supply caches, the Army began eliminating the PCdoB revolutionaries. Armed 
militants of Araguaia suffered the same fate as the FLN members that found themselves 
at Aussaresses’ villa de Tourelles in Algeria, or the urban guerrillas who ran afoul of 
OBAN (Operaçao Bandeirantes) or DOI (Destacamentos de Operaçaoes Internas) 
operatives in Brazil’s cities. Government agents executed them and disappeared their 
bodies. “The final balance sheet of this operation,” the National Truth Commission 
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reported, “was the total annihilation of the guerrillas in the region: 56 dead guerrillas 
(whose bodies are still missing) and more than two hundred peasants arrested on charges 
they constituted the guerrilla support network.”166 The Brazilian Army ended “Operation 
Marajoara” in March 1975.   
CONCLUSION 
Brazil faced multiple Leftist revolutionary challenges in the tumultuous decades 
of the 1960s and 1970s. The military feared a revolution from above as pro-Communist 
Presidents Jânio Quadros and João Goulart ruled the country in the early 1960s. After a 
contested succession in the aftermath of Quadros’ resignation, Goulart sought to move 
the country further to the left. He alienated landowners and rural elites by supporting 
voting rights for illiterates and proposing land redistribution. He also stoked the 
military’s fear of threats to its institutional integrity by supporting the unionization of 
enlisted members and publicly supporting sailors accused of mutiny. In response, the 
armed forces ousted Goulart in April 1964 and established a long-term military 
government. The country also encountered several attempts at revolution from below as it 
confronted Cuban-inspired rural foco attempts and urban terrorist movements in the 
1960s. The Brazilian Army deployed its forces to the countryside again in the early 1970s 
to thwart a second wave of rural insurgencies.  
During these internal security crises the Brazilian generals relied on their own 
doctrine and judgement. Unlike the armies of the Andean Ridge, they did not seek U.S. 
Army advice or assistance.  Brazilian officers had little need for American 
counterinsurgency doctrine because they had already developed their own National 
Security Doctrine. Brazilian Army theorists of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG) 
                                               




melded internal security and economic development lessons from Brazil’s past with 
many of the concepts of French revolutionary war theory to develop their own national 
policy. American officers helped establish the Escola Superior de Guerra in 1949, but the 
school quickly became a Brazilian institution. However, because of this linkage some 
historians have mistakenly perceived the NSD as having been “imported” from the 
United States.  
The National Security Doctrine was a product of Brazil. The Escola Superior de 
Guerra incorporated several themes from the Vargas era into its new doctrine. The 
school’s theorists recognized Brazil’s need to modernize. They also accepted the 
necessity of using repression to enforce internal security which would allow them to 
implementation their economic development policies. Doing so, they argued, required a 
strong centralized government in order to achieve both security and development. This 
Brazilian linkage of internal security and internal economic development in the late 
1950s predated the United States’ emphasis on economic development and internal 
security – packaged as counterinsurgency – which took place later under the John F. 
Kennedy administration in the early 1960s.  
American counterinsurgency and the Brazilian National Security Doctrine both 
promoted internal security and economic development. However, they differed 
dramatically in the mechanisms they advocated for achieving those goals. Washington 
envisioned its strategy as means to support friendly democracies facing insurgencies. 
Brazilian strategists saw dictatorship as a more effective form of government than 
democracy. American policymakers proposed economic assistance to mitigate popular 




Brazilian officers sought economic independence from the United States, in part through 
the creation of national industries and the use of state-owned enterprises.  
Meanwhile, the Brazilian Army also developed its own Contra-Revolucionario 
tactics. It modeled many of these techniques and procedures on the French counter 
insurgency experiences in Southeast Asia and Algeria.  Brazil’s incorporation of French 
revolutionary war doctrine and counter insurgency techniques included several important 
concepts that marked its response to the internal security challenges of the Cold War era. 
First, Brazilian generals accepted the French premise that internal dissent and armed 
opposition were elements of a global subversive war waged by Communism to defeat 
Western Christianity. Second, they incorporated the view that their opponent’s use of 
terrorism legitimated the use of torture as a remedy. Third, they reorganized police and 
military structures to create “parallel organizations” – in effect specialized intelligence 
units – to implement systematic repression and obscure responsibility. Lastly, they 
invoked state-directed terror against their population to intimidate them away from 
supporting the insurgents or opposing the military government.  
The Brazilian Army developed its Contra-Revolucionario doctrine slightly ahead 
of the U.S. Army’s conceptualization of counterinsurgency. Because it had its own 
doctrine, the Brazilian Army had little reason to adopt American counterinsurgency. 
Brazilians attended few U.S. Army internal security courses and the country accepted just 
three Special Action Force counterinsurgency related mobile training team visits during 
the 1960s. American military officers did not provide their Brazilian counterparts with 
internal security advice, an American general explained to Congress, “because they don’t 
ask.”167 Instead, the Brazilians drew lessons from the French Army. They developed 
                                               




specialized intelligence organizations rather than counterguerrilla battalions. These 
clandestine intelligence units employed repression, including the use of torture and 
executions, to break the insurgencies. Brazilian forces also used repression to intimidate 
their citizenry; they did not seek to win the hearts and minds of the populace. These 
“Dirty War” tactics evolved from past Brazilian history and the incorporation of French 






Chapter Nine: Counter Revolution in Chile 
 
Unlike most of its South American neighbors, Chile faced few revolutionary 
threats during the 1960s. It had no prior history of internal violence as in Colombia, or 
recurrent military coups d’état and dictatorships as in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and 
Venezuela. Chilean democracy and stability in the pre and post-World War II era made it 
unique among Latin American nations. Chile had last experienced a golpe de estado in 
1924 and its most recent dictatorship ended in 1931.1 Therefore, rather than seeing 
Brazil's revolution of 1964 as a model for emulation, the Chilean armed forces 
considered themselves above needing any internal security or internal development 
model at all. Most officers were apolitical, and some - like future dictator Augusto 
Pinochet - professed little understanding of or appreciation for politics.2  
Chile enjoyed a mostly peaceful 1960s, although storm clouds gathered late in the 
decade. Chilean students drew inspiration from the Cuban Revolution, yet the nation 
spawned few guerrilla movements. The country’s geography did not lend itself to rural 
insurgency, and it lacked despotic governments for the militants to rail against in order to 
gather supporters. Meanwhile, the nation experienced an ongoing political shift to the 
left. Chile’s traditional Leftist parties and leaders continued to pursue the electoral path to 
power that had seemed close to achieving success. The participation of legal Socialist and 
Communist parties in the country’s political process also helped undermine the appeal of 
armed revolution.  
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Chilean officers repeatedly spurned American efforts to instill a 
counterinsurgency capability during the decade. Like their Southern Cone counterparts, 
they rejected the implication that they needed foreign assistance in managing their 
internal security, especially if that judgement and assistance originated from the 
hemispheric hegemon the United States. Moreover, Chile faced no insurgency and its 
highly nationalistic military prided itself on its reputation for strict constitutionality. For 
those and other reasons, the country’s political and military leaders limited the country’s 
military interaction with the U.S. Army. The only internal security training they 
requested from the United States was assistance with riot control procedures in 
preparation for the 1964 presidential elections. Yet even this modest training caused 
consternation for Chile's political and military leaders. They asked the Americans not to 
publicize the assistance and to minimize the number of U.S. military trainers sent to the 
country.  
The rise of military dictatorships in Argentina in 1966 and Peru in 1968 triggered 
an altogether different response. Chilean officers worried about strong authoritarian 
governments in Buenos Aires and Lima. They feared their ambitious counterparts, at the 
helm of military-controlled regimes, might be tempted to seize portions of Chile's 
national territory at a time when its government appeared weak and its military 
unprepared. In turn, Chilean officials did accept American conventional military training, 
equipment, and aid.  
American counterinsurgency doctrine, on the other hand, held little appeal in 
Chile. The nation confronted minimal domestic unrest until 1970. Consequently, Chile 
sent few students to American internal security courses. For example, Chile sent just nine 




1964. During the same time period its northern neighbor Peru sent seventy-one. The 
country also largely shunned Special Action Force mobile training teams related to 
counterinsurgency. Between 1962 and 1973, Chile accepted thirty-nine MTTs. Only two 
of them pertained to internal security. Santiago received a counterinsurgency assessment 
survey in 1963 but never authorized any follow-on training. It accepted a psychological 
operations visit that same year which ended its counterinsurgency interactions with the 
Special Action Force. The cumulative record of Special Action Force visits to Chile 
paints a dramatic picture. Ninety-five percent of the MTT missions that Chile accepted 
related to civic action and conventional military skills, not internal security. If American 
counterinsurgency doctrine was readily available, why did Chilean generals chose a 
different internal security doctrine in 1973?   
Because Chile faced no domestic threats during the 1960s, the nation's armed 
forces saw little need to develop or import doctrines for internal security. Only as 
Salvador Allende steered the nation towards socialism, and economic crisis and internal 
insecurity worsened in the early 1970s, did military leaders contemplate overturning their 
democracy. When the generals finally did decide to act their situation appeared much like 
that of Brazil in 1964. Chile in 1973 did not resemble the two successful cases of 
American counterinsurgency in South America. The nation was not experiencing a 
popular rejection of violence and a new embrace of democracy as had been the case in 
Venezuela and Colombia in the early 1960s. Meanwhile, by the early1970s American 
counterinsurgency doctrine seemed discredited in the aftermath of Vietnam.  
Many historians have written about the degree to which Cuba’s revolution 
inspired Southern Cone Leftists. Fewer authors have examined the ways in which the 




“economic miracle” influenced regional military officers. The effects of Brazil’s National 
Security Doctrine did not go unnoticed in Argentina and Chile. When faced with the 
worsening crisis of the early 1970s, Chile’s generals looked to Brasilia, not Washington 
for internal security concepts and advice. After seizing power General Pinochet 
established a personal dictatorship implementing a Chile-specific version of the National 
Security Doctrine developed in Brazil.  
Like the regime in Brazil, and later in Argentina, Pinochet restricted political 
competition and civilian participation in government. He also pursued an economic 
restructuring plan imposed by decree rather than consensus. To cement his rule, Pinochet 
employed many of the same brutal French counter revolutionary war tactics his Brazilian 
counterparts had used. Pinochet’s government ruthlessly repressed “subversives” and 
“Marxists enemies” of all stripes using torture, disappearances, and murder. In doing so, 
he intentionally created a climate of fear to intimidate Chilean society into obedience. 
Pinochet rejected the tenets of American counterinsurgency doctrine; the winning of 
hearts and minds was not on his agenda. 
CHILE’S SLOW DRIFT TO THE LEFT IN THE 1960S.  
Although Cuba spared Chile from its export of revolution, social and political 
tensions increased during the 1960s. Conservative President Jorge Alessandri led the 
nation in the early years of the decade. Nevertheless, the country’s electorate remained 
polarized. Alessandri won the presidency by a slim margin in 1958, narrowly beating out 
the Socialist-Communist alliance Popular Action Front (Frente de Acción Popular – 
FRAP) candidate Salvador Allende.3 President Alessandri sought to weather the 
economic and social challenges of popular discontent in the aftermath of the Cuban 
                                               




Revolution of 1959, but he accomplished little to remedy Chile’s problems. The nation 
continued to face myriad issues on its path to modernization.  
Like its neighbors, Chile sought to industrialize in the aftermath of the Great 
depression of the 1930s. However, the country lacked the vast agricultural and human 
resources of Argentina and Brazil. Instead, nature endowed Chile with minerals. The 
country boasted the world’s largest reserves of copper and nitrates along with substantial 
iron deposits. Nevertheless, Chile did pursue Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
which also coincided with a wave of rural-urban migration in the post-World War Two 
era. “Industry has not, however,” analysts of the CIA noted in 1963, “realized the hopes 
originally held out for it. It is heavily dependent on imported capital equipment and raw 
materials…is monopolistic and inefficient, [and] it is handicapped in competing in 
foreign markets.” Chilean industry also suffered from “the limited size of the domestic 
market [which] makes it difficult…to achieve economies of scale.” Meanwhile, a 
powerful landed oligarchy and skewed land tenure stifled agricultural production. The 
result was “unbalanced growth, declining productivity, and inflation that has ranged from 
15 to as high as 80 percent per annum.” All of which left the country dependent on its 
mineral exports making it vulnerable to the boom and bust cycles of the global market. 
“Although some progressive measures have been adopted,” CIA analysts judged, “the 
[Alessandri] administration has not accomplished enough to arrest the leftward trend in 
Chilean politics.”4 
Chile confronted numerous challenges in the early 1960s, although rural 
insurgency was not among them. “Despite peasant grievances,” American analysts 
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observed in 1963, “there is at present no significant potential for rural insurgency in 
Chile.” The country also relied on its highly professional national police force, the 
Carabineros, as the first line of defense against internal disruptions. The lack of 
insurgency and the Chilean Army’s “history of apolitical attitude” limited the appeal of 
American counterinsurgency training.5  However, Chilean nationalism also played a role.  
American Army officers in Santiago found their efforts to disseminate 
counterinsurgency doctrine blocked at almost every turn. Chilean pride was a formidable 
barrier. “There is a strong feeling among many influential officers of the Chilean Army 
that they are perfectly capable of running their own army,” American officers lamented in 
1962, “and do not need advice or assistance from the U.S. Army Mission.” Economic 
problems also contributed to the “non-acceptance and apparent lack of interest” in 
American military schools and mobile training teams.6 However, “political 
considerations also played a part,” U.S. officers reported to their Canal Zone superiors. 
“There is no insurgency threat in Chile; however, there is a legal Communist Party here. 
All government agencies carefully consider their actions in this context to avoid 
providing [a] propaganda opening for the Communist Party. The Army, too, feels it must 
proceed careful [sic] for even the name Counter-Insurgency is subject to 
misinterpretation and distortion.”7 “Attempts by the Military Missions and USIS [United 
States Information Service] to introduce anti-Communist literature into military 
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channels,” a later report noted, “have met with little success, except for unofficial 
distribution.”8 
Despite these obstacles, Chile did accept a very limited amount of American 
internal security training in the early 1960s. The Chilean Army sent nine students to the 
School of the Americas counterinsurgency courses between 1961 and 1964. Another six 
Chilean officers attended courses at the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina from 1961 to 1963. The Special Action Force deployed its first mobile training 
teams to the country in 1962. Green Beret teams taught a medical course and provided 
Ranger training to their Chilean Army counterparts during the first year of their 
interaction.9 Meanwhile, the Chilean Army declined American counterinsurgency 
training. “Chilean Army offered a [counterinsurgency] Mobile Training Team in Feb 62,” 
American officers in Santiago reported to the Canal Zone. The Chileans responded with 
silence. “No reply received,” the U.S. officers tersely noted. However, the same report 
held at least a partial explanation. “Commander in Chief, Chilean Army authorized the 
use of the Counter Subversive Warfare Manual published by the War Academy,” 
American officers explained, “for use in that Academy and the Chilean Army Service 
Schools.”10 The Chilean Army’s development of its own “counter subversive warfare” 
doctrine by mid-1962 obviated the need for an infusion of American counterinsurgency.  
The Special Action Force expanded its training deployments to Chile the 
following year. Seven mobile training teams visited the country in 1963, up from just two 
visits the year before. Green Beret instructors taught courses on marksmanship, medical 
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and engineering subjects. Two teams followed up on the Chilean Army’s interest in 
advanced infantry skills and provided a second and third iteration of Ranger training. 
1963 also marked the Chilean Army’s first acceptance of an American internal security 
mission. A counterinsurgency survey team visited the country, but Chilean authorities 
never approved any follow on missions to provide the actual tactical instruction. That 
same year a Green Beret team provided a course on psychological operations, which the 
Special Action Force categorized as a form of counterinsurgency training.  
Chile again faced presidential elections in 1964. For the United States, the 
elections proved both a challenge and an opportunity. “The principal immediate [Cold 
War] threat,” American officers wrote in mid-1963, “is a victory of the Communist 
infiltrated leftist coalition, Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP), in the 1964 national 
elections.” CIA analysts largely concurred. “Although some progressive measures have 
been adopted,” they wrote, “the [Alessandri] administration has not accomplished enough 
to arrest the leftward trend in Chilean politics.”11 American policymakers feared that 
avowed Marxist Salvador Allende might win the presidency. Chilean authorities, 
meanwhile, feared the elections might trigger “possible disturbances” by Allende’s 
supporters if he did not win and asked for U.S. assistance. American diplomats in 
Santiago framed the request as “a remarkable first opportunity for us to enter into the 
delicate internal security field” in their reports to Washington.12  
Chilean authorities and American officials viewed the military assistance request 
with some trepidation. Both parties agreed that, an “internal security program would be 
beneficial and useful, providing that it could be handled on unobtrusive basis in order not 
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to arouse public opinion.”  In making his official request, the Chilean Minister of Defense 
approved a “preliminary survey team visit…from Panama, and he emphasized the need 
that this matter be kept confidential.” He also “expressed the hope that for any secondary 
training the number of Americans be kept down to an absolute minimum and that 
previously trained Chilean officers be employed for this purpose.” Meanwhile, American 
diplomats in Santiago  emphasized “the need to avoid any publicity on this and also 
strongly endorse COMILGP’s [Commander U.S. Military Group] recommendation that 
the term “counter-insurgency” be avoided as this [is an] unpalatable term here which 
could negate [the] value of this project which we consider of great significance.”13 
American military officers in Santiago and Panama quickly set about working to 
provide the requested support. After the U.S. Southern Command dispatched an internal 
security survey team, it arranged to provide riot control supplies and equipment for the 
Chilean security forces. The United States delivered “shotguns, ammunition, non-lethal 
chemical grenades, communications [equipment], and items for individual protection” in 
mid-July. A second shipment later the same month delivered “additional 
items…primarily communications equipment.”14 Predictably, U.S. Southern Command 
looked to the Special Action Force to support the internal security assistance request for 
Chile. In light of Chilean officials’ and American diplomats’ concerns, the Green Berets 
dispatched just two officers. Nevertheless, their counterparts in Santiago appreciated the 
help. “Special mention should be made of the MTT of a Military Police and Signal 
Officer from the 8th Special Forces Group, Panama,” U.S. Army officers in Chile 
reported, “who worked with the USARMIS [U.S. Army Mission] and Chilean Army for 
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several weeks before the [1964] elections.” Chile also sent a group of students to the 
Canal Zone for an impromptu riot control course. “The special training in the School of 
the Americas provided to almost fifty selected junior officers of the armed forces in 
control of civil disturbances and the use of riot control equipment,” American officers in 
Santiago wrote, “was also of great value.”15 
After the elections, American officers in Chile were effusive in their praise of the 
internal security assistance project. Although the minimal U. S. training, conducted out of 
the public view, likely had little influence on the peaceful outcome of the election 
process, American officers in Santiago interpreted it as a great success. “The calm 
orderliness of the elections probably was due in no small part to the preparedness of the 
Armed Forces and the Carabineros to deal quickly and forcefully with any disturbance,” 
U.S. Army Colonel William P. Jones explained to his superiors in Panama. “The Armed 
Forces and Carabineros evidenced sincere determination to maintain internal order and 
security. They cooperated with [the] US Military Missions to an extent not previously 
realized in this field [of internal security] and readily accepted both equipment and advice 
in their preparation.”16 The increased military cooperation with Chile relating to internal 
security was short lived.  
Despite the prevalent view of American military hegemony and dominance in the 
regional Cold War literature, Latin American political and military officials were quite 
capable of setting and enforcing limits on their interactions with the United States. 
Chilean officials determined the parameters of the 1964 internal security assistance 
project with the United States and they strictly limited it to riot control and civil 
                                               





disturbance training. General Andrew P. O’Meara, the Commander of U.S. Southern 
Command in Panama, considered that level of internal security training inadequate. He 
worried that Chilean officers’ apolitical attitudes made them unaware of “the dangers 
which the Communists pose to their country today.” In a private letter to Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy in May 1964 O’Meara continued, 
[T]he Chilean military, in particular the higher military leaders, have held 
themselves aloof from politics for so long that their professionalism is 
quite narrow and unsophisticated in the light of today’s threats. In the past 
they have resisted our efforts to give them any type of counterinsurgency 
instruction on the basis that no insurgency exists in their country. There is 
no doubt that the Chilean military need a realistic view of the current 
threats. The problem is to get it to them without arousing their resistance. 
If we let them suspect we consider their present outlook unsophisticated, 
we will get nowhere.17 
But O’Meara could not order Chilean officials to accept American training. Instead, he 
proposed to address the issue by hosting a “strategic intelligence seminar” in the Panama 
Canal Zone. He requested that Attorney General Kennedy “devote a day to join the 
seminar and to address it” as a means “to attract from Chile, as well as other countries, 
participants of adequate seniority and responsibility.”18  
General O’Meara hosted the seminar in June 1964. “Fifty military and para-
military officers, representing 17 Latin American countries, participated in a 
USOUTHCOM Strategic Intelligence Seminar at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, from 8-17 
June,” Southern Command historians recorded. “Ten U.S. guest speakers and 15 senior 
U.S. military officers participated.”19 It is not clear from the available records if Attorney 
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General Kennedy attended the event. However, Chilean participation did not meet 
American expectations. “The Chilean Army declined the invitation to attend the Strategic 
Intelligence Seminar in Panama,” U.S. officers in Santiago wrote, “as did the Chilean 
Navy and Air Force. Chile was represented at the Seminar by two officers of the National 
Police (Carabineros).” Meanwhile, the American officers had more bad news to transmit. 
“No internal security type training spaces [counterinsurgency schools] have been 
accepted by the Chilean Army,” the same report noted, “for [the continental United 
States] or Panama.”20 Although the level of interaction was limited, 1964 proved the high 
water mark for internal security cooperation between the United States and Chile. The 
Special Action Force conducted no further counterinsurgency related missions to the 
country after that year.  
Chile continued its drift to the Left in 1964, although Salvador Allende again lost 
his bid for the presidency. “In the 1964 presidential contest,” American researchers 
explain, “the right [the party of Alessandri, who was ineligible to run for re-election] 
abandoned its standard bearers and gave its support to [centrist candidate Eduardo] Frei 
in order to avert an Allende victory in the face of rising electoral support for the 
leftists.”21 Nevertheless, Frei promised an ambitious program of social and economic 
reforms including “greater Chilean control over the United States-owned copper mines, 
agrarian reform, better housing for residents of the sprawling shantytowns, [and] more 
equitable income distribution,” among other issues. In a sign of the times, Frei also 
adopted the rhetoric of the Left. “To distinguish his more moderate program from 
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Allende’s Marxism,” American researchers note, “Frei promised a ‘Revolution in 
Liberty.’”22 
The United States continued its military cooperation with Chile after 1964, but the 
focus was on conventional skills - not counterinsurgency. The Special Action Force 
conducted four mobile training team visits to Chile in 1964, in addition to its special two-
man riot control mission. Green Beret instructors taught courses on marksmanship, 
medical civic action and two seminars related to equipment maintenance. In 1965, 
another four teams returned to Chile to provide training on military parachuting, civil 
affairs, communications and marksmanship. The Special Action Force continued its 
efforts to assist the Chilean Army in developing an airborne unit in 1966. Two Green 
Beret officers and five enlisted men spent two months in Chile training a cadre of 
instructors at the newly-established Chilean Army Airborne School in the procedures of 
how to conduct a basic airborne course. Other Special Action Force teams taught courses 
on the operation of engineer equipment, supply and maintenance procedures, and 
intelligence. Another four teams followed in 1967, but Chile accepted only three visits in 
1968. The decline continued in 1969 with only one Green Beret team travelling to Chile 
that year. As the country again faced elections in 1970, it chose not to seek American 
assistance. The Special Action Force sent no teams to Chile during 1970.23  
Meanwhile, social and economic tensions continued to build during the late 
1960s. “Chile is involved in a serious political and economic situation,” CIA analysts 
wrote in 1968, “which could result in the election of a Communist-supported Popular 
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Front president in 1970.”24 The following year even Chile’s apolitical army became 
restive. “In October 1969,” another CIA report noted, “some army units…mutinied over 
serious grievances involving salaries eroded by inflation, deteriorating equipment, and 
dissatisfaction with [President] Frei’s appointees to the top military posts.” Loyalist 
military units quickly contained the uprising, known as the tacnazo, but the polarization 
of society continued.25 Frei’s reform programs have “come too fast for some elements of 
society,” the CIA analysts observed, “and too slowly for others.” The result was that 
Chile’s “deeply ingrained democratic traditions” were “not only under strong attack from 
leftist extremists but from rightist elements as well.” As Chileans again prepared for 
presidential elections in 1970, the country faced its first outbreaks of terrorism and 
violence. Meanwhile, the political coalition of the center and the right that elected 
Eduardo Frei in 1964 crumbled. The conservative National Party and the centrists 
Christian Democrats each backed their own candidates which paved the way for a narrow 
victory by the left.26 
THE CHILEAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM: THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT  
In September 1970, Chileans went to the polls to select a new president. Salvador 
Allende, of the Popular Unity (Unidad Popular – UP) Leftist coalition, garnered thirty-six 
percent of the vote. Allende narrowly edged out the conservative candidate former 
President Jorge Alessandri (with 34.9 percent) and his center-Left rival Radomiro Tomić 
(with 27.8 percent). Despite the slim margin, Salvador Allende earned enough votes to 
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gain him the presidency of Chile on his fourth attempt at that office.27 However, in 
Chile’s highly charged atmosphere of 1970, Allende faced considerable resistance to his 
taking office.  
Although shrouded in secrecy at the time, the President of the United States 
directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to undertake covert operations in Chile to 
influence the 1964 and 1970 presidential elections. American agents spent three million 
dollars to support Eduardo Frei’s 1964 election campaign in an effort to block Salvador 
Allende and his Frente de Acción Popular – FRAP from taking the presidency. That 
effort succeeded. Frei won fifty-seven percent of the vote. The CIA again undertook 
covert efforts to prevent an Allende presidency in the run up to the 1970 elections. 
However, rather than back a candidate, as they had in 1964, American agents instead 
embarked on “a covert ‘spoiling’ operation designed to defeat Salvador Allende,” 
according to a later United States Senate investigation. “In all, the CIA spent from 
$800,000 to $1,000,000 on covert action to affect the outcome of the 1970 Presidential 
election” in Chile. That effort failed when Allende won a slight plurality at the polls in 
September.28 
Allende’s electoral victory did not end American actions to block him from 
becoming the president of Chile. Instead, the CIA embarked on two additional covert 
programs to prevent his taking office. Track I focused on a “constitutional solution.” 
“Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote,” U.S. Senate hearings 
later explained, “the Chilean Constitution required a joint session of its Congress decide 
between the first- and second-place finishers…the CIA fastened on the so-called Frei re-
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election gambit as a means of preventing Allende’s assumption of office. This gambit, 
which was considered a constitutional solution to the Allende problem, consisted of 
inducing enough congressional votes to elect Alessandri over Allende with the 
understanding that Alessandri would immediately resign, thus paving the way for a 
special election in which Frei would legally become a candidate.” Track I failed on 24 
October when 153 members of the Chilean Congress voted for Allende to become 
president. Only thirty-five congressmen voted against him.29 
Track II sought to foment a military coup d’état. The plan had little chance of 
success. Few Chilean officers would have felt compelled to break their constitutional 
loyalty in 1970 – especially to mount a pre-emptive coup d’état at the behest of the CIA. 
Nevertheless, the “CIA established contact with several groups of military plotters and 
eventually passed three weapons and tear gas to one group,” the U.S. Senate investigation 
revealed. “The weapons were subsequently returned, apparently unused.” In any event, 
small groups of mid-level coup plotters could never succeed if opposed by the senior 
leadership of Chile’s armed forces, especially the army. Therefore, most of the plots to 
overthrow the government began with removing the army’s constitutionalist commander 
General René Schneider. With Schneider out of the way, so the theory went, the Chilean 
Army would then be free to oppose Allende. One group not affiliated with the CIA put 
the theory to the test. They made two failed attempts to kidnap Schneider in late October. 
During their third attempt Schneider resisted and received a fatal gunshot wound. Yet 
rather than spark the hoped-for uprising, Schneider’s murder reinvigorated the military’s 
                                               




constitutionality. Track II had also failed. Chileans inaugurated Allende as their president 
on 3 November 1970.30 
Salvador Allende presided over three of the most tumultuous years in Chilean 
history. No single issue caused the Chilean military to overthrow his government.  
Instead, a confluence of social, economic and political factors combined to create the 
perception that the country stood on the brink of economic collapse and civil war by late 
1973. Increasing politicization of the armed forces and growing threats to the military as 
an institution contributed to the crisis.  
Although he lacked a strong electoral mandate – nearly two-thirds of Chileans had 
voted against him -- President Allende quickly embarked the country on his “Chilean 
Road to Socialism.” One of his first economic measures was an effort to increase 
domestic consumption. “By July 1971wages and salaries had been raised by almost 55 
percent…the legal minimum wage…by about 66 percent,” American researchers noted. 
“In addition, the government instituted massive increases in public spending, in part to 
stimulate employment.” The plan worked – at first. However, the increased consumption 
soon led to shortages and rising inflation.  “By late 1971 some food shortages had 
become noticeable,” the American researchers continued. “General and severe shortages 
of food and other consumer items did not appear until late 1972, but the shortages then 
worsened steadily and dramatically through 1973.”31 
Meanwhile, Allende’s nationalizations of foreign companies and seizures of 
domestic manufacturing and industrial centers also harmed the economy. While turning 
over control of critical industries to the workers might have made good sense as socialist 
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policy, it led to economic turmoil. At the same time, government agencies expropriated 
farms and unused lands while rural workers also seized properties – often without official 
approval. By 1973, “Agricultural production had declined to the level of the early 1960s,” 
American researchers note, “and industrial production was 15 percent below the figure 
for 1971.”32 Urban and rural workers were unable to achieve a level of productivity 
sufficient to meet domestic demands, forcing the government to increase imports. When 
the increased need to import basic items and foodstuffs depleted the country’s foreign 
reserves, the government resorted to printing money. Inflation skyrocketed. Meanwhile, 
Washington viewed Allende’s socialist government as a threat to regional security and 
continued to oppose it by diplomatic and economic means.  
Allende’s internal policies, combined with the external policy of the United States 
to “squeeze” the Chilean economy, produced spectacular results. “The money supply 
increased by 116% in 1971, and in mid-1972 the inflation rate reached 5 percent a 
month,” political scientist Paul Sigmund observes. “The Chilean wage earner saw his 
entire 22 percent wage readjustment disappear in the first five months of 1972, and 
shortages of food and replacement parts led to massive dissatisfaction expressed in 
women’s marches, shopkeeper’s strikes, and continued violence in the streets.”33 
Inflation jumped to a record 150% by December 1972, and showed no signs of slowing 
down. In late 1973, just prior to the coup, the Central Bank estimated that the rate of 
inflation for the year would surpass 500%.34   
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On the political front, Allende moved even more swiftly. He formally 
reestablished diplomatic ties with Cuba on 12 November 1970 – just nine days after 
taking office. “The move was hardly surprising, given Allende’s election promises,” 
historian Tanya Harmer notes, but it did give “Havana its first diplomatic opening in 
Latin America since 1964.” The reengagement with Cuba also reflected Allende’s 
personal friendship with Fidel Castro and his deep ties to the regional revolutionary 
movement. “In 1966 [Allende] participated in the Tricontinental Conference,” Harmer 
explains. “Subsequently, he was one of those who proposed the formation of the 
Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS)” and he also attended its inaugural 
meeting in 1967. “Then, in February 1968,” Harmer continues, “Allende inspired 
Havana’s unswerving gratitude when he accompanied the three Cuban survivors of Che’s 
guerrilla column in Bolivia out of Chile to safety after their escape to that country.”35  
Despite the sympathies of powerful political figures like Salvador Allende and 
Fidel Castro, guerrilla movements came late to Chile and had difficulty taking root. Some 
five hundred Chileans had travelled to Cuba by 1962. Yet unlike other South American 
nations, not all of them received revolutionary instruction. Chile’s legal Communist 
Party, one of the strongest in Latin American, “has refused to send members to Cuba for 
guerrilla warfare training,” analysts of the CIA reported, “as the [Chilean] Socialists have 
done.” 36 Although some number of Chilean militants did receive instruction in the 
techniques guerrilla warfare while visiting the island, the first revolutionary movement in 
the country did not form until several years later. A declassified U.S. Department of State 
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analysis of “Guerrilla and Terrorist Activity in Latin America” in 1964 discussed 
insurgent activity in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela among South 
American nations. Chile merited no mention.37 The country’s leftist students, enamored 
by the Cuban Revolution and the writings of Che Guevara, soon sought to rectify the 
situation.  
Radical students in Concepción formed the Movement of the Revolutionary Left 
(MIR) in 1965. They envisioned the group as the vanguard of revolution in Chile. The 
MIR began its “armed struggle” in 1969 seeking to foment revolution among Chilean 
campesinos in the south and urban workers in the cities. However, the movement 
remained less dangerous and less well known than its Ação Libertadora Nacional (ALN) 
counterparts in Brazil or the Montoneros in Argentina. The MIR “probably has a 
hardcore membership of two thousand or so -- mostly students,” the CIA judged in 1972. 
“Although scornful of the parliamentary path to socialism, the MIR reached an 
accommodation with Allende in 1970,” the analysts continued. “The MIR remained 
outside the [Unidad Popular coalition], but provided qualified support for its programs 
and manpower for Allende’s personal security force. Allende, for his part, freed members 
of the MIR imprisoned under Frei and permitted the MIR to pursue its revolutionary 
activities without government harassment.”38 The MIR eventually failed in its efforts to 
convert Allende’s “road to socialism” into a revolution, but the militants’ actions did 
serve as a powerful catalyst for counterrevolution.  
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Members of Allende’s inner circle began worrying about his physical security 
even before he took office. The CIA was correct in its assessment that the MIR provided 
support. However, relations between the MIR and Allende’s government remained 
contentious. One MIR member later confided that the militants “did not consider 
protecting a president who represented the bourgeois Chilean institutionalism to be 
particularly ‘honorable.’” For its part, the new government did not fully trust the MIR. 
Therefore, it looked to Havana for internal security assistance. Allende’s daughter Beatriz 
made the initial request on 14 September 1970 and Fidel quickly dispatched a three-man 
survey team of advisors to assess the situation. Among them was Beatriz’s new husband, 
a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans helped form a new security detail for Allende, 
known as the Grupo de Amigos Personales (Group of Personal Friends – GAP), and also 
began providing arms to the Chileans. “Later, after November 1970 [when Allende took 
office], Cuba began supplying the GAP with more arms,” Tanya Harmer argues, “while 
other members of Cuba’s Tropas Especiales – including members of Castro’s own 
bodyguard – began arriving in Chile to offer logistical training.”39 
 While tolerating the MIR, and increasing the role of the Cubans, President 
Allende also sought to safeguard his socialist government by eliciting domestic military 
support. Ironically, his own actions helped politicize the formerly aloof Chilean armed 
forces and bring about his own downfall. Military officers in Brazil and Argentina had 
long involved themselves in their countries’ internal development. In Chile, on the other 
hand, it was Allende who drew military officers into the country’s internal economic 
development. In his early attempts to link the military to his administration as a powerful 
support group, Allende envisioned the armed forces as a force for national development. 
                                               




In a speech given in Temuco in March 1971, Allende promoted military involvement in 
the future development of the copper and steel industries, atomic energy, and scientific 
research.  President Allende “cleverly appealed to the armed forces,” historian Frederick 
Nunn notes, “by saying that there was no such thing as a modern, well-trained, well-
equipped army, navy, or air force in an underdeveloped country.”40  At the same time 
Allende continued his relations with the Cubans. Fidel Castro visited Chile and enjoyed a 
three week tour of the country in November 1971.41 
In his attempts to include the Chilean military in matters of national development, 
Allende seems to have overlooked two very important events in regional history: the 
Brazilian coup of 1964 and the Argentine coup of 1966. Both these events occurred 
during an era of social and economic turmoil in which the armed forces felt compelled to 
act to prevent civil war. In each case the generals seized control of the government and 
ousted the civilian leadership. Moreover, both movements found their roots in the 
National Security Doctrine developed by the Brazilian Escola Superior de Guerra.  The 
Chilean armed forces in the early 1970s had no such doctrine, until Allende helped give 
them one. “In short,” Nunn explains, “a Chilean civilian was infusing a developmentalist 
attitude into the armed forces (particularly the army) for his own purposes, thinking he 
could control that spirit.”42  
President Allende also drew military officers into the role of internal security. In 
October 1972, Allende signed a law prohibiting possession of machineguns and heavy 
weapons by anyone other than the military and Carabineros. Additionally, the new Arms 
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Control Law designated the Ministry of Defense as responsible for arms searches, not, as 
previously, the Ministry of Interior (Carabineros). This law granted broad powers to the 
armed forces to conduct arms searches for illegal arms and prosecute violators in military 
courts. By upsetting the separation of defense and internal security/police functions that 
existed prior to the law, the Arms Control Law undermined the moderating role of the 
Carabineros and further increased the politicization of the military. The Armed Forces 
immediately began conducting raids to locate arms caches; placing themselves in direct 
opposition to powerful social groups (like the MIR) and reinforcing their fears of rampant 
arms smuggling and arming of civilian groups with direct, institutional evidence. 
“Initially, the military chose not to enforce it [the Arms Control Law],” Paul Sigmund 
notes, “but when they began to do so in 1973 the arms searches revealed stockpiling of 
arms by both sides [Left and Right-wing groups], which undoubtedly contributed to the 
military decision to take power that September.”43  
The United States did not end its relations with the Chilean military after the 
inauguration of Salvador Allende. But as the country’s situation worsened, Washington 
provided no internal security support. Three Special Action Force teams visited Chile in 
1971. Green Beret instructors taught a course on military parachuting and conducted 
training on engineer equipment and armored vehicle maintenance. The following year 
only two teams traveled to Chile. One established an English language laboratory while 
the other presented an airmobile staff operations course. In 1973 the Special Action Force 
increased the number of visits to Chile, but the training it provided was mundane and 
unrelated to the crisis gripping the nation. Green Beret teams established another 
                                               




language lab and taught two additional maintenance courses. The fourth mission provided 
engineer construction training related to soil analysis.44  
Although President Allende and the Chilean generals disdained American internal 
security training they did continue accepting U.S. military aid. That assistance, in the 
form of conventional training and equipment, continued after Allende’s election but it did 
not increase sharply. American military aid provided to Chile between 1971 and 1974 
averaged $12.2 million, slightly lower than the 1962 to 1969 average of $12.6 million. 
On the other hand, U.S. economic aid to Chile did decrease dramatically.  However, that 
decline began several years before Allende’s election (see Table 9.1).45 Because the 
United States wanted to retain its links to the Chilean Armed Forces after 1970, and 
President Allende sought to avoid alienating his military, the amount of American 
conventional military aid to Chile remained generally unchanged.  
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Table 9.1: United States Economic and Military Aid to Chile 1962-1974. 
 
Meanwhile, Allende also accepted Cuban internal security assistance and arms, 
but not for Chile’s uniformed services. “Ever since Allende’s direct request for Cuban 
security assistance in September 1970,” Harmer explains, “the Cubans had been helping 
the Chileans by collaborating with their intelligence services and arming Allende’s 
bodyguard, the GAP. As one of the MIR’s leaders later recalled, the Cubans helped turn 
the GAP into an ‘organized military structure’ with ‘schools of instruction’… Beyond the 
GAP, the Cubans would also separately train and arm sectors of the MIR, the PS 
[Socialist Party], the PCCh [Chilean Communist Party], and MAPU [Movement for 
Popular Action] during Allende’s time in office.”46 
Furthermore, Allende converted Chile into a safe haven for Southern Cone 
revolutionaries during his tenure. In mid-1972, militants of the Argentine Ejército 
Revolucionario del Pueblo –ERP escaped from prison. They commandeered a plane and 
                                               

























fled into exile, but their destination was not Cuba. Instead they flew to Chile “where they 
then requested asylum.” “By the end of 1972,” one historian notes, “there were 
Uruguayan Tupamaros and approximately one thousand Brazilian left-wing exiles living 
in Chile.” Cuban training and arming of leftist guerrillas and paramilitary groups like the 
Grupo de Amigos Personales, and the growing number of foreign revolutionaries 
flocking to the country, exacerbated government tensions with the Chilean armed forces 
and helped undermine Allende’s control of the military.  
Cracks in Allende’s civilian control of the military became fissures in 1973. 
Interventionists in the army attempted to oust him in late June. Men of the Second 
Armored Regiment drove their tanks to the presidential palace and opened fire. 
Constitutionalist army units still loyal to the government suppressed the rebellion, but at a 
cost of twenty-two killed and thirty-two wounded both civilian and military. The tancazo 
(dubbed that because of the use of tanks and to differentiate it from the earlier tacnazo of 
1969), highlighted the growing institutional split between rival factions of the military. 
President Allende added to the polarization in a radio address later that same day when he 
stated: “I call upon the people to take over all the industries, all firms, to be alert; to come 
to the center of the city, but not to become victims; the people should come out into the 
streets, but not to be machinegunned, do it with prudence.” He added, “If the moment 
comes the people will have arms.”47 Splits in the army and Allende’s threat to arm his 
supporters both threatened the Chilean Army as an institution. The army still remained 
loyal, but social and political polarization had badly frayed the sinews of civilian control 
over the military. 
                                               




While the generals worried about the growing rifts in their institutions, and the 
external threat of rival armed groups, the MIR and other leftists added yet another danger 
to the list of their fears. “Like other Chileans,” CIA analysts reported in late 1972, “men 
in uniform are disturbed by shortages of consumer goods and by rising inflation. They are 
concerned in particular that the policies of the regime are accelerating the polarization of 
Chilean society and leading to a breakdown of public order.” “The security forces are 
also disturbed by reports the government is abetting the arming of MIR supporters,” the 
analysts continued, “that it is doing nothing to check the proliferation of illegal armed 
groups, and that the Communists, Socialists, and the MIR are intent upon infiltrating the 
armed forces.”48 Guerrilla and radical Leftists’ efforts to infiltrate the military exactly 
conformed to the armed forces’ fears of Communist subversion. It also represented a 
potentially lethal threat to the institution of the military. “Intoxicated by a dream of 
popular revolution,” another author notes, “radical students from the MIR took up 
paramilitary training and attempted to infiltrate the armed forces, imagining the troops 
would side with them to bring down capitalism forever.” Chilean generals feared they 
might succeed.49  
Conditions in Chile had deteriorated to such a degree by mid-1973 that for the 
first time in more than four decades civilians were openly calling for the military to 
intervene. “When civilians began clamoring openly for a coup, they touched a chord of 
military pride,” Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzeula judge. “Hundreds of 
housewives, irate over food lines and convinced the government was planning to impose 
leftist indoctrination in schools, threw chicken feed at soldiers on parade.” Senior Chilean 
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officers bristled at the public criticism. “We felt vilified and cornered,” Air Force General 
Gustavo Leigh later explained, “the people were calling us cowards.” On 22 August, a 
majority of the Chamber of Deputies declared the Allende government’s actions 
unconstitutional and called on the military to “place an immediate end” to the state of 
affairs.50 Public scorn and civilian demands for a coup d’état were among the last straws 
the armed forces could bear. Constitutionalist Army Commander Carlos Prats resigned on 
23 August.  
By late 1973, President Allende and his Leftist supporters had driven the country 
far down the “road to socialism.”  Yet the pace of revolution was too slow for many of 
those on the far Left and Allende began to lose control of his political coalition, and most 
importantly the spiraling violence.  Meanwhile, his policies incurred increasing resistance 
from those on the right, both within the government and amongst the population. 
Allende’s control of the military, and the country, soon slipped from his grasp. Although 
external factors – including the opposition of the United States—exacerbated conditions 
in Chile, it was Allende’s own actions that drove the country to the brink of civil war. On 
the day of General Prats resignation President Allende selected General Augusto 
Pinochet as the new army commander.51 It was a bad choice. Pinochet led a revolt against 
Allende nineteen days later. “President Allende failed because he lacked the power to 
impose a revolutionary socialist regime yet insisted on employing the rhetoric of 
revolution,” Brian Loveman observes. His policies, missteps and tolerance of the radical 
Left “set the stage for a counterrevolution that imposed upon Chile a regime of coercion, 
intolerance, and brutality unequaled since the era of conquest.”52  
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COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN CHILE: THE PINOCHET REGIME 
On September 11, 1973, the residents of Santiago experienced war. The nation’s 
armed forces had fired the opening salvos of a self-declared internal war in Chile. The 
first “enemy” the military attacked was their own government. Chilean Air Force planes 
bombed and strafed the La Moneda presidential palace in downtown Santiago. Army 
units followed and assaulted the burning building with tanks and infantry. The attack 
ended the socialist presidency of Salvador Allende and his life. He reportedly committed 
suicide rather than surrender. The assault also brought to a close four decades of 
uninterrupted constitutional rule in Chile, yet the fighting did not end there. The 
conventional attack to overthrow Allende was brief – it lasted just one day. The internal 
“dirty war” it unleashed persisted for years. As in Brazil and Argentina, the Chilean 
military saw itself at war with subversive Communism. Like those nations, it responded 
by replacing its “flawed” democracy with a military dictatorship dedicated to reforming 
the country. “Marxist resistance is not finished,” Pinochet declared to the nation ten days 
after the coup. “There are still extremists left. Chile continues in a state of internal 
war.”53 
Like his counterparts in Brazil and Argentina, Pinochet installed a regime that 
implemented the central elements of the National Security Doctrine. He replaced 
democracy with a dictatorship and he restricted political and social rights. His 
government also later imposed a program of economic restructuring by decree rather than 
by consensus. Unlike their Brazilian counterparts, Chilean officers had no long-prepared 
doctrine or elaborate plans for internal security and internal economic development.54 
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They also had little experience in government. Because Pinochet and his officers lacked 
both experience and a well-developed plan, they imported their internal security and 
economic development models. Pinochet’s economic policies had their roots in the 
United States. His security policy, on the other hand, he derived from Brazil.  
General Augusto Pinochet lacked a definitive plan for the country at the time of 
the coup; however, one Chilean officer did have a concept for internal security. He was 
also a former student and protégé of Pinochet’s at the Chilean Army War College. His 
name was Colonel Juan Manuel Contreras. Pinochet and Contreras shared much the same 
views regarding the need to apply harsh measures in response to internal security threats. 
“I hope the army will not have to come out,” Pinochet stated in 1971 in response to 
request by President Allende to help quell civil disturbances, “because if it does, it will be 
to kill.”55  Other Chilean officers agreed. At a dinner party prior to the coup, a 
constitutionalist army colonel commented on the turnout for a pro-Allende rally several 
days before, “a million people is impressive, don’t you think?” His companion, a young 
navy officer replied, “I believe our last census count reported our population at ten 
million. Surely we could get along with nine.”56 However, the harsh internal security 
views of Pinochet, Contreras and others likely formed many years earlier.  
As was the case throughout South America, Chilean officers studied insurgency 
during the post-World War II era. “Chilean soldiers translated accounts of 
counterinsurgency operations in places ranging from Algeria and Vietnam to Northern 
Ireland,” one author notes. These officers also formed their own opinions and judgements 
about how best to confront the new revolutionary threats of the 1960s and discussed them 
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in the Chilean Army War Academy’s journal. Some officers were critical of American 
counterinsurgency doctrine. “In 1966 Major Manuel Contreras wrote that the pernicious 
nature of Marxist-Leninism had caused the Vietnam War, fracturing the country and 
causing guerrillas to take up arms against their fellow countrymen,” John Bawden 
observes. Contreras “believed the United States was wasting time with politically 
sensitive strategies.”57 As the Vietnam War progressed, American counterinsurgency lost 
much of its appeal and some Chilean officers advocated elements of French counter 
revolutionary war theory as a more effective doctrine. “In the wake of the Tet Offensive 
(1968), Contreras and Colonel Augustín Toro-both writing from the academy of war-
offered a more complete analysis of the [Vietnam] conflict,” John Bawden continues, 
“including their conviction that Washington could only win the war if it continued to 
send its best trained and committed special forces to confront the Viet Cong while 
simultaneously abandoning all efforts to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Vietnamese 
population. In their view, ‘killing guerrillas, destroying their hideouts, and submitting the 
civilian population to the strictest surveillance’ was the only way the war would be 
won.”58  
Pinochet and the Chilean generals did not seek American internal security advice 
or assistance in toppling the Allende government. Nor did they ask for U.S. Army help in 
conducting their counterrevolution after the coup. By 1973, the American military were 
not the experts in confronting internal subversion. U.S. forces had only recently 
completed their ignominiously withdrawal from Vietnam that same August. Instead, the 
internal security experts in South America were the Brazilians, and the Chileans turned to 
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them for help after the coup d’état. “The Brazilians,” Tanya Harmer notes, were 
“obviously inclined to help… the Brazilian ambassador in Santiago personally extended 
recognition to the junta early on 11 September. ‘We won,’ he reportedly exclaimed. 
Brasilia then offered the Chilean junta immediate help with suppression [of Leftists], 
working as advisors to the new regime, as well as directly interrogating and torturing 
prisoners in Chile’s National Stadium.” 59 The mass arrests of some 7,000 Leftists and 
other “subversives” after the coup and their detention at the National Stadium echoed the 
Brazilian security forces’ “massive dragnet” operation in São Paulo in 1969.60 It was also 
similar to French mass arrests during the Battle of Algiers in 1957. Like those cases, the 
detentions in Chile also led to torture and selective executions. The use of torture was not 
the only similarity to the Brazilian and French internal security models.  
Pinochet’s dictatorship eventually exhibited all four main tenets of French 
“revolutionary war” doctrine. First, it conceptualized threats to the country’s internal 
security as being part of a global total war against Marxism. “The feat of September 11 
brought Chile into the heroic struggle against Marxist dictatorship that is fought by 
freedom-loving peoples,” Pinochet told the nation on the date of the coup. “This same 
freedom-seeking spirit that moved the Czechs and Hungarians to fight against a powerful 
and merciless enemy, inspired the Chilean people to defeat international Marxism.”61  
Second, Pinochet, Contreras and other senior officers viewed the use of torture 
and executions as legitimate means to confront and root out the Marxist “enemy.” In 
order to justify the brutal repression and outright murder of Chilean citizens Pinochet 
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promoted the idea of Marxism as a disease. The Allende government and guerrilla 
organizations like the MIR, Pinochet and other officers believed, had “infected” Chile 
with the “disease” of Marxism. The concept that Marxism represented a sickness or 
tumor on the body of society served to dehumanize anyone on the Left who espoused 
subversive ideology, not just the armed guerrillas. Augusto Pinochet explained that, 
“Marxism is an intrinsically perverse doctrine; therefore anything that flows from it, 
regardless of how healthy it may appear to be, is corroded by the venom that gnaws at its 
roots.” Air Force Commander Gustavo Leigh was even blunter when he advised that the 
security forces must “cut out the Marxist cancer.”62 Classifying Marxism as a disease 
also helped to overcome the moral obstacle to torture and murder by agents of the State. 
The generals were not ordering their subordinates to brutalize and kill their fellow 
citizens, they were “saving” their country by excising diseased tissue.  
Third, the regime created specialized intelligence organizations to implement 
systematic repression in order to defeat Marxism. In early 1973, Manuel Contreras 
commanded an Engineer Regiment and the Tejas Verdes Army base to the west of 
Santiago and near the port city of San Antonio. Contreras apparently anticipated the 
overthrow of Salvador Allende and saw the impending crisis as an opportunity to 
implement the theories he had written about years earlier. “[A]ccording to troops 
stationed there,” Mark Ensalaco writes, “Contreras began converting the base into a 
concentration camp and interrogation center on September 9, 1973,” two days before the 
coup.63 
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After the 1973 coup d’état, Contreras transformed his experiment into the 
National Intelligence Directorate (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional or DINA) which 
bore much of the responsibility for the nearly three thousand Chileans disappeared or 
murdered by the Pinochet regime and the tens of thousands more who suffered torture 
inflicted by government agents.64  Contreras was the primary architect of state-directed 
repression in Chile. He also became the second most powerful man in the country. 
The DINA was not the only intelligence organization employed by the 
dictatorship, but it was by far the most powerful. It also existed as a parallel organization. 
Decree Law 521, of 18 June 1974, officially established the DINA as an independent, 
autonomous agency. Prior to that date, the DINA operated as a department under the 
nominal control of the national Prisoners Service (SENDET). Both arrangements placed 
the DINA outside the normal military structure. The decree law also granted DINA 
operatives unlimited powers of search and seizures and subordinated all other intelligence 
services to it. As its power grew, so too did the size of the organization. Some 600 full-
time military agents and civilian contract employees comprised the DINA at the time of 
its official inception in mid-1974. At its zenith in 1977 the organization had ballooned to 
9,300 agents and a network of informants numbering in the tens of thousands.65 
The DINA also enjoyed almost unlimited authority. “[N]o judge in any court or 
any minister in the government is going to question the matter any further,” a senior 
Chilean officer explained after the coup, “if DINA says that they are now handling the 
matter.” The same source confided to his American contact that there are three sources of 
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power in Chile: “Pinochet, God and DINA.”66 Later researchers have confirmed this 
appraisal. “Contreras reported to no one but Pinochet, the sole consumer of DINA’s 
intelligence reports. No one but Pinochet could give an order to Colonel Contreras, who, 
though he commanded no divisions, possessed more power than any other Chilean 
general.”67  
Chile is a much different country than Brazil and the structure of its repressive 
apparatus reflected those differences. Because Chile lacked multiple large metropolitan 
areas and a vast national territory, it did not develop a network of regional intelligence 
organizations, as was the case in Brazil. Instead, Contreras organized the DINA to 
operate throughout the national territory and beyond. The DINA consisted of the Interior, 
Exterior and Logistics Sections. All of the operational “warfighting” elements of the 
DINA belonged in its Interior or Exterior Sections. 
The Interior Section was “responsible for combating real or perceived internal 
subversion” within Chile, according to a declassified American intelligence report 
detailing the organization. Contreras further subdivided the Interior Section into a series 
of “brigades” with specific geographic or functional responsibilities. The Metropolitan 
Brigade operated solely within Santiago. The Interior Brigade consisted of “mobile units 
that deploy from Santiago to outlying areas.” The National Brigade was comprised of 
“military and civilian” operatives “who usually work outside of Santiago.” 68 Each of 
these brigades contained five to eight man actions teams, which conducted patrols and 
surveillance, made arrests, abducted subversives, applied torture and disposed of bodies. 
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The Citizen’s Brigade, on the other hand, was unique to Chile. It consisted of civilians 
who “usually act as informers.”69 
The creation of the DINA enabled the post-1973 dictatorship to apply counter 
terror, the fourth element of French counter revolutionary warfare, through 
disappearances and executions. Counter terror served as the means to instill fear 
throughout society in order to force the population into obedience and intimidate it away 
from supporting the Marxists. The Interior Brigades provided the DINA with its ability to 
collect intelligence. Its action teams gathered information through the systematic torture 
of subversives and their supporters, while the Citizen’s Brigade’s network of informants 
or soplones (whisperers), numbering up to 20,000 to 30,000 persons, kept watch over 
society.70 This elaborate system of surveillance was a uniquely Chilean innovation 
among the counterrevolutionary regimes of the Southern Cone. “With a networks of spies 
and informants in factories, universities, political parties, and social organizations, the 
DINA sowed mistrust among colleagues, neighbors, and friends,” Pamela Constable and 
Arturo Valenzuela judge. “The secret police tentacles also wound through the 
government itself; dossiers were gathered on employees and telephones were tapped.”71 
Together, the agents of torture and disappearance and the network of soplones instilled 
fear not only in Chilean society at large, but also within the regime itself.  
The Exterior Brigade, part of the Exterior Section, was also a Chilean invention. It 
included the “operatives who conduct traditional intelligence operations in foreign 
countries.” But it also did more. The Exterior Brigade provided Contreras with the ability 
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to strike his enemies outside Chile - what he termed an “extraterritorial capability.”72 
Contreras later expanded this capability into a regional cooperative arrangement with 
other military regimes in South America. National intelligence organizations appraised 
each other of wanted militants hiding in exile, local security forces then apprehended and 
disappeared the fugitives with the understanding that the security forces of the requesting 
country would return the favor. Contreras called the scheme Operation Condor.73  
Whom the Chilean Generals and the DINA targeted as their “Marxist enemies” 
differed from the Brazilian model and greatly impacted the human cost of Chile’s “dirty 
war.” “The Brazilian death toll from government torture, assassination, and 
‘disappearance’ for 1964-81,” Thomas Skidmore explains, “was, by the most 
authoritative account 333, which included 67 killed in the Araguaia guerrilla front in 
1972-74.”74 The fact that the Brazilian military primarily targeted just the armed 
guerrillas for execution helps explain the low incidence of deaths. Although the Brazilian 
regime tortured thousands of guerrilla supporters and sympathizers, it did not murder 
them, even during the brutal Araguaia guerrilla campaign.  
In contrast, the Chilean generals greatly expanded the scope of the “enemies” they 
faced. They took Roger Trinquier’s 1964 maxim literally. “Any individual who, in any 
fashion whatsoever, favors the objectives of the enemy” Trinquier argued, “will be 
considered a traitor and treated as such.”75 Pinochet’s regime targeted the Movement of 
the Revolutionary Left and other armed groups, but its view of its “Marxist enemy” was 
much broader and encompassed more of society than just the armed guerrillas and 
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paramilitaries. Pinochet’s government also tortured and murdered former members of 
Allende’s government, Socialist and Communist party members, labor leaders and many 
others. However, the working class, which made up the backbone of the Popular Unity’s 
electoral base, bore the brunt of the regime’s repression (see Table 9.2).76  
Table 9.2: Victims of Human Rights Abuses and Political Violence in Chile by 
Occupation, 1973-1990.  
 
 
The Pinochet dictatorship’s widespread use of torture, disappearances and 
executions in the aftermath of the coup d’état generated a growing human rights outcry. 
The regime killed more than 1,500 persons in 1973 while detaining and torturing tens of 
thousands more.77 Although the ability of groups within Chile to challenge the regime 
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remained limited during the 1970s and beyond, domestic human rights groups did 
succeed in shining an international spotlight on the abuses of the Pinochet government. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued one of the first reports 
condemning the regime for its gross violations of human rights in early 1974. The United 
Nations Human Rights Commission also took up the issue of Chile, garnering General 
Assembly resolutions accusing the country of the use of torture and other serious human 
rights abuses in December 1975 and again two years later.78 “The UN,” one author notes, 
“helped keep Chile in the international spotlight for the duration of the military 
regime.”79 
The denunciations embarrassed the Chilean government, but they also created real 
foreign policy problems for the regime. In 1974, the U.S. Congress banned military aid to 
Chile due to its poor human rights record. “A number of high-ranking [Chilean] Army 
officers,” analysts of CIA reported in January 1975, “agree that DINA’s methods of 
operation have done a great deal to tarnish Chile’s international image.”80  
The activities of DINA’s Exterior Brigade soon made matters even worse. DINA 
agents assassinated former Chilean army commander Carlos Prats and his wife in Buenos 
Aires in October 1974. Prats had become a vocal critic of the military regime and some 
feared he might be planning a counter-coup. One year later the DINA used its 
“extraterritorial capability” again. Italian agents working for the DINA shot and killed 
Bernardo Leighton and his wife in Rome. What was Leighton’s crime? He had served as 
interior minister under the government of Eduardo Frei. As the DINA continued to 
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expand its definition of “enemies” of the regime, it worsened the Pinochet government’s 
international standing. In September 1976, DINA agent Michael Townley set a car bomb 
in Washington, D.C. that killed Allende’s former defense minister Orlando Letelier. His 
American co-worker was also in the car and later died from her wounds. The attacked 
shocked Washington and as the investigation unfolded the clues pointed directly to the 
DINA. In response, the U.S. Congress passed additional legislation in mid-1976 ending 
all arms sales to Chile.81  
Pinochet sacrificed Contreras and the DINA to assuage his critics within the 
government and abroad in July 1977. He replaced the DINA with an organization 
responsible for many of the same functions and initially retained Contreras as its director. 
However, Pinochet forced Contreras to resign in November formally signaling the demise 
of his former protégé. Executions and disappearances dropped with the demise of the 
DINA, but the repression continued for many more years.82   
After gaining control of the internal security situation through brutal measures, 
Pinochet’s government sought out an economic policy that also conformed to its goals for 
the nation. The policies Pinochet adopted followed the tenets of the National Security 
Doctrine in that they avoided consensus and bypassed the political process.  However, 
Chile’s economic program differed dramatically in terms of its objectives from the 
program pursued by the Brazilian generals. Officers in Brazil sought to continue the 
country’s economic modernization through the pursuit of industrialization, state control 
of the economy and the use of state-owned enterprises. Pinochet incorporated a team of 
U.S-trained Chilean economists to advise him on how to revive the economy and reverse 
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the damages wrought by Allende’s “road to socialism.” Because those economists had 
studied at the University of Chicago, Chileans soon dubbed them the “Chicago Boys.”  
The economic plan devised and implemented by the Chicago Boys proved nearly 
as brutal as the political repression unleashed by the security forces. It also targeted 
Allende’s former base of support – the working class. “Convinced that 50 years of 
erroneous policies and their results needed to be corrected rapidly, [the Chicago Boys] 
were unconcerned that their [neoliberal reforms] would lead to the collapse of many 
industries and a massive increase in unemployment,” Marcus Taylor argues. “Provoking 
a recession, they believed, was a necessary evil in order to obliterate industries that were 
inefficient and relied upon state interventions in order to survive.” The Chicago Boys’ 
approach was the opposite of the Brazilian Generals’ state-directed industrialization plan. 
It also stood as a complete repudiation of Allende’s socialist economic program. The 
result was a “process of rapid de-industrialization” that devastated the manufacturing 
sector among other areas of the economy. Productivity of the manufacturing sector, one 
author notes, “did not recover to its 1972 level until 1987.”83   
CONCLUSION 
Chile avoided the revolutionary struggles and strife that engulfed most of its 
South American neighbors during the 1960s.  The Cuban Revolution inspired Chilean 
students, just as it had student radicals in other regional countries, but Chile was not 
fertile ground for guerrilla movements. The country’s geography made rural insurgency 
difficult. Moreover, the lack of despotic governments or severe social strife left the 
militants bereft of issues to rail against in order to gather supporters. Chile did, however, 
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experience an ongoing shift to the left in its national politics during the decade. The 
country’s traditional Leftist parties appeared to make steady progress along the electoral 
path to power. At the same time, the success of those legal Socialist and Communist 
parties in the country’s political process helped diminish the appeal of guerrilla 
revolutionary movements.   
U. S. military officers found little acceptance for American counterinsurgency 
doctrine among their Chilean counterparts throughout the 1960s. Because Chilean 
officers faced no insurgencies, and prided themselves on being apolitical, they saw no 
need to adopt or import any internal security or internal economic development models.  
Chilean military and political leaders also exerted a high degree of control over 
what military assistance they accepted from the United States. Despite the pervasive view 
of American hegemony and dominance, the United States was not able to dictate that 
Chile adopt American counterinsurgency doctrine. Instead the country sent few students 
to U.S. internal security courses and accepted only two Special Action Force mobile 
training teams related to counterinsurgency – neither of which taught tactics and doctrine.  
Only in the months preceding the 1964 presidential elections did Chilean officials seek 
out American internal security assistance. Those same officials placed tight controls on 
the support they accepted and strictly limited it to riot control and civil disturbance 
training, not counterinsurgency. The increased internal security interaction with the 
United States was a one-time event. Chilean authorities requested no American assistance 
for the 1970 elections. 
Salvador Allende’s election to the presidency of Chile in 1970 was a watershed 
for the country. Allende quickly embarked the country on his “Chilean road to socialism” 




became increasingly anxious. Allende’s election and his socialist agenda drew the ire of 
the United States. Although the Chilean President did not order the cessation of military 
relations with the Americans, he did not look to Washington for internal security advice. 
Instead, Allende turned to Havana. The new president reestablished diplomatic relations 
with the island just nine days after taking office. The first Cuban advisors arrived not 
long after and helped form and train Allende’s personal bodyguard. The Cubans also 
smuggled arms to Chile and provided weapons and training to Leftists guerrilla groups. 
At the same time, Allende courted the military and drew them into internal security and 
economic development, eroding their formerly apolitical stance.  
By 1973, the country tottered on the brink of an economic collapse and civil war. 
In September the Chilean armed forces broke the bonds of four decades of adherence to 
the constitution and ousted Allende in a bloody assault on the presidential palace. In the 
aftermath of the coup, the Chilean generals lacked long-term plans for their government. 
But they did not look to the United States for internal security advice or assistance. 
Instead they looked to the Brazilians. Army General Augusto Pinochet soon gained 
undisputed control of the military junta. He then adopted the tenets of the National 
Security Doctrine: a long-term military dictatorship to reorganize Chilean society while 
fighting an internal war against Marxism. His government also employed many of the 
same French counter revolutionary war tactics Brazil had used since 1964, but Chileans 
adapted them to fit their national circumstances.   
Pinochet embarked the nation on an internal war to cleanse it of the “Marxist 
cancer” of the Allende years. His regime followed many of the repressive precedents set 
by the Brazilians since 1964, but his subordinate Colonel Manuel Contreras also added 




organizations – as in Brazil, Contreras designed the National Intelligence Directorate 
(DINA) as a single centralized entity to conduct torture, disappearances and executions 
throughout Chile. Contreras also added two new capabilities: a network of informants to 
gather intelligence and sow fear and an external section to strike his enemies abroad. The 
assassination of political foes in Buenos Aires, Rome and Washington by DINA 
operatives, or by local agents at the request of Contreras, worsened the international 
human rights backlash against the Pinochet regime.  
At home in Chile, Pinochet and Contreras also adopted a much broader view than 
the Brazilians as to who their enemies were. They targeted armed leftists groups and 
Socialist and Communist party members, but they also focused much of their wrath on 
Chilean workers. Pinochet later adopted a neoliberal economic program that also 
punished the working class and industry. In expanding the scope of their “enemies” and 
using the economy as a weapon, the Pinochet regime set a brutal new precedent for the 





Chapter Ten: Counter Revolutions in Argentina 
Argentina suffered one of the worst periods of political and economic instability 
in its history during the post-World War Two era. Political violence and economic 
downturns led the military to overthrow what it deemed to be ineffective governments in 
1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976. A staggering thirteen presidents governed the country 
between 1960 and the return to democracy in 1983.1 However, this turmoil was not the 
result of the National Security Doctrine. Instead, the military regimes of 1966 and 1976 
imposed their versions of the NSD in an effort to control the effects of Peronism and 
remedy the nation’s political and economic ills. 
The country also faced multiple rural insurgency attempts during the 1960s. The 
first foco, inspired by the 1959 Cuban Revolution, began late that same year in Tucumán 
Province. It quickly foundered, but others followed. All of the guerrilla focos lacked local 
support and once detected, the security forces easily defeated them. Urban insurgency, on 
the other hand, proved both more enduring and more violent. Argentina’s urban guerrilla 
era began in the aftermath of the cordobazo, a spontaneous uprising in the city of 
Córdoba in 1969. Argentine security forces eventually defeated the urban guerrillas after 
several years of internal strife and violence, but the methods they used imposed a horrific 
cost on Argentine society.  
Latin American agency once again demonstrated considerable power. Argentina 
resisted American efforts to establish a regional military alliance during the early 1950s. 
The country only relented and signed a formal military assistance agreement with 
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Washington in 1964 – more than a decade after most of its South American neighbors. 
When the Argentines did sign, they did so for their own reasons. In a time of severe 
economic constraints during the mid-1960s, political and military leaders in Buenos Aires 
parlayed Washington’s Cold War fears into a successful effort to have the American 
government fund much of their military modernization efforts. Argentina accepted 
conventional American military equipment and training, but the nation’s generals had 
little interest in U.S. internal security doctrine.  
While Cuba’s revolution inspired Southern Cone Leftists, the Brazilian army’s 
“success” at achieving internal stability and the country’s “economic miracle” captured 
the attention of Argentine military officers. General Juan Carlos Onganía seized power in 
Buenos Aires in 1966. He sought to implement an “Argentine Revolution” modeled on 
the Brazilian Revolution of 1964. Onganía’s internal restructuring program faltered in the 
aftermath of the 1969 cordobazo. Other Argentine generals toppled him in an internal 
military coup d’état in 1970. They too proved unable to impose stability and eventually 
relinquished authority to civilian politicians once again, allowing new elections in 1973.  
Those elections led to the return of Juan Perón, who had been living in exile since 
his ouster by the military in 1955. The seventy-eight year old former dictator assumed the 
presidency and negotiated a social pact that brought calm to the nation. Stability proved 
fleeting. Perón died in July 1974 and the social compact crumbled. By 1975 violence 
again wracked the country as armed groups on the Left and Right terrorized one another 
through bombings and assassinations. The Argentine Army seized power once more in 
1976 and unleashed the most brutal military regime in the Southern Cone.  
As was the case in Brazil and Chile, American counterinsurgency doctrine held 




during the 1960s and 1970s. Generals in Buenos Aires perceived the return of Peronism 
as the most immediate threat to their country and their institutions, not rural insurgency. 
Consequently, Argentina sent few students to American internal security courses. For 
example, Argentina sent just seven students to the School of the Americas 
counterinsurgency courses between 1961 and 1964. During the same time period Peru 
boasted seventy-one graduates while Venezuela counted seventy-nine.  
Argentina also shunned most Special Action Force mobile training teams related 
to counterinsurgency. Between 1962 and 1973, Argentina received a total of twenty-nine 
MTT visits from the Canal Zone-based Green Berets. Four of those missions related to 
counterinsurgency, but only one taught tactics. Eighty-six percent of the Special Action 
Force mobile training teams that Argentina accepted related to civic action and 
conventional military skills, not internal security. Moreover, Buenos Aires did not request 
military assistance from Washington when facing internal unrest. Why did Argentine 
military leaders reject American counterinsurgency training if it was readily available and 
funded by the United States? 
Generals in Argentina, like their Brazilian and Chilean counterparts, replaced 
their elected democracies with dictatorships implementing nation-specific versions of the 
National Security Doctrine. These countries did not receive those doctrines from the 
United States; instead they crafted their own concepts. Argentina received an infusion of 
counter revolutionary warfare theories directly from French veterans of Indochina and 
Algeria. Paris dispatched several army officers to serve in a military advisory mission, 
established in Buenos Aires in 1957. Those same French officers taught internal security 




Argentine Army field manuals related to internal security in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.  
Argentina’s path to the “dirty war” took place over the course of two military 
dictatorships. Those regimes represent a continuation and evolution of the National 
Security Doctrine in Argentina. The 1966 and 1976 dictatorships both restricted political 
competition and civilian participation in government. Both also pursued a technocratic 
plan of national development managed by military officers. Neither pursued winning the 
hearts and minds of the population. General Onganía’s 1966 “Argentine Revolution” 
sought to pre-empt the outbreak of a subversive war by legislating morality and ending 
the country’s bitter political competition. That effort failed. However, it did have 
important implications for the next succeeding and last dictatorship.  
By the mid-1970s, unrest in Argentina verged on an outright civil war. Residents 
of Buenos Aires endured assassinations and bombings on a daily, even hourly basis.2 
Army General Jorge Rafael Videla seized power in 1976 and unleashed a brutal internal 
war on his country to reestablish order. The failure of the legalistic approach of the 1966 
regime helped convince Videla and his generals to adopt extra-constitutional and illegal 
measures. Videla’s regime undertook the widespread use of torture, disappearance and 
murder to eliminate their enemies and intentionally created a climate of fear to terrorize 
the population into obedience. It also attempted to conceal its repressive enterprise to 
avoid the human rights backlash that the military regimes in Brazil and Chile had faced.  
Why was the dirty war in Argentina several times more deadly than in Brazil and 
Chile? Like their neighbors, generals in Buenos Aires responded to the threat of 
revolution with home-grown National Security Doctrines and French counter 
                                               




revolutionary tactics. The tactics and doctrine the Argentine Army used were similar, but 
its leaders greatly expanded the number of “enemies” they chose to attack. Beyond the 
armed guerrillas, Argentina’s generals also fought religious, economic and cultural 
adversaries in an effort to achieve an enduring victory in their three decade long battle 
against Peronism.   
THE ORIGINS OF COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY DOCTRINE IN ARGENTINA  
Nature endowed Argentina with a wealth of natural resources; among the most 
important are its fertile Pampas which have long shaped its economy. Before the 1930s, 
the nation’s economy was still primarily agricultural and driven by export-led growth.3 
The country first sought to manufacture previously imported simple consumer goods and 
agricultural tools in the 1930s as a response to the disruption of imports during World 
War One and the Great Depression.4 Like other Latin American nations it implemented 
elements of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), a nationalistic economic policy 
that seeks to replace dependence on imported goods with the ability to manufacture such 
products domestically. However, like its neighbors, Argentina also learned that pursuing 
ISI becomes increasingly more problematic in its latter stages. The increased costs of 
implementing these policies usually forces a corresponding reduction in expenditures 
directed toward the popular sector and social spending, which often results in social 
unrest and economic turmoil.   
Argentina’s industrialization gained momentum in the late 1940s and 1950s. The 
military administration that took power in June of 1943 encouraged the development of 
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the manufacturing sector of the economy for the first time, whereas previous 
governments – usually led by agricultural elites – sought to prevent it.5 However, it was 
not until the presidency of Juan Perón (1946-1955) that state-directed industrialization 
became government policy.  
Perón also changed the rules of the political game and exacerbated social conflict. 
He crafted a powerful coalition of working-class labor, the bureaucratic middle-class (the 
military and government employees) and industrial elites. He then set his new coalition in 
direct opposition to the country’s traditional agricultural elites. Perón’s vision for the 
nation rested on two pillars: industrialization (to create jobs - and thus more supporters) 
and the redistribution of agricultural export earnings (to fund industrialization while 
increasing wages and lowering prices for his followers).  
Perón presided over dramatic changes in the composition of Argentina’s economy 
and its productive sectors. Labor unions surged in membership as the National Labor 
Confederation (Confederación General del Trabajo - CGT) grew from 520,000 in 1945 to 
almost 2.3 million in 1954. Perón also greatly expanded the public sector. The Army 
grew from 30,000 in 1943 to 100,000 by 1945. Public sector civilian employment also 
expanded from 243,000 in 1943 to 541,000 by 1955 – in part due to an effort to mask 
growing unemployment. By 1955, Perón’s policies had generated an economic crisis, and 
in September the military removed him from power.6  
Juan Perón’s nearly decade-long tenure as president made an enduring impact on 
Argentine politics, society and economy. First, he implemented state-direction of the 
economy. Second, he led a political mobilization of the working class and a polarization 
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of society into two opposing factions (the agricultural sector and the urban middle-class 
aligned against the working-class). Lastly, he converted control of the government into a 
“winner-takes-all” concept whereby whoever won the presidency would no longer share 
the fruits of the economy equitably. Instead, political groups expected the chief executive 
to distribute those gains as “rents” or spoils to political supporters and favored sectors.7 
Consequently, the new system encouraged the opposition to undermine government 
policies and force them from office in order to gain another turn at controlling the rents. 
For his supporters, Perón became an almost mythical savior. After his fall, they longed 
for his return to power. Many military officers, on the other hand, saw him as a 
dangerous demagogue and a threat to the social order.  
Instability stalked Argentina after Perón’s ouster in 1955. No president equaled 
his almost ten years in office until the election of Carlos Menem in 1989. Instead, 
Argentina suffered a series of military governments and interrupted civilian presidencies. 
An interim military government led by General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu followed 
Perón. In the first of many attempts to break the power of Peronism, Aramburu dissolved 
the Peronist party and imposed government control of the CGT labor federation.8 On the 
economic front, Aramburu de-emphasized industrialization and shifted economic policy 
back in favor of agricultural exports, redistributing income from consumers to the rural 
sector dominated by elite landowners. After some initial success, the economy turned 
downward again and Aramburu had to schedule new presidential elections.9  
Arturo Frondizi won the presidency in 1958 – without the participation of the 
Peronist party. Frondizi shifted the country back onto a developmentalist track, but he 
                                               
7 Wynia, Argentina in the Postwar Era, 10, 80.  
8 Rock, Argentina, 334.  




also implemented a “deepening” of ISI funded by public and foreign investment. 10 His 
economic policies had a dramatic effect: real income of industrial workers dropped 25.8 
percent in 1959 while real income from beef production rose by 97 percent. Nevertheless, 
Frondizi’s administration also generated a political and economic crisis, and the military 
ousted him from office in March 1962.11  
The military government that followed Frondizi held power only until new 
elections in July 1963. Again the military banned Peronist party participation. Arturo 
Illia, a small town country doctor, won the election, but he garnered only twenty-five 
percent of the votes cast. During his tenure, Dr. Illia sought to break the country’s cycles 
of instability through greater political inclusion and an attempt to forge a working 
relationship with labor and the Peronists. However, his economic policies led to spiraling 
inflation. Agriculturalists, industrialists and organized labor united in opposition to the 
Illia government as the economy worsened in early 1966. President Illia’s policies of 
inclusion and compromise ultimately failed.12 The military regime that replaced him 
instead chose to rely on exclusion and forced compliance. Army General Juan Carlos 
Onganía seized power in 1966. He then set about implementing an Argentine version of 
the National Security Doctrine.  
Meanwhile, Washington had little common ground to form a military alliance 
with Buenos Aires in the 1960s. The two countries endured problematic relations 
throughout much the Twentieth Century and World War Two was no exception. The 
Argentine military’s pro-German sympathies caused some American policymakers to 
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view the nation as a potential adversary, rather than a potential ally.13 Argentina’s 
political leaders did eventually join the Allies, but only in the waning days of the war 
when it was certain that the Axis powers faced defeat. Unlike other regional countries, 
the United States and Argentina had no wartime alliance on which to base their military 
relations in the Cold War era. 
The United States began forging a regional military alliance in the early 1950s as 
a bulwark against possible encroachment into the Western Hemisphere by the Soviet 
Union. Argentina resisted those efforts. Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, and Peru signed 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreements (MDAAs) with the United States in 1952. Brazil 
and Uruguay followed in 1953. Bolivia tarried and did not sign an accord until 1958. Yet 
Argentina held out. Buenos Aires again refused to follow Washington’s lead, and 
declined to sign an MDAA during the 1950s. Because of the lack of an agreement, the 
country did not receive a U.S. Army mission until 1960. Buenos Aires finally relented 
and signed a formal military assistance agreement with Washington in 1964 – more than 
a decade after most other South American nations.14 
In the interim, Buenos Aires looked to France for military advice.  In 1956, the 
military government of President Aramburu sought to form a relationship with the French 
armed forces. Paris agreed. In response, the French Army dispatched three colonels to 
Buenos Aires in 1957 to serve as military advisors. Those officers, all veterans of 
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Indochina and Algeria, provided a direct link to the French Army’s experiences in 
counter revolutionary warfare. The French colonels also taught courses at the Argentine 
Army’s War College (Escuela Superior de Guerra). In another sign of the burgeoning 
bilateral military relationship, Buenos Aires sent sixty senior officers to attend the French 
Army’s Ecole Supériere de Guerre (Superior War College) in Paris in 1958. The 
Argentine students also visited Algeria, just one year after the “Battle of Algiers.”15 
However, attending the French Army’s Superior War College was not new. “Argentina 
traditionally sent its Army staff officers for education abroad,” Argentine historian Diego 
Llumá explains. “The selection was made according to an order of merit list for each 
promotion group: the first place officers travelled to France, the second tier went to 
Spain, the third to Germany, and the fourth group visited the United States.”16  
Although military officers in Argentina had the same access to French works on 
revolutionary war as did their Brazilian and Chilean counterparts, they also absorbed the 
writings of their French advisors in Buenos Aires. French Lieutenant Colonel Patricio de 
Naurois published the article “Guerra Subversiva y Guerra Revolucionaria” in the 
October-December 1958 edition of the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra. de 
Naurois’ countryman, Lieutenant Colonel Henri Grand d’Esnon delivered a lecture on 
“Guerra Subversiva” at the Argentine Army’s Escuela Superior de Guerra in May 1960. 
He later published a copy of his remarks, also in the school’s magazine or revista. 
                                               
15 Diego Llumá, “Los Maestros de la Tortura,” Todo es Historia, no. 442, 6-8; Eric Steiner Carlson, “The 
Influence of French ‘Revolutionary War’ Ideology on the use of Torture in Argentina’s ‘Dirty War’” 
Human Rights Review, July-September 2000, 76; David Rock, Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist 
Movement, its History and its Impact (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 196. For the number 
of Argentine students visiting France and Algeria see Llumá, “Los Maestros de la Tortura,” 8 and  Alex A. 
Taylor del Cid, “Purging the Bad Blood: Argentina’s Long March Towards the ‘Dirty War, 1930-1985” 
(unpublished dissertation, University of Calgary, 2005), 292 note 60. Llumá claims 120 students travelled 
to Paris and Algeria while Taylor del Cid cites the number as 60. I have chosen to use the lower figure.  




Argentine authors soon took up the pen themselves and added their views about 
subversive war in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Argentine Army Lieutenant Colonel 
Manrique Miguel Mom authored the article “Guerra Revolucionaria: El Conflicto 
Mundial en Desarrollo” in 1958, while Argentine Colonel Osiris J. Villegas wrote Guerra 
Revolucionario Comunista in 1962 and Jordan Genta penned Guerra 
Contrarevolucionario in 1963.17  
Yet the French advisors and their Argentine acolytes did more than just write 
about counter revolutionary war, they also worked to disseminate their theories beyond 
Argentina. French and Argentine army officers hosted the first “Inter-American Course 
on Counter Revolutionary War” in Buenos Aires in October 1961. One hundred and 
thirty-three officials and officers from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and 
Argentina” participated in the course, according to the official history of the Escuela 
Superior de Guerra, which hosted the event.18 
Afterwards, the French Ambassador to Argentina sent a message to his superiors 
in Paris informing them of the course and lauding his officers. “The role of the French 
advisers in the conception and preparation this course has been determinant [i.e. 
decisive],” Ambassador De Blanquet du Chayla wrote. There was more. He also 
informed the Foreign Ministry that the Americans were “jealous of the French advisors’ 
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influence with the Argentine Army staff and in the Escuela Superior de Guerra in Buenos 
Aires.”19  
This direct French interaction with the Argentine Army in the late 1950s and early 
1960s strongly shaped Argentine officers’ views. French officers helped draft Argentine 
Army doctrine in field manuals such as “Operations Against Irregular Forces” and their 
concepts influenced national policy like Plan CONINTES (Plan for Civil Insurrection 
Against the State) during the late 1950s.20 The French advisors also helped design several 
Argentine Army counter revolutionary war exercises beginning in 1959.21 Therefore, like 
their Brazilian army counterparts, the Argentine Army had developed its own counter 
revolutionary doctrine and was conducting its own internal security exercises before the 
United States Army began formally teaching counter guerrilla (and later 
counterinsurgency) courses in 1961. “For three years the French military advisers 
prepared the pillars of the doctrine of the dirty war,” Diego Llumá argues, “and 
ideologically formed some officers who would become generals in the decade of the 
seventies.”22 Meanwhile, the French Ambassador was correct. The United States’ 
military influence was minimal at best.  
Argentina faced its first rural foco at the end of the 1950s. Inspired by the recent 
Cuban Revolution, young revolutionaries took to the hills in Tucumán and Salta 
Provinces in the country’s remote northwest in October 1959. Argentines knew them as 
the “Uturuncos” or Tiger-men, because their leader chose that Quechua word (meaning 
tigre) as his guerrilla nom d’guerre. The would-be revolutionaries successfully attacked a 
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remote police station, seizing weapons and uniforms, but the project foundered soon 
after.  Despite their ferocious sounding title, the hardships of the guerrilla life proved too 
much for the Tiger-men, most of whom were middle class students. This first rural foco 
collapsed under the pressure of the local security forces and the arrival of the rainy 
season. The guerrilla force was too small and too fleeting to require the deployment of 
the country’s military forces. However, the generals did use the Uturunco threat as a 
pretext to force civilian President Arturo Frondizi to implement Plan CONINTES in 
March 1960. Military leaders swiftly used their expanded powers under the plan, but not 
to respond to rural guerrillas. Instead, they declared emergency zones in urban areas like 
Buenos Aires, intervened in labor unions, and arrested hundreds of striking workers.23  
The U.S. Army established its first advisory mission in Buenos Aires during that 
same year of 1960. It did not take American officers long to recognize the preeminent 
role of their French counterparts regarding internal security. Consequently, U.S. Army 
officers in Argentina adopted a position unique in the hemisphere. “The major policy 
objective of the USARMIS [U.S. Army Mission to Argentina] is to increase Argentina’s 
internal security capabilities by enhancing the effectiveness of its Army in all roles 
traditionally assigned to a ground military arm,” the American officers contended in July 
1962. They then proposed a list of conventional military goals. “Achievement of the 
foregoing objectives,” they argued, “will meet the requirements of Internal Security 
Training.”24 No other U.S. Army mission in South America adopted this indirect 
approach for meeting its internal security goals. French officers’ dominant role in 
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providing internal security training to the Argentine Army meant that the American 
officers in Buenos Aires were unable to fulfill their duties in that area. U.S. Army officers 
were under pressure from policy makers in Washington and military authorities in 
Panama to disseminate counterinsurgency training and doctrine. Argentine authorities 
rejected that training. 
Therefore, the American officers in Buenos Aires developed an indirect approach 
to solve their dilemma. They argued that making the Argentine Army more effective in 
its conventional role would also make it capable of dealing with any internal threats. That 
conceptualization provided them a way to address the pressure from their superiors while 
recognizing the situation in Argentina in which their internal security training was 
unwanted.  
American officers in Buenos Aires did attempt to impart U.S. counterinsurgency 
doctrine to their Argentine counterparts, but without much success. The entrenched 
French advisors were not the only obstacle they faced. Economic and political crises, 
endemic in Argentina, affected U.S. military assistance and training. Resistance also 
arose from unexpected sources. Unlike his French counterpart, the American Ambassador 
in Buenos Aires apparently did not wholeheartedly support the efforts of his military 
officers. A survey for a counterinsurgency mobile training team mission “will be 
requested as soon as [the] U.S. Ambassador concurs in its desirability,” American Army 
officers wrote in 1962. “There has been some difficulty in obtaining full concurrence.”25 
The survey mission did eventually take place, but not until three years later in 1965.  
In the meantime, a new rural foco opened in Salta Province in 1963. Argentine 
revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara sponsored the Salta foco from his position in Cuba, 
                                               




although he did not lead them in person. Fellow Argentine Jorge Masseti, known as 
“Comandante Segundo,” directed the revolutionaries while preparing for Guevara’s 
eventual arrival. Once back in Argentina, Che would presumably become “Comandante 
Primero” and assume command of the group. By 1962, some 500 Argentines had 
travelled to Cuba. An unknown number of those visitors received training in techniques 
of guerrilla warfare from Cuban military personnel, but few of them participated in the 
1963 insurgency attempt.26 Guevara hand-selected five new guerrilla candidates instead. 
He chose them from among the nearly four hundred of his countrymen in Cuba that he 
had hosted at his Gran Asado (barbecue) in May 1962. Che directed a cadre of Cuban 
veterans that had served under his command during the revolution to train his new 
guerrilla recruits. Masetti himself had earlier received training from Cuban veterans. 
Ironically, Masetti also received urban guerrilla training in Algeria from National 
Liberation Front (FLN) revolutionaries.27 He did so at roughly the same time that French 
officers in Buenos Aires were instructing their Argentine counterparts in the counter 
revolutionary tactics they had devised to “defeat” those same FLN urban terrorists during 
the “Battle of Algiers” in 1957. 
Guevara dispatched his guerrilla foco on its mission to Argentina in late 1962, just 
as the missile crisis with United States began to unfold. Unexpectedly, the trip took six 
months to complete and included an extended layover in newly-independent Algeria. The 
beleaguered revolutionaries finally made their way to South America in May 1963 and 
landed in La Paz, Bolivia by way of São Paulo, Brazil. Bolivian Communist Party 
members helped the men of the new foco infiltrate the Argentine frontier and make their 
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way into Salta Province. Once back on Argentine soil they recruited another thirty would-
be guerrillas, many of them students from the University of Buenos Aires. The insurgents 
named themselves the Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo (Guerrilla Army of the People – 
EGP) and worked to establish an urban support network.28  
Nevertheless, the Salta foco did not succeed. In an effort to train the “troops” of 
his guerrilla army, Comandante Segundo took them on arduous marches in the rugged 
Andean foothills. The revolutionaries also established several base camps and supply 
caches during their training. However, local peasants soon reported barbudos, bearded 
men in uniforms, buying supplies to the security forces. Salta’s Rural Police dispatched a 
small eight-man patrol to investigate. The provincial policemen captured two insurgents 
who turned out to be guerrilla infiltrators from the Federal Police. Armed with insider 
knowledge, and joined by additional Rural Police members, the security forces captured 
several EGP guerrillas, confiscated arms and supplies, and even located the main rebel 
base. Meanwhile, Masetti and another twenty or so guerrillas managed to evade capture.  
Yet the foco survivors’ ordeal had just begun. “Over the course of the next 
month,” one historian notes, “the guerrillas wandered through the selva seeking food and 
refuge and finding little of either. Three died of hunger … thirteen fell into the hands of 
police with little or no resistance.” Three others died in firefights with the security forces. 
The fate of Jorge Masetti and one luckless recruit remain unknown. Presumably they died 
in the wilderness, but no one has ever found their remains.29 Once again local security 
forces succeeded in eliminating an embryonic rural foco. Argentine Army units did not 
deploy for action against the guerrillas.  
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Despite these early insurgencies, few Argentine officers availed themselves of the 
opportunities for American counterinsurgency training in the early 1960s. The French 
dominance of internal security played a major role, but Argentine officers’ pride also had 
an effect. “The Argentine Army sends NCO students [sergeants] to courses at Fort 
Gulick,” American officers explained. “Since the advisors from the French Army 
Mission teach internal security at the Escuela Superior de Guerra, officer students do not 
attend courses in the Canal Zone. This mission encourages officer attendance. However, 
the Argentine Army prefers to request officer spaces in schools in CONUS [the 
continental United States].”30 Just seven Argentine students attended the School of the 
Americas counterinsurgency course in Panama between 1961 and 1964 – out of an army 
of over 80,000 men. Meanwhile, nineteen officers received instruction at the Special 
Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The available records do not detail what 
courses the Argentine students attended at the center. However, later reports hold a clue. 
The U.S. Army mission in Buenos Aires sent another four officers to Fort Bragg for 
training in 1964. All four “will attend the Special Warfare Staff Officers Course,” the 
Americans reported, one of the four will “also attend the Psychological Warfare Officers 
Course.”31 None took the counterinsurgency course.  
Although the Argentine Army had little use for American counterinsurgency 
training, its officers continued to plan and conduct their own internal security exercises. 
U.S. Army officers in Buenos Aires were aware of these efforts and remarked on them to 
their superiors in Panama. U.S. officers did not claim any credit for these activities, but 
they did describe them using American terminology. “Counterinsurgency exercises were 
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included in the CPXs [Command Post Exercises] held during November [1964],” 
American Army officers reported. They then included some uniquely Argentine aspects, 
“[O]nly regular army personnel, including both officers and NCOs [non-commissioned 
officers] participated. Soldier conscripts are not given counterinsurgency training of any 
kind.”32 In the politically charged atmosphere of the mid-1960s, Argentine Army officers 
did not fully trust their conscript troops.  
Military relations between Washington and Buenos Aires improved in 1964 with 
the signing of a formal military assistance agreement. However, the preponderance of 
American military assistance focused on conventional military equipment and training 
rather than internal security. Moreover, the signing of the agreement represented a brief 
marriage of convenience more than it did a deep commitment by either party. 
Washington wanted to draw Argentina into its regional anti-communist alliance. For the 
Argentine military, this desire on the part of the Americans represented a golden 
opportunity. “During recent months the Government of Argentina has evidenced interest 
in concluding a Military Assistance Agreement with the United States,” American 
officers reported in mid-1963. However, the same officers judged that the Argentine 
initiative was “motivated largely by a desire to obtain on a grant [U.S. funded] or credit 
basis the equipment needed in the [country’s military modernization] plans.” In other 
words, for the Argentine generals the agreement was a means to gain American-funded 
military equipment during a period of “pressing budgetary restrictions.”33 Argentina’s 
political leaders also saw the agreement as way to benefit at the expense of the United 
States. “President [Arturo] Illia,” one historian who later interviewed him writes, “was 
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particularly attracted to [the agreement] because it provided the wherewithal to promote 
beneficial civic action projects.”34 
On 10 May 1964, Washington and Buenos Aires signed the agreement. In a show 
of goodwill on the part of the United States “an impact package was delivered to 
Argentina within 60 days of the signing of the military assistance agreement,” American 
officers in Panama explained. “The total value of the package was $2 million and 
included items for all three [Argentine military] services.” As part of the package, the 
U.S. military delivered five armored personnel carriers, ninety trucks and trailers, four 
boats, five light aircraft, two cargo planes, radios, rocket launchers and recoilless rifles.35 
Yet the honeymoon was short-lived. “Although the expeditious delivery of Grant Aid 
[U.S. purchased] equipment created a favorable impression among the Argentine Military 
Forces,” Canal Zone officers reported in 1965, “some dissatisfaction has been shown 
during the year because of the long lead times for delivery of MAP [Military Assistance 
Program] material.” Regardless of the grumblings, the United States shipped another 
thirty armored personnel carriers to Argentina in 1965. The two countries also signed a 
credit agreement for fifty A-4 fighter jets and extended the loan of two U.S. 
submarines.36  
Meanwhile, the Special Action Force conducted its first mobile training team 
mission (MTT) to Argentina in 1964. Three Green Beret teams taught military 
intelligence and engineer skills and conducted airborne training (military parachuting) 
with the Argentine Army that year. The country finally received its long awaited 
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counterinsurgency survey mission (deferred since 1962) in 1965. Another MTT returned 
to Argentina and conducted a course on counterinsurgency tactics later that same year. It 
was the only Special Action Force mission that taught American internal security tactics 
to the Argentine Army.37  
Four additional Green Beret instructor teams visited Argentina in 1965. All of 
them taught conventional military skills. The first three missions focused on artillery 
maintenance and repair, marksmanship, and engineer training classes. The fourth team 
provided instruction on the Argentine Army’s newly-acquired U.S. equipment. “Captain 
Charles H. Fry and Master Sergeant Isabelino Vasquez-Rodriguez, both of Company A, 
8th Special Forces Group (Airborne), trained Argentine personnel in the operation and 
maintenance of 90-millimeter recoilless rifles,” the Southern Command News reported in 
September 1965. During their six-week mission the two men trained fifty-three officers, 
non-commissioned officers and civilian maintenance technicians on the “newly 
developed weapons [that] were provided to the Argentine Army through the U.S. Military 
Assistance Program.”38   
As was the case throughout the hemisphere, Latin American officials chose what 
military training they accepted from the United States, and Argentina was no exception. 
Five Special Action Force teams visited the country in 1966. None taught 
counterinsurgency tactics or doctrine. Instead, Argentine Army officials sought technical 
training from their American counterparts. Three Special Action Force teams visited 
Argentina that year in support of intelligence training. The first mission was a single 
Green Beret officer assigned to conduct a survey for “Military Intelligence in support of 
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Counter-insurgency.” The purpose of the mission was to “develop recommendations for a 
course of instruction to portray the use of military intelligence in counterinsurgency 
operations.” The survey mission led to a follow on visit “to conduct a senior officer 
course of four weeks duration…to emphasize [intelligence] operations during the primary 
stages of insurgency.” The Special Action Force team of three officers and one warrant 
officer who taught the course deemed their visit a success. “[T]he students are now better 
prepared to meet and take action against incipient insurgency through the use of applied 
intelligence,” the team leader reported to the Canal Zone. “The students were also 
prepared to use their instruction in the event of actual guerrilla warfare.” The final 
intelligence related mission of 1966 took place late in the year and instructed Argentine 
students on techniques of photographic imagery interpretation. 39  
Two conventional skills Special Action Force teams also visited Argentina in 
1966. The first taught an orientation conference on medical-veterinary civic action. The 
other mission provided Argentine army troops with instruction on newly-arrived U.S. 
equipment. One Green Beret officer and two enlisted men arrived in Buenos Aires in 
June 1966 with the task of training twenty-seven “officers and men of the Argentine 
Army in the operation and maintenance of the M-41A3 Tank.” Once again the needs and 
desires of the host nation army set the agenda. “The object of the mission,” the team 
leader confided, “was to enable the Argentines to drive their tanks in their Independence 
Day parade.” Political turmoil affected what might otherwise have been an uneventful 
mission. “[T]he team was in the country during the June 27-28 coup d’etat when Lt. 
General Ongania was installed as the provisional president of Argentina,” the team 
members reported. “However, by the end of the course all class members were capable of 
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operating and maintaining their tanks.”40 The Green Beret instructors departed the 
country on the third of July. They missed seeing the students drive their tanks in the 
Independence Day parade by just six days.  
Although it did little to disrupt the tank operation training mission, the June coup 
d’état did interrupt the broader Military Assistance Program with Argentina. The United 
States suspended all grant aid and military assistance sales to Argentina on 28 June. 
Washington recognized the new government in Buenos Aires on 22 July and resumed 
military training support three days later. However, material assistance support to 
Argentina did not resume until late October. That same month the United States delivered 
the first twelve (of a planned fifty) A-4B fighter aircraft to Argentina. But earlier in the 
year Washington informed Buenos Aires that, “the second 25 of 50 A-4Bs being sold to 
Argentina had to be deferred due to Southeast Asia requirements.”41 America’s growing 
military commitments in Vietnam trumped the needs of its reluctant South American ally.  
PREEMPTIVE COUNTER REVOLUTION IN ARGENTINA: THE ONGANÍA REGIME 
General Juan Carlos Onganía ousted civilian President Arturo Illia during an 
economic and political crisis, as had his army predecessors throughout the century. Yet 
his was to be no normal military caretaker government awaiting the next round of 
elections. Onganía instead sought to impose revolutionary change. “There is considerable 
indirect evidence that many [Argentine] military [officers] have convinced themselves 
that in removing Illia government they would be fulfilling basically identical role in 
Argentina that armed forces performed in Brazil in ousting Goulart,” American 
Ambassador Edwin M. Martin to confided to Washington. They also “believe that they 
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would be acting with [an] identical spirit of renovation, of anticommunism, anti-
corruption, anti-inefficiency and of unreserved support for pro-Western foreign policy.”42 
The Onganía government’s “implicit model was the military regime that had been 
established in Brazil in 1964,” historian David Rock argues. “Following the Brazilians, 
Onganía sought to create a modernizing autocracy that would change society from above, 
with or without popular backing.”43  
Onganía named his new government the “Argentine Revolution,” and like his 
Brazilian predecessors, he founded the regime on the tenets of the National Security 
Doctrine. His government replaced democracy with a dictatorship, it restricted political 
and social rights, and it sought to impose economic development by decree rather than by 
consensus. Historians tend to focus their efforts on either the 1966 “Argentine 
Revolution” or the later 1976 Processo de Reorganización Nacional. However, in order to 
best understand the roots of the “dirty war” it is necessary to view these two military 
regimes as a continuation and evolution of the National Security Doctrine in Argentina.  
The economic plan adopted by the Onganía regime focused great effort on 
economic stabilization. It also pursued development. Dr. Adalbert Krieger Vasena, 
Onganía’s minister of economy, implemented an economic plan that consisted of three 
goals: “first, the deepening of the industrial structure through local production of 
intermediate inputs, capital goods, ancillary infrastructure; second, the expansion of the 
consumer durables sector; and third, the promotion of non-traditional exports.”  The plan 
also relied on an even greater state intervention in the economy through wage and price 
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controls.44  In pursuit of his objectives, Krieger Vasena devaluated the currency by forty 
percent. He also reduced tariffs, promoted industrial exports, and stabilized wages and 
prices. The plan initially showed good results. It reduced inflation and stimulated a 
recovery.45   
The Krieger Vasena economic plan also created conditions that contributed to a 
future revolt in 1969. The public sector, and especially the military, made impressive 
gains. “Government employees, including underpaid teachers, military and police 
forces,” Central Intelligence Agency analysts observed, “received a raise averaging 20 to 
25 percent.”46 Labor paid much of the bill. Krieger Vasena’s policies suppressed real 
wages with workers taking a ten percent cut in 1968. Social pressure began to grow due 
to the harsh repression the military junta applied to political parties, students and labor 
unions.  
As Onganía implemented his economic policies, his “Argentine Revolution” 
faced almost no armed opposition. Therefore, it had no need to employ counter 
revolutionary warfare, at least initially. Onganía and his generals legislated their 
repression instead. In one of the new government’s first acts, just six days after seizing 
power, it banned all student political groups. That same day, security forces assaulted the 
National University of Buenos Aires, violating its historic sovereignty and beating 
students, faculty, and administrators alike. The policemen also arrested more than four 
hundred students. In August 1967 the regime outlawed Communism. The new law 
granted federal agents “the right to arrest anyone linked to spreading, harboring or 
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engaging with communist materials… as well as anyone with ‘communist ideological 
motivation,’” historian Cyrus Cousins explains, “and imprison them from one to eight 
years.” The government also passed other laws relating to morality and censorship.47 
Like the early Brazilian dictatorship, Onganía’s government attempted to counteract 
subversive influences and activities through its deployment of the legislative and judicial 
powers of the state.  
Meanwhile, rural insurgency did again menace the country – albeit briefly. The 
last rural foco attempt of the decade took place in 1968. Once more the revolutionaries 
chose the remote Tucumán Province, but local security forces easily quashed the nascent 
guerrillas. Local peasants denounced a group of “muchachos extraños” (strange men) in 
September 1968. Fourteen men of the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) had been conducting 
their first reconnaissance march in the Taco Ralo region of Tucumán Province. Alerted 
by local residents, the Gendarmería (Border Guards) dispatched a one hundred man 
patrol which captured all of the unarmed guerrillas.48 Meanwhile, the most noteworthy 
Special Action Force visit of 1968 was a course on supply accounting procedures.49 
The illusion of calm in Argentina broke the very next year. In May of 1969, the 
industrial city of Córdoba erupted in a working class revolt that lasted several days. 
Ending the uprising necessitated the deployment of 5,000 Army troops to supplement the 
4,000 local police. The toll for regaining order was costly. “In the end,” one historian 
notes, “up to 60 people lay dead, hundreds were wounded, and 1,000 arrested.” The 
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cordobazo shattered the all-powerful image of the military regime. Within days Onganía 
dismissed Krieger Vasena. Other generals in turn ousted Onganía a year later.50 
Although it did initially force compliance, Onganía’s political and economic 
repression also created simmering resentment. Students in Córdoba, many of them also 
night shift workers in the factories, joined with laborers to oppose the military 
government during the cordobazo. Other workers and students across the country took 
note – especially the Peronists. The radical youth elements of the Peronist movement now 
rejected compromise, strikes and protests, and increasingly turned towards armed 
insurgency.  
The country received its first bitter taste of French counter revolutionary warfare 
tactics later in 1969. Other members of the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) took up arms 
after the cordobazo. One group in Buenos Aires attacked a few police stations and stole a 
cache of weapons, which they used in later assaults. Meanwhile, a different cell in the 
Córdoba region ran afoul of the military. Army troops captured several members of that 
FAP cadre in August, and immediately subjected them to torture. Many of the new urban 
guerrillas died from abuse suffered while in custody.51 It was a harbinger of the 
repression to come.  
Rather than taming the country’s instability, Onganía’s term dramatically 
increased its intensity. The armed forces installed General Roberto Levingston as 
president in June 1970. Levingston eliminated Krieger Vasena’s wage freezes in favor of 
indexing (adjusting wages based on the cost of living), but a second riot in Córdoba in 
1971 ended his brief term of office. General Alejandro Lanusse took office in March 
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1971 with the objective of setting the conditions for the return of civilian rule. Lanusse’s 
“policy of ‘institutionalization,’” one historian notes, was “effectively a retreat by the 
military to pave the way for a return of Perón.”52 “Perón’s restoration,” another author 
argues, “was an admission of political bankruptcy by a military now prepared to clutch at 
any straw to contain the radical left.”53 The Argentine military “are disillusioned with 
their own record of failure in governing,” analysts of the CIA later wrote, “and acutely 
aware of widespread public contempt for their leadership.”54 Although the military 
relinquished political control due to internal disunity and a loss of credibility, its counter 
revolutionary “war” against internal enemies soon accelerated.  
The Army did not proscribe the Peronists from competing in the hastily called 
elections of March 1973, but they did disallow Juan Perón’s participation as a candidate 
through a 1972 residency requirement provision to the electoral law. The effect of the 
exclusion was short-lived. The Peronist candidate, Hector Campora, won the elections 
with forty-nine percent of the vote. Campora’s term was brief and destructive. In one of 
his very first acts, he declared an amnesty and released all imprisoned guerrillas – some 
2,200 in total. “The political amnesty decreed by the new government,” one historian 
judges, “immensely strengthened the hand of the guerrillas.”55 It was also the death knell 
of the military’s adherence to legal norms and reliance on the judiciary as a method to 
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confront subversion. Shortly thereafter, the military circumvented the legal system and 
began developing “parallel organizations” to wage war on the armed guerrillas.  
President Campora resigned from office in July amid worsening civil unrest, 
triggering new elections in September. No longer proscribed from running, Perón won 
with sixty percent of the vote and took office in October 1973. The Peronists return to 
power coincided with an upturn in world commodity prices generating a sixty-five 
percent increase in export earnings in 1973. “As throughout the postwar period,” David 
Rock observes, “improving economic conditions invariably favored greater political 
calm.”56 In this atmosphere of economic success, Perón used his charisma and power to 
incorporate unions, industrialists and the rural sector into a “Social Contract.” He 
included them in crafting policy objectives and replaced exclusion, protest and opposition 
with inclusion, negotiation and bargaining mechanisms.57 The plan represented a novel 
approach in country more accustomed to coercion and forced compliance.  
Fate gave Perón’s “Social Contract” little time to succeed. The Peronist champion 
died from a heart attack on 1 July 1974. Juan Perón’s death shattered the fragile alliance 
he created. Upon his death, the presidency of Argentina passed to the vice president - 
Perón’s third wife. Rather than restoring calm and regaining control, María Estela 
(Isabel) Martínez de Perón presided over a rising level of political and economic chaos in 
the country. Instability and violence surged. The country increasingly became 
ungovernable as the economy fell into crisis and rival factions of Peronism engaged in 
urban guerrilla warfare.58 Rather than oust Isabel Perón at the first sign of trouble, the 
military left her in office and allowed the government to flounder in an effort to discredit 
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Peronism. The generals’ intransigence also served to increase support for intervention.59 
“For more than a year surging inflation had been accompanied by growing violence—the 
classic scenario for a coup d’état,” David Rock explains, “While intensifying the war on 
the guerrillas, the Army waited until the last vestiges of the government’s popular support 
had crumbled and Peronism lay shattered.”60  
As president, General Onganía and his supporters sought to prevent the outbreak 
of a subversive war in Argentina by legislating morality and eliminating political 
competition.61 At the same time, the regime attempted to end the nation’s boom and bust 
economic cycles by imposing economic stability measures. Both efforts failed. Those 
reversals led to the return of Juan Perón, but they also sowed the seeds of the much 
harsher dictatorship of General Jorge Rafael Videla in 1976. Videla and his followers, 
well aware of the failings of Onganía’s earlier revolution, eschewed legality and adopted 
extra-constitutional tactics in response to the rise of urban terrorism. Videla’s regime also 
implemented state control of the economy – not to pursue development or stability – but 
as a weapon to break the power of the working class and industry; the traditional pillars 
of Peronism.  
COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY WAR UNLEASHED: THE VIDELA REGIME 
The 1969 cordobazo marked a turning point in Leftist opposition to the 
government in Argentina. It inspired disturbances in other cities and touched off an 
increasing wave of strikes and “revolutionary direct action” (kidnappings, bombings and 
assassinations) across the country. The working class continued to demonstrate its power 
through strikes. Meanwhile, radical students and the youth element of Peronism began 
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the transition to armed insurgency. “Some Peronists and other extremists in the labor and 
student sectors have long engaged in occasional acts of urban violence,” analysts of CIA 
explained in 1971, “but the phenomena of bank robberies, kidnappings, and other 
spectacular acts of urban terrorism are relatively new” (see Table 10.1).62  
The cordobazo triggered the rise of urban insurgency. Argentina’s new city-based 
revolutionaries drew many of their tactics from the theories of Carlos Marighella. 
Although Brazilian security forces killed Marighella in a shoot-out in November 1969, 
his influence continued to grow – especially among radical students in the major cities of 
the Southern Cone. Fidel Castro published Marighella’s Mini-manual of the Urban 
Guerrilla two months after his death making it widely available across the region. “The 
Argentine guerrillas are not known to have developed any new theories of revolution,” 
CIA analysts later reported, “and apparently look for guidance to Carlos Marighella, slain 
Brazilian tactician, rather than to Lenin, Mao, or Guevara.”63 
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Table 10.1: Indicators of Social Protest in Argentina, 1966-1972. 
 
By the early-1970s, uncoordinated acts of “revolutionary direct action” had 
coalesced into the disciplined activities of urban guerrilla organizations. “[T]wo leftists 
groups have emerged as particularly significant,” analysts of the Central Intelligence 
Agency wrote in 1975, “the People’s Revolutionary Army [Ejército Revolucionario del 
Pueblo -ERP]…and the Montoneros.” “[C]urrent estimates place the strength of the ERP 
at 500-700,” the American analysts explained, “while the Montoneros are believed to 
have approximately 1,500 militants in the Buenos Aires area alone, and at least 15,000 
sympathizers nationally.”64 
The Trotskyist ERP “is the most widely feared leftists-extremist group,” the CIA 
judged.  However, the guerrillas of the People’s Revolutionary Army, led by Roberto 
Santucho, were capable of more than just assassinations, bombings and kidnappings. 
They also conducted actions to embarrass and undermine the authorities. In early January 
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1971 the group distributed stolen toys to poor children living in a Buenos Aires villa 
miseria or shantytown. “This particular operation was especially effective,” one author 
writes, “since the police, acting on behalf of the vandalized company, subsequently had 
to take the toys away from many children.”65 
The second major urban guerrilla group, the Montoneros, took their name from 
Argentina’s gaucho horsemen of the previous century. Led by Fernando Abal Medina 
and Mario Firmenich, the “Montoneros burst upon the scene in May 1970,” analysts of 
the Central Intelligence Agency wrote,  “with the abduction, ‘trial,’ and ‘execution’ of 
former President Pedro Aramburu – the same general who had sent Peron into exile in 
1955.”66 Aramburu, as former junta president, was also responsible for inviting the first 
French officers to teach counter revolutionary warfare in Argentina.  
The dictatorship that followed Argentina’s brief return to Peronism became the 
most notorious government in the nation’s history. The military junta, under the 
leadership of Army General Jorge Rafael Videla, named itself the Processo de 
Reorganización Nacional (National Reorganization Process). The new dictatorship 
expanded the “dirty war” begun in late 1974 after Isabel Perón’s declaration of a state of 
siege.67 Between 1974 and 1983, military and police forces murdered and disappeared the 
bodies of between 10,000 and 22,000 citizens (some human rights groups estimate as 
many as 30,000), while torturing thousands more.68 The Processo employed central 
elements of French counter revolutionary doctrine, but it adapted those elements to fit 
Argentine circumstances. It also implemented a brutal restructuring of the economy 
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designed to de-industrialize the nation as a means to help end the menace of Peronism 
and the cripple the power of the working class. 
Videla’s Processo regime demonstrated all four hallmarks of French 
“revolutionary war” doctrine. First, it conceptualized threats to the nation’s internal 
security as being part of a global total war for the survival of Western Civilization. “A 
terrorist is not just someone with a gun,” Videla once remarked, “but also someone who 
spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization.”69 Second, Videla’s 
government viewed the use of torture and executions as legitimate means to counteract 
the terrorism waged by urban insurgents. Third, the regime created specialized 
intelligence organizations to implement systematic repression in order to defeat the 
insurgency. But unlike the named and officially acknowledged intelligence units in Brazil 
and Chile, Argentine generals created a decentralized network of clandestine detention 
centers to conduct their dirty war. Finally, the 1976 Processo dictatorship is perhaps most 
notorious for the way it applied counter terror. It used disappearances and executions to 
create a nation-wide climate of fear in which anyone could become the next victim. The 
purpose was to intimidate the population into obedience and coerce them away from 
supporting the guerrillas.  
Although General Videla did not assume the presidency of Argentina until after 
the March 1976 coup d’état, the Army, under his command, began implementing key 
elements of the “dirty war” the year prior.70 The Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo 
(ERP) began preparing Argentina’s last rural foco effort in June 1974 when it established 
the Ramón Rosa Jiménez Mountain Company. Disregarding the region’s history of being 
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inhospitable for rural insurgency, Santucho and the ERP leadership formed the new 
company in the mountains and jungles of Tucumán. The ERP guerrillas did not end their 
urban operations, but the militants’ infatuation with Che Guevara’s revolutionary theory 
drove them to pursue a rural foco effort as well. The guerrillas of the Companía del 
Monte harangued local villagers, attacked police and army installations and soon declared 
much of the province as a “liberated territory.”  
Prior to 1975, the police forces constituted the official response to the guerrilla 
threat, while right wing death squads operated in a state of semi-official approval.71 By 
1975 the Army had had enough. The increasing number of attacks on military 
installations and the murders of military officers drove senior generals to pressure the 
civilian leadership for action. On 5 February 1975, they got their orders. President Isabel 
Perón signed a decreed directing the armed forces “to carry out the military operations 
considered necessary and/or annihilate subversive elements active in the Province of 
Tucumán.”72 The Argentine Army considered this their “transition to the offensive.” The 
dirty war now began in earnest.  
The Army deployed 1,500 troops to Tucumán just four days after the presidential 
decree. General Acdel Edgardo Vilas commanded all forces for “Operation 
Independence,” which included the bulk of his 5th Infantry Brigade. However, the 
national decree also activated Argentina’s war time provisions which subordinated its 
Gendarmería and Federal Police to military control in combat zones. Vilas’ total force 
numbered between 3,000 and 3,500 men. “By the time the army moved into Tucumán,” 
historian Paul Lewis writes, “the [ERP’s] Companía del Monte controlled about a third of 
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the province.” Some one hundred armed militants comprised the Mountain Company, 
four hundred supporters aided their operations and the group had amassed “around 2,500 
sympathizers and occasional collaborators.”73 
General Vilas rejected American counterinsurgency tactics which dictated a 
response centered on elite counter guerrilla battalions to out maneuver the insurgents in 
the dense jungles and mountainous terrain. Instead, he implemented an Argentine version 
of French counter revolutionary war. “From the beginning of Operativo Independencia,” 
Vilas later explained, “everything centered in the cities of San Miguel de Tucumán and in 
Concepción.” Rather than chase the guerrillas in the mountains and forests, Vilas drew 
them into the cities and subjected them to torture to break their organization. He modeled 
his operation on the French experience in Algeria. “Vilas was enamored with the works 
of French Army Colonel Roger Trinquier,” historian Martin Andersen argues, and 
Trinquier’s writings served as Vilas’ “principle guide” during Operation Independence.74  
At the same time, American military relations with Argentina were in decline. 
The U.S. Army assigned twenty-eight American officers and enlisted men to its mission 
in Buenos Aires in 1964. A Brigadier General commanded them. Another twenty-four 
Argentine officers, non-commissioned officers and conscripts supported the U.S. Army 
Mission. By 1975, the same mission counted just twelve members.75 Meanwhile, the 
Special Action Force conducted its last mobile training team missions to Argentina in 
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1972. The Green Berets taught a course on airmobile (helicopter) operations and 
provided training on an English language laboratory.76 
Back in Tucumán in 1975, Vilas’ methods clearly showed the elements of French 
counter revolutionary war theories. First, Vilas and his officers rejected the rule of law. 
“Operación Independencia can’t just consist of a roundup of political prisoners,” 
Brigadier General Luciano Benjamin Menéndez, one of Vilas’ staff officers, argued. 
“Because the army can’t risk the lives of its men and lay its prestige on the line to act as a 
kind of police force that ends up by turning over X-number of political prisoners to some 
timorous judge… who will apply lenient punishment which in turn will be cancelled out 
by amnesties granted by ambitious politicians courting popularity. We’re at war, and war 
obeys another law: he who wipes out the other side wins.”77 Vilas and his officers next 
rejected government controls. Among the security forces, “everyone understood there 
existed a parallel government situated in the 5th Brigade,” Vilas later admitted. A key 
rationale for the creation of a “parallel government” was to obscure the army’s 
responsibility and to facilitate torture.  
The Argentine armed forces learned an unintended lesson from the human rights 
outcry against the abuses of the neighboring military regimes in Brazil and Chile. Rather 
than moderate their behavior, the Argentine generals simply sought to obscure any 
official links to the repression. “[I]n Tucumán the Army was in an operations zone for 
anti-guerrilla activity,” the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons later 
concluded, “and had to take great care to avoid any link being established between the 
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clandestine groups working in the secret detention centers and the official face of the 
Armed Forces.”78  
Like the French in Algeria, General Vilas established clandestine torture centers 
in his zone of operations. He eschewed naming specialized intelligence units (as in Brazil 
and Chile) and instead opted to conceal the entire enterprise. The Clandestine Detention 
Centers “functioned as intelligence nodes as well as extermination camps,” one 
researcher grimly noted. Argentine prosecutors later concluded that the tactics employed 
during Operation Independence included “kidnapping, torture, forced-disappearances and 
murders of 270 victims.”79 It was to be the model for the nation.   
The Argentine Army in Tucumán Province targeted far more “enemies” than just 
the armed revolutionaries. The security forces arrested “labor and student activists, left-
wing political figures, journalists, teachers, and anyone else identified as having 
suspicious connections,” one historian explains. “The great majority of [those] arrested 
were tortured, questioned, and then they ‘disappeared’ (i.e., were shot).”80 “It is a war [in 
Tucumán] in which there are apparently no prisoners,” journalist Juan de Onis reported to 
the New York Times in November 1975, “and in which the military make little distinction 
between guerrillas carrying weapons and collaborators serving as couriers or supplying 
men in the hills.”81 Soon the military was fighting the same war, using the same tactics, 
all across the country.  
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General Rafael Videla seized power in March 1976 and by later that same year his 
forces had devastated the main guerrilla organizations. “The Montonero’s fighting 
capacity was in rapid decline,” Paul Lewis explains. “By the end of 1976 they had lost 80 
percent of their combatants … [the] ERP’s organization fell apart even faster … By mid-
July the organization was in a shambles and the leadership badly depleted.”82 The 
Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo’s leader, Roberto Santucho, died in a shootout with 
police on 19 July 1976. Montonero leader Mario Firmenich survived the onslaught 
longer, but fled Argentina for Cuba in late December.83  
Yet despite the security forces’ success in disrupting and depleting the guerrilla 
formations by late 1976, the repression continued. Why the seeming disconnect? The 
explanation is that the Argentine generals continued to target suspected guerrilla 
supporters and sympathizers, as they had done in Tucumán, rather than just the armed 
militants. Therefore, they had many more “enemies” to confront even after the armed 
guerrillas were dead or in exile. “We are going to have to kill 50,000 people,” one 
general bluntly explained, “25,000 subversives, 20,000 sympathizers and we will make 
5,000 mistakes.”84 General Videla was less precise, although no less explicit. “As many 
people as necessary must die in Argentina,” he explained, “so that the country will again 
be secure.”85 Data compiled by the National Commission on the Disappearance of 
Persons validates the fact that the generals targeted many persons who were not armed 
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guerrillas. Roughly one half of all forced disappearances took place in the year 1977 and 
later– long after the decapitation of the ERP and the Montoneros (see Table 10.2).86  
Table 10.2: The Disappeared in Argentina, 1973 to 1983. 
 
Whom the Argentine military targeted for apprehension and transfer to its 
Clandestine Detention Centers differed from the Brazilian model. The Argentine generals 
– facing uncontrolled urban terrorism – more closely followed the path of their Chilean 
counterparts in adopting an expanded definition of their “enemies.” Argentina’s generals 
followed Trinquier’s 1964 maxim literally. The security forces branded as a traitor “any 
individual who favors the objectives of the enemy” and subjected men, women and 
children to their wrath.87  
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The generals in Buenos Aires also embarked on a much wider war. They used the 
1975 guerrilla war as the rationale or trigger for “going on the offensive” as they stated. 
But the offensive they undertook targeted more than just the armed guerrillas. The 
generals also fought a hidden war against Peronism and working class militants using 
repression and union interventions as well as economic policy. The military had been on 
the “defensive” against Peronism since the late-1940s and sought a definitive and final 
victory in 1976.88 The generals also fought a religious and cultural war against the 
intelligentsia whom they blamed for spreading Marxist and anti-Christian beliefs, which 
they saw as another form of subversion and equated with Peronism.  
Another clue to the larger death toll in Argentina is the size of the Peronism itself. 
Salvador Allende won the Chilean presidency with just thirty-six of the votes cast– the 
Left was a minority. In contrast, Hector Campora won the Argentine presidency with 
forty-nine percent of the vote. Juan Perón later outdid him garnering the votes of sixty 
percent of the electorate. The Left in Argentina was not a minority. Moreover, it was 
immensely popular so the generals could never openly declare they were at war with 
Peronism without losing a great degree of public support and potentially triggering a 
much larger rebellion.  The Argentine generals’ expansive view of their “enemies” and 
the much larger hidden war they undertook against Peronism helps to explain the greater 
suffering nation endured.  
Attacking such a broad number of enemies required a large and elaborate 
infrastructure of repression. The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons 
later chronicled a total of 340 Clandestine Detention Centers that operated during the 
1976 “dirty war” dictatorship. Tellingly, the military established the sites throughout 
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Argentina’s national territory, not just in the few largest cities which were the terrain of 
the urban guerrillas.89  
Like their colleagues across the Southern Cone, Argentine officers adopted 
rhetoric and policies that dehumanized their “enemies” and facilitated stripping them of 
their legal and human rights. “One cannot and should not recognize the Marxist 
subversive terrorist as a brother,” one commander explained. “It is not enough that he be 
born in our country. Ideologically, he has forfeited the right to call himself an Argentine.” 
The country’s president and senior military officer agreed. “I want to clarify that 
Argentine citizens are not the victims of the repression,” General Videla claimed. “The 
repression is against a minority that we do not consider Argentine.”90  By declaring 
subversives and their supporters “non-citizens” and “traitors,” the military regime created 
a legal and moral fiction that allowed them to justify employing illegal tactics against 
their own citizenry. 
The generals deemed a wide segment of the population non-Argentines and 
targeted them for repression. Students made up the overwhelming majority of the armed 
insurgents, but they were not the only victims of disappearance, arrest and torture (see 
Table 10.3).91 The military authorities also attacked the intelligentsia whom they saw as 
the purveyors and propagators of Marxist and anti-Christian values and ideals.92 “[W]e 
consider it a serious crime to attack the Western and Christian way of life and try to 
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change it for one that is completely alien to us,” General Videla declared. “The aggressor 
in this type of struggle is not just the bomber, the gunman or the kidnapper. At the 
intellectual level, it is anyone that tries to change our way of life by promoting subversive 
ideas; in other words, [anyone] who tries to subvert, change or disrupt [our] values … A 
terrorist is not just someone who kills with a gun or a bomb, but anyone who spreads 
ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization.”93  
Table 10.3: Victims of Repression in Argentina by Occupation.  
 
President Videla’s plan to restructure the country went beyond just eliminating 
subversion and ending the country’s civil war, the dirty war also included an economic 
component. As was the case in Chile, the workers in Argentina suffered the brunt of the 
political repression. But that was not enough. Videla also used the economy as a weapon 
against his working class Peronist “enemies.” Videla’s selection of José Martínez de Hoz 
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as Minister of the Economy foreshadowed the approach. Although a Harvard trained 
economist, Martínez de Hoz was also a son of the rural agricultural elite.94  
While Videla’s military and police patotas (the arresting units of the clandestine 
detention centers) disciplined the urban guerrillas, workers, and intelligentsia through 
torture, disappearances and murder, Martínez de Hoz set out to discipline the economic 
sectors of the country. Central to the new approach would be a drastic shift away from 
industrialization in favor of a return to the primacy of agricultural exports.  “The essence 
might be described as a rejection of the kind of society shaped by thirty years of conflict 
over industrialization,” economist John Sheahan argues. “Argentina’s national troubles 
were identified as the end product of a dissolution of national life that dated back to 1946. 
The goal became no longer economic growth, or industrialization, but a complete 
transformation of Argentine society such that a repetition of populism and the subversive 
experiences of the first half of the 1970s would be impossible.”95  
Martínez de Hoz implemented free market policies that resembled many of those 
adopted by the Chicago Boys in Chile. He reduced the role of the state in the economy 
through privatizations and reduction of government expenditures. He eliminated import 
tariffs and subsidies, liberalized monetary and exchange policy, and imposed a drastic 
reduction in real wages.96 Yet rather than using a gradual approach, Martínez de Hoz 
implemented his policies in an abrupt and damaging manner making them more punitive 
than corrective.  
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Industry and urban labor—the foundations of Peronism—were the main targets. 
In 1976 the government “reduced real wages by nearly 50 percent in relation to the 
previous five years,” while the elimination of tariffs and subsidies led to a twenty-six 
percent decline in industrial employment between 1975 and 1980. These policies led to 
the “virtual destruction” of textile manufacturing and the “collapse” of the tractor 
industry. “By 1981 some observers estimated that industry was operating at only 50 
percent of installed capacity,” Ronaldo Munck argues. “It is hardly an exaggeration to 
speak of deindustrialization in Argentina.” Industrial employment shrank by 240,000 
positions between 1976 and 1980. Over the same time period, the public sector 
eliminated 500,000 workers and the textiles industry contracted from 120,000 jobs to a 
mere 40,000.97 “Representing the accumulation of decades of frustration about 
grievances unattended,” David Pion-Berlin explains, “the Proceso went to political and 
economic extremes hitherto unwitnessed to ‘cleanse’ the nation of its problems. 
Unprecedented levels of state terror directed at a cross-section of the population, coupled 
with sweeping economic changes that left industries and trade unions paralyzed, were 
primary features of this de facto regime.” Videla and Martínez de Hoz sought to tame 
instability in Argentina, not through sound policy, but instead by killing their political 
foes and attempting to destroy their economic base. 98 
By 1980 the military had eliminated the guerrilla threat and the patotas had 
returned to the barracks and police stations, but the country faced yet another economic 
crisis. Changes in banking laws in 1977 and 1978 led to a rapid expansion of finance 
companies or casas finacieras. Overall, the financial sector grew by forty-five percent 
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between 1976 and 1980. After an interlude of easy money and quick profits, the first 
finaciera, Banco de Intercambio Regional, failed. Others followed and “by October 1980 
the financial system was reported ‘close to collapse.’” 99 In March 1981, General Roberto 
Viola assumed the presidency. Martínez de Hoz resigned and Lorenzo Sigaut replaced 
him as minister of the economy. Sigaut attempted to restart the industrial sector by 
announcing a twenty-three percent currency devaluation and an injection of new credit, 
but General Leopoldo Galtieri ousted Viola and Sigaut in December.100  
Galtieri faced a titanic economic crisis. “With a huge public deficit, high inflation, 
continuous currency devaluations, and an external debt crisis,” one author notes, 
“conditions in the country in 1981-1982 were even worse than those that had prevailed in 
1975 before the coup.” Galtieri’s economic minister, Roberto Alemann, implemented a 
return to the policies of Martínez de Hoz. Alemann reopened the economy, cut public 
spending, raised taxes and sought to stimulate exports.101 In any event, Alemann’s 
economic policy was for naught. In April 1982 Galtieri bet his political future on the 
invasion of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands in what one author eloquently termed “a 
suicidal move to rally popular support for the government.” The gamble ended in disaster 
and defeat a few short months later. General Reynaldo Bignone forced Galtieri from 
office in July 1982. He quickly began efforts to end the Processo and return the country 
to civilian rule.102  
Argentina would never be the same as it was before the Processo regime. The 
brutal methods used by the military officers of the 1976 dictatorship caused deep wounds 
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in the society they had sworn to protect and defend. The application of French counter 
revolutionary war tactics also inculcated hatred rather than eliminating it. The 
psychological wounds of the dirty war lasted long after the generals relinquished power 
and returned to the barracks in disgrace.  
CONCLUSION 
Argentina endured recurrent political and economic crises during most of the 
early Cold War era. Military officers cut short several governments they deemed 
ineffective from 1943 to 1976.  The presidency of Juan Perón triggered much of the 
instability. Perón introduced populism to Argentina. He activated the working class as 
political base of support and pursued industrialization as a way to develop the country 
and increase his power. Yet Perón also transformed Argentine politics. Control of 
government became a “winner takes all” proposition. Those in power distributed the 
country’s wealth as “rents” to their supporters. Opposition groups sought to undermine 
the sitting government and force it from office in order to gain another turn at controlling 
the spoils of office. The military ousted Perón from office in 1955 and forced him into 
exile. Much of the country’s instability over the next two decades emanated from efforts 
by the military to control the lingering effects of Peronism and prevent Perón’s return. 
From 1959 to 1976, Argentina also had to contend with rural insurgencies. Most 
rural focos quickly collapsed due the efficiency of the security forces, but also because 
the countryside lacked much revolutionary potential. Even the famed Argentine guerrilla 
champion Ernesto “Che” Guevara failed in his efforts to establish a foco in his home 
country.  Comandante Segundo, Guevara’s designated stand-in, presided over a disaster 
that ended the foco before Che could arrive and take charge. The urban working class 




Meanwhile, Buenos Aires spurned Washington’s attempts to include the country 
in America’s Cold War military alliance. Most South American nations signed military 
assistance agreements with the United States in the early 1950s. Argentina held out until 
1964. When Buenos Aires finally relented it did so not because of a desire to follow 
Washington’s lead, but because it sensed opportunity. Argentine authorities capitalized 
on American Cold War fears and manipulated the regional hegemon into funding the 
modernization of its military forces. Argentina accepted conventional American military 
equipment and training, but rejected U.S. counterinsurgency. 
Argentina looked to France for military advice instead. French veterans of 
Indochina and Algeria taught internal security doctrine and tactics in Buenos Aires 
beginning in 1957. Those same officers also helped draft Argentine Army field manuals 
and design exercises for countering insurgencies. When U.S. Army officers first 
established an advisory effort in Buenos Aires in 1960 they found the door to internal 
security training closed. The Argentine Army sent few students to American 
counterinsurgency courses and accepted only one Special Action Force mobile training 
team mission to teach counterinsurgency tactics. That mission took place in 1965 – a 
decade before the Argentine Army commenced counter insurgent operations in Tucumán.  
Argentine officials also eschewed American assistance with their internal 
security. The country again faced an economic and political crisis in 1966. General 
Onganía overthrew the elected president in June of that year and took power, but he 
needed no American military advice. Instead, Argentine officers requested a mobile 
training team to provide training on their newly-arrived American tanks. The generals’ 
impetus was not security fears; they wanted their soldiers to drive the tanks in the 




Argentine generals rejected American counterinsurgency doctrine and instead 
followed the tenets of the National Security Doctrine developed in Brazil. After toppling 
the civilian government, General Onganía sought to replicate the Brazilian revolution of 
1964. He and his subordinates ended political competition, restricted social and political 
rights, and imposed an economic restructuring program. Because they faced no armed 
opposition, they had no cause to employ their French counter revolutionary war 
techniques. However, Onganía’s political repression and economic policies created 
simmering resentment. Social pressure boiled over in 1969 in a spontaneous uprising in 
the industrial city of Córdoba. The cordobazo, as Argentines dubbed it, led to the demise 
of Onganía’s “Argentine Revolution” and ended the country’s first effort to implement 
the NSD. It also spawned urban guerrilla movements advocating armed revolution.  
Onganía’s failure led to the return of Juan Perón. The elderly former-president 
won re-election in late 1973. Perón crafted a “Social Contract” that brought a brief 
stability to the country, but he died in office in 1974 and insecurity again gripped the 
nation. The country appeared to be in the midst of a civil war by 1976. In March of that 
year the military again seized power and implemented a second National Security 
Doctrine regime. The new dictatorship, under the command of Army General Rafael 
Videla, embraced French counter revolutionary war tactics and unleashed a “dirty war” 
on the nation. Videla and his supporters adopted an expansive definition of their enemies 
and dehumanized them as traitors and non-citizens.  
The combination of a National Security Doctrine government and the widespread 
use of French counter revolutionary war tactics against the population resulted in the 
most lethal dirty war regime in the Southern Cone. In the space of just six short years 




while torturing tens of thousands more. The Processo dictatorship forever stained the 
reputation of the Argentine military and caused deep wounds in the society it had sworn 
to protect and defend. The regime’s brutal tactics also inculcated lingering hatreds rather 






Chapter Eleven: Conclusion 
 
Havana’s “export of revolution” and Washington’s “counterinsurgency era” under 
President Kennedy set the international stage for Latin America’s Cold War during the 
1960s. Both nations fought a hidden war -- one seeking to replicate revolution, the other 
working to prevent the spread of Communism. However, the agency of local actors in 
South America often thwarted the efforts of both of these outside actors. Unique internal 
factors in each nation proved of much greater impact than external influences. South 
American leftists adapted and transformed Che Guevara’s theories to fit local 
circumstances. Militants in Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia and Peru all 
sought to replicate Fidel Castro’s rural-based revolution, although without success. 
Others modified the Cuban model. Brazilian Carlos Marighella transformed Guevara’s 
rural foco strategy into an urban terrorism doctrine that influenced city-based guerrillas in 
several other countries. Numerous leftist insurgent groups accepted at least some Cuban 
financial and guerrilla training support. Yet almost all insurgent groups rejected Cuban 
control.  
Similarly, South American political leaders chose whether to accept or reject U.S. 
internal security doctrine and training. Venezuela and Colombia embraced American 
counterinsurgency and sought U.S. Army assistance in confronting internal insecurity. 
Brazil, Argentina, and Chile shunned the American “model.” Instead, they each 
developed local variants of what was later termed the National Security Doctrine, which 
they based in large part on French theories of counter revolutionary war. These Southern 




developed distinctive counter revolutionary tactics. They adopted practices and tactics 
from the French experience in Algeria, but they also derived lessons from the experiences 
of their regional neighbors and adapted their tactics to fit their own histories and goals.  
Declassified U.S. Army documents and American government records form the 
foundation of this dissertation. These records open the “black box” of American foreign 
military training and allow the opportunity to demystify counterinsurgency. Unit histories 
of the Special Action Force, course catalogs and attendance records of the Special 
Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the School of the Americas in Panama 
bring new facts to old debates. For the first time these documents allow us to understand 
what the U.S. Army actually taught under the rubric of counterinsurgency, who they 
trained and when, and to what degree regional armies accepted or rejected that training.  
These declassified documents also provide new insights into how Washington 
sought to disseminate its counterinsurgency doctrine in South America. The majority of 
that effort took place through U.S. Army schools and mobile training team missions. 
However, both activities soon confronted barriers of nationalism and resistance to change 
in regional armies. Political and economic crises at the national level often interrupted 
U.S. military assistance even in countries that sought American help. Meanwhile, the 
problems of perishability inherent in training conscript-based armies, many of whose 
soldiers were illiterate, plagued U.S. Army efforts across the region and throughout the 
decade.  
The U.S. Army overcame these obstacles and instilled enduring 
counterinsurgency capabilities in Venezuela and Colombia through a three-tiered process. 
American instructors taught individuals, they trained units and, most importantly, they 




sustain and expand U.S. counterinsurgency tactics and doctrine within their 
organizations. In Bolivia, American trainers only instructed individuals and selected 
units. The Bolivian Army chose not to integrate American internal security tactics and 
concepts into its schools systems. Thus the capabilities of its two Special Action Force 
trained counterguerrilla battalions withered over time. When Che Guevara targeted the 
country for revolution in 1967, Bolivian and American policymakers lacked confidence 
in the Bolivian Army’s counterinsurgency-trained units. Instead of relying on these 
formations, they directed the Special Action Force to train yet another new 
counterguerrilla battalion from scratch. That unit eventually helped defeat Che Guevara’s 
guerrilla foco, but it also exemplified the perishability of American counterinsurgency 
training. Because the Bolivian Army did not instill a counterinsurgency instructor 
capability in its schools, it was not able to sustain the proficiency of its counterguerrilla 
battalions.  When the conscript soldiers manning those units completed their one-year 
term of service they departed – and they took their advanced skills with them. The next 
batch of conscripts had no formalized means of receiving counterinsurgency training 
from within the Bolivian Army, thus the proficiency of the counterguerrilla battalions 
rapidly declined. Other armies that lacked an internal counterinsurgency instructor 
capability faced the same dilemma. Training only individuals and units was not enough to 
overcome the perishability obstacle.  
Washington’s effort to spread its counterinsurgency doctrine also struggled 
against the often underestimated strength of Latin American agency. The United States 
did not dictate counterinsurgency for its regional allies. No regional army, even those 
most accepting of American military support, served as proxies of the United States. In 




determined what American military training they accepted, not Washington – and 
regional leaders overwhelmingly chose civic action and conventional military skills 
training over internal security.  
The historiography of Latin America’s Cold war has often overestimated the 
impact and durability of U.S. counterinsurgency training. Despite the claims by some 
U.S. Army School of the Americas administrators that all courses had applicability to 
counterinsurgency, the majority of instruction included only a cursory discussion of 
internal security doctrine. Likewise, far fewer students undertook counterinsurgency 
focused courses than previously understood. Although the School of the Americas trained 
more than a thousand students a year during the 1960s, the number attending internal 
security classes numbered less than two hundred in the apogee year of 1962. The same 
dynamic affected the Special Action Force’s mobile training team efforts. During the 
peak years of its counterinsurgency training efforts in 1965 and 1966, internal security 
missions comprised less than twenty percent of its overall activity. The bulk of the Green 
Beret’s missions in South America across the decade taught civic action and conventional 
military skills, not counterinsurgency.  
The very fact that armies accepted U.S. training does not imply that South 
American political leaders ceded control of their military forces to the Americans. The 
Special Action Force was tasked to “develop, organize, train and direct native forces” 
among its primary missions, yet it never actually directed any regional military forces 
during its eleven-year lifespan. U.S. Army officers recommended a large influx of Green 
Berets to advise and direct Colombian Army battalions in 1962. Political leaders in 
Bogotá immediately rejected that proposal. Venezuelan and Bolivian presidents also 




zones. Despite the widespread perception of American military hegemony in the 
historiography of Latin America’s Cold War, U.S. military officers never directed South 
American army units during internal security or combat operations within their national 
territories during the 1960s. Special Forces trainers remained far removed when a 
company of the Bolivian Ranger Battalion they helped create captured Che Guevara.  
These same declassified records also shed new light on how United States 
policymakers conceptualized counterinsurgency and how Army strategists converted 
theory into doctrine and tactics. New research helps bridge the gap between a discourse 
analysis and action. This dissertation connects what policymakers and military strategists 
said and wrote about counterinsurgency with how security forces in six South American 
nations actually implemented those policies and tactics on the ground. Washington 
conceived its counterinsurgency doctrine as a means to support friendly democratic 
governments facing the threat of Communism and external aggression while on the path 
to modernization. President Kennedy and his advisors developed their counterinsurgency 
doctrine as “preventative medicine” to avert another Cuba in the hemisphere.1 American 
policymakers prescribed civic action and internal economic development under the 
Alliance for Progress as means to temper internal unrest and defuse the potential for 
revolutions. They also sought to avoid an internal war in a friendly nation that might 
require the commitment of American military forces. U.S. Army strategists, in turn, 
developed counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics that stressed concern for the local 
peasantry in an effort to “win the hearts and minds” of the populace.  American 
strategists saw the peasantry as a potential bulwark against the revolutionaries. 
Meanwhile, army tactics focused on raising elite counterguerrilla battalions capable of 
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defeating the armed guerrillas in the remote countryside. In the Andean Ridge, 
Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia adopted these concepts.  
The armies of the Southern Cone rejected American counterinsurgency. Instead, 
the National Security Doctrine held sway at the Southern end of the continent. However, 
there was no single National Security Doctrine. Contrary to some authors’ assessment, 
the United States did not export these concepts. Brazilian, Argentine, and Chilean 
military theorists developed their own unique internal security concepts, but there were 
strong similarities between these countries policies. These doctrines, although 
superficially similar to American counterinsurgency in their focus on internal security 
and internal economic development, differed dramatically in the methods they advocated. 
Southern Cone officers came to blame civilian politicians for much of the political, social 
and economic turmoil their nations faced during the 1960s. They viewed democracy as 
fractious, weak and ill-suited to overcome the threat of Communism. In turn, the National 
Security Doctrines they developed envisioned authoritarian government, led by military 
officers, as the best method to achieve internal security. Once they had brought their 
unruly populations and inept politicians under control, these officers reasoned, they 
would then be free to implement their economic policies without the hindrance of 
political competition. The Brazilian Army led the way. They seized the reins of 
government in 1964 and implemented an economic development agenda while restricting 
political participation and public freedoms. Argentina sought to emulate elements of the 
Brazilian program in 1966 but failed. Argentine military officers tried again in 1976 with 
disastrous consequences. Chile undertook its own authoritarian dictatorship and 
economic restructuring in aftermath of the 1973 coup d’état that ended the socialist 




armies’ imposition of military dictatorship was the antithesis of Kennedy’s 
counterinsurgency doctrine which sought to strengthen electoral democracies, not replace 
them.  
These National Security Doctrines of the Southern Cone derived much of their 
intellectual origin from French counter revolutionary war theory. Brazilian and Argentine 
officers, and later the Chileans, accepted the French premise that the political and social 
upheavals of the 1960s Cold War were much more than just struggles on the road to 
modernization. Like French military officers, they saw internal dissent and armed 
resistance as proof of an ongoing subversive war waged by Communism. At stake in this 
new global war was the fate of Western Christianity, which created a total war mindset. 
Anything was permissible to ensure the survival of the state – even the sacrifice of 
democracy. Southern Cone military dictatorships also adopted many of the harsh tactics 
the French Army applied during the Algerian War. Rather than focusing lethal military 
force only against the armed insurgents, as dictated by American counterinsurgency, 
Southern Cone armies went much further. They branded members of each of these groups 
as traitors against the state and dehumanized them as a “cancer” they must excise from 
the body of the nation or as “non-citizens.”2 The Brazilian Army detained and tortured 
guerrilla supporters and sympathizers in later campaigns, although it restricted its killing 
to the armed insurgents. The Chilean and Argentine armies greatly enlarged the scope of 
whom they considered their enemies and unleashed torture, disappearances, and murder 
against the armed guerrillas, their supporters, and their sympathizers alike. 
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Meanwhile, the Venezuelan, Colombian and Bolivian armies all employed the 
American counterinsurgency model during the 1960s. None of these armies embarked on 
a “dirty war” against their own citizens. These historical case studies do not suggest that 
U.S. military aid or American counterinsurgency enabled democracy to survive. Bolivia 
again reverted to military dictatorship. Moreover, the survival of democracy has 
complicated causality that lies beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, these 
cases do cast serious doubt on the thesis that U.S. military assistance or American 
counterinsurgency caused coups d’état or human rights violations. The historical record 
shows that South American countries that accepted U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine fared 
much better than those that rejected it in favor of National Security Doctrines and French 
counter revolutionary tactics. Brazil, Chile and Argentina chose not to accept U.S. Army 
counterinsurgency doctrine and tactics. Military regimes in those nations conducted 
“dirty wars” against their own populations a result of their own choices, not because of 






Appendix: Types of Special Action Force Mobile Training Team 
Missions 
Army Forces Southern Command designated the 8th Special Forces Group the 
primary organization responsible for offering and conducting twenty-five types of mobile 
training team missions in its 1966 Regulation No. 551-5 Foreign Nationals. 
1. Internal defense operations. 
2. Counterguerrilla warfare operations. 
3. Psychological operations. 
4. Unconventional warfare operations. 
5. Medical health, field sanitation, and first aid. 
6. Unit supply.  
7. Engineer construction. 
8. Engineering equipment maintenance and supply procedures. 
9. Well drilling. 
10. Intelligence and counterintelligence.  
11. Communications operations and maintenance. 
12. Military Police operations. 
13. Airborne training and operations. 
14. Parachute maintenance. 
15. Rifle marksmanship. 
16. Weapons (small arms, mortars, and light artillery). 
17. Small arms maintenance. 
18. Demolitions and counter-demolitions training. 




20. Basic unit training and advanced individual training, infantry and artillery. 
21. Underwater operations. 
22. Jungle operations. 
23. Mountain operations. 
24. Desert operations.  
25. Ranger training.1 
 
 
In its 1965 historical report, the Special Action Force listed twenty-five varieties 
of mobile training team missions that it had completed between 1962 and 1965. Each 
listing also contained a brief summary:  
 
Airborne: To train personnel in airborne techniques, including basic airborne, free fall 
and packing and maintenance procedures.  
Artillery Repair and Maintenance: To present detailed instruction on the operation and 
maintenance of the 90mm recoilless rifle, and instruct in the care and maintenance of 
ammunition.  
Automotive Foreman: To train personnel in field of maintenance and supply systems, 
and techniques of instruction for supply and maintenance specialty courses.  
Counter-Guerrilla: To present instruction in counter-guerrilla operations and special 
warfare techniques. 
Counterinsurgency: To assist the host country in preparing and coordinating a national 
counterinsurgency plan. To assist in the preparation of a national civic action program, 
including civic works, public relations, health and sanitation. Also to conduct 
psychological operations training for officers and enlisted men of the armed forces.  
Engineer: To conduct on-the-job training in improving and simplifying road construction 
techniques, and the present courses of instruction to officers and enlisted men on the 
                                               




operation and maintenance of engineer equipment. To provide technical advice on repair 
and parts systems, and assist in the construction and inspection of civic action rural 
schools. 
Explosives, Ordnance and Demolitions: Instruction to train members of the Latin 
American armed forces as EOD specialists for commercial and military explosives and 
unconventional explosives.  
Forestry: To form a plan for the utilization of a proposed CCC-type [Civilian 
Conservation Corps] organization to be used in the fields of reforestation and soil 
conservation.  
Infantry: Instruction in infantry weapons employment and maintenance. Also instruction 
in squad-level and platoon-level tactics and battle drills.  
Infantry Tactics: To train cadre in small unit tactics and weapons proficiency, and 
advise on the conduct of basic individual training.  
Intelligence Technical Specialist: To instruct in the use and maintenance of intelligence 
equipment kits.  
Logistics: To provide detailed orientation to senior military logistics installation 
commanders and general staff officers on current U.S. Army doctrine and procedures for 
logistics at all echelons.  
Marksmanship: To train a rifle team in all aspects of competitive marksmanship and 
coaching.  
Medical: To advise armies on hospital administration, pharmacy operation and to train 
medical aidmen. 
Medical Equipment Repair: To give training in the repair and general maintenance of 
various types of medical equipment.  
Medical Sanitation: To construct a sanitary demonstration area, and conduct classes on 
basic sanitation for company level.  
Military Intelligence: To instruct Latin American armed forces in intelligence collection 
and analysis, interrogation procedures and photographic interpretation.  
Military Police: To develop a criminal investigation program. To provide select 
individuals with a working knowledge of correctional principles, and the theories and 
practices which apply to confinement facilities. Also to make a safety survey and advise 




Ordnance, Ammunition: To conduct physical security and ordnance ammunition 
surveys of storage sites and make recommendations to improve deficiencies.  
Ordnance, Maintenance: To advise officers and enlisted men in the operation and 
maintenance of the five-ton wrecker and other heavy equipment.  
Psychological Operations: To conduct assessments of actual and potential capabilities 
of the armed forces for psychological operations, civic action and printed media.  
Psychological warfare: To organize and Information Office at the Ministry of War level, 
and train personnel in news writing, photography, radio, television, and internal 
information.  
Signal: To conduct radio operator instruction and radio maintenance courses up to third 
echelon maintenance.  
Underwater Survey: To conduct underwater surveys of rivers to determine the best 
method of destroying rapids to improve river navigation. 
Wheeled Vehicle Maintenance: To instruct in the maintenance of tactical vehicles from 
troubleshooting to rebuilding engines.2   
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